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Mary Murphy, DCU, No 52148904
Domestic Constraints on Globalisation 
A case study o f  Irish Social Security Policy 1986-2006
This thesis looks at the extent to which Irish social security policy outcomes and the 
process o f social security policy making has been influenced by global factors and 
Ireland’s relatively high level o f  internationalisation It asks, has Ireland’s immersion in 
the global economy impacted on the content or the process o f mediating policy1? Using 
hypotheses developed from competition state theorists, it first examines whether Irish 
social security policy has recommodified and refocused towards the market Having 
examined indicators relating to regulation, retrenchment, residualisation and 
activation/conditionality and defamiliarisation it concludes policy has shifted towards an 
‘Irish style’ recommodification but has shifted less in this direction than might have been 
expected in a ‘competition state’ as internationalised as Ireland
Understanding how this policy was mediated involves examining Irish governance and 
institutions, interests and policy discourse in the Irish social policy community and 
exploring whether governance processes were influenced or transformed by international 
economic and political processes The thesis examines eight types o f policy decisions 
and isolates explanatory variables that can help account for the trajectory o f change It 
identifies, over the two decades o f the study, three distinct policy periods during which 
identifiable policy coalitions worked within the policy institutions to pursue different 
policy ideas These periods are differentiated by degrees o f ambition, openness, and 
capacity relating to policy change The key variable determining the different period was 
who held political power The thesis concludes that within the broad scope o f policy 
permitted in a competition state that the consensus nature o f  the Irish policy system is 
confined to a relatively narrow set o f policy options and that the complexion o f the 
government is the factor determining the policy focus and the choices relating to type, 
scale and pace o f  policy development
Abstract
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Social Welfare Glossary
Claimant: a person applying for a payment in his /  her own right for themselves or also for 
child and adult dependants.
Contingency: this refers to a specific ‘state’ which a person must be able to prove in order to 
be eligible for payment for example disability, illness, old age, unemployment.
Contribution record: record o f  amount o f PRSI paid or credited to people during their 
working lives.
Credits disregards: 1994 scheme allowing homemakers to disregard a period spent caring for 
under-12s at home. A maximum o f  20 years can be disregarded when calculating the 
claimant’s eligibility to a social insurance based pension.
Governing contribution year: the year(s) in which you must have paid a certain number o f  
PRSI contributions (or received a certain number o f PRSI credits) to be eligible for a social 
insurance payment.
Limitation rule: the limitation rule means in households where both adults have eligibility for 
a payment in their own right (for example, both are unemployed) the total payment to the 
household is reduced to 1.7 times the rate o f two adult payments. This rule does not apply 
where both adults are old-age pensioners or are entitled to disability allowance.
Means test: there are four specific tests for different categories o f  income. Income for 
earnings (and income from spouse's earnings), Benefit and privilege (value o f living in the 
family home) Savings and investments, Rental income from property
Pay-related social insurance (PRSI) payments: Employed people pay insurance (usually a per 
cent o f  earnings) into a fund that then covers them should they be unable to work.
Pre-entry credits: are given when you first start work and are awarded retrospectively to the 
beginning o f the tax year in which you start work and the previous two tax years.
Qualified Adult Allowance: payment issued to a claimant in respect o f a qualified adult, 
formerly adult dependant allowance.
Qualified Adult: a claimant can claim a payment (for non old-age payments usually 70 per 
cent o f the adult payment) when the claimant can prove a spouse or partner does not have a 
social welfare payment in their own right or earn adequate income from employment (€88.88 
per week or more), formerly called adult dependant.
Secondary Benefits: a collective term given to a group o f  payments, mainly the medical card, 
housing supplements or subsides, fuel allowances, back-to-school allowances and Christmas 
bonuses and free schemes for those on old-age pensions. The term secondary benefits has no 
particular legal meaning, but is usually used to describe the non-cash benefits a person on 
social welfare might be getting in addition to their main payment such as the back-to-school 
allowances etcetera. It is important to note that some o f  these schemes (in particular, medical 
cards and differential rents) are major schemes in their own right and are available subject to 
conditions such as means tests both to people on social welfare and to people whose ineome
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is from other source, in other words they are not linked to a ‘main’ social welfare payment
Signing on for credits people getting certain payments from the Department o f  Social and 
Family Affairs (for example Unemployment Benefit, Disability Benefit, Maternity Benefit) 
automatically get credits People not getting a payment but eligible for credits have to show  
they qualify (for example by sending in medical certificates in the case o f  illness, or by 
‘signing on’ as unemployed) A person out o f  the PRSI system (paid or credited) for more 
than two years will normally have to pay 26 PRSI contributions before claiming credits
Social assistance payments these are means tested and funded totally by the Exchequer To 
qualify a person must prove a contingency and pass a means test
Social insurance credits are designed to protect the social insurance record o f  someone who 
has already been in insurable employment but is temporarily unable to work (either short­
term or long-term) for specific reasons such as unemployment, illness or certain types o f  
caring work
Supplementary Welfare Allowance a means-tested safety net system for those who fall out 
o f  social insurance or assistance because they cannot prove any o f  the contingencies or 
because they have a specific need that cannot be met in the mainstream social welfare 
system
Universal payments a class o f  payments paid to everyone who passes a specific contingency 
and are paid regardless o f means and social insurance record
Voluntary PRSI contributions If aged under 66 and no longer covered by PRSI you can pay 
voluntary contributions so you can be covered for a limited range o f  social insurance 
payments Payment is usually a percentage o f income or if  on a very low income a fixed 
amount
6
Abbreviations
ABP Area Based Partnership
ALMP Active Labour Market Programme
BIWG Benchmarking & Indexation Working Group
BTW Back to Work
CB Child Benefit
CDA Child Dependent Allowance
CMRS Conference o f Major Religious Superiors
CORI Conference o f Religious in Ireland
CPA Combat Poverty Agency
CSO Central Statistics Office
CSW Commission on Social Welfare
DA Disability Allowance
DB Disability Benefit
DCRGA Department o f Community, Rural & Gaeltacht Affairs
DETE Department o f Enterprise, Trade & Employment
DOF Department o f  Finance
DOL Department o f  Labour
DOT Department o f  an Taoiseach
DSFA Department o f  Social & Family Affairs
DSFCA Department o f  Social, Family & Community Affairs
DSW Department o f Social Welfare
DWS Developmental Welfare State
EAPN European Anti-Poverty Network
EMU European Monetary Union
ESRI Economic & Social Research Institute
ETUC European Trade Union Congress
EU European Union
FA Farm Assist
FAS State Employment and Training Agency
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FF Fianna Fail
FG Fine Gael
FIS Family Income Supplement
FLAC Free Legal Advice Centre
GAIE Gross Average Industrial Earnings
7
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEU Gender Equality Unit
GNP Gross National Product
IB Injury Benefit
IBEC Irish Business & Employers Confederation
ICTU Irish Congress o f  Trade Unions
IDA Industrial Development Authority
IFA Irish Farmers’ Association
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
INOU Irish National Organisation o f the Unemployed
ISME Irish Small & Medium Enterprises
ISSA International Social Security Association
LES Local Employment Service
LFS Labour Force Survey
NAPS National Anti Poverty Strategy
NAPsincl European Union Anti-Poverty and Social Inclusion Strategy
NEAP National Employment Action Plan
NESC National Economic & Social Council
NESDO National Economic & Social Development Office
NESF National Economic & Social Forum
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NPB National Pensions Board
NWCI National W omen’s Council o f  Ireland
OECD Organisation for Co-operation and Development
OPFP One Parent Family Payment
OYETCP Open Your Eyes To Child Poverty
P2000 Partnership 2000
PCW Programme for Competitiveness and Work
PD Progressive Democrats
PESP Programme for Economic & Social Progress
PEU Public Expenditure Unit
PNR Programme for National Recovery
PPF Programme for Prosperity & Fairness
PR Proportional Representation
PRB Pay Related Benefit
PRSTV Proportional Representation Single Transferable Vote
PSEU Public Service Executive Union
PSRI Pay Related Social Insurance
PTJI Part-Time Job Initiative
QA Qualified Adult
RR Replacement Ratio
SMI Strategic Management Initiative
SVP St Vincent de Paul
SWA Supplementary Welfare Allowance
TD Irish Member o f  Parliament
TWIGS Integration o f Tax & Social Welfare Working Group
UA Unemployment Assistance
UB Unemployment Benefit
9
What is required is an account o f the process by which social issues move onto the policy 
agenda, what proposals are accepted and rejected, and why, how and by whom such policies 
are implemented (Pierson, C 1998 96)
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, 
OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY AND 
STRUCTURE
1 1 Ireland in the global economy
This introductory Chapter introduces this thesis by placing Ireland in a global context It then 
sketches out the research interest and describes the research rationale, aims and objectives, 
methodology and chapter structure
Across the world social security systems are under pressure The pressures come from a 
combination o f  economic and political globalisation in the form o f  new social vulnerabilities 
and neo-liberal global policy regimes Domestic pressures include demographic changes, 
ageing populations and changing household structures Ireland, in common with all other 
countries, is exposed to these pressures This thesis is primarily concerned with how the Irish 
social security regime responded to those pressures According to the Globalisation Index 
Kearney (2003, 2004, 2005) Ireland is one o f  the worlds most globalised countries This 
thesis is especially concerned with examining whether the type o f  social security change 
' experienced in Ireland can be attributed to Irish exposure to the international economic 
environment (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000a 2) The thesis examines, over the two decades 
1986-2006, what happened Irish social security policy It concludes Irish social security 
recommodified but did so in a particularly Irish style, qualitatively different to other liberal 
welfare regimes and other small open European economies such as Netherlands and 
Denmark By understanding how Irish social security policy developed in the way it did the 
thesis enables greater understanding o f how social security regime adjustment is managed in 
the context o f  a highly globalised political economy and gives insight into domestic
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constraints on globalisation
In one o f the most widely accepted definitions o f globalisation Held et al (1999 6) describe 
globalisation as
a process which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation o f  social 
relations and transactions, assessed in terms o f  their extensivity, intensity, 
velocity and impact, generating transcontinental inter-regional flows o f  activity, 
interaction and the exercise o f power
All sub-systems exist within a larger state and international political economy This state- 
centred approach understands the state as a powerful actor which must satisfy internal 
political demands while carefully managing international economic participation
Since states are intrinsically Janus-faced, standing at the intersections o f  transnational 
and domestic processes, their structures, capacities and polices are always influenced 
by identifiable aspects o f the particular world circumstances in which they exist 
(Evans et a l , 1985 350)
While Hay (2006) and Smith (2005) dispute the extent o f Irish globalisation the starting 
point o f  this thesis is that Ireland is indeed one o f the world’s most globalised countries 
Lane and Ruane (2006 5) note that Ireland is to the ‘forefront o f  the economic globalisation’ 
and how ‘standard trade and financial indicators show that the scale o f international 
economic transactions between Ireland and the rest o f  the world ranks near the top o f  any 
group o f comparator countries’ The extent o f  Irish globalisation is a key factor informing 
Irish policy development as the extreme openness o f  the Irish economy makes it vulnerable 
to globalisation (O’Connor, 2003) The three most important contextual changes for social 
protection policies, the globalisation o f the world economy with social contributions 
increasingly being seen as a threat to competitiveness, the prevalence o f neo-liberal 
approaches amongst national and international policy makers and the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and Stability Pact (Sarfati and Bonoli, 2001) are consistently themes in Irish 
policy discourse that set the context for Irish social security policy-making
Cemy (2000a 22-23) characterises the competition state as a state where all state actors 
(politicians and bureaucrats) respond to the pressures o f  global markets by promoting the
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competitive advantages of the state
state actions are often designed to enforce global market rational economic and 
political behaviour on rigid and inflexible private sector actors as well as on 
state actors and agencies The institutions and practices o f  the state itself are 
increasingly marketised or “commodified”, and the state becomes the spearhead 
o f structural transformation to market norms both at home and abroad
Programmes for Government (PFG) (Ireland 1992a, 1994a, 1997d and 2002b), the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC) three-year strategy documents (1987, 1990, 1993, 
1996, 2000, 2003 and 2005a, b), the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) (Ireland 1997c, 
2002c) and the National Competitiveness Council (2000) all provide very useful overview  
statements on economic and social strategy They emphasise the necessity o f  high 
employment rates to the maintenance o f a low-tax economic model The first words in the 
National Anti Poverty Strategy report (NAPS, Ireland 2002a 1) make reference to 
‘maintaining our international competitiveness through policies that encourage enterprise 
and investment5 NAPsmcl (2003a 1) sets out the core objective o f  national policy
A dynamic national economy, full employment and the effective elimination o f  
long-term unemployment, equality o f opportunity, life-long learning, adaptation 
to information society, the promotion o f research and development
NESC documents have in common an emphasis on the need for a consistent policy 
framework for small open European democracy They argue the framework needs to be 
based on low inflation, steady wage moderation and a set o f complementaiy policies, which 
promote and facilitate structural adjustment o f supply-side policies in order to produce 
flexibility and improve competitiveness (NESC 1996 14-15) NESC firmly places 
competitiveness in a global context ’globalisation places a premium on structural 
adjustment’ (NESC, 1996 vn) A strategy report o f  the National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC 2000 1) outlines a vision for Ireland based on an economy and society that
responds especially to the constantly evolving requirements o f  international 
competitiveness, understood as the necessary condition o f  continuing economic 
and social success
12
Clearly these quotes illustrate how the concept o f a competition state applies to Ireland 
(Dukelow 2004) Boyle (2005 16) describes Ireland as an exemplar competition while Kirby 
and Murphy (2006 forthcoming) make a strong argument that the concept o f a competition 
state describes
accurately the nature and operation o f the Irish state in the era o f the Celtic
Tiger since it prioritises goals o f  economic competitiveness over those o f social
cohesion and welfare
The research objectives are informed by a theoretical understanding that globalisation, in the 
form o f a new competitive form o f capitalism, has impacted on the Irish political economy 
and consequently on Irish social security and other forms o f  social policy
1 2 Research Interest and Rationale
The thesis has a central puzzle The thesis argues that, despite Ireland’s status as one o f the 
world’s most globalised nations and the emphasis on competitiveness in national policy 
discourse, recent Irish social security reform, while consistent with many characteristics 
identified by Competition State theory, does not fully conform to what might be expected in 
a Competition state The central research question seeks to understand why this might be the 
case and to understand, m the Irish context, how domestic constraints limit policy choices 
even in highly globalised competition states
Given the apparent success o f  the Celtic Tiger the Irish model o f  development is o f strategic 
interest to other small open economies struggling to find a path through an increasingly 
globalised world (Cousins 2005a, Dukelow, 2004, Castles 2001, Glyn 2002, Smith 2005) 
Lessons pertaining to Irish social development are therefore highly relevant How do 
domestic limits on the impact o f  globalisation translate into Irish social security policy in 
Ireland9 How are global impacts mediated into Irish social security policy9 Who mediates 
what policy and how do they do it9 What role do institutions, policy ideas and interests play 
and what is the relationship between these variables9 This thesis aims to illuminate some 
answers to these intriguing questions and in doing so identify what is required to mediate a 
more equitable Irish model o f development, an outcome that is fully possible even in a 
globalised world
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Research Aims and objectives
The starting point for this research is the development o f  the Irish social security system  
from the Commission on Social Welfare (CSW, Ireland, 1986) in 1986 to 2006 The research 
examines how the global context influences recent social security1 reform in Ireland and how 
global impacts are mediated into Irish social security policy The thesis is concerned not 
only with what happened to Irish social security but with how and why certain policy choices 
were made and others disregarded
This research aims to understand what happened to Irish social security policy over the two 
decades 1985-2005 The thesis does not comment on or evaluate the effectiveness o f  the 
Irish social security regime Rather it examines how such reform has been domestically 
managed and how the international political economy has influenced Irish social security 
reform Heidenheimer et al (1990) describe policy as action or non-action This research 
endeavours to establish what did or did not happen to Irish social security policy and to 
understand how and why policy decisions and processes followed the pattern that they did
• what changed in relation to Irish social security policy,
• the domestic and international process through which change was mediated
• the domestic and international rationale for the specific Irish change trajectory
1 3 Theoretical Framework
The thesis extracts from the work o f  competition state theorists Torfing (1999), Cemy (1999, 
2000, 2002a,b) (Cemy, Menz and Soederberg, (2005), Alber and Standing (2000) and Jessop 
(2002)2 a set o f  common analytical positions to develop a three part theoretical framework 
comprising the changes that happened, the process through which changes were mediated, 
the rationales that informed the policy decisions This framework to guide the investigation
1 S ocial secu rity  is defined  as a ll cash  based  incom e transfe rs funded  by  the  D ep artm en t o f  S ocial and 
Fam ily  A ffa irs  in the  R epub lic  o f  Ire land
2 T he ind iv idual w ork  o f  these theo rists  is ou tlined  m A ppend ix  B
o f how the Irish social security system changed in the context o f  Ireland’s significant 
globalisation is outlined below and elaborated on in the following chapter .
W hat -  the changes that happened?
International literature rarely addresses Irish social security reform and Irish academic 
research has not conclusively resolved what has happened to Irish social security. Where the 
question is addressed, different researchers have not agreed about the interpretation o f what 
happened. McCashin (2004) and Daly and Yeates (2003) both suggest that Ireland escaped a 
neo-liberal reform trajectory, while Kirby (2002), Allen (2002), Taylor (2005) and Dukelow  
(2004) suggest Irish social welfare outcomes illustrate a stronger neo-liberal trajectory. 
Cousins (1995, 2005a) and Kennelly and O'Shea (1997, 1998) argue that the distinguishing 
feature o f the Irish social security system is an absence o f  significant reform.
The initial challenge for this research is to provide a fuller picture o f Irish social security 
changes so more definite conclusions can be drawn about what happened to Irish social 
security policy. In competition state theory the context for domestic social security policy is 
international competitiveness. Low taxation and wage moderation lead to pressure for cuts in 
public sector spending and limits the capacity to fund social security and leads to regulation, 
privatisation and the use o f  new public management techniques. Public investment is 
expected to focus on learning and training, to enhance labour market supply and to create 
flexible labour markets. There are shifts from universal to targeted social protection 
spending. This residualisation causes new and multiple forms o f inequality with the weakest, 
those not able to access the labour-market, suffering most from adaptation. The welfare 
system becomes more contingent and productivist with increased active provisions based on 
trampoline metaphors. Rights are more conditional and linked to obligations. Labour market 
activation policy can be carrot or stick but will promote welfare to work strategies. There is 
an increase in women's labour market participation; this impacts on the capacity o f  the 
family to provide welfare and commodifies care. Chapter Two develops a theoretical 
framework to critically evaluate recent Irish social security change. The overall thesis 
hypothesis is that recommodification o f social security occurs as social policy is 
subordinated to the needs o f the economy (Jessop 2002). Redistributive welfare rights take 
second place to a productivist reordering o f social policy to meet present and future 
economic needs. Chapter Two unpacks what recommodification means and develops 
indicators that can capture the degree to which such recommodification is taking place in 
Ireland. Chapter Three familiarises the reader with the Irish social security system, Chapter
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Four uses this framework to examine Irish social security policy over the years 1985 -  2005
How -  the process of mediating change 9
International social security literature (see Chapter Two) highlights how nation states 
adapted their social security systems in response to new pressures and challenges in an 
increasingly globalised world A central tension in this literature is captured in Pierson’s 
(1998 53) imagery o f  ‘irresistible forces and immovable objects’ By irresistible forces 
Pierson means external globalisation pressures and internal and demographic pressures for 
change By immovable objects he means the powerful capacity o f  path-dependent national 
institutional frameworks to shape the impact o f  these pressures on social security policy 
Diversity o f responses to common global and domestic pressures illustrates the crucial role 
played by nationally specific structures and politics in mediating domestic and international 
pressures for change (Cemy 2002a) theorises that changes in the international political 
economy transform the traditional domestic ‘iron triangle’ o f  politicians, bureaucrats and 
non elected actors into a ‘golden pentagon’ where new multilevel governance and trans­
national actors are new features o f  the domestic Irish social security policy community3
Competition state theory is used here to develop a framework to examine how globalisation 
impacts on the governance and policy mediation o f the Irish and international policy 
community The framework is influenced by Hay (2004b 246) and Swanks (2002) analysis 
which stresses how ‘policy making even in response to common external challenges is a 
highly complex and differentiated process’ Chapter Two develops a more detailed 
theoretical framework that enables exploration o f how policy is mediated It offers a 
conceptual framework to map the Irish social security policy community and international 
policy community and to account for how changes in policy are mediated in those policy 
communities Chapters Five and Six explore in some detail the context through which Irish 
social security policy is mediated by mapping and analysing the domestic and international 
policy community (interests, institutions and discourses) in which policy was mediated 
Chapter Five examines the changing governance characteristics o f  the Irish social security 
policy community, the way the policy processes have changed and the impact o f the 
international system on these changes Chapter Six explores the economic and political 
impact o f  globalisation on Irish social security
3 T he w ords ‘iro n ’ and ‘g o ld e n ’ do  no t have  n o rm ative  values
Why- the rationale for policy change?
Competition state theory stresses how political agency, the role played by domestic 
institutions and practices, national and international interest groups and the evolving 
relationship between the public and private determine policy choices all determine change 
(Cemy et a l , 2005 17) Swank (2002) differentiated states according to institutional 
characteristics and laid particular stress on how the type o f  electoral regime and number o f  
veto points impacted on the style and culture o f domestic mediation o f policy decisions
Having established and interpreted what happened and having mapped and analysed the 
domestic and international policy community in which policy was mediated, the third task is 
to develop a better understanding o f  the policy dynamic which drove the policy decisions 
that gave the Irish social security regime its distinctive character Again Chapter Two further 
develops a framework to enable exploration about how the specific features o f  the Irish 
political system contribute to the culture o f  decision making and act as a constraint on policy 
making This framework is applied to case studies o f  specific social security decisions and 
policy processes in Chapter Seven and Eight in order to answer the research question in two 
ways The case studies enable discussion o f  the relationships between Irish policy processes 
and policy outcomes to international economic and political processes They also highlight 
the domestic constraints and vetos which limit the impact o f  international forces o f  change 
Chapter Nine concludes with the answer to the research question and reflects on what has 
been learned about the Irish social security community
1 4 Research Methodology
This section describes the approach to the research, outlines the data collection and 
analytical methods and addresses limitations o f  this research approach The thesis research 
methodology is in a constructivist interpretative approach whose ontology accepts that 
reality is relative and socially constructed but that it is nonetheless epistemologically 
possible to objectively to establish fact through a mixture o f  rigorous methods The research 
approach is m the constructivist tradition o f critical theory, which understands that the 
‘natural order o f  things’ is really the dominant discourse which has power over other 
subordinate discourses, for example in the way the ‘male’ discourse dominates the ‘female’ 
discourse (Palen 2000 223) Critical theorists seek to expose, where possible, the social 
construction o f reality and the role o f ideas and discourse in managing or mitigating policy 
adjustment and political relationships
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Truth is always speculative and one’s own perception o f the truth is grounded by one’s own 
particular experiences. Denzin and Lincoln (2002) stress the need to identify the researcher 
as a multicultural subject. In this case the researcher is a white female middleclass political 
activist, who works within a particular interpretative community with its own philosophy or 
ontology. The researcher was, up to one year prior to commencing the research, an 
identifiable actor in the policy community that is the subject o f the research. This 
positioning, which clearly has both advantage and disadvantage, has been borne in mind 
throughout the research period. Prior participation in the policy community meant some 
information and interviews were more accessible to the author. However, it also meant that 
some policy elites may be less likely to expose sensitive information than they might be to a 
more ‘neutral’ researcher. The researcher also has to be aware o f self-bias and that her 
perceptions o f events are influenced by how she personally participated in some processes.
An Inter-disciplinary Approach
The thesis is characterised by an inter-disciplinary methodological approach, which offers 
the opportunity o f a rounded and nuanced account o f Irish social security development. The 
choice o f an interdisciplinary approach and particularly an inter-disciplinary approach that 
incorporates an international political economy perspective is motivated by the need to 
reflect on the changing nature o f the domestic state in the context o f globalisation. The focus 
on globalisation makes international political economy highly relevant to a small open 
economy such as Ireland, hence the choice o f this theoretical approach over alternative 
sociological frameworks. This is especially so the disciplines capacity to theorise dimensions 
o f  power and the relationship between internal and external power.
This is not to suggest that an international political economy approach is sufficient it has a 
limited capacity to examine policy detail and needs to be augmented with other theoretical 
approaches. Therefore the research draws heavily on the social policy discipline to utilise 
available historical, descriptive and analytical social security literature as well as quantitative 
data from welfare economics literature. Political and policy science conceptual tools are used 
to enable the understanding o f  discrete and detailed policy process o f  change: o f particular 
relevance are political science concepts to understand systems change and policy science 
concepts to enhance appreciation o f the policy community and the different degrees and 
types o f  change and discourse. An academic justification for this research is this
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interdisciplinary approach and the examination o f in-depth social security policy change 
through the lens o f international political economy. The interdisciplinary approach offers a 
rich conceptual framework that incorporates domestic and international dynamics underlying 
social security changes although it is a challenge to integrate these approaches and manage 
such wide ranging information and analysis.
Research methods, strategies for obtaining information and data analysis techniques have to 
be nuanced enough to pick up the internal tensions in the state where competing discourses 
exist. The following section discusses the secondary literature review, and the primary 
research methods which include case studies, document analysis and elite interviews.
Secondary Research - Literature Review
A political economy approach to social security also treats social security as part o f  a larger 
social system o f  production and is relevant to the context o f globalisation. The first 
methodological decision is the choice o f the subject area for literature review and the 
decision to choose social security over other social policy subject areas (for example health, 
housing or education. The academic justification for the choice o f subject area is reflected in 
the large and growing international literature concerning advanced welfare states attempts to 
reconfigure or calibrate their social security systems (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000 a & b, 
Hemreijck 2003, Sarfarti and Bonoli 2001, Esping-Andersen 2001, Pierson 2001). Castles
(2002) and Cousins (2005a) note the absence o f material relating to Irish social security in 
international literature. Daly and Yeates (2003:86) reflect ‘in the case o f  Ireland, there is the 
problem that it rarely appears in the international literature’. A number o f recent domestic 
publications illustrate the topicality o f  this subject matter (Taylor 2005, McCashin 2004, 
Dukelow 2004, Cousins 2005a) but do not fully exhaust the discussion. This thesis aims to 
contribute towards filling some remaining gaps (for example the role o f  social partnership in 
mediating social security change and theorising about development o f Irish activation 
policy), contributing to and contesting this domestic and international literature. Social 
security policy appears the most appropriate policy area to investigate. It is an area o f  social 
policy that is in the main determined nationally and it, more than any other social policy 
area, lies in the nexus o f the market-state-family relationship that comprises the political 
economy. The main literature review developes the conceptual framework for the research 
reviewing a broad range o f interdisciplinary literature to elucidate ways to understand 
change. The chapter focuses on competition state literature and argues commodification is a
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useful way to theorise social security change Chapter Three reviews Irish social security 
literature
Case Study Approach
The methodological approach used in this thesis reflects the interdisciplinary nature o f  the 
research and is based on a process o f ‘analytical induction5, which Znaniecki (1934, cited in 
Evan et a l , 1985 348) described as ‘drawing concepts, questions and causal hypotheses from 
a variety o f  existing theoretical debates’ The methodology sets up an analysis that ‘explores 
the role o f  several variables encapsulated as institutions, interests and ideas in the 
determination o f outcomes’ (Hall, 1989 90) Such analysis favours the case study as an 
heuristic methodological approach that allows depth and insight into the story o f Irish social 
security reform This type o f  approach avoids narrow mono-causal explanations and opens 
up the possibility o f leading to more realistic and wide ranging understanding, knowledge 
and answers At the same time the dangers o f  a single case study approach need to be 
avoided, in particular the danger o f  presenting the case study as unique The hope is, in 
adopting a case study approach over a comparative approach, that the detailed analysis can 
unearth a more thorough understanding o f  the domestic constraints on globalisation and that 
this learning can be successfully comparatively applied and tested in other countries and 
policy areas
The case study will comprise a review o f  social security reform in Ireland from 1986 to 
2006 Heidemheimer et al (1990) advised that a period o f at least a decade is required to 
follow processes o f policy change The 20-year period chosen encapsulates a rich body o f  
social security policy processes where institutional memory remains fresh The starting 
point, 1986, is a clear benchmark to the extent that the CSW4 (Ireland 1986) was launched 
and key discussions which contributed to the reestablishment o f  social partnership were 
underway in NESC5 The research covers the period up to the completion o f  the thesis (April 
2006) and hence incorporates two significant recent developments, the report Developmental 
Welfare State (NESC, 2005a) and a significant and radical structural reform proposal (DSFA  
2006)
4 T he C om m ission  on Social W elfare  (C SW ) w as an expert w ork ing  g roup  w hich  p roduced  a 
consensus rep o rt w h ich  con ta ined  ov er 100 recom m endations and  sign ifican tly  in fluenced  social 
secu rity  po licy
5 T he N ationa l E conom ic  and Social C ouncil (N E S C ) is a  social and  econom ic  po licy  adv iso ry  body  
to  governm en t See C hap te r F ive  fo r g rea te r detail 20
The period under review is broken down into a number o f separate case studies. Chapter 
Seven examines case studies that highlight learning about the decision-making process in 
three key policy areas; child- income support; women and social security reform social 
security cutbacks. It also analyses a key policy process, Social Partnership. Chapter Eight 
examines policy mediation processes that dealt with the macro debate between equity and 
efficiency; including policy relating to income adequacy; work incentives and conditionality. 
The chapter traces how policy relating to ‘working aged’ social security claimants has been 
mediated. These case studies were selected according to two criteria. The first four, in 
Chapter Seven, were chosen to draw out and illustrate the relationship between political 
culture and decision making. The processes examined in Chapter Eight represent key policy 
moments where policy related to work incentives and activation was strengthened. These 
were chosen to demonstrate how the journey from a redistributive welfare state to a 
productivist workfare state was mediated and to highlight the role o f the social construction 
o f change in the mediation policy. To enhance causal or explanatory capacity and to go 
beyond descriptive accounts o f policy mediation the processes are analysed in a common 
framework which enables comparison across a number o f  variables. This common 
framework traces individual policy ‘journeys’ that represent important debates in Irish social 
security discourse and captures the recent narrative o f social security in Ireland6. The 
analysis draws on data gathered through interviews with members o f the policy elite and 
documentary analysis o f  policy reports and media coverage. The methodological framework 
used aims to identify features common to distinct policy processes. It builds on an approach 
used by Mabett (2004) and Boyle (2005). The latter’s working approach involved 
identifying the policy problem, the source o f  the problem and the policy initiative to deal 
with the problem. It uses key documents, proposals, policy coalitions, decision points and 
decisive factors. The framework used here augments B oyle’s reference points with ‘political 
party input’ ‘international influence’, ‘Social Partnership’ and ‘type o f discourse’. These 
reference points will assist in identifying competing ideologies, discourses, advocacy
6 T he theo re tica l w ork  in C h ap te r T hree, the know ledge and  analysis o f  w hat happened  in C h ap te r 
Four, the m app ing  o f  the dom estic  and in ternational po licy  com m unity  in C hap ters F ive  and  Six are  
too ls to  he lp  nav igate  th e  e igh t p o licy  p rocess jo u rn ey s.
coalitions and political struggles The analysis also aims to identify any correlation between 
changing policy and changing governance7
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Document analysis
In deciding how to approach the examination o f social security change various approaches 
could be taken One possible approach was to utilise the existing framework developed by 
Esping Andersen (1990) and to reapply his methodology over 1970, 1990 and 2000 This 
was considered and rejected on the grounds that it gives a very limited account o f  change 
accounting only for social insurance payments and being especially weak on gender A 
second alternative approach might have been to identify two static points in time and to
7 A  sum m ary  o f  the  overa ll find ings from  the analysis o f  bo th  C hap te r Seven and C hap te r E igh t are 
inc luded  in T ab le  8 1 a t the end  o f  C hap ter E igh t
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compare indicators (such as the total social wage for different population groups) at those 
two points However, influenced by Pierson (1994), the chosen approach is not to measure 
quantitative inputs or outcomes but to analyse the type o f  qualitative policy changes that 
happened and to determine how the structure o f  social security policy was changing The 
primary research method is document analysis or examination o f  written material including 
primary and secondary social security legislation, administrative circulars outlining changes 
and annual budget policy decisions8
A key challenge in the research is going beyond a descriptive account o f change and 
undertaking a critical and meaningful analysis o f  such a large amount o f  data 
Disaggregating the reform process into discrete dimensions and indicators increases the 
capacity to make sense o f  multidirectional change Chapter Two develops the research 
strategy for this technical examination o f this data
Elite interviews
Document analysis is combined with information from elite interviews as the main research 
methods used to map the international political economy, domestic political institutions and 
specific social security institutions Policy tracing runs the risk o f being descriptively 
fascinating but being weak in terms o f  causation or explanation Pinning down the range o f  
influences does not mean accounting for what actually determined any policy9 It is
g
D ocum ents co v er a n u m b er o f  g overnm en t D epartm en ts inc lud ing  D epartm en t o f  S ocial and Fam ily  
A ffa irs, D ep artm en t o f  E n terp rise , T rade  and E m ploym en t and D epartm en t o f  F inance , D epartm en ta l 
po licy  sta tem en ts, annual repo rts  and stra teg ic  p o licy  sta tem en ts R elevan t docum ents inc lude  B udget 
S tatem ents, Social P artnersh ip  ag reem ents, N ationa l E conom ic  and  Social C ouncil and  N ational 
E conom ic and  Social F orum  R eports , N a tiona l A n tipoverty  S trategy  reports and subm iss ions and  
re levan t docum enta tion  from  key  in ternational social secu rity  in stitu tions
M uch ‘p o licy  d iscu ss io n ’ is in person , by  phone o r em ail, lo ca ted  in cab inet, com m ittee  o r co rpora te  
a rrangem ents and  there fo re  quite inaccessib le  and  h idden  from  pub lic  v iew  In Ire land  it also  takes 
p lace  m  c lien ta lis tic  in fo rm al lobbying  and  advocacy  p rocesses D esp ite  the ro le o f  the  F reedom  o f  
In fo rm ation  leg isla tion  the  po licy  p rocess it is still quite covert and  d ifficu lt to  dec iphe r T his lim its 
the stud ies capacity  to  u n co v e r p o licy  dy n am ics T he in -dep th  in terv iew s w ith  25 p o licy  actors w ill 
illum inate  these gaps 23
necessary to go behind the process and account for what influences and shapes the interests 
o f the key actors engaged in those processes This means accounting for the causal power o f  
political discourse and rhetoric (Torping, 1999) in influencing and explaining change
Such,an approach requires interviews with key policy actors This type o f  narrative research 
is an effective strategy for obtaining information from those who have the greatest insight 
into decisions, the ‘insiders’ Elite interviews enable probing and questioning and take the 
reader beyond a description o f  the mechanics o f the policy process and closer to 
understanding why certain decisions were made Elite interviews enable the reader to 
unearth, to some extent, the motivations o f key policy actors, to understand the deeper 
political culture that informs the process o f  policy making and to gam insight into policy 
actors’ understanding o f  their role in the context o f the political culture The challenges in 
eliciting facts from highly political and secretive policy processes are illustrated by Heclo's 
(1974b) insights into the study o f  the UK policy process He notes the difficulty o f  capturing 
how public service personal relations are characterised by ambiguity and contradiction The 
same may be expected o f the secretive and closed Irish policy world
Burton (2001 216) noted how many policy makers are happy for their world to remain 
murky as it easier to practise in such an environment Traditionally in Ireland the policy 
community had been relatively accessible to the academic community The sampling 
strategy in relation to interviews was to seek a broad representative sample o f the policy 
community as represented in Figure 5 2 This meant interviewing a representative sample o f  
the five aspects o f  the policy community, political, bureaucratic, non government 
organisations and social partners, international community and experts The policy actors 
interviewed include government Ministers, Ministerial advisers, opposition spokespeople, 
key civil servants, at least one o f each social partner pillar, community and voluntary sector 
representatives, academic and independent experts and media commentators The 
researcher’s previous and ongoing professional relationships with some o f those interviewed 
biases both the interviewee and those interviewed 10 17 interviews took place one year into 
the research project and were used to scope the scale o f  change, to map the policy 
community and to prioritise policy areas for more detailed analysis The interviews focused 
on eliciting the views o f  the interviewees on four main themes, how social security has 
changed over the relevant time frame, the interviewee's organisations role in mediating 
change, the interviewees perception about the wider domestic and global political
10 F o u r in terv iew  requests  w ere d irec tly  declined , opp o ther fa iled  to  respond  to  rep ea ted  requests
environment o f  social security change and the degree to which national and international 
economic constraints impact on social security policy The interview also attempted to gam a 
sense o f  the interviewee’s own personal interpretation o f  these themes See Appendix A for 
interview schedule The interviews were taped, transcribed and analysed in a manual 
framework, which sought to systematically and rigorously account for the data obtained The 
same style and approach was used in all 17 interviews After 17 interviews a clear pattern 
began to emerge and there was sufficient quality data to begin analysis
Eight further interviews took place six months before completion o f the research These were 
used to more selectively acquire additional information, tease out remaining questions about 
specific policy processes and develop recommendations These were not taped but recorded 
in note form as each interview proceeded They were not analysed in the same framework as 
the earlier interviews or as each other but used more selectively to reinforce or confirm key 
observations In all 25 interviews privacy was guaranteed, direct quotes from those 
interviewed are only used when it is impossible to identify the source or if  information is 
already public
The three primary data collection and data analysis research methods, case studies, document 
analysis and elite interviews, are brought together throughout the case study to produce a 
narrative or story o f social security reform The story makes connection between variables 
(including international drivers, institutions, ideas and interests) to give a full account o f the 
domestic and international factors influencing policy process
1 5 Thesis Structure
The case study methodology permeates the thesis structure Following this introductory 
section Chapter Two uses the literature review to compare competing theoretical positions 
and develop the theoretical framework based on competition state theory Chapter Three 
reflects on the Irish Social Security System, its histoiy, objectives and its place in 
comparative welfare typologies To examine whether Irish social security policy has 
recommodified Chapter Four examines five indicators, activation /  conditionality, regulation, 
retrenchment, residualisation and defamilansation Chapter Five uses Cem y’s (2002a) 
concept o f the golden pentagon as a framework to review five points o f  the Irish social 
security policy community, political actors, bureaucrats, non-power holding actors, policy 
elites and multilevel governance Chapter Six examines how aspects o f  economic and 
political globalisation impacts on the domestic mediation o f  policy and on policy outcomes
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Having established what happened and where and how policy is mediated the thesis then 
turns to examining why specific policy choices were made Chapter Seven aims to further 
understand how Irish political institutions, actors and ideologies impact on social security 
policy It examines three policy ‘case studies’ child income support policy, cut backs and 
gender and also assesses the degree to which Social Partnership social security processes 
influence policy Chapter Eight relates to policy concerning people o f working age and the 
scrutinises three key policy processes, the Expert Working Group on Integration o f  Taxation 
and Social Welfare (Integration Report, Ireland 1996a) and the Benchmarking and 
Indexation Working Group (Benchmarking Report, Ireland 2001b) and the journey through 
five stages o f activation or conditionality policy from Job Search in 1987 to Job Seekers 
Allowance in 2006 This isolates the key policy dynamics impacting on the journey from 
social protection to economic connection or Irish style commodification Chapter Nine 
examines the relationship between ideas, institutions and interests, concludes that this 
relationship offers an adequate theoretical explanation for Irish social security reform
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At the heart o f  the globalisation debate is an argument about diminished democracy or the 
general diminution o f  the ability o f  democratically elected governments to pursue social 
policy goals that depart from market oriented principles (Swank 2002 274)
CHAPTER TWO THEORETICAL APPROACH 
TO EXAMINING IRISH WELFARE
2 1  In tro d u c tio n
This chapter aims to develop a theoretical framework that will be used in later chapters to 
examine changes in Irish social security It begins by surveying literature concerning the 
impact o f  globalisation on the welfare state It critically analyses quantitative empirical 
approaches to the study o f social security reform and concludes the inconclusiveness o f  this 
literature and lack o f  theorising about the state in a global economy limit this approach and 
its capacity to make sense o f  how social, economic and political processes together create 
welfare change
It is then argued that more qualitative International Political Economy literature m the form 
o f competition state theory offers a more richly developed theory o f  the state in the context 
o f globalisation The work o f theorists associated with competition state theory is reviewed 
in some detail before reviewing the usefulness o f commodification as a conceptual tool The 
chapter concludes by developing a number o f frameworks that can be used in the thesis to 
examine what happened Irish social security, how it happened and why it happened
2 2 Survey of Globalisation / Welfare State Theories
There are many definitions o f globalisation This thesis adopts a widely used definition o f  
globalisation which stresses that globalisation is an economic and political process
Globalisation is a process which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organisation o f  social relations and transactions, assessed in terms o f  their 
extensivity, intensity, velocity and impact, generating transcontinental inter­
regional flows o f activity, interaction and the exercise o f  power (Held et a l ,
1999 6)
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Globalisation, in the context o f  literature concerning social security policy, refers to a 
number o f  pressures deriving from outside domestic states including international 
competitiveness, the mobility o f capital worldwide and intensified international trade A 
central cause o f intensification o f such pressures has been the impact o f  new information and 
communications technologies which have made possible both the more intense and 
immediate global interconnectedness that drives finance, production and trade and also new  
forms o f corporate organisation and governance that have come to dominate more and more 
key production chains worldwide Yeates (2002) identifies three mam bodies o f literature 
concerning globalisation and social policy, the first concerns the impact o f globalisation on 
social policy, the second concerns how the welfare state contributes to globalisation and the 
third the globalisation o f the social policy process
This Chapter is primarily concerned with the first body o f  literature the impact globalisation 
has on welfare (literature related to the global social policy process is reviewed in Chapter 
Six) Table 2 1 outlines a typology based on the work o f  Cousins (2005a 47) to make sense 
o f the vast, contradictory and often inconclusive range o f  literature concerning globalisation 
and social security It groups the literature into different typologies that reflect two mam 
variables whether the theorist is positive or negative about the future o f welfare and the 
degree to which the author stresses the impact o f globalisation over the domestic as a driver 
o f social security reform
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Table 2.1: Scales of influence of globalisation on welfare
Strength o f  
Globalisation
Strong Nuanced W eak Does not exist
Positive 
impact on 
welfare
Positive impact 
through
compensation in 
social democratic 
states (Rodrik, 
1997: Garrett 
1998)
Positive policy 
convergence 
(Jenson and St 
Martin, 2003)
Some states well 
positioned to 
manage 
globalisation 
(Swank, 2002: 
Weiss, 2005)
Other pressures 
equally strong, 
welfare state 
resilient to 
change 
(Pierson P, 
2001)
Adaptation to 
new social risks 
(Esping- 
Andersen,
1999, 2001)
No new trend o f  
globalisation (Hirst 
and
Thompson, 1997)
Negative 
impact on 
welfare
Negative race 
to the bottom 
(Deacon, 
2000a, b)
End o f
Welfare
(Ohmae,
1995)
States
retrench
believing
global
pressure (Hay, 
2006)
Competition state 
welfare policy 
politically 
mediated (Cemy 
et al., 2005)
States fiscal 
capacity curtailed 
(Scharpf, 2000 )
State uses 
globalisation to 
hide a neo liberal 
ideology (Hay, 
2004) *
The Debate about the impact o f globalisation on social security
Literature concerning globalisation and social security can be grouped into those who argue 
there will be negative outcomes, retrenchment or recommodification and those who argue that 
the welfare state is resilient and will compensate for and adapt to new risks. The overemphasis
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on trying to prove or disprove welfare retrenchment has, at times, produced ‘sterile debate’ 
(Sarfati and Bonoli 2001:5). This debate, reviewed below, is often frustrating and 
inconclusive.
Arguments presented on both sides seem to be either very general or very 
narrowly focused and hence mutually incompatible, while the empirical 
evidence seems generally inconclusive Scharpf and Schmidt (2000a:4)
A common way to judge the adequacy o f any theoretical framework is to test if  the theory is 
empirically supported. Political economists or those using more quantitative methodological 
approaches have produced the most empirical evidence to support their theories. Their 
evidence, while still inconclusive, generally supports the compensation hypotheses and 
refutes the hypotheses that globalisation will cause the welfare state to decline, retrench or 
race to the bottom. Using largely quantitative evidence, political economy theorists (Pierson, 
1996: Huber and Ray, 2001; Green-Pedersen and Haverland, 2002) argue that the absence o f  
retrenchment offers proof that globalisation is not a threat to the welfare state. Garrett (1998) 
argues that social democratic states are more likely to compensate for the increased risks o f  
globalisation. Swank (2002) concurs but concludes liberal states have retrenched11.
However, there are challenges relating to producing adequate macro quantitative empirical 
evidence to adequately support such hypotheses. Allan and Scruggs (2003:3) question the 
validity o f many quantitative claims made in the absence o f a comprehensive cross-national 
and cross-temporal data set on comparative welfare state programmes. Alber and Standing 
(2000:102-103) argue that comparability o f  existing data collections cannot be assumed to be 
reliable, consistent or valid and conclude ‘that social science has difficulty in arriving at a 
common interpretation o f  recent trends’. Over-reliance on quantitative analysis o f  macro­
expenditure also fails to capture the dynamic o f institutional change underneath broad 
spending variables. Daly and Yeates 2003:87) remark on how relatively narrow 
conceptualisations o f welfare change based on social expenditure and crude financial 
indicators are not justified ‘ it is now evident that social expenditures are a poor guide either 
to a nations commitment to welfare or to the quality o f  social rights obtaining in societies. 
Time might be more productively spent examining qualitative change in the nature o f
Sw ank also  found  dem ograph ic  pressure a key  factor in explaining retrenchment. Throughout th is  
period  Ireland m ain ta ined  a re ltive ly  you th fu l dem ograph ic  p rofile .
welfare institutions, trends with regard to the policy content o f the welfare state or welfare 
state outcomes across different groups especially gender’. Globalisation impacts on gender- 
related welfare policy in a number o f ways impacting on family formation, increasing 
women’s labour market participation. Industrial restructuring leading to increased women’s 
employment also leads to commodification o f child and elder care and declines in fertility. 
This in turn impacts on labour supply and migration policy. Despite this there is little attempt 
in the mainstream political economy literature to feminise the globalisation debate.
An adequate examination o f changes results in not simply a conclusion o f  retrenchment or 
resilience but will account for the inconsistencies and multi-directional change. It is also 
more likely to highlight how globalisation is only one o f  a number o f factors influencing the 
pace and direction o f welfare change. Cousins (2005a:49) concluded
More recent studies have generally returned more nuanced findings accepting 
that globalisation can have an impact on welfare states but arguing that its 
impact varies depending on the political and economic context or that it is 
outweighed by other factors.
Esping-Andersen (1999, 2003) argues that pressures associated with post industrialisation, 
demographic ageing and welfare state maturation are more powerful than exogenous 
pressures. In his image o f ’irresistible forces and immovable objects’, Pierson P.(1996, 2001) 
argues a strong and empirically supported case that globalisation's influence on welfare 
institutions and outcomes is mediated and limited by domestic political institutions and 
interests. He finds welfare institutions in a state o f permanent austerity but path dependent 
and resistant to change. Arguments that discount the power o f globalisation and focus on 
social and economic transformations at domestic state level do not contextualise the 
domestic state in terms o f a transformational theory o f the state and its relationship to the 
international political economy. Pierson P. (1998), for example, argued that globalisation 
accompanies and accentuates but does not cause a ‘triple transition’ (slowdown in the growth 
o f productivity, maturation o f welfare state government commitments and ageing o f  the 
population). He failed to examine how globalisation impacts on the nature o f  the state, the 
nature o f governance or mediation o f change and how therefore impacts on how such 
pressures are actually negotiated. Nonetheless Pierson P. (2001) captured the multi­
dimensionality o f  social security reform by conceptualising three dimensions o f  reform, each 
o f  which, while evident in all welfare regimes, are more likely to dominate in a specific type
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o f  welfare regime The first o f  these dimensions, restructuring, refers to ‘reforms which seek 
to make contemporary welfare states more consistent with contemporary goals and demands 
for social provision5 (Pierson P 2001 425) These include reforms to meet new social needs 
presented by changing demographics and family structure and are more likely to dominate in 
a social democratic regime The second dimension is 'cost containment1 understood as 
attempts to keep balanced budgets in the context o f  fiscal austerity, deficit reduction and tax 
moderation and it is more likely to be found in conservative and liberal regimes The third 
dimension, recommodification, attempts ‘to restrict the alternatives to participation in the 
labour market, for example, by either tightening eligibility or cutting benefits5 (Pierson P 
2001 422) and is most likely to be found in a liberal regime
Swank (2002) influenced by Pierson P (1998) found retrenchment in only liberal regimes 
and argued that certain pluralist systems o f interest representation and liberal programmatic 
structures provided a conducive environment for neo-liberal regimes lures electoral 
institutions (2002 282) He concluded that configurations o f  national institutions play a large 
role in determining ways in which national policy makers respond to the economic and 
social pressures associated with globalisation The fact that Ireland has a liberal regime but 
does not have a pluralist or majontarian electoral institutions associated with other liberal 
regimes suggests Ireland may respond to globalisation differently than other liberal regimes
This short evaluation o f methodological tensions in the debate highlighted the need to 
understand welfare change in a more qualitative way that focuses less on the quantitative 
expenditure inputs and more on institutional changes to welfare policy and content and how 
this impacts in differentiated ways on different groups This was especially highlighted in 
relation to the need for a gender analysis Quantitative methodologies, because they cannot 
account for the causal power o f  political discourse and ideas, are limited in what they offer in 
terms o f understanding the causal factors o f welfare change Standing and Alber (2000 103) 
stress the need to ‘unravel policy development to analyse national policy debates and official 
policy justifications o f change5 Approaches incorporating political discourse analysis may 
offer a richer understanding o f  the processes underpinning social security change and 
especially the use o f  state rhetoric to legitimise change The focus on negotiation o f  policy 
implies the need to examine the transforming role and discourse o f the state and how this is 
reflected in the mediation o f  policy It also implies the need to be aware o f  the changing role 
o f  the variables that influence policy mediation, ideas, interests and institutions
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2.3 Complex International Political Economy Competition State Theory
Having acknowledged the strengths and limitations o f more quantitative approaches to 
understanding the impact o f globalisation on social security the discussion now turns to more 
complex or transformationist approaches to globalisation (Smith 2005:17-18). These 
approaches accept that globalisation does exist and is a highly complex set o f  qualitative 
processes which reconfigure power upwards, downwards and outwards to markets and which 
transforms national governance. One set o f  ‘complex’ literature is now discussed in more 
detail. Competition state theory offers a transformational approach, which examines the 
linkage between globalisation, transformation o f governance and subsequent 
commodification o f welfare outcomes. Cemy et al. (2005) define a competition state as what 
happens when globalisation resituates the state so that it prioritises the needs o f  global 
capital over those o f its own citizens. Cemy et al (2005) describe the emergence o f a 
‘competition state’ which emerges out o f the tensions between the demands o f economic 
globalisation and the old embedded state / society practices that characterised the national 
welfare state. The process is a political rather than economic process.
The emerging embedded neoliberal consensus is not simply a developing from 
outside or from above: it is also a political construction promoted by political 
entrepreneurs who must design projects, convince others, build coalitions and 
ultimately win some sort o f political legitimacy from inside and from below  
(Cemy, Menz and Soederberg, 2005:19).
Kirby and Murphy (2006:forthcoming) explain how ‘in this situation, state actions are often 
designed to enforce global market rational economic and political behaviour on rigid and 
inflexible private sector actors as well as on state actors and agencies’. The institutions and 
practices o f the state itself are increasingly marketised or “commodified”, and the state 
becomes the spearhead o f structural transformation to market norms both at home and 
abroad. Many domestically oriented interest and pressure groups are increasingly 
marginalised in the formulation o f  policy while transnationally linked groups not only gain 
influence but also can play state actors o ff against one another.
It is possible to extract from the work o f competition state theorists Torfing (1999), Cemy 
(1999, 2000, 2002a,b) (Cemy, Menz and Soederberg, (2005), Alber and Standing (2000) and 
Jessop (2002) a set o f  common analytical positions that will be used to develop a framework
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to guide this investigation o f the Irish social security system (Appendix B). The framework 
should enable rigorous examination o f the thesis objectives. There are clear challenges in 
drawing such works into a collective theory, not least their choice o f quite different language 
to describe similar concepts and the reconciliation o f Marxist and non-Marxist approaches. 
However all stress the political and discursive construction o f economic reality and distance 
themselves from a more fundamentalist Marxist type o f economic determinism. All accept 
that globalisation exists, is here to stay and has reoriented the domestic state to be more 
internationally focused. All argue that globalisation is a key driver behind the transformation 
o f the industrial welfare state into a competition state. They describe a withering, or 
hallowing, o f  the state into a larger but less effective state focused on micro rather than 
macro policy. They stress the power behind deregulated international capital markets and 
understand this change in Polanyian concepts o f  market disembeddedness and 
commodification. All are wary o f  overly functionalist globalisation explanations and focus 
instead on the powerful causal role o f  national political mediation and the discursive 
construction o f change. They highlight shifting forms and new spatial levels o f  governance, 
new actors and emerging roles o f  transnational political elites. All expect remarkable 
country-specific heterogeneity but offer ideal type models as tools to help develop ones 
understanding o f  change.
The overall thesis hypothesis is that recommodification o f social security occurs as social 
policy is subordinated to the needs o f the economy (Jessop 2002). Redistributive welfare 
rights take second place to a productivist reordering o f social policy to meet present and 
future economic needs. However it is necessary to unpack what recommodification means 
and develop indicators that can capture the degree to which such recommodification is taking 
place. In competition state theory the context for domestic social security policy is 
international competitiveness. Low taxation and wage moderation lead to pressure for cuts in 
public sector spending and limits the capacity to fund social security and leads to regulation, 
privatisation and the use o f new public management techniques. Public investment is 
expected to focus on learning and training, to enhance labour market supply and to create 
flexible labour markets. There are shifts from universal to targeted social protection 
spending. This residualisation causes new and multiple forms o f inequality with the weakest, 
those not able to access the labour-market, suffering most from adaptation. The welfare 
system becomes more contingent and productivist with increased active provisions based on 
trampoline metaphors. Rights are more conditional and linked to obligations. Labour market 
activation policy can be carrot or stick but will promote welfare to work strategies. There is
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an increase in women's labour market participation, this impacts on the capacity o f the 
family to provide welfare and commodifies care
2 4 A critical assessment of Competition State Theory
Pierson asserts there is only weak evidence supporting the causal impact o f  globalisation 
(1998 540) Cemy and Jessop do not attempt to empirically prove their respective 
hypotheses Cemy claims the value o f International Political Economy (IPE) is not that it can 
provide answers but that it can provide questions (1999 147) Jessop asserts the value o f  
ideal type models lies in how they can assist one to understand change and further ones 
knowledge about future collective choices, he does not expect they can be empirically 
proven (2002 4) Torfing (1999) and Standing and Alber (2000), on the other hand, use 
competition state theory to develop country-specific case studies, their work testifies that the 
theories are useful windows through which welfare change can be examined The real test o f  
adequacy is not whether you can prove a theory but whether you can use a theory 
Competition state theory has already been practically applied in Ireland (Kirby, 2002 
Dukelow, 2004 Boyle, 2005, Kirby and Murphy 2006) More recent work by Cemy, Menz 
and Soederberg (2005) uses the theory to examine change in a wide variety o f  states
Phillips (2005) identifies a functionalist bias where competition state theorists understand the 
form o f  state as an outcome o f its adaptation to the challenges o f economic globalisation 
This bias, according to Phillips, results in a failure to consider the role o f  politics in 
producing ‘variation, contingency and specificity in the institutional structures o f states, the 
nature o f state strategies and the types o f state-society linkages that prevail in particular 
political economies’ Philips (2005 110) A functionalist theory would not be able to 
accommodate the variety o f  outcomes described in Cemy et al (2005) Different varieties o f  
capitalism are compatible within the competition state Torfing (1999 7) explains that liberal 
social market states, statist social democratic states or corporatist conservative states pursue 
different strategies towards a competition state Jessop (2002) anticipated states would 
contain elements o f  four variants o f the competition state neo-liberal, neo-corporatist, neo- 
statist and neo-communitarian Cemy et a l , (2005 21) identify heterogeneity at nation state 
level but offer three competition state models which, they argue, are emerging varieties o f  
neo liberalism, the Development State model, the Anglo-American model and the European 
Neo-Corporatist model He understands this as divergence within convergence on the ‘roads 
to globalisation' The debate in this thesis about whether Ireland’s model o f  development is a
35
neo-liberal, neo-statist or neo-corporatist model is further discussed in Chapter Four.
Crucially, globalisation brings both opportunities and threats (Cemy et al., 2005). 
Competition state stresses the role o f  politicking and how policy is influenced by discourse 
and the domestic political mediation o f policy change. Torfing (1999), for example, 
identified political mediation and discourse as the key variable in determining the scope, 
extent and style o f the transition o f social security policy to workfare12. Cemy refers to a 
limited convergence o f the Left on a political imperative to reinvent the social dimension o f  
politics within the various versions o f social neo-liberalism (Cemy et al., 2005:20, 21). 
NESC (2005a, b) is evidence in Irish discourse o f trying to innovative creatively within the 
new neo-liberal playing field
As with other key political economy theories competition state theory is inadequate when it 
comes to theorising about gender or race related change. None o f the literature reviewed 
above explicitly account for gender and care related change. Competition state theory, apart 
from the broad predictions o f recommodification and residualisation o f those furthest from 
the labour market, fails to develop hypothesis about how changes in the state and the market 
impact on the capacity o f society to produce reciprocal or family based forms o f  welfare. 
This clear limitation implies a potential failure to observe any trends outside o f  the 
productivist model (mirroring the original feminist critique (Lewis 1993) o f  Esping- 
Andersen's 1990 work). This is a major omission given that competition state theorists 
predict shifts in the risk o f poverty to those furthest from the labour market (Cemy et al 
2005, Alber and Standing) and that such shifts are highly likely to further feminize poverty. 
Nor, in a theory that focuses in shifts in governance, is there is any analysis o f  whether shifts
12 C om petition  state theo ry  is b road ly  com patib le  w ith  P ierson 's  (1994 , 1996, 1998, 2 0 01 ) and  Sw ank
(2003) po litical sc ience w ork. P ierson  (1998) a rgued  th a t po litica l res is tance  to  re tren ch m en t m eans 
tha t governm en ts are m uch  m ore  likely  to  m ed ia te  and  res truc tu re  ra th e r than  d ism an tle  w elfare  states. 
Sw ank  (2002) hypo theses tha t the type  o f  po litica l in stitu tions an d  the n u m b er o f  ve to  po in ts  are 
crucial variab les tha t de term ine  dom estic  capac ity  to  nego tia te  restructu ring . T he la rger the n u m b er o f  
ve to  po in ts the m ore d ifficu lt the nego tia tion  o f  change and  the m ore likely  the  status quo  to  rem ain . 
T hese  hypo theses are co m patib le  w ith  and en rich  com petition  sta te  theo ry  and  m ay b e  o f  real value 
w hen  try ing  to  exp la in  qu ite  specific  Irish  w elfare  re fo rm  choices.
in governance impact on patriarchal power relations and subsequent gender related welfare 
outcomes.
However, competition state theory’s focus on the changing nature o f the state gives it a clear 
theoretical edge. Political economy understands welfare as being dependent on the politically 
negotiated relationship between the market and the state: if  the state or the market changes 
then changes in welfare policy and outcomes will follow. Competition state theory enables 
us to appreciate the states own conflicting demands and internal and external pressures. It 
stresses the importance o f  understanding the context in which the state is making specific 
decisions and how governance is transformed to include a new transnational power elite and 
multilevel governance (further examined in Chapters Five and Six). There are clear 
weaknesses, including its treatment o f gender and methodological challenges relating to 
measuring or quantifying qualitative change. However competition state theory still offers a 
way forward to explore and examine what happened Irish social security policy, the 
processes through which decisions were made and the rationale for those changes.
2.5 Commodification
The discussion now turns to the challenge o f conceptualising defining and measuring the 
type o f welfare change or commodification envisaged by competition state theory. 
Commodities are the objects, through whose production and exchange, surplus is created, 
extracted and amassed (Scholte, 2000). In Polanyian (2001) terms, commodification occurs 
when any resource is given a monetary value and becomes tradable in a market with a view  
to extracting profit. Commodification is often used to describe how globalisation is 
increasing the reach o f the market system into different areas o f  life, including education, 
health, housing, sport and care, with a negative affect on welfare. Scholte (2000) describes 
how over time a widening spectrum o f  resources (consumer goods, finance capital and 
information / communication) has been incorporated into the capitalist accumulation process. 
Competition state theory uses the concept o f commodification to explain how the 
globalisation o f the political economy impacts on the relationship between the state, the 
market and welfare outcomes. Competition state theorists hypothesis that the market 
economy is again being disembedded from society. This happens as more social, political 
and economic relationships are negotiated in commodified terms with monetary values 
attached to them and as the state deregulates laws that previously protected citizens from 
market excess.
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In the case o f  labour, commodification occurred when labour became a saleable commodity 
in the market Polanyi (2001) argued, however, that labour was a false commodity because, 
unprotected, labour is too vulnerable to the market’s greed for profit If labour is left 
unprotected the market’s urge to maximize profit would destroy human labour by forcing its 
commodity price below that considered necessary for human survival Polanyi (2001) 
anticipated that following a ‘movement’ towards commodification, society, sensing a 
diminution o f human welfare, will respond in a ‘double movement’ by pressing the state to 
protect commodified labour from the excesses o f  market greed Society would press the state 
to decommodify labour
The state responds to such a double movement by controlling or regulating the labour market 
and introducing social protection to remove the citizen’s complete dependency on that 
market Polanyi’s (2001) concept o f  commodification places welfare policy, labour market 
regulation and social protection legislation within the broader state / market relationship The 
extent o f decommodification depends on the degree to which the state has intervened to 
protect the citizen from the vagaries o f the market system It is a political choice as to how 
much the state chooses to decommodify labour and embed the market into society
Scharpf and Schmidt (2000a) describe how the relative weakness o f  the international 
political economy was a vital factor explaining the growth o f the modem welfare state and 
the particular varieties o f capitalism that emerged Once the ideological demand for change 
had occurred after WW2 the formation o f the modem welfare state, expansion o f social 
rights and decommodification was enabled by the weakness o f  the capitalist world economy 
after World War Two Domestic states were relatively unconstrained by the nature o f  a weak 
world economy and were able to decommodify labour and embed the market without 
endangering the viability o f the national economy Scharpf and Schmidt (2000a 1) explain 
how this was a time o f embedded liberalism with few constraints on domestic policy choices
since exit options for investors, producers and consumers could be controlled 
national policy makers had considerable freedom to regulate the conditions o f  
investment production, employment and distribution without endangering the 
international viability o f  the national economy
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Since the 1970’s, however, a series o f internationally focused decisions have eroded national 
economic boundaries. Capital exchange, currency controls, and trade barriers have been 
removed. This stronger international political economy impacts on the capacity o f the 
domestic state to maintain the level o f social protection and labour market regulation found 
in strongly decommodified mature welfare states. As social rights become less affordable, 
decommodifed welfare states become less viable. Hence we see recommodification or 
combinations o f  welfare retrenchment, increased labour market conditionality and labour 
market deregulation. People are more likely to have to resort to the labour market or private 
markets for various forms o f social protection or public services that were previously 
delivered by the state.
Measuring levels of commodification
Just as Boyer and Hollingsworth (1997) observed many varieties o f  capitalism so too there 
are many levels o f  decommodification. Even under similar pressures some societies chose to 
remain more decommodified than others. Esping Andersen (1990) developed a methodology 
to measure and compare levels o f decommodification13. Esping-Anderson’s methodology 
was, and still is, the subject o f lively debate and criticism (Lewis, 1992; Room, 2000). Van 
Hoorhis (2002) argues there are critical methodological and weaknesses in the 
conceptualisation and quantification o f decommodification measures. Nonetheless Esping- 
Andersen’s work is still used extensively. It was utilised by Scruggs and Allan (2003a,b,c) to 
assess whether states have recommodified over the period 1970 to 2000. They found that 
most states welfare states have consistently decommodified14. Korpi and Palme (2002) and 
Alber and Standing (2000) used different definitions o f decommodification to analyse data to 
assess if recommodification has occurred. All find some evidence o f recommodification that 
contradicts the more positive conclusion o f Scrugg and Allen (2003a,b,c). However all are 
open to contestation on methodological grounds. None use the same definition or 
measurement and results cannot be compared.
13 E sp ing  A ndersen  defined  decom m od ifica tion  as the s ta te ’s a ttem p t to  p rov ide  social righ ts tha t 
guaran tee  w elfare , independen t o f  the m arket. H ow ever, from  the perspec tive  o f  th is thesis, h is 
defin ition  fails to  accoun t fo r cond itionality  (im posed  labou r-m arket b eh av io u r as a  cond ition  o f  
rece iv ing  a social secu rity  paym ent).
14 H o w ever th e ir quan tita tive  da ta  and  use o f  E sp ing  A ndersen 's  o rig inal m ethodo logy  and  defin itions 
are bese t w ith m ethodo log ica l, da ta  and c o m p a r a t i ^  d ifficu lties.
In evaluating the possible use o f Esping Andersens methodology to measure 
recommodication, the author concluded that, because the methodology does not account for 
o f  how levels o f  conditionality impact on levels o f personal commodification, it was not a 
useful conceptual or methodological tool. Given that the intention o f decommodification is 
an expression o f societal and state strategies to make people feel less vulnerable, it is 
surprising there have been few attempts to develop qualitative methodologies to measure 
outcomes from the perspective o f the social security claimant or end user. It would, for 
example, be useful to know whether people believe they have over time experienced 
commodification and feel more vulnerable to market changes. A great deal more needs to be 
done to develop methodologies and indicators capable o f measuring the true extent o f  
commodification and the adequacy o f social protection from the perspective o f the 
vulnerable. Such a measurement would need to include analysis o f how rules governing 
claimants social and economic behaviour impact on feelings o f  vulnerability.
The most serious and sustained criticism o f the concept o f  commodification comes from a 
gender perspective which argues that to equate citizenship with simply paid work is gender 
blind. Bradshaw and Shaver (1995) reflect that the concept o f commodification makes sense 
only for those who are in the paid employment market and does not make sense for those 
who not (including many women who work in the home in caring or household roles). 
Feminists have developed defamiliarisation as a concept o f female social citizenship (Lister, 
1994). This is defined as the degree to which individual adults can uphold a socially 
acceptable standard o f living independently o f the family either though paid work or 
provision o f social security. Progress towards social rights for women (defamiliarisation) can 
be measured by reference to three policy issues, enabling women access to paid work, 
enabling employment in the context o f  women’s different role to men as primary carers 
within the family and access to individual rights with the social security and tax systems 
(Kilkey and Bradshaw, 1999). This gender analysis raises some fundamental issues about 
the concept o f commodifciation (more reliance on paid markets) as a negative outcome for 
people. If access to paid employment can be seen as a positive social right for women then 
surely too access to paid employment is a positive social right for people living in poverty 
who are other wise denied various social rights o f participation. The key question is how 
does commodification impact on the citizen’s quality o f  life and to what degree does 
participation in paid employment enhance social citizenship? Torfings (1999) differentiated 
between positive or offensive workfare and negative or defensive workfare clarify types o f
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commodification (in Chapter Three)
Notwithstanding the clear challenge, especially the gender challenge, inherent in both 
conceptualising and measuring commodification, it has much to offer as a theoretical 
concept For both men and women it allows exploration o f  welfare change in the context o f  
the individual’s transitional relationship between the state and the market As a theoretical 
concept commodification offers a nuanced and qualitative approach to understanding how  
societal change impacts on individual welfare By enabling an understanding o f  how the 
nature o f social security can change without the amount o f  social security expenditure 
changing it enables one to understand the paradox o f  worsening welfare outcomes happening 
without parallel welfare expenditure retrenchment While there are methodological 
difficulties in defining and measuring commodification it remains a theoretically useful way 
to approach an examination o f  welfare change
2 6 The Theoretical Framework -  Outline of the Theoretical Approach
The following sections develop a number o f  hypotheses relating to the three key thesis 
questions Firstly what happened Irish social security or more precisely did the changes 
anticipated by the ‘competition state’ happen Secondly how was social security policy 
mediated in the policy process, and thirdly why did policy outcomes take the form they did
What happened Irish Social Security
Hypotheses developed in 'new politics o f the welfare state* political economy literature 
(Pierson P, 2001, Swank 2002) and outlined in the earlier literature review are used to assist 
in the development o f  the framework By building on the Pierson’s conceptual framework 
and augmenting it with competition state theories hypothesis discussed above that social 
security delivery becomes more regulated, outcomes more residuallsed and payments more 
conditional on active labour market behaviour and by building gender related hypotheses 
into the picture the following framework emerges
Activation and conditionality Passive income maintenance shifts to active spending on 
training and education Welfare is reinvented into ‘workfare’ where income support is more 
conditional and linked to obligations to participate in the labour market Cemy et al 
(2005 18) define workfare as ‘new regulations and programmes designed to enable or
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compel the poor to enter the labour market through a combination o f  offensive carrots 
(training, education employment subsidies) and defensive sticks (reduced and time-limited 
benefits)’ This extends to women and increased labour market participation o f  women 
impacts on family capacity and commodifies care
Retrenchment The prioritisation o f  international competitiveness results in a ‘low tax, low  
inflation’ fiscal policy as expressed and supervised in the EU’s Growth and Stability Pact 
Fiscal pressures lead countries to resort to short-term cost cutting and long-term cost 
containment and cost avoidance
Residuahsation The state aims to reduce fiscal obligations by decreasing welfare 
recipients’ dependence on the state and forcing them to rely more on the labour market 
Employment routes out o f poverty are prioritised at the expense o f redistributive and 
egalitarian objectives The focus on maintaining low welfare rates to promote work 
incentives has inegalitarian implications for those who cannot exercise employment routes 
out o f  poverty (Cemy et a l , 2005 17) Non-labour market participants including the elderly, 
people with disabilities and those involved in ‘caring’ duties at home are more vulnerable in 
‘the increasing relative gulf between the rich and poor’
Regulation The function o f  the state changes N ew public management regulatory 
frameworks enable governments ‘to steer not row’ (Cemy et al 2005 17) New forms o f  
governance lead to the delegation o f policy to new actors at national and other levels There 
is a trend towards the privatisation o f provision, and public service delivery is organised 
around commercial or market-consumer principles
Defamiliansation As the labour market potential o f  women is recognised various policy 
changes take place to promote women, including mothers, participation in the labour market 
These include individualisation o f  tax and social welfare, education and training supports for 
women and provision o f childcare in the private market
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Table 3 2 WHAT Indicators for what policy changes happened
Recommodification ; Indicators
i
Activation /
Conditionality
Retrenchment
Residuahsation
i
Active Spending - carrots 
Conditionality - sanctions 
Extending to lone parents /  disability 
Cost cutting 
Cost containment
Cost avoidance (failure to expand or to meet new risks) 
Targeted payments -  
Increased relative poverty, ^
| Non labour market (old, disabled, home duties) poorer
I
1
; State as regulator
i
I
Regulation 1 Privatisation
i!
i N ew Public Management -  customer focus
...  i!
Defamiharisation
Individualisation
i
W omen’s Access to Education and Training 
More market provision o f  childcare
How -  the process of mediating change
Hay (2004b 246) reinforces Swanks (2002) conclusion when he stresses how ‘policy making 
even in response to common external challenges is a highly complex and differentiated 
process’ Competition state theorists are used here to develop a framework to examine how  
globalisation impacts on the governance and policy mediation o f  the Irish and international 
policy community Cemy (2002a) describes how the policy community transforms from an 
‘iron triangle’ to a ‘golden pentagon’ This imagery while perhaps a little forced nonetheless 
provides a conceptual framework to map the Irish social security policy community and 
international policy community and to account for how changes in how policy is mediated in 
those policy communities and to link those changes to international political economy 
changes
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Cemy et al., (2005) describe the emergence o f a more fragmented and complex social 
security policy community. They identify how power shifts to employers, business and 
capital within that community and how pressures from the international political economy 
result in new forms o f  multilevel international governance including the presence o f new  
international policy elites. Chapter Five and Six examine whether governance has been 
transformed according to the indicators or features outlined in Table 2.3 which will guide the 
discussion in Chapter Five.
Table 2.3 How Indicators for the process of mediating change
Hypotheses: Transforming Governance Indicators
Iron Triangle to Golden Pentagon
Presence o f international policy elite 
Multilevel governance
Fragmented and Complex
More actors
More institutional spaces
Power shifts to capital
Shifts in power between institutions 
Regulation
Why -  the rationale for policy changes
Competition state theory stresses how political agency and the role played by domestic 
institutions and practices, national and international interest groups and the evolving 
relationship between the public and private determine policy choices (Cemy et al., 2005:17). 
Chapter Two referred to how Ditch and Oldfield (1999) differentiated between ‘innovative’ 
and ‘consolidating’ regimes. Swank (2002) also differentiated states according to 
institutional characteristics and laid particular stress on electoral regimes and the number o f  
veto points. Hay (2004a:205) observed how:
Certain political systems, those that are centralised adversarial first past the post 
or two-party, for instance, are more prone to crisis engendered institutional 
change than others, who may be characterised by incremental reformism.
It has been asked whether or not Irish political culture and institutions might be the key 
variables capable o f explaining the Irish welfare reform trajectory and in particular its
44
apparent path departure from the Anglo-Saxon or Liberal welfare regime It was stressed 
earlier how all competition state theorists stressed the importance o f  political mediation, 
discourse and ideas15 This points to the relationship between Irish political culture, and 
institutions, interests, and patterns o f  political discourse How do features o f  Irish national 
political culture and political institutions shape and determine Irish social security policy 
change7 The thesis hypotheses thatlnsh institutions promote a consensus based political 
culture, and therefore there is a minimalist approach to political discourse and exposure to 
only to ideas acceptable to the consensus political culture This low-key and mcrementalist 
approach to Irish social security reform mitigates against extreme forms o f positive and 
negative policy and slows the pace o f  reform While features should as clientalism, Catholic 
church values and patriarchy have been extensively discussed in Irish literature ( Lee 1999,
O Connell and Rottman 1992, Coakely 2004, Chubb 1992) other features which are part o f  
and/or contribute to a consensus oriented policy community, the weak resourcing the policy 
community, the role o f  social partnership in policy mediation and the underdeveloped role 
o f  civil society are examined in more detail in Chapter Five and Chapter Seven Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven develop discussion about the co-ordinative problem-solving style o f  
Irish policy discourse, the pragmatic rejection o f  ideological debate and debates whether the 
Irish policy community can be said to be insular or whether is beginning to be dominated by 
EU discourse Table 2 4 outlines the key features one might expect in a the Irish social 
security policy community and the type o f signposts that will guide the exploration o f why 
Irish social security policy is mediated the way it is
15 In fluenced  by  B ly th  (2001 , 2002), C ox  (2000), L iste r (1988), S tand ing  (1999), D eacon  (2001a,b , 
2002), P ierson  (2001), Sw ank  (2002 , 2003), A lb e r and  S tand ing  (2000), S ch ap f an d  S chm id t (2000a, 
b ) as w ell as L ijphart (1 9 9 9 ) and  T sebelis  (2002)
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Table 2.4 Why indicators for rationale for policy changes
Hypotheses:
Conservative consensus policy community
Indicators
Conservative values
PR electoral system/clientalism  
Catholic Church Values 
Patriarchal Powers Structures
Weak policy community
Under resourced policy community
Ideational ‘cognitive lock’ role o f social 
partnership.
Civil society role underdeveloped
Lack o f  policy discourse
Coordinative problem-solving discourse 
Pragmatic rejection o f ideological debate 
Insular and dominated by EU discourse
Conclusion
The thesis has a central puzzle. The thesis argues that, given Ireland’s status as one o f the 
world’s most globalised nations and the emphasis on competitiveness in national policy 
discourse, a competition state theoretical framework (Cemy et al., 2005) was most suited to 
examine the experience o f Irish social security policy reform. Having critiqued more 
quantitative approaches to analysing the impact o f  globalisation on social security, the 
chosen theoretical approach, based on competition state theory, understands change in a 
more qualitative and transformative fashion. The thesis links a number o f  theoretical 
approaches which have in common a focus on the linkage between globalisation and 
increased competitiveness and the political mediation o f  a more commodified social security 
regime. Using those theories and adapting work by Pierson P. (2001) a framework was 
developed that will now be used as a theoretical framework to examine what happened to 
Irish social security and to explain the process through which it happened and the rationale 
for decisions made. Chapter Four uses this theoretical framework to examine what happened 
through the lens o f activation / conditionality, retrenchment, residualisation, regulation and 
defamilarisation. Chapters Five and Six describe and analyse the shifting patterns o f  
governance in the social security community within a competition state and highlight the
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increasing fragmentation and complexity o f  policy mediation and the increased influence o f  
multilevel governance and presence o f  mtemational elites Chapters Seven and Eight 
examine distinct processes where social security policy was mediated and highlight among 
other trends the causal impact o f Irish political culture on the scale and scope o f  Irish social 
security decisions, as well as the social or political construction o f discourse Chapter Nine 
concludes and discusses what we have learned and whether the theoretical framework has 
been adequate to the task o f understanding how social security policy has been managed in a 
highly globalised country
If the examination, finds that recent Irish social security reform, while consistent with many 
characteristics identified by Competition State theory, does not fully conform to what might 
be expected in a Competition state then the central research question is why this might be the 
case and to understand, in the Irish context, how domestic constraints limit policy choices 
even in highly globalised competition states The table below summarises the key themes 
examined in the research
Table 2 5 Summary of theoretical framework and research methods
M ethod
1
Hypotheses Indicators
Case Study WHAT Happened Recommodificati on
Document analysis 
Document analysis
I
Document analysis ;
i
State as regulator
j
Regulation \ Privatisation
! New Public Management -  customer focus!_ „ __ 
j Cost cutting
i
Retrenchment Cost containmenti
1 i
■ Cost avoidance (failure to expand or to meet new risks) 
| j Targeted payments -  
I Resldualisation j Increased relative poverty
j Non labour-market participants are poorer
Document analysis
1
1!
!
! Active Spending -  carrots
i Activation / ~ .
Conditionality ' Conditionahty - sanctions
' Extending to lone-parents and/or disability claimants
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M e th o d H y p o th e s e s
[
| In d ic a to r s
Document analysis \ Individualisation
Defamiliarisation W omen’s Access to Education and Training 
More market provision o f childcare
Case study How -  Process Transforming governance
Document 
Analysis/ Elite 
Interviews
Iron Triangle to 
Golden Pentagon
Presence o f international policy elite 
Multilevel governance
Document 
Analaysis/ Elite 
Interviews
Fragmented and 
Complex
More actors
More institutional spaces
Secondary Lit
Elite Interviews Power shifts to capital Shifts in power between institutions
Secondary Lit s Regulation
Case Study WHY -  Rationale
i
| Conservative consensus policy community
i
Elite interviews 
and document 
analysis
Case studies
Secondary Lit
f
1i
]
i
1
i Conservative values
i
i
i
PR electoral system/cllentalism 
Catholic Church Values 
Patriarchal Powers Structures
Elite interviews 
and document 
analysis
Case studies
Secondary Lit
Weak policy 
community
i
i
Under resourced policy community
Ideational ‘cognitive lock’ role o f social partnership
Civil society role underdeveloped
Elite interviews 
and document 
analysis
Case Studies
Secondary Lit
1
i
Lack o f policy i 
discourse !
3
1
!1
1!
; Coordinative problem-solving discourse 
1 Pragmatic rejection o f ideological debate 
Insular and dominated by EU discourse
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To examine the origins o f policy is to understand the processes o f  policy change with a view  
to understanding how to shift policy in a more radical direction
(Ginsburg 1992 2)
CHAPTER THREE - OVER VIEW OF THE IRISH 
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
31 Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to analyse the Irish social security system in its historic 
context in order to discuss ho it can be classified and to provide a basis for discussing its 
trajectory o f  change This chapter is sub-divided into four mam sections history, objectives, 
structure and international comparative literature Because path dependency is a strong 
explanatory variable in understanding Irish social security reform an insight into its history, 
structure and objectives prepares the ground before examining more recent changes
Path dependency is a concept derived from political science, historical sociology and new 
economic history It understands that existing institutions and policies restrain options for 
change Previous commitments must be honoured, the institutional complexity involved in 
meeting the future implications o f previous and present policies makes policy reform more 
complex and difficult to negotiate (Heclo 1974a) Path dependency also influences the 
political mediation o f  policy, the structure o f  existing policy and formal institutions are key 
variables determining policy change in the way they influence policy-making capacity o f  
governments and type o f  policy feedback Pierson (1994 14) emphasises how 'policy 
feedback5 from previous political choices leads to ‘new institutional politics’ where alliances 
and interests that developed around previous institutions and policies influence future paths 
o f  development Political action about policy choices is therefore influenced by references to 
past social relations, ethos, myths and ideology (Harryson and O ’Brien, 2003 1) We cannot 
understand how the future is determined without reference to the past However, path 
dependency is a theoretical tool for explaining consistency in policy decisions and is not an 
appropriate tool for explaining change, accepting that path dependency exists does not mean 
that change is not possible
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3.2 History
One cannot reflect on Irish social security history without referring to Ireland’s colonial past. 
McLaughlin (2002) highlights how the absence o f  a new poor law in Ireland (North and 
South) led to a stronger and long lasting reliance on charitable welfare. This, alongside an 
absence o f nation building, she argues, contributed towards a social policy culture with 
unusually dominant elite values, an aversion to rights culture and strong institutional 
positioning o f  professional middle classes. The first UK statutory system o f social welfare 
was means-tested Poor Law (1838), introduced in Ireland as the Poor R elief (Ireland) Act 
1847. In Poor Law the objective o f preserving work incentives was paramount, the principle 
o f ‘less eligibility’ meant those who benefited from Poor Law had to be worse o ff than those 
in the lowest-paid employment (Cousins, 2003:12).
Until Ireland gained independence in 1921 social welfare schemes introduced in the United 
Kingdom also applied in Ireland. These included Workman’s Compensation Act (1897), Old 
Age (Non-contributory) Pension (1908) National Insurance Act Sickness and Unemployment 
Benefits (1911) (Cousins 1995:13). After independence, the ideology o f the new state was 
deeply conservative (Burke, 1999:26) as was the international ideology. While the economic 
resources o f  the new state were simply not there to support any radical social policy, even if  
they were, the political desire seemed equally lacking. That said, during the 1930’s the social 
insurance system was expanded and new social assistance schemes introduced; 
Unemployment Assistance in 1933, Widows and Orphans Pension in 1935 (Mills 1999:7). 
Poor Law was renamed Home Assistance in 1939, and, while some administrative 
arrangements improved, the basic Poor Law principle o f less eligibility remained for many 
categories. The infirm, the widow, the orphan and the aged (Cousins, 1995a: 18) were 
considered ‘deserving’ o f  social protection. For all others the objective o f preserving work 
incentives drove policy.
Early Irish approaches to income maintenance and social policy were relatively insular. 
There was little reformist social analysis associated with the secular left and ideals o f  
equality. Instead the Catholic Church promoted a social policy based on alleviation o f  
poverty and subsidarity (Acheson et al 2004:83). The strong ‘catholic hegemony’ Mahon 
(1987:54) was combined with a strong insularity which kept national attention focused 
inwards (Lee \999). This attitude and approach continued on into the 1950s and ‘60s, In 
contrast to most other European states ‘the ending o f the second world war was not a
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moment o f  great upheaval for Ireland’ (Conroy, 1999 34) nonetheless some international 
debates influenced change in Ireland and the Department o f Social Welfare (DSW), 
established in 1947, influenced by the 1942 UK Beveridge principles, adopted the 1949 
DSW  White Paper on Social Policy This in path dependant fashion consolidated the 
inherited contingency-based system o f  benefit and means-tested payments and retained the 
principle o f  ungenerous basic standard payments and protecting the incentive to work Over 
time social insurance coverage was extended, but not to public-sector employees or the self- 
employed Home Assistance remained alongside contingency- based means tested payments 
for selected groups o f deserving poor The unambitious and insular policy culture was some 
what broken down, by first Europeanisation and now globalisation A built up o f demand in 
the 1960s lead to insurance and means-tested schemes expansion during the 1970’s with 
Retirement Pension, Invalidity Pension and a Death Grant introduced in 1970, a Deserted 
W ife’s Benefit in 1973 and Lone Mothers Allowance in 1974 Social insurance was 
extended to all employees, except part-time workers, in the form o f  Pay-Related Benefit 
(PRB) in 1974 and contributions became related to wages in 1979 In 1977 a new national 
means-tested scheme, Supplementaiy Welfare Allowance (SWA), replaced what remained o f  
the Poor Law or Home Assistance scheme
The impact o f  EU membership and the feminist movement was felt in the 1970’s and early 
1980’s when Irish social security policy welfare was rather grudgingly reformed to meet the 
EEC Social Security Directive 7 9 / 7  Introduction o f  equal treatment into the social security 
system had a chequered history Despite judicial and political intervention it has been only 
partially achieved and Irish social security payments still remain family based and non- 
mdividuahsed (Murphy 2003) The 1980’s fiscal and unemployment crises caused a 
structural shift from insurance payments as an increased number o f claimants became 
dependant on means-tested Unemployment Assistance Government responded to this crisis 
by targeting expenditure at those most in need, expanding the use o f SWA and maintaining 
real increases in social assistance payments This was, in part, funded by retrenching social 
insurance payments
The influential 1986 Report o f the Commission on Social Welfare (CSW, Ireland 1986) is 
the only comprehensive review o f  the Irish social security system It recommended retaining, 
consolidating and strengthening the system with a focus on improving the adequacy o f the 
payment and reinforcing the social insurance system The latter occurred over the next 
decade Social insurance cover extended to new groups o f workers, the self-employed in
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1988, part-time workers in 1991 and Community Employment participants and civil servants 
in 1995. Several means-tested payments were also introduced or improved including, a Pre- 
Retirement Allowance and a Lone Parents Allowance in 1990, the latter subsequently 
amended to One-Parent Family Payment in 1997, and Disability Allowance in 1995. The 
Carers Allowance was introduced in 1992 and a 1994 Home Makers Disregard disregarded 
time spent caring for children in the calculation for entitlement to social insurance pension. 
N ew  social insurance benefits were also introduced including Widowers Contributory 
Pension in 1994 and Carers Benefit in 2000. Asylum seekers were excluded from 
mainstream social security provision in 1999. Somewhat later than the UK, Ireland 
developed a habitual residence test in 2004, which excluded migrant workers from 
mainstream social protection. Ireland has thus far avoided following the UK down the 
welfare-to- work path o f  tax credits, merging benefits and job placement agencies or making 
payments more conditional. Over this time social welfare payments, while much improved, 
have never reached an adequate level and are still considered ungenerous by international 
comparison (CSW Ireland, 1986, NESC 2005a).
3.3 Present Day Structure
The current Irish social welfare system contains almost equal elements o f means tested social 
assistance and social insurance payments together with a universal Child Benefit payment 
and other universal additions for old-age pensioners including free travel, heating units and a 
television licence. There is a means-tested in-work payment called Family Income 
Supplement (FIS). All o f  these are administered centrally through the Department o f  Social 
and Family Affairs (DSFA). There is also a means-tested safety-net payment administered 
by the Health Service Executive through a regionally delivered SWA scheme. This scheme 
also incorporates a number o f additional supplements, some o f which are discretionary, for 
example, Emergency Needs Payments, and some o f which are means tested; such as Rent 
Supplements, Diet Supplements and back to school allowances. Ireland is highly dependant 
on means-tested payments with three times the EU average dependency on such payments 
(NESC 2005a). Social insurance payments are in the Beveridgean tradition, low and flat rate. 
Irish social security payments are low and do not exceed 30% o f  the gross average industrial 
earnings for working aged claimants or 32% per cent o f the gross average industrial earnings 
for pensioners.
The rules o f  the social welfare system are legally gender neutral, however the legacy 0 f the 
male-breadwinner system and the culture o f social welfare in Ireland mean the payment
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structures closely resemble a male breadwinner model McLaughlin and Yeates 1999, 
Mlaughn Kelly and Yeates 2002 More recently the social security system has begun to be 
characterised by racial bias as migrants became excluded from mainstream and 
supplementary social security provision The family based payment structure recognises the 
concept o f dependency within the family and enables adult claimants to have financial 
responsibility for ’dependants’, both adult and children A claimant with a dependant adult is 
entitled to claim a Qualified Adult Allowance (QAA) The fact that 95 per cent o f these QA 
claimants are women highlights the underlying gender bias o f the system (Murphy, 2003) 
Child Income Support is paid through a claimant to a dependant child by means of a Child 
Dependant Allowance (CDA) addition to the claimant’s social welfare payment Low-paid 
workers with children may be eligible for a means-tested Family Income Supplement A 
universal Child Benefit payment is paid to all families with children regardless of income 
Bradshaw and Shaver (1995) note that Irish tax and social security system is comparatively 
more generous to dependant mother and wives
Despite some simplification the Irish system remains very fragmented with a large number 
of contingencies16 The policy legacy o f the early development of these contingencies is a 
critical variable in explaining later decisions The traditional Poor Law principle o f Mess 
eligibility’ and maintenance o f the incentive to work still dominates attitudes towards rate 
setting which keep social security payments low and income inadequate The path 
dependency of highly targeted ungenerous and inadequate payments may be an important 
explanatory factor in explaining recent Irish reform Payments were already so low and 
targeted that there was no room or reason to reduce them even further As Mathews 
(1990 116) argued ‘given the low absolute level o f the payments, however, attention should 
be focused more on design than cuts’
The biggest structural path departures from the UK (Irelands natural comparator) are the 
ongoing retention of a number of contingent means tested payments, including separate 
income support for lone parents, a third tier means- tested SWA safety net, a less punitive 
and less expansive interpretation o f conditionality / workfare and a resistance to developing
16 Contingencies refer to a specific attribute a person must have or a behavioral condition they must 
comply with to qualify for a payment a lone a parent must be parenting alone, an unemployed person 
must be available for and genuinely seeking work If circumstances change and the contingency no 
longer applies, they are no longer eligible for that payment even if their need remains the same
tax-based income-support measures. NESC (2005a) highlights comparatively low social 
expenditure, more targeted and ungenerous payments, higher inequality and poverty and a 
less focused conditionality policy as key points differentiating the Irish regime from other 
small open European economies. Within the group o f liberal regimes Ireland stands out in 
terms o f its recognition of poverty and appreciation of social justice (but not social rights) 
and a less judgemental approach to the destitute and unfortunate. By large there is an 
absence of the social moral paternalism that characterises the welfare discourses of other 
English speaking countries. Irish constitutional politics has had some impact on Irish social 
security, the weak culture of rights as, for example, illustrated in the non incorporation of  
international human rights into domestic law is in part the consequence of the written 
constitution. McCashin (2004) also identifies constitutional vetos on reform of Irish social 
security. Some of the more positive treatments of wives (in terms of greater generosity 
towards dependants (Bradshaw and Shaver 1995) and the limited attempts towards activation 
of women with caring responsibilities are influenced by the primary role afforded to mothers 
in the 1937 constitution. The presence of a contested land border has to date not materialised 
in or prompted an underlying objective of harmonisation. Indeed the contested nature of the 
border perhaps enforced difference. Even in the mid 2000’s (post Good Friday Agreement 
and ceasefires) there is little evidence of an objective of harmonisation. There is increased 
cooperation and technical transfer of knowledge and systems primarily around fraud, frontier 
workers and migration.
3.4 Objectives of the social security system
Cousins (1995a) argues that is difficult to discern the objectives o f a social security system 
that developed in such a fragmentary and ad hoc fashion as the Irish system There is 
however consensus that the origins of the Irish social welfare system lie clearly in the liberal 
objective poverty alleviation (Powell, 1992) rather than a more social democratic objective 
of equality. McCashin (2004) stressed how policy development was dominated by a Fianna 
Fail government responding in an adhoc but populist fashion to the needs of the day. Ferriter
(2004) stressed the historical primacy o f anti-poverty objectives but also identified as did 
Roche (1984), from 1958 onwards, awareness that social security policy was relevant to 
efficiency objectives of increased productivity and economic growth.
The 1986 CSW agreed three financial objectives for social security policy: the abolition of 
poverty, income redistribution and income replacement. It also agreed to five principles 
through which the efficacy of policy should be measured: adequacy, redistribution,
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comprehensiveness, consistency and simplicity It did not define an explicit efficiency or 
work-incentive objective or principle but stressed the importance o f protecting work- 
mcentives as an overall constraint o f tax-transfer policy Neither did it establish consensus 
about the primacy o f adequacy or redistribution principles in determining policy While 
McCashin (2004) argues that CSW saw income redistribution as an objective o f the social 
security its larger historical legacy was the concept o f an ‘adequacy benchmark’ which 
promoted poverty reduction as the primary political objective O'Neill’s (1993) review of  
social security policy objectives confirms that the dominant equity and efficiency 
considerations influencing tax and transfer policy did not include income redistribution but 
did include poverty alleviation, earnings replacement and incentive preservation The 
National Anti-poverty Strategy (Ireland 1997c, Ireland 2002a) also highlighted consistent 
poverty alleviation17 and incentive preservation objectives Income redistribution or income 
equality was explicitly rejected as a government policy objective during the process of 
negotiating the NAPS Johnston (2002 3) refers to the fact that ‘one weakness in the revised 
NAPS is the absence of a relative18 income poverty target’, a feature critically reviewed by 
the European Commission who noted lack of attention to income equalities as a major 
weakness o f Irish policy (Hanan, 2002 5)
3  5 In t e r n a t io n a l C o m p a r a t iv e  C o n te x t
This section places the Irish social security system in an international context There is no 
ideal welfare type nor is it necessarily fruitful to force countries into boxes or labels (Kasza 
2002, Cousins, 1995b, Arts and Gelissen, 2002, Van Hoorhis, 2002, Peillon, 1994, Bambra, 
2004, NESC, 2005a) It is useful, nonetheless, to reflect on welfare regime literature as it 
relates to Ireland Titmuss (1956) originally located Ireland as a residual laggard welfare 
regime with a heavy reliance on social assistance means-tested payments Much modem 
debate about comparative welfare regimes focus on Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of  
Welfare Capitalism (1990) and his typology o f liberal, conservative and social democratic 
welfare regimes This debate has been o f limited use As Cousins (1995b) notes that Esping-
17 Consistent Poverty has been defined as living below a specified income level (60 per cent of 
median disposable household income) and experiencing enforced deprivation of one of eight 
indicators of deprivation such as a warm overcoat or a second pair of shoes
18 Relative Income Poverty refers to the proportion of the population falling below a certain income 
level, this population are considered to be at risk of poverty and experiencing income inequality
Andersen did not rise to the challenge of locating Ireland in any one regime, probably ecuase 
Ireland does not fit into any o f Esping-Andersen’s (1990) ideal types (O'Donnell, 1999; 
Boyle, 2005; Cousins, 1995b). Further the typology has been roundly critiqued from a 
number of perspectives and particularly from a gender perspective. Dissatisfied with 
Esping-Andersen’s definition and methodology Castle and Mitchell (1993) stressed the 
importance of culture in identifying welfare regime typologies and developed a Families of 
Nations typology. They added a fourth ‘radical’ category to Esping-Andersen’s typology to 
account for Australia and New Zealand (NZ) and concluded that Ireland was a hybrid of  
liberal and radical welfare regime models. Leibfried (1993), dissatisfied that Esping 
Andersen’s typology failed to account for Southern European welfare regimes, developed a 
forth ‘Latin Rim’ category. Because o f Irish peripherally, Catholicism and its agricultural 
economy, he associated Ireland, to some degree, with this Latin Rim typology.
NESC (2005a) argues Ireland is a hybrid system. While some acknowledge the liberal 
nature of Irish social security, some are more comfortable describing Ireland’s system as 
‘cross cutting’ (McLaughlin, 2001), or as moving from a conservative to liberal welfare 
regime (McCashin, 2004). This thesis, however, concurs with Kennelly and O’Shea (1998), 
Pierson (2001), Peillion (2001), Dukelow (2004), O’Connor J. (2003) O’Connor A. (2005) 
and later work of Esping-Andersen (2003), who classify Ireland as a liberal welfare regime. 
While the more general welfare state (including health, education housing and social 
services) may more accurately be described as mixed or hybrid, when it comes to classifying 
the Irish social security system it is possible to make a convincing case that Ireland has 
many features one associated with a liberal or residual welfare regime. These include a Poor 
Law legacy of less eligibility, ungenerous social welfare payments associated with low 
Replacement Ratios (RRs19), an exceptionally high proportion o f means-tested payments 
(NESC 200a:98) and flat-rate social insurance payments. Even taking into account both 
public and private spending on social inclusion the OECD finds Ireland is a low spender on 
social protection by EU standards (NESC 2005a; 113). Ireland has, relative to wealth as 
measured by GNP of GDP, low levels o f social expenditure or transfer effort. Finally if the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating, when evidence of welfare outcomes is reviewed Ireland 
ranks amongst the highest levels o f relative poverty and income inequalities in the OECD.
19 Replacement ratios measure the ratio of income when unemployed to income when in work. (Callan 
et al 1996)
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Structure, history and culture are not the only ways to define or differentiate social security 
regimes, gender or racial typologies have also been developed to highlight the danger of 
classifications which fail to capture how structural features o f social security exclude certain 
groups from forms of social protection. This awareness o f excluded groups and structural 
discrimination will become more relevant as globalisation and associated pressures produce 
new vulnerabilities and social risks. Lewis (1992) firmly locates Ireland as a strong male- 
breadwinner social security regime with a household payment structure, low female labour 
market participation and weak childcare provisions. While clearly a male breadwinner social 
security regime McLaughlin, Kelly and Yeates (2002) and McLaughlin and Yeates (1999) 
note how the Irish system has generous treatment of dependants, non working wives and 
children. Other positive features which distinguish the Irish system is the early introduction 
of Carers Allowance. More recently, the Irish social security regime has begun to display a 
sharp racial segregation or division where habitual residents are defined as the only 
legitimate receivers of welfare and asylum seekers are segregated from mainstream social 
security (Gebbes 2003).
Korpi and Palme (2003:435) associated Ireland with the UK, the US, NZ, Canada, Denmark, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands as ‘basic social security institutions’, a group which 
experienced the greatest degree of retrenchment, as measured by a decline in RRs over the 
years 1975 to 1995. Eardley et al. (1996) classed Ireland, along with the UK and Canada, as 
having an integrated safety-net social assistance regime. Gough (2001) placed Ireland with 
the UK and Australia as a regime type that was extensive, inclusive and with above average 
benefits. Ditch and Oldfield (1999) who ranked continental European countries, as a 
‘consolidator’ while ranking other English speaking countries as ‘radical innovators’. 
Consolidators ‘have not engaged in any significant policy development beyond uprating of 
benefit level, the refinement of existing objectives and minor administrative changes’ 
(1999:65). Radical innovators (Australia, Canada, UK and USA and New Zealand) all 
introduced significant changes and displayed evidence of policy innovation and share 
diffusion o f policy knowledge. While Ireland failed to respond to Ditch and Oldfield’s 
survey Ireland does appear more inclined to consolidation than radical innovation. While 
structurally similar to liberal regimes, it is less open to change and has less capacity to 
innovate in its political culture or political institutions. This important distinction will be 
developed later in the thesis. Clearly Ireland does not fit neatly into Esping-Andersen’s or 
other typologies. However the broader categorisation o f ‘liberal’ or ‘Anglo-Saxon’ fits with 
Irish social security historical path dependency and historical colonial UK dependency. It
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also fits with a more general cultural hegemony with other English speaking countries, with 
which Ireland is consistently compared.
The conclusion that Ireland belongs to the Anglo-Saxon regime was demonstrated in an 
influential paper by Sapir20 (2005) which distinguished the efficient but unequal UK and 
Irish models from the efficient and equal Nordic models, the inefficient and unequal 
Mediterranean models and the equal but inefficient Continental models.
Table 2.1 European welfare typology (Sapir 2005) Equity -vertical,efficiency -  horizontal
Low Efficiency High Efficiency
High Equity Continentals Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg
Nordic Austria, Denmark Sweden 
Finland, Netherlands
Low Equity
Mediterranean 
Spain, Greece, Italy
Anglo Saxon 
UK, Ireland, Portugal
3.6 Chapter Conclusion
Some key observations can be made at this stage. The difficulty in locating Ireland in 
international comparative typologies highlights that the Irish state has mediated its own 
unique brand of social security. It continues to do so based on path dependant liberal 
objectives of poverty alleviation and incentive preservation in a strong male breadwinner 
model which most closely resembles the Anglo Saxon model favouring efficiency at the 
expense of equality. The author concurs with Cousins (2005a) that on balance the United 
Kingdom (UK) is indeed still Ireland’s natural historical comparator. However while the 
structure o f the social security system might most closely resemble UK other aspects of Irish
20 Sapir (2005) differentiated the equity axis by reference to the inclusiveness of secondary 
education systems and the generosity of redistribution systems, deregulation or flexibility of 
labour markets differentiated the efficiency axis.
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policy development most certainly do not The Irish social security system is differentiated 
from the Anglo Saxon world’s liberal or residual model and other liberal English speaking 
regimes by way o f its colonial, rural and Catholic history (Daly and Yeates 2003, Cousins 
1995b), its institutional orientation to corporatism (Dukelow 2004) and its proportional 
representation electoral regime While this thesis is not comparative broad reference is made 
in later chapters to the Irish social security regime reform experience relative to other 
international models The strongest benchmark for assessing change is the degree to which 
change has been consistent with or is a path departure from a loosely defined liberal regime 
However Ditch and Oldfield’s (1999) differentiation of consolidating regimes from more 
innovative English speaking regimes suggests that accounting for Irish political culture and 
its relationship to innovation might be an important step towards accounting for the Irish 
reform experience
Pierson (1994 44) identifies the phenomena of policy ‘lock-in’ as a process of path 
dependence where initial choices o f institutional design have long-term implications In the 
Irish context it is possible to see the impact o f original political choices about the balance 
between social insurance, universal and residual payments, about the degree to which the 
social security system is a strong male-breadwinner model, about the emphasis placed on 
poverty alleviation or work incentives and the lack of focus on equality objectives The 
degree to which these choices are ‘locked in’ or have powerful alliances arguing to retain 
them will clearly influence the capacity for reform The presence of path dependent 
institutions and alliances makes it more likely that change will be negotiated in an 
incremental fashion The next chapter examines how the social security system has changed
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Does the crisis o f the welfare state mean economic forces of production must clash with 
social demands o f redistribution or does challenge amount to a more modest disequilibrium 
pointing to a round of more piecemeal adjustments?
(Heidenheimer et al 1990 265)
CHAPTER FOUR: WHAT HAPPENED TO IRISH 
SOCIAL SECURITY 1985-2005?
4 1  In t r o d u c t io n
Ireland is a test case for how globalisation impacts on social security policy (Dukelow, 2004, 
Cousins 2005a, Smith 2005) This Chapter aims to describe and analyse what happened Irish 
social security policy over the years 1985-2005 Even though Irish social security literature 
is relatively sparse there is, nonetheless, an interesting tension in the literature between three 
distinct conclusions, Irish change has been negative Irish change has been positive Irish 
change has been sparse and insignificant As discussed in the previous chapter the author 
accepts the difficulty of categorising the Irish social security system but nonetheless, for the 
purpose of having an operational benchmark for loose comparison, has chosen to benchmark 
Irish reform to international trends is the Anglo-Saxon liberal welfare regimes The chapter 
proceeds by using the theoretical indicators outlined in the previous chapter to frame the 
examination o f what happened It begins by reviewing recent relevant Irish social security 
literature It then over the next five sections addresses trends relating to aspects o f activation 
/ conditionality, retrenchment, residualisation, regulation and defamilarisation It ends by 
examining whether the Irish social security experience o f recommodification has been 
negative or positive and whether the Developmental Welfare State (NESC 2005a) might 
drive Irish social security policy in a different direction
4 2  D e b a te s  on the c u r r e n t  I r is h  s o c ia l w e lfa r e  syste m
Ireland rarely appears in international literature and too often the national literature is overly 
descriptive or theoretically underdeveloped Recent literature such as the McLaughlin and 
Yeates (2002) which discusses recent seminar papers examining North-South issues relating 
to social need and administration and two substantial publications McCashin (2004) and
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Cousins (2005a) filled gaps but considerable analysis remains to be done to more fully 
understand or explain the development of Irish social security policy (Cousins, 2005a).
Taylor (2002), Kirby (2002), O'Heam (1998) and Allen (2000) locate Irish social security 
reform on a neo-liberal trajectory with negative income distribution outcomes. Dukelow 
(2004) stresses employment participation and evolving concepts of social citizenship. 
Conroy (1999) identifies how continuation o f gender biased policy means inequalities 
remained unchallenged. Fanning (1999) notes policy is driven by poverty alleviation, making 
work pay and protecting the traditional role of the family. Kennelly and O Shea’s (1998) 
conclusion that Irish reform is modest relative to the UK is consistent with Daly and Yeates 
(2003) and McCashin (2004) who assert Ireland is developing a benign regime. Although 
Nolan (2000) described a declining welfare effort and O’Riain and O’Connell (2000:339) 
described ‘solidarity without equality’ both highlighted that this did not mean a neo-liberal 
trajectory. Cousins’ (1995a) assessment of policy change up to 1995 notes how change was 
minor and incremental. In later work Cousins (2005a:70) reflects on why there have been 
few radical challenges from either the left or right for structural reforms to the Irish social 
security system. He notes, how despite obvious pressures, there has been little public 
demand for reform. He concludes, using methodology developed by Pierson (1996), that 
Ireland has undergone less restructuring than the UK.
Table 4.1
Benefit Rules Structure
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0 = no significant change; - = reduction; -- = large reduction; + = increase; ++ = large 
increase
Source: Cousins (2005a:70)
There is consensus, to some degree, that measured against the UK or other liberal regimes.
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Ireland did not experience significant change but there is conflict about whether the change 
that did occur has been negative or positive. Most agree there was little change in Ireland at a 
time when other countries experienced substantial change. There are two puzzles. Was Irish 
change negative or positive? Why was there not more fundamental structural change over 
this period? To answer both questions we need to first examine empirically the nature, style 
and pace of Irish social security reform. This is done through the theoretical framework 
outlined in the previous chapter and repeated in Table 4.2 below. Competition state theory 
particularly stresses the activation / conditionality hypothesis hence more detailed attention 
is paid to this hypothesis than to the retrenchment, residualisation and regulation hypotheses. 
The following sections now examine each indicator in turn.
Table 4.2 What happened
Hypotheses
Recommodifïcation
Indicators
Activation / 
Conditionality
Active spending
Greater workfare (incentives and sanctions) 
Extend conditionality to lone parents / disability
Retrenchment
Costs Cutting 
Cost Containment
Cost Avoidance (no adaptation to risks)
Residualisation
More targeted payments 
Increased relative poverty,
Old, disabled & home duties greater risk of poverty
Regulation
State as Regulator 
Privatisation
New Public Management -  customer focus
Defamiliarisation
Individualisation
Women’s Access to Education and Training 
More market provision of childcare.
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The following chart summarises the trends m key data relating to Irish social security 
Collated from Irish Departmental Annual Statistical Reports the data is presented in five 
yearly snapshots from 1985 to 2004 (2005 data were unavailable at the point o f completion 
of thesis) Given the male breadwinner model nature o f the Irish social security system 
women are always not fully visible in this data Figures for Qualified Adults are not 
consistently available so the number o f unemployed recipients with children has been used 
as proxy figure but this may overestimate number o f QA's in both 1990 and 1995 Overall 
the data in the chart supports the conclusion that, over the two decades, there was little 
structural change The next four sections draw from that data, from interviews with key 
actors and from technical analysis of key documentation to establish whether Irish social 
security has recommodified according to the indicators developed by the author as 
applications o f the logic o f the competition state to social security
T a b le  4 3  I r is h  S o c ia l S e c u r it y  T r e n d s  19 8 5 -2 0 0 5  (2 0 0 4  m o st re ce n t y e a r )
19 8 5 19 9 0 19 9 5 2000 20 0 4
Total expenditure % 
GNP
Cash exp (euro) 
Total recipients 
Social Insurance 
Social Assistance 
Social Assistance %
Benefit 
Dependency 
ratio as %of 
total
population
e
<D
Unemployed Passive 
(LR)
Unemployed Active 
(BTW, FIS, FA, PTJI)
14 6%
2,918m
725,518
12 4 %
3,567m
396,438
339,080
46%
20 5 % 
37 5 % 
207,032
733,297
2,230
382,843
350,454
-j
47 79 % j
 4 -
20 9 % 
37%
11 4 % 7 8% 9 2%
5,218m
839,633
339,780
6,714m j 11,291m
  î  _____
869,994 957,000
440,057 531,768
499,853! 429,9371 435,964
59 53 % 
23 4 %
49% 45%
23 % 23 9%
40 9 %
224,7111 277,746 116,069 131,339
6,569 21,404 64„833 ; 40,216
Pay Related Benefit 69,375 recip ! 20m exp ! 16m exp N/A N/A
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19 8 5 19 9 0 19 9 5 20 0 0 20 0 4
Lone parent and 
widows / widowers
115,044 139,322 176,027 206,130 212,952
Disability SI 81,991 96,928 95,063 97,922 106,590
Disability SA DPMA DPMA 48,000
DPMA 54,303 DA 72,976
OAPs 234,090 247,272 254,156 267,760 292,425
Carers 1,240 5,056 16,478 25,610
SWA expend (euro) 23.399m 62.103m 151.634m 295.160m 605.820m
SWA recipients 21,341 25,572 68,086, 72,010 110,784
N o’s insured 1,178,950 1,430,264 1,551,680 2,299,910 256,106
Population in relevant 3,443,405 3,525,719 3,626,087 3,917,203 4,000,000
census year
1981 1991 1996 2002 2004
Insured as % of pop 34.23 % 40.56 % 42.79 % 58.71 % 64%
Females N /A 357,620* 421,473* 464,588 526,098
- as % of total 48.76 % 50.2 % 53.4% 54.9%
Qualified Adults 163,948 149,373 152,142 127,903 119,000
- as % of population 4.6 % 4.2 % 4.2 % 3.4% 2.9%
Child Benefit 1,187,465 1,108,561 1,065,471 1,018,175 1,051,005
Child Allowances 405,748 444,462 473,510 374,877 357,000
Children as %pop 11.4% 12.4% 13.2% 11.4% 9%
(Source: Annual DSFA statistical reports, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004)
4 .3  A c t iv a t io n  /  c o n d it io n a lit y
Pierson (2001) expects this dimension of recommodification, namely a greater focus on work
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incentives, activation and conditionality, to be of greater significance in a liberal welfare 
state such as Ireland Competition State theorists expect the state to become a commodifying 
agent and to play a transformative role in social policy by subordinating the welfare state to 
market forces This can happen through privatisation of social services like health or 
education It happens in social security policy by stressing the link between social security 
and the labour market or paid employment No one doubts that Ireland, over the last two 
decades, laid greater stress on employment (Dukelow, 2004) and activation (McCashin,
2004) and promoted paid employment as the best route out o f poverty (NAPS, Ireland 
1997c, 2002a) Less attention has been focused on critical analysis o f the Irish activation 
strategy The three indicators examined in this section are increased availability of active 
labour market measures, greater workfare (defined as both punitive sanctions and supportive 
incentives (Cemy et a l , 2005), and the extension of work obligations to those traditionally 
considered not to be active in the labour market These are now reviewed m turn
In c re a s e d  a v a ila b il it y  o f  A c t iv e  L a b o u r  M a r k e t  P r o g r a m m e s  ( A L M P ’s)
From 1975 policy relating to ALMPs rested with the Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment (DETE) and their national training and employment agency AnCo (restructured 
into FAS in 1992) Since the foundation o f AnCo, Ireland had always been a large spender 
on ALMPs As well as skills training, AnCo introduced the Employment Subsidy Schemes 
and Community Training Workshops in 1978 and the Social Employment Scheme in 1985 
FAS introduced the Community Employment Development Programme in 1991 which was 
changed to the Community Employment Scheme in 1994 In 1993 the Employment Support 
Service was established by the DSW The percentage budget spent on income maintenance- 
based activation schemes administered through the DSFA has grown over time and there has 
been a shift in the ratio o f expenditure on passive social security payments to the 
unemployed relative to 'active unemployment' payments supporting education or labour 
market activity Boyle (2005) observes how the Departments active spending increased from 
45 per cent of the Department’s total budget in 1993 to a 2 5 per cent in 2002, numbers 
availing of'active' payments grew from 2,230 FIS recipients in 1985 to 64,833 in 2000 but 
declined to 40,216 in 2004 The variety o f options grew to include Back to Work, Enterprise 
or Education Allowances, Part Time Job Incentive, FIS and Farm Assist In 1998 the 
DSFCA (formerly DSFA) set a target o f increasing the proportion of unemployment 
spending on active measures by 20 per cent The Department o f Finance administer a 
Revenue Assist work incentive
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The numbers of participants on ALMPs totalled 82,184 in 1998 and increased to 101,000 in 
2000 and dropped back to 88,772 in 2001. In 1999 the numbers participating on Active 
Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) represented over 100 per cent of the total number of  
unemployed as defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In 2001 Ireland 
ranked 6th out of 30 OECD countries for spending on active labour market measures and, 
along with Scandinavian countries, spent double the OECD average (Boyle 2005). One 
explanation for such positive Irish engagement in ALMPs is the fact that Ireland was for a 
long time a significant recipient of European Structural Funds, which promoted the use of 
such programmes. Ireland made active and creative use o f such funding and some times 
stretched it use for other social policy purposes. Such ambiguous or contradictory purposes 
mitigated labour market progression outcomes21 (O’Connell, 2002, Indecon 2005). Cousins 
(2005a) argued that counting non-progression focused schemes actually overestimates 
ALMP expenditure.
On the other hand some National Development Plan (Ireland 2000c) social inclusion 
objectives might just as easily be interpreted as actions to meet the changing technological 
needs of the economy. Moran (2005) highlighted how 21 out of 37 initiatives listed under the 
social inclusion element of that NDP refer to employability, training or up-skilling. Failure to 
account for such labour market focused educational expenditure underestimates total ALMP 
expenditure. Skills training in Irish Post-Leaving Courses (PLCs), for example, focused on 
basic IT skills and tele-sales services to serve the labour market needs of foreign investors 
with cheap, flexible low-paid (often female) labour (Breathnach, 2000). This is likely to 
continue as policy responsibility for life-long learning is with the labour-market focused 
DETE rather than the Department of Education and Science.
Boyle (2005:11) notes the paradoxical situation that Ireland, ‘with an anorexic level of  
spending on social policy’, still managed throughout the 1990s to spend 2% of GNP on 
active labour market measures. This is consistent with the competition state hypothesis that 
public investment shifts over time to focus on projects which enhance capital or create 
flexible labour markets which promote enterprise, innovation, learning and training. 
Expenditure under social inclusion measures in the National Development Plan (2000-2006) 
is in reality serving the changing and growing labour market needs of the economy. At the
21 Boyle (2005) refers to the populist motivation behind the persistence with community employment
schemes even though, with low progression rates, the schemes were not meeting labour-market needs.
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same time competing social policy objectives fudge the economic orientation of ALMPs and 
failure to achieve institutional co-ordination means there is less labour-market progression 
from ALMP’s than one might expect from such a high level o f expenditure ( O’Connell, 
2002)
Greater w o r k f a r e  (p u n it iv e  s a n c tio n s  a n d  s u p p o rt iv e  in c e n tiv e s )
Workfare is often associated with the concept of ‘conditionality’ where work obligations or 
conditions are attached to payments Dwyer (2002 24) argues that conditionality occurs 
when ‘eligibility to certain basic publicly provided welfare entitlements becomes dependant 
on an individual first agreeing to meet particular compulsoiy duties or patterns of  
behaviour’ Van Oorschot and Abrahamson (2003 301) stress how social security
regulations in almost every country associate the right to a payment with an obligation to 
seek and accept work In Ireland conditions for access to unemployment payments have 
always included a requirement regarding attachment to the labour force, claimants have to be 
‘available for and genuinely seeking work’ to receive payment No such employment or 
labour-market condition is obliged of other claimants of working age22 It is consistent with 
competition state theory that social security becomes more conditional and that work and 
behaviour obligations become more stressed The following discussion assesses how 
conditional the Irish system is relative to other countries and whether the degree of  
conditionality has changed over time
McLaughlin (2001) argues that defensive workfare, conditionality and compulsory labour 
market activation found in other liberal regimes is remarkably absent in the Irish policy 
regime Boyle (2005 59) argues a punitive social security regime was never a serious 
political option for Irish politicians O’Riain and O’Connell (2000 334) describe ‘less a 
welfare backlash welfare to work strategy, more a social inclusion strategy’, Jordan et al 
(2000 27) argue Ireland ‘does not (unlike the UK) rely on negative sanctions or pressures’ 
and Daly and Yeates (2003 94) comment that ‘Ireland has much less interest in using public 
resources to change general behaviour of claimants ’ McCashin (2004 200) goes so far as to 
say
22 The One Parent Family Payment does facilitate recipients moving into employment and Disability 
Allowance encourage and assist claimants to identify and take up available training, educational and 
other self-development opportunities where approfg a^te (O’Connor A , 2005)
Ireland does not have any workfare strategy to reduce unemployment supports 
or coerce unemployed people into work, none o f the workfare type policies 
implemented elsewhere are adapted in Ireland
Dukelow (2004 22) however provides evidence of legislative and administrative reforms 
focused on implementing a more active form of conditionality and suggests ‘the balance has 
shifted towards greater compulsion, targeting and spending restraint’ Taylor (1995, 
2002 57) disputes a benign assessment arguing there has been ‘a distinct neo-liberal tinge to 
the preference for more stringent criteria for eligibility to welfare entitlement’ but offers no 
practical evidence to support his conclusion Allen (2000) makes similar conclusions with 
little supportive evidence A more thorough investigation of empirical evidence is required 
before it is possible conclude whether or not Irish social security has become more 
conditional The following discussion assesses whether Irish policy is characterised by 
positive supports or negative punitive measures and compares the use of Irish sanctions 
relative other OCED countries
R e v ie w in g  e v id e n c e  a b o u t I r is h  c o n d it io n a lit y
McCashin relies on analysis by Hvinden, Heikklia and Kankare (2001 188, cited in 
McCashin (2004 220) and reproduced in the table below to conclude (2004 224)
the general rules governing entitlement to Unemployment Assistance (UA) and 
Unemployment Benefit (UB) have remained largely unchanged in the last 
decade Nor has there been a reduction in the duration o f UB entitlement or the 
real value o f the payments The detailed rules determining unemployment status 
that a person must be available for and genuinely seeking work have also 
remained intact during this recent period of activation
It is difficult however to defend McCashins conclusions According to the table Ireland 
experienced four changes in this period, this is an average amount The Netherlands as we 
will see experienced seven changes while some countries, Portugal, Sweden and 
Luxembourg experienced very few Further as Table 4 5 shows it can also be agued that 
Ireland experienced substantially more change then that reflected in Table 4 4
6 8
Table 4.4 Changes in social security in 16 European countries
M o r e
a c t iv a t io n
B e n e fit
re d u c t io n
L im it e d  t im e  
e l ig ib i l it y
T ig h t e r
e l ig ib il it y
S t r ic t e r  w o r k  
a v a i la b i l it y
M o r e  m e a n s  
te stin g
L o w e r  u n ­
e m p lo y m e n t
H ig h e r  L a b o u r  
P a r t ic ip a t io n
Denmark X X X X X X
Finland X X X X
Norway X X X X X
Sweden X X
Austria X X X X
Belgium X X X X
France X X X
Germany X X X X
Luxembourg X
NL X X X X X X X
Greece X X
Italy X X
Portugal
Spain X X X X
UK X X X X
Ireland X X X X
Source McCa.shin 2004 220 (originally in Hvinden, Heikklia and Kankare (2001 :p l88)
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Hvinden, Heikklia and Kankare’s (ibid) assessment, that Ireland experienced benefit reduction 
but did not expenence limits on duration, tightening o f eligibility, stricter work availability or 
increased means testing, is open to contestation There is evidence o f change in each indicator 
(duration, tightening o f eligibility, stricter work availability, increased means testing) While 
some change is modest in scale, temporary in nature and inconsistent it is still true to say that, 
over the last twenty years, Irish UB and UA payments have been retrenched, eligibility has been 
tightened and the duration shortened Table 4 3 below, shows significant recommodification and 
is evidence that Ireland experienced more recommodifying change than many claimed Work 
incentives dominated Irish social security discourse in the early 1990’s (O Donoghue, 1992) 
However it is still difficult to decide from the analysis in the table or elsewhere, whether, on 
balance, the Irish change was ‘offensive and supportive’ or ‘punitive and defensive’ One clear 
trend however is inconsistency While social insurance-based changes have been more 
restrictive, many o f the social assistance-based changes have introduced significant carrots and 
substantial income disregards However NESC (2005a) highlight how positive carrots such as 
back to work supports are often prematurely withdrawn and are inconsistently available to 
broadly similar claimants Loftus (2005) shows how there has been a consistent failure to 
annually index earned income disregards across a number o f mcome-support measures
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Table 4 5 R ecom m odifying Irish Social Security Changes 1985-2005
C h a n g e C a r r o t  o r  o ffe n s iv e  m e a s u re s , S t ic k  o r  d e fe n s iv e  m e a s u re s
Back To Work / Education / Enterprise 1
M o r e  a c t iv e  
m e a s u re s
Family Income Supplement
Farm Assist
Part Time Job Initiative
i
i
j Restriction in eligibility criteria for Back To Work / Enterprise / Education
i!
!
B e n e f it
r e d u c t io n
Real increases in lower payments
Income disregards for Disability Allowance, One 
Parent Family Payment
; Abolition o f Pay Related Benefit 
, No indexation policy 
' No benchmarking policy
L im it a t io n  o f
b e n e fit
d u r a t io n
No limit imposed on Unemployment Assistance, 
One Parent Family Payment
! 1997 OPF obliged to seek work when child 18
! 2004 limited benefit duration for new claimants
!
| 2004 lone parents transitional payment cut
T ig h t e n in g  of 
e l ig ib i l it y
Significant expansion o f social insurance coverage
1996 Easing and simplification o f Unemployment 
Assistance to facilitate part-time work
| 1992 Substantial loss o f earning rules limited eligibility to Unemployment Benefit for
| part-time workers
!
| 1993 Graduated earnings and benefits introduced
! 1993 Changes for irregular and part-time workers, shift workers and week-on / week 
\ off workers access to social security
; 2004 Graduated earnings’ indexes doubled
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C h a n g e C a r r o t  o r  o ffe n s iv e  m e a su re s S t ic k  o r  d e fe n s iv e  m e a s u re s
S t r ic t e r  w o r k  
a v a i la b i l it y
1998: NEAP referral process voluntary with no 
sanction
1996: Reciprocal obligation o f the unemployed to seek work stated in PPF national 
wage agreement
1997: Genuinely Seeking Work (GSW) guidelines published. More intense application 
of obligations
1998: new guidelines drawn up by DSCFA - stricter wage guidelines, shift in 
occupation required, stricter job seeking required
Reinforced GSW and AW rules
Increased expenditure on fraud controls -  increased surveillance and intense scrutiny o f  
claims
M e a n s  te s t in g
1993: Improved means test for Unemployment 
Assistance
Improved qualified adult means test
1997: Increased disregard for OPFP
1997: Significant disregard Disability Allowance / 
Disability Benefit
1994-2002: Improvements in Family Income 
Support
1994-2002: tax exemption limits 
2005: minimum wage out of tax net 
PRSI exemption schemes
1992: Income limits imposed. Unemployment Benefit limited by nine weeks when 
redundancy payment over IR£ 12,000
Means test on Deserted Wives Benefit
Change in means test for Unemployment Assistance (reversed in 1993)
1994: Child Dependent Allowances frozen to promote work incentives 
1994: Income disregards for UA, OPP and SWA frozen 
2004: Means testing o f CDAs (€350 limit)
72
L e v e ls  o f  S a n c t io n s  /  E n fo rc e m e n t
It is informative to review the scale of Irish sanctions relative to other countries, to assess 
whether they have changed over time and the degree to which they are enforced relative to 
other countries. In an index of 19 countries (developed by the Danish Ministry o f Finance in 
1998 and cited in Marin and Grubb 2001) Ireland ranked one o f the least strict countries 
below both the UK and Denmark which, in turn, are below the OECD average and well 
below Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands which were above the OECD average23. Auer
(2000) (cited in Martin and Grubb, 2001:141) compared levels o f activation in Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Ireland and concluded that Ireland was exceptional, showing little 
evidence of ‘a general shift in attitude and / or policy stance clearly tightening their 
surveillance of benefit eligibility'. The story suggests a fairly benign and supportive Irish 
regime.
The story however needs to account for the reality that the Irish system has always had strict 
conditionality criteria. The Irish system has the ultimate sanction in that it can deny an 
unemployment payment to those who refuse to seek or accept offers of work. Conditions 
relating to unemployment payments were first introduced following on from the British 
National Insurance Act (1909). While 1921 UK legislation which introduced a ‘genuinely 
seeking work’ clause did not apply in Ireland, Irish policy-makers regularly interpreted Irish 
law to mean that unemployed claimants had to prove they were looking for work. In 1986 
this requirement (which had been repealed in the UK in 1936) acquired legal status in 
Ireland. Dukelow (2004) noted that initial attempts in the early 1980’s to curb expenditure 
focused on increasing surveillance and more intense scrutiny o f those claiming benefits and 
more critical view of job refusals (DSW, 1983.13). Taylor (2002) and Allen (2000) 
emphasised this tendency to heighten fraud controls, pointing to the fact that new technology 
enabled more intensive scrutiny o f claimants. This brief historical reflection suggests a 
benign assessment is not consistent with the historical experience o f unemployed people. In 
a more personal history of conditionality, Allen (1998) argues there has always been an Irish 
culture of strict monitoring and surveillance of claimants and cites graphic evidence of 
hostile policing of unemployed people.
Martin and Grubb (2001) question the effectiveness of the Danish ranking tool on the grounds that
it did not account for differences in implementation
The 1987 Job Search Programme combined measures to control abuse with offers o f training 
in job search methods Job Search reported success as the numbers o f unemployed people 
who were found to be in employment when registered as unemployed This evaluative focus 
(rather than, for example, reporting success as the numbers who successfully found jobs) 
suggests fraud control and not activation was the primary concern o f Job Search (INOU, 
1997, Bond, 1988) When unemployment was at its peak the Department had neither the 
resources nor the inclination to fully police whether people were genuinely seeking work 
(INOU 1998) Employers were also reluctant to be burdened with large numbers o f job 
seekers While a strong undercurrent o f policing mentality remained, some policy was 
relaxed, claimants signing on for credits were exempted from Genuinely Seeking Work 
criteria for and new guidelines allowed claimants participate in voluntary work24
Tightening of sanctions
By late 1996 however unemployment had fallen according to the Labour Force Survey 
(CSO, 1996) There was growing political impatience with the lack of decline in the number 
of live register claims Confusion about how to reconcile different measurements of  
employment, led to the report Unemployment Statistics (NESF, 1998) There was also an 
anti-fraud campaign and calls for greater conditionality and policing o f the unemployed 
Allen (1998) recalls how the Irish Small and Medium Enterprise (ISME) employer’s 
organization contributed to the public concern by labelling the unemployed ‘social misfits’ 
and ‘course junkies’ EBEC language was more subtle and highlighted activation (IBEC, 
1996) Clause 4 33 in Partnership 2000 (Ireland, 1997b) referred to the reciprocal obligations 
of the unemployed and the 1997 FF / PD Action Programme for the Millennium (Ireland, 
1997d) prioritised ‘attacking fraud and abuse o f social welfare’ The White Paper on Human 
Resource Development published m May 1997 proposed a revitalised national employment 
service to engage in a new labour -market activation policy nationwide (1997 5 61,5 62)
24 The mid 1990’s atmosphere was at times quite hostile to the unemployed The INOU campaigned 
against the External Control Unit of the Department of Social Welfare ‘interrogating ‘ unemployed 
people and for veiy strictly imposing availability rules denying payment when claimants engaged m 
voluntary work or leisure pursuits during the working week (INOU, 1996) As late as 1999 the INOU 
called for an emergency meeting with Minister Dermot Ahem to end 'absurd' roadblocks that had 
been set up m order to try to ambush people doing ^  double -  ‘working and signing’ (INOU, 1999)
The impact o f this discourse made it politically easier to reinforce conditionality criteria. 
New resources were invested in setting up a special unit to undertake management o f the live 
register and to focus on ‘customer activation’ and ‘a more effective application of 
conditionality requirements’ (Dukelow, 2004). This case management approach by the 
DSFCA (2000b: 25) involved both fraud control and employment support functions. In April 
1997 existing guidelines on availability and seeking work were published with a view to 
stricter implementation o f job seeking obligations. This was followed in June 1998 by new 
regulations tightening availability and job seeking guidelines (SI 137, 1998)25
Significant changes were introduced. Claimants were required to take jobs with lower wages 
than in previous employment, to shift occupation and to show proof of job seeking. Section 
42 of the 1993 SW Consolidation Act laid down the specific conditions and included Section 
4.7 sub-section 4C where failure to take up a labour market, training or education option can 
lead to a payment review. Guidelines on the management of the live register through a case 
management Customer Activation Approach were issued to the Department’s Local Area 
Control Teams (DSFCA, 2000b).
25 Legislation requires genuinely seeking employment suitable to your age, education, physique, 
location and family circumstances and showing genuine efforts to secure employment. Being 
unavailable for work would include the following: looking for one particular type of work only. 
Looking for part-time work only. Moving to a place where the prospect of getting work is 
significantly reduced. Placing unreasonable restrictions on taking up work due to domestic 
circumstances. Placing unreasonable restrictions on the rate of pay for the job. Not having childcare 
facilities in place.
New Regulations, introduced in May 1998, define reasonable steps to secure employment as one or 
more of the following: Oral and written applications for work to employers. Looking for information 
on the availability of employment from employer's advertisements and employment agencies. 
Availing of suitable training opportunities. Acting on the advice given by Job Facilitators, FAS or 
other placement agencies such as the Local Employment Service (LES) or steps towards self- 
employment. Departmental Guidelines advise that if you have not found suitable employment in your 
preferred area of work, within a reasonable period (3 months) then you should broaden the range of 
work and wage you are looking for.
Use of sanctions
It also matters whether such punitive or ‘strong’ conditionality was or is implemented or 
enforced Given the hostile media environment and escalated hype about fraud, Taylor 
(2002 519) noted the ‘fear that supportive conditionality could lapse into periods of renewed 
hostility to the unemployed’ Martin and Grubb (2001) comparatively analysed data relating 
to the period o f benefit sanction following a voluntary quit or refusal to accept work / active 
labour market measure They also analysed data relating to the incidence of refusals and 
sanctions Their data for thirteen countries does not, unfortunately, include Ireland but 
nonetheless it is possible to use Irish information to compare Irish sanctions and incidence of  
use o f sanctions with other OECD sanctions In relation to voluntary loss of a job, Ireland 
does not rank as one o f the more lenient countries, the mne-week exclusion is an average 
exclusion (similar to countries like Norway, Germany and Australia) The fact that Irish 
claimants can be totally excluded from payment for failure to accept an offer of an active 
labour market measure places Ireland at the higher end of the punitive scale for this kind of  
refusal (similar to Spain, France and Denmark)
DSFA’s unpublished administrative analysis o f live register flows shows that the level of 
benefit sanctions imposed for voluntary job loss or non-take up o f employment amounted to 
0 5% (3,517 of 251,253) claim closures in 2004 The table below, collated from Social 
Welfare Appeals Office Annual Reports, outlines numbers o f unemployed claimants who 
appealed decisions to withhold these payments on grounds o f failing availability or 
genuinely seeking work tests It shows these increased substantially to almost 3,000 by 2000 
(when unemployment levels were falling)
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Table 4 6 Numbers appealing loss of payment - "available for or genuinely seeking work’
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Source Social Welfare Appeals Office Annual Reports 2000-2004
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Appeals Office Annual Report 2000 (2001 8) outlines a substantial work increase for the 
Appeal Office ‘available for and genuinely seeking work appeals increased by 1,700 or 47 
per cent in 2000’ A subsequent report (2002 12) noted concern that
Claimants who are ill-equipped to take up employment — frequently come to 
attention on appeal as a result of having their unemployment payments 
disallowed for failing to fulfil the statutory requirements o f being available for 
and genuinely seeking work
This suggests active and inappropriate implementation o f conditionality These rules also 
impact differentially on men and women The historical legacy o f the strict male 
breadwinner full-time definition of employment still applies Claimants have to be available 
for full-time work and to prove childcare supports are in place, which, to this day, restricts 
many women from registering as unemployed (Murphy, 2003) Cousins (1992) noted that 
1992 rule changes restricting access to unemployment and disability benefits were motivated 
by perceptions of high levels o f take-up o f these benefits by married women Unpublished 
administrative data show that in 2004 a significant 5,290 claimants, the vast majority 
women, were refused payment on the grounds o f their not being available for work at the 
initial stage of the claim because they did not have childcare arrangements or because they 
were seeking only part-time work (Murphy, 2003)
In parallel with enforcement o f a stronger conditionality regime, the DSFA was required 
under the European Employment Strategy to work closely with the DETE to develop a 
National Employment Action Plan These plans include a preventive strategy, under the 
requirements o f EU Employment Guidelines, o f engaging systematically with persons at an 
early stage o f unemployment in order to prevent their drift into long-term unemployment 
The scheme is described as voluntary and gives a commitment that those who fail to engage 
would be given another chance to re-engage However at the time it was first introduced the 
discourse relating to the NEAP was ambiguous, PD Minister Mary Harney claimed ‘dole 
payments would be cut’ (Irish Independent 18 June 1998) while the Fianna Fail Taoiseach 
and Minister Ahem claimed that ‘throwing people off the dole is no remedy’ and rejected 
this threatening approach (Irish Times 18 June 1998) The 1998 NEAP report to the EU 
stressed how ‘action continues to be taken also to ensure that those receiving unemployment 
payments are aware of their obligations to actively seek work or to avail of employability 
enhancing obligations’ (Bond, 1998 11)
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Unemployed claimants clearly heard the hard message By December 1999, under the 
NEAP, 78 per cent o f the 18-24 target group with six months unemployment and 36 per cent 
of adults aged 45-55 and with 12 months unemployment had signed off the live register 
Three years later out o f 13,129 o f the 20,000 referred between January to October 2001, 63 
per cent had left the live register Given the exit rate was even higher among those who 
didn’t turn up to the intervention it cannot be assumed that the quality of the intervention led 
to progression from the live register Rather the threatening discourse prompted many to 
assume they would be forced to take action in relation to activation and many pre-empted 
such action by activating themselves There was also significant job growth which would 
have lead in any case to substantial live register exit The end result was a significant exit 
from unemployment (Murphy C , 2002) The INOU continue to voice fears about 
commitment to a voluntary engagement (Tinsley, 2004) In 2005 the voluntary engagement 
was applied to older unemployed with similar results (DETE, 2006)
The international comparison suggests Ireland ranks relatively high on policing ‘available to 
work’ criteria and ‘genuinely seeking work’ criteria Ireland has not shied away from 
actively implementing a conditional regime Rhetoric played an important role in the period 
of job search A traditionally active approach to fraud control and a policing mentality is 
embedded in Departmental culture but co-exists with relaxation o f criteria relating to 
genuinely seeking work during mass long-term unemployment The NEAP made a positive 
contribution to ‘mobilising labour supply’ and hence making social security more 
productivist and labour-market oriented Rhetoric and discourse again played a role in 
sending signals to claimants Now we turn to examine the third indicator, the extension of 
conditionality beyond unemployed claimants to all working-aged claimants
E x te n s io n  o f  C o n d it io n a lit y  to W o r k in g -A g e d  C la im a n t s
There has been a significant extension of eligibility criteria for active labour market 
measures to lone parents and to people with disabilities but crucially participation for these 
groups remains voluntary Pearson (2003), Grubb (2004), Daly and Yeates (2003) and 
McLaughlin (2001) observe that, relative to Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, NZ, the UK 
and the US, Ireland has been slow to activate and move towards greater conditionality 
spouses o f the unemployed, lone parents or people with disabilities Since the year 2000 
there is more reference in discourse to extending conditionality and workfare approaches to 
these groups The DETE have been subtly promoting more activation in their annual Labour
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Market Review (FAS 2004). However DSFA continues to tread carefully on the path 
towards greater activation. The DSFCA (2000e) argued that without a childcare 
infrastructure, it would be neither possible nor reasonable to introduce work conditionality 
for lone parents. The DSFA (2003b) applied the same logic about service deficits to explain 
their reluctance to extend conditionality to people with disabilities.
A recent NESC (2005a) proposal to bring social assistance claimants into a more conditional 
framework based on a participation income and other government proposals (DSFA 2006) 
have injected pace into the debate. Cousins (2005a) noted the significance of this new 
language of ‘working age’ and ‘life time attachment to the labour force’. Already developed 
in UK policy discourse, such ideologically motivated language, implying those of working 
age should be at work, has important gender implications placing all working aged 
claimants, including mothers, on an employability continuum. This language is consistent 
with DSFA’s recent use of ‘working aged’ or ‘distance from the labour market’ to classify 
claimants according not to ‘who’ they are but their relationship to the labour market (Bohan, 
2005; 0 ‘Connor A, 2005; DSCFA, 2000e; DSFA 2003c, 2006 ).
A key report (DSFA, 2006) was considered by the Cabinet Committee on Social Inclusion 
and launched for consultation in March 2006. The report described as ‘radical’ (OPEN, 
2006) recommends a partial abolition of the limitation rule and full abolition o f qualified 
adult and one parent family payments and replacing these with a parental allowance for 
parents with children under eight and a job seekers allowance for parents with children over 
seven. Employment is defined as 19.5 hours thus protecting the concept of choice for parents 
to provide their own after school care for school going children. The proposal is in the 
process of public consultation, if it is positively received a process of legislative change will 
begin in the 2007 social Welfare Act and given there have already been calls for a ten year 
implementation period it is unlikely to be fully operational within the next five years. Until it 
is implemented in full Ireland still deviates from a strong model of conditionality in its 
reluctance to extend conditionality to lone parents, the spouses of male claimants and people 
with disabilities.
S e c tio n  c o n c lu s io n
This section analysed, at a considerable level o f detail, the competition state hypotheses that 
Irish social security policy has become more active and conditional. It reviewed three main
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indicators It established that Ireland ranks high in the use o f active labour-market measures 
and that, over time, there has been pressure to achieve more employment progression from 
these measures, this suggests a productivist agenda Behind the façade of ‘supportive 
conditionality’ and a ‘voluntary’ implementation o f the NEAP, the Irish state has been both 
willing and able to legislate for greater conditionality, to implement existing sanctions and 
controls on unemployed claimants and to engage in a quite hostile fraud discourse However 
these defensive approaches have been balanced with supportive carrot-hke incentives to 
employment While there have been some changes to enable other social security claimants 
to participate voluntarily in active labour-market programmes this has been inconsistent and 
limited in scope (OPEN, 2006) There has not been, by mid 2006, extension o f conditionality 
beyond unemployed claimants to all working-aged claimants The next three sections of this 
chapter examine more briefly how Irish social security developed in relation to retrenchment, 
residualisation and regulation
4 4 R e tre n c h m e n t
Retrenchment has been descnbed as ‘cutting back, scaling down or general tightening or 
reining in of social security spending so that the scheme is less attractive claimants’ (Green- 
Pedersen, 2000 40) Given that liberal regimes have less reason and opportunity to cut 
already ungenerous rates, the thesis expects to find evidence o f only moderate cost cutting in 
Ireland Pierson (1996), Green-Petersen (2000) and Lindbolm (2005) argue that it is difficult 
to separate reforms motivated by cost cutting from other policy-motivated reforms 
Retrenchment necessarily makes welfare schemes less attractive or worthwhile to claimants 
and this in itself implies increased vulnerability to the market or commodification This 
section examines evidence relating to Irish retrenchment under three definitions of 
retrenchment cost cutting, cost containment and cost avoidance Where possible the 
approach is to tiy to fit relevant Irish change into specific retrenchment indicators In reality 
however it is difficult to distinguish between short term cost-cuttmg, cost-containment 
(restricting the longer-term implications o f ongoing commitments) and cost-avoidance or 
rejection o f new cost commitments
Taylor (2002 507) noted how the 1980’s in Ireland, and in many other countries, were 
dominated by cuts in public expenditure This extreme period of cuts included the first stage 
of withdrawal of Pay Related Benefit in 1984 and is outside the scope o f this study This 
section takes up the story about Irish social security retrenchment from the Commission of  
Social Welfare (Ireland, 1986) which proposed an expansion o f the social insurance base
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and making payments more adequate (McCashin, 2004). The timing o f the 1986 CSW report 
was highly significant in that, while it did not stimulate significant public debate about social 
security priorities, it had a ready audience in the NESC which was preparing a strategy 
report which would be a key influence in developing the 1987 Programme for National 
Recovery (PNR, Ireland, 1987b). The CSW consensus on adequacy and social insurance 
expansion gave the NESC an immediate and positive focus on social security policy. Thus, 
when the then Taoiseach Charles Haughey requested all Departments to prepare expenditure 
cuts (MacSharry and White 2000:68-70), the social security budget was somewhat protected 
by both government and social partnership commitments to protect the real incomes of the 
poorest (Ireland 1987a,b).
C o s t -c u t t in g
Retrenchment is defined by Pierson (2001) as cost-cutting responses to budgetary constraints 
and fiscal austerity. This section aims to isolate changes primarily justified by the need to 
meet short-term budgetary imperatives. Most retrenchment studies review macro expenditure 
levels and overall trends in spending. Irish welfare effort could be defined as social security 
spending as a percentage o f Gross National Product (GNP); a reduction in this percentage 
would mean evidence of Irish social security retrenchment. Using this definition, welfare 
effort, measured as social welfare expenditure as a percentage of GNP, halved from 14.6 per 
cent GNP in 1985 (DSW 1986) to 7.8 per cent GNP in 2000 and rising to 9.2 per cent in 
2004 (DSFCA 2000f). However using an alternative definition which defines retrenchment 
as a drop in real levels of expenditure there is no evidence of Irish retrenchment. Headline 
expenditure grew substantially over the same period almost doubling in real terms from 
2,918m in 1985 to 6.714m in 2000 and 11.291m in 2004. This real increase was 
significantly ahead of inflation. This information provides contradictory results and does not 
inform as to the content of social security policy or the impact on personal social protection 
outcomes.26 It is more informative to review actual changes in benefit levels and personal 
welfare. Below we review recent work which attempts to capture such micro-level change.
26 There are other more technical problems associated with macro expenditure data. Given that tax 
relief on pensions almost equals social security expenditure on pensions analysis of tax reliefs, as 
expenditure forgone would give a more accurate assessment of expenditure. In the Irish case 
comparisons over time need to take into account changing levels of unemployment, while cross 
national comparisons need to account for the Irish population profile and dependency structure.
Hay27 (2006 12) measures changes in unemployment benefit levels and places Ireland eighth 
in an index o f welfare generosity o f ten west European countnes He estimates that by 1995 
Irish generosity dropped by 6%  to 94 from a starting point of 100 in 1985 Korpi and Palme 
(2003 441) use changes in the value of the Replacement Ratio to measure retrenchment in 
personal welfare outcomes or individual loss o f social protection28 Contrary to Pierson’s
(2001) logic, that liberal regimes will experience least retrenchment, they conclude that the 
largest cuts in Replacement Ratios appear in more liberal countries dominated by basic 
social security institutions with below -average rates (the UK, Ireland, NZ, Denmark, 
Canada, the Netherlands and the US) In the Irish context the drop in Replacement Ratios 
reflected cuts m benefits (1988), taxation of benefits (1993), abolition of PRB (1994), 
reductions of IR£15 in Injury Benefit, and restriction of the minimum payment for Maternity 
Benefit as well as non-indexation o f benefits to net wages Allan and Scruggs (2003 20) 
measure a similar definition o f retrenchment over the period 1970 to 2002 and concur that 
benefits and pensions significantly retrenched
Several countries move from the bottom to the top o f the ranking (Norway and 
Finland) while others have moved precipitously down (Netherlands, UK, 
Ireland) as a result o f the abolition o f pay related Benefit by 2000 the least 
generous state pensions were in Austria, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland, 
all of whom have relatively low replacement rates in all pensions’
Cousins (2005a) refutes Korpi and Palme’s (2003) assessment and argues that proponents of 
retrenchment are over-reliant on abolition o f pay-related Benefit as a proxy for retrenchment 
Cousins (ibid) argues abolition of pay related Benefit was motivated by redistribution from 
social insurance to social assistance payments in order to meet the commitment to protect the 
real incomes of the poorest (Programme for Government (Ireland 1987a 3), Programme for 
National Recovery (Ireland, 1987b) O’Connor A (2005 30) rejects Cousins argument
27 This index was scored using unemployment Benefit and allowed for variation m demand according 
to unemployment and retirement levels Using this methodology only Ireland, Germany France and 
Italy registered a decline m welfare generosity from 1985-1995
28 They utilize replacement ratio data from the Social Citizenship Indicator Programme to analyse
retrenchment trends across OCED countries over the years 1975 to 1995
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arguing that the stated aim of the 1987 FF government was to control costs rather than to 
redistribute between welfare claimants
Abolition of pay-related social insurance was made politically plausible by agreeing to 
redistribute cost savings to fund increases in lower social assistance payments Given other 
payments were already low government had little room to manoeuvre more cuts Social 
assistance replacement ratios’ decline over this period was a function, not o f cutbacks, but of  
minimum wage policy and tax reductions, policies motivated more by work incentive than 
cost containment policy Changes introduced in the Dirty Dozen and Savage Sixteen 
(discussed in detail m Chapter Seven) were introduced as shorter term responses to fiscal 
austerity in the context of 1992 preparations for Economic and Monetary Union or the 
context o f the 2003 post 9/11 recession In both cases the monetary savings accrued as a 
result of these cuts were relatively low (the Savage Sixteen cuts only realised savings of 
€5 8m) Given the political risk and subsequent blame attached to both sets of cuts, one can 
conclude that the fiscal pressure to cut social security spending was strong at that time This 
is consistent with Swank’s (2002 277) observation that international capital mobility is not 
systematically and directly related to social security policy change in the contemporary era 
but is at times of fiscal stress
CSW's (Ireland 1986) consolidation- focused proposals could be achieved through minor and 
incremental reforms The political sensitivity to cutting welfare was reflected in the strategy 
of achieving reforms on a 4no losers’ basis by levelling up payments or by enabling old 
relatively insignificant payments to naturally die out (Heclo, 1974, Heidenheimer 1990, 
Pierson 1994, 1998) The number of Child Dependant Allowances was, for example, reduced 
from 36 to three on a no loser's basis, no new claimants were allowed to register for Deserted 
Wives Benefit but existing claimants were allowed to continue to claim the benefit, Single 
Women’s Allowance (a payment given to single women living in the family home) was also 
phased out in this way and, since 2006, no new claimants are allowed access the Pre- 
Retirement Allowance
These cutbacks were the exceptions that proved the rule Real increases in expenditure 
outweighed cost-containment measures over the period 1986-2004 and substantial 
investment was made in improvements in lone-parents payments, disability allowances and 
farmers’ social assistance as well as the introduction o f the Carers Allowance / Benefit
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Short-term cost cutting was not a consistent feature o f Irish social security Post-1986 
changes that lower the attractiveness o f the payment were more likely to be motivated by 
practical or ideological recommodification objectives as by immediate fiscal pressures for 
retrenchment
C o s t -C o n t a in m e n t
Cost containment means restructuring to mitigate longer term cost implications o f already 
existing commitments Many countries automatically link benefit rates to developments in 
the economy (Veit-Wilson, 1998) Examples include indexing payments to the inflation rate, 
growth in average industrial earnings or the minimum wage Governments often pursue cost- 
contamment and limit future cost increases by manipulating such indexation policies 
(Heidenheimer, 1990 Pierson, 2001 and Lindbolm, 2005) There is evidence, in debates 
about monitoring social welfare payment generosity, that Irish civil servants manipulate 
indexation the formulas used to track the trends m payments A SIPTU Pensions Brief 
(2005 3) warned how government used annual earnings data from the previous year as the 
formula to determine social welfare levels for the current year For example 200 euro is 34 
per cent o f average industrial earnings for 2005 but only 32 per cent of average industrial 
earnings for 2006 However in Ireland the dominant tendency has been not to manipulate 
indexation policy, but to firmly resist the adoption o f any such indexation policy
Avoiding indexation o f payments is a technical and more obscure way to achieve spending 
cuts than by cutting levels o f payments or eligibility criteria Decisions not to develop 
indexation policy can yield considerable cost savings over a number of years McCashin 
(2004 81) notes that, unlike other countries, Ireland has no statutory requirement to index 
social security payments Taylor (2005) argues the expenditure control culture o f the 
Department o f Finance (DOF) overly influenced social security indexation policy Certainly 
over the last two decades Department of Finance strongly resisted pressure to adopt an 
indexation formula for pensions, workmg-aged adult and child social security payments In 
1998 government explicitly rejected a Pensions Board recommendation for a 34 per cent 
Gross Average Industrial Earnings (GAIE) indexation formula for contributory old-age 
pensions (this later evolved into government policy) In the course of this debate the 
Department of Finance (DOF) argued that
to adopt an index for pensions might open the door for direct comparison
between those pensions and other social welfare payments there could be
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several undesirable side effects including fiscal cost and disincentive effects for 
employment and economic expansion (NRB, 1998 88)
In 2001 the government again explicitly rejected a majority recommendation from the Social 
Welfare Benchmarking and Indexation Working Group (Ireland 2001b) for a 27 per cent of 
GAIE benchmark for the lowest social assistance payments The terms of reference 
instructed the working group deliberating indexation policy to have
regard to their long-term economic budgetary PRSI contribution, distributive 
and incentive implications, in light o f trends in economic demographic and 
labour market patterns (2001b 2)
This terms of reference highlights how policy relating to work incentives and labour market 
patterns were a significant factor determining deliberations about policy concerning income 
adequacy In the group those resisting indexation policy focused primarily on the need for 
adaptability and flexibility in the context of international competitiveness
the uncertainty associated with the medium to long-term well being of the 
economy requires that the government should not be tied into a position in a 
critical area of public expenditure (ibid 61)
The need to promote work incentives was also a concern The groups’ majority 
recommendation was qualified by the following statement
an essential part o f a strategy for income adequacy should be a proactive policy 
of engagement with people of working age on social welfare to ensure that, 
where possible, they have the opportunity to avail o f employment, education 
and training opportunities (ibid 61)
A focus on work incentives cannot however explain government failure to increase income 
disregards relating to Unemployment Assistance, one- parent family payments or secondary 
benefit retention Loftus (2005 71) argues
The €146 50 disregard and the €293 00 ceiling set at the introduction o f the 
One-Parent Family Payment in 1997 were set at these levels to take account of
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the cost of childcare, the upper limit was related to average industrial earnings 
at the time These have not been increased during eight years o f strong 
economic growth The threshold at which payment is withdrawn is now less 
than the earnings o f a full-time worker at the National Minimum Wage
She further notes a similar situation applies in relation to the threshold to retain secondary 
benefits under the Back to work Allowances what’s included in the level remains at 317 43 
euro, just over 10 euro more than the full-time National Minimum Wage Freezing 
supplementary welfare rent- allowance income thresholds from 1994-2005 resulted in a 26 
per cent drop in the value of the disregard for Rent Supplement thresholds Income 
disregards help people into employment, freezing them is inconsistent with a stated policy 
objective o f enabling transition to employment This suggests that cost containment is 
driving this policy
A 1986 decision to relax an informal inflation indexation formula (which had previously 
maintained the real value o f Child Dependant Allowances (CDAs)) was followed by a 
decision to freeze the nominal value of CDAs in 1994 The fact that cost savings were low 
suggests this policy was primarily motivated by the need to provide for work incentives 
rather than for cost containment purposes
Korpi and Palme (2003) note how, under pressure from high unemployment, governments 
manage growing need by relaxing conditions for access to social assistance The 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance System (SWA) was introduced in 1974 as a safety net for 
people with urgent or exceptional needs Over the years o f high unemployment the cost of 
SWA soared as the scheme provided help for mainstream items such as basic living, utility 
bills, travel and childcare costs In 1992 a set o f cutbacks known as the ‘Dirty Dozen’ cuts 
signalled the reversal of this trend by restricting use of SWAs for utility bills and introducing 
a minimum rent contribution In 1994 the amount of Rent Supplement available through 
SWA was capped and an earnings threshold over which rent could not be paid was 
introduced In 2003 a further set o f cuts entitled the ‘Savage Sixteen’ brought further 
restrictions on the use of SWAs including restricted use of the supplementary welfare 
system, ceasing the use o f heat, diet and Creche Supplements and further attempts to restrict 
eligibility to Rent Supplement These cuts, all introduced on a no losers basis, can be 
interpreted not so much as policy to save immediate costs but as a policy to control and 
contain future costs or regain control over n expenditure programme
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The evidence proves that cost containment is a clear objective o f Irish indexation policy. 
Callan et al (2004) note that the increased distance between benefits and wages and a direct 
outcome of rejecting indexation policy, mean social welfare pensions and working aged 
payments were less generous and income inequality higher than if an indexation policy has 
been agreed. Such political resistance to indexation is also reflected by a reluctance to set 
tangible monetary targets in the NAPS (Hanan, 2002). The growth in both relative poverty 
and income inequality can be partially correlated with the absence of an adequate indexation 
policy. Work incentives were also a major consideration in arriving at a decision to reject 
indexation policy for both working age and pensions payments. Paradoxically governments 
failed to index and preserve the effectiveness of earned income disregards. The conservative 
ethos of cost containment appeared stronger than the neo-liberal ethos of enabling access to 
employment.
C o s t  A v o id a n c e
The two decades 1986-2005 saw considerable expansion of contingencies and some positive 
restructuring of a number of existing payments. However, at the same time, there was a 
conscious avoidance of addressing other newly defined social risks through the social 
security system. This section first reviews social security expansion and improvements. It 
then discusses evidence of cost avoidance, paying considerable attention to two structural 
characteristics: failure to reform in any meaningful way the male breadwinner model and 
recent reforms which led to a racial structuring of the social security system. These reforms 
are a function of underlying patriarchal and racial power structures as well as fear of future 
costs.
S o c ia l s e c u r it y  e x p a n s io n  a n d  im p ro v e m e n ts
In 1996 responsibility for administration of an unpopular Means Tested Disability Payment 
(DPMA) moved from the Department of Health to the Department o f Social Welfare. The 
latter Department improved the administration of the scheme, making it a much more 
entitlement-based payment and renamed it Disability Allowance (DA). The Department 
however, despite significant lobbying continues to resist the introduction of a Cost of 
Disability payment (Conroy, 2003, McManus, 2003). Small Farmers Assistance (SFA) was 
restructured to a more accessible payment called Farm Assist (FA); the administrative 
improvements resulted in increased take up. The FA reform recognised new risks and new
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needs arising from the structural reform of agriculture and the specific welfare needs of 
small farmers. However it was also a direct response to a rally of over 40,000 people under 
the banner of the Irish Farmers Association (IFA). The same decade saw the introduction of 
a Carers Allowance (1992). In an interview with the author key civil servants reflected how 
Minister Michael Woods, the Minister responsible for its introduction, was motivated to 
introduce support for carers by his direct experience o f hearing needs expressed in his 
political clinic work in his constituency. However as will be seen in section 7.4.3 the same 
urgency has not been applied to dealing with the social risks of childcare as experienced by 
families with children where both parents are in paid employment. Nor as seen in the 
following section has the state responded to meeting social risks associated with migration.
A  r a c ia l  m o d e l o f  s o c ia l s e c u r it y
The recent presence in Ireland o f asylum seekers, refugees and migrant workers has led to a 
recalibration, or restructuring, of the social security system. This recalibration, motivated by 
cost considerations and the objective of discouraging larger movements of asylum seekers 
and poorer migrants to Ireland, excluded these new social risks from social protection. The 
exclusion happened in four distinct ways: regulations obliged attachment to the Irish labour 
market in order to activate EU social insurance contributions; the habitual residents rule; 
policy on direct provision; migrant workers exemption from PRSI system.
Since joining the EEC in 1973 Ireland has had to ensure the Irish social security system 
reflected the principle of free movement of workers within the EU. It does this by 
acknowledging social insurance contributions from other EU countries for the purposes of 
qualifying for social insurance benefits in Ireland. All EU countries reciprocate.29 In order to 
contain the costs o f such reciprocity Ireland (like other EU countries) introduced regulations 
which held that in order to activate a social insurance record from another EU country a 
person has to demonstrate recent attachment to the workforce (defined as one week’s social 
insurance contribution) (Ellis 1996).
Ireland, under EU regulations, must also ensure all EU citizens are equally treated under 
rules governing access to social assistance. In practice, up to 2004, all EU citizens could 
apply for Irish social assistance payments under the same rules that apply to Irish nationals. 
Through the 1980’s and 1990’s given high levels of unemployment few EU nationals sought
Ireland has also voluntary reciprocal pension agreements with a large number of non EU countries.29
Unemployment Assistance. Any social assistance claims by EU citizens, were, in order to 
minimise ‘social tourism’ or ‘benefit shopping’, subject to rigorous monitoring under 
conditionality rules. However, in response to fears associated with the impact of the 
accession of ten new and poorer states into the EU, the Department of Justice obliged the 
Department of Social and Family Affairs to introduce a Habitual Residence Condition 
(Section 17 of the Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2004, 1st May 2004). 
While the legislation was introduced to prevent migrant workers from EU Accession States 
immediately claiming social security the Irish government was obliged to apply the 
legislation to all EU citizens including Irish people. Unless a person can prove Habitual 
Residence in Ireland, or the UK Common Travel Area, for the two previous years they can 
be refused social assistance benefits.
Non-nationals, including migrant workers and people being recognized as refugees, are most 
likely to suffer from its provisions as most migrant workers find it impossible to meet the 
criteria in relation to their intention to live in Ireland permanently (NCCIR, 2005). Pressure 
from lobby groups and a legal challenge from the European Union resulted in two changes in 
2005. EU migrants were allowed access to family-based payments and working migrants are 
now allowed access to social security. However, the rule still prohibits all other migrants and 
asylum seekers from accessing social security.
A system of direct provision of social security and denial of the right to work to asylum 
seekers was introduced in 1999. Asylum seekers are accommodated in institutional hostel- 
type lodgings, isolated from Irish society and denied the right to work. Access to social 
security is restricted to a subsistence payment worth less than 15 per cent o f the lowest 
weekly social assistance payment. The payment has not been indexed since its introduction 
in 1999 and is clearly inadequate to enable participation in Irish life. Less in monetary terms 
than that allocated to Irish people in equivalent institutional / hostel care it is a rare instance 
o f direct inequality in the Irish social security system (Fanning et al, 2001).
EU regulations, in order to ease worker mobility, exempt migrant workers from paying PRSI 
contributions if they are working in an EU country for a period of less than 52 weeks and if 
they are covered by PRSI in their country of origin. Following lobbying by the multinational 
construction company, GAMA, the Irish government legislated to exempt PRSI 
contributions for non-EU migrant workers without a qualifying criteria that they are covered 
by PRSI contributions elsewhere. This legislation leaves migrant workers without any social
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insurance protection in either country and exposed in the event o f illness or accident and this 
impacts on their future eligibility for pension coverage.
There have been contradictory trends in cost avoidance patterns. Irish governments have 
been willing to respond to need highlighted by lobby groups or identified through direct 
political constituency work. It is more likely to respond to some need and pressure groups 
(carers and farmers) than other need or pressure groups (women and non-nationals). Such 
lack of response directly impacts on welfare outcomes. The proportion o f women claimants 
grew from 45 per cent of social welfare claimants in 1985 to 55 per cent of social security 
claimants in 2005. This shift reflected a number o f structural changes including the dramatic 
growth in female labour force participation, féminisation o f poverty and increased incidence 
of parenting alone. This failure to adapt to the parenting needs of two earner households is a 
significant indicator that Irish social security has been slow to adapt to new social risks. 
Direct provision for asylum seekers, exemptions from PRSI for migrant workers and a 
habitual residence rule combine to exclude asylum seekers and migrant workers from 
mainstream social security system. This has directly contributed to increased homelessness 
and destitution in the adult migrant population and nutritional deficiencies among both adults 
and children in direct provisions accommodation (Fanning et al 2001; NCCIR, 2005). Such 
policies seem contradictory in the context of an EU that promotes labour market mobility, 
gender equality and high rates of employment for men and women. However they are less 
contradictory when the failure to meet new social risks is understood in the context of 
commodification where social risk is left to the mercy of the market.
S e c tio n  C o n c lu s io n
Compared to what might be expected in the competition state literature Ireland has 
experienced limited social security payments cuts. The CSW (Ireland, 1986) proved useful 
in providing a menu for social security development that was low key, incremental and 
consistent with fiscal environment o f the late 1980’s. The most significant features of Irish 
retrenchment were cost containment, resistance to indexation formulas and failure to 
calibrate and accommodate other new social risks. These failures consolidate gender and 
racial structural divisions in both the social security system and society. Pierson P. (1994, 
1998, 2001) expects that in liberal regimes there would be limited restructuring to meet new 
social needs and this is evident in the Irish case. The desire to keep social expenditure low, to 
have limited state intervention and the preoccupation with basic poverty alleviation means 
that liberal welfare regimes have limited ambition in relation to social policy, preferring to
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leave the solution with the family or market
4 5 R e s id u a lis a t io n
This section examines evidence related to the thesis hypothesis of residualisation Indicators 
reviewed here include more use o f targeted payments, increased gaps between the rich and 
poor and new or shifting risks o f inequality where those most distant from the labour market, 
older people, carers, women in the home, lone parents and people with disabilities, suffer 
most poverty The section concludes there is significant Irish evidence of residualisation
G r e a t e r  use o f  ta rg e te d  p a y m e n ts 9
Competition state theory expects states to shift from universal to selective social security 
payments (Alber and Standing, 2000 101), however ‘Ireland is exceptional within the EU for 
the high proportion of its social spending which is means tested’ (NESC, 2005 xvi) An 
already targeted welfare state does not need much adjustment to be consistent with the 
notion o f a targeted competition state welfare regime
The 1988 extension o f the social insurance system to the self-employed and farmers, 
increased levels o f employment par,icipation and increased labour market participation of  
women all contributed to significantly greater coverage o f the population in the social 
insurance system However, so far, expanding social insurance provision has led to little shift 
in the balance between the numbers claiming social assistance and insurance payments nor 
led to progress in decreasing reliance on means-tested payments Reliance on means-tested 
social assistance payments accounted for 46 per cent of payments in 1985 and rose to an all- 
time high o f almost 60 per cent in 199530 Economic growth and a substantial decrease in 
long-term unemployment meant the numbers dependant on social assistance subsequently 
returned to the 1985 level o f 45 per cent by 2000 and it has remaines steady sicne at 45% in 
2004 This reliance however remains the highest in Europe, three times the EU average and, 
for example, over nine times the level o f Belgium Such path dependency would be
30 Unemployed claimants with exhausted eligibility to insurance-based payments had to revert to 
means tested payments, emerging school leavers went straight into means-tested payments and as 
O’Connor (2005 11) suggests, changes in eligibility criteria for social insurance payments may have 
also shifted some claimants towards means tested payments
reinforced by the (NESC 2005)31 recommendation that Ireland should maintain its hybrid 
model and reliance on means-tested payments32
r
The structural persistence of a large number o f social assistance claimants indicates a 
significantly residualised population (NESC, 2005) There is also increased vulnerability 
(Kirby 2005) Growth in the number of SWA claimants from 21m in 1985 to 332m euro in 
2000 and 605m euro in 2004 in SWA-related expenditure shows greater reliance on a safety- 
net provision The major growth in supplementary rent allowance expenditure shows a 
partial adaptation to meet previously unrecognised housing needs and the increased social 
risk of homelessness (Hickey and Downey, 2005) Other indicators o f residualisation, the 
numbers of homeless and the numbers using food banks (Friel and Conlon, 2004) also show 
increases in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s
Given already high levels o f means-tested payments there is little surprise that no evidence 
can be found of movement from social insurance or universal to residualised means-tested 
payments In fact, for child-income support the opposite is true, a move from targeted 
payments to a greater focus on universal Child Benefit Over the late 1980s policy focused 
on concern that families with children faced potential poverty and unemployment traps The 
government focused on increased Child Benefit as its primary child-income support and anti- 
child poverty strategy From 1986 the role of means-tested child income support was de- 
emphasised and in 1994 a policy decision was made to freeze the nominal level o f these 
payments This led to a fundamental shift in the structure of child income support for low- 
income families At the same time the social risks to be met through Child Benefit were
31 This recommendation is a significant policy shift from the previous 1986 CSW recommendation to 
expand social insurance coverage and, over time, reduce the use of social assistance payments
32 The distinction between social assistance and social insurance payments has somewhat blurred over 
this period There are means-tested income limits to various social insurance-based payments 
Improved income disregards in Unemployment Assistance and relatively high earnings thresholds for 
One Parent Family Payment and Disability Allowance and State Pension (formerly Non Contributory 
Old Page Pension) recipients bring the payments closer to a partial basic income style of payment 
Policy is very inconsistent across time and across claimants Some disregards have not been indexed 
and have deteriorated over time while at the same time other new and significant income disregards 
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stretched by political actors to include childcare (Montague, 2001). NESC (2005a:52) 
showed how in 1993 means- ested CDA expenditure was 25 per cent higher than the 
expenditure on universal Child Benefit and by 2003 Child Benefit was five times higher than 
expenditure on the more targeted payment.
The ratio of targeted to universal payment for low income families child income support 
shifted from 74:26 in 1993 to 37:63 in 2002 (CPA 2005b). This has impacted on the 
distributional outcome of child income support. For those in medium and higher income 
brackets who received only Child Benefit the value of the payment increased by 173% from 
1994 to 2004. However low income families relying on the combined child-dependant 
allowances and Child Benefit saw a total increase in the combined child income support 
payments of only 52% from 1994 to 2004. This policy was clearly driven by work incentives 
and is a clear indicator of how social policy is subordinated to the needs of the economy and 
to a productivist reordering of social policy. The outcome is a stubborn and high level of  
child poverty (CPA, 2005).
R is e  in  o v e r a ll in c o m e  in e q u a lit y
This shift from targeted to universal child income support payments runs counter to Alber 
and Standings (2000:101) expectation of shifts to means tested payments. However the 
outcome, high levels o f child poverty, is consistent with the type of residualisation expected 
in a competition state (Cemy et al., 2005:17). For adult payments the reality remains a 
consistent reliance on high levels of targeted payments. These payments are not only means 
tested but are characterised by a minimal subsistence type of support ( 0 ‘Connor A. 
2005:35,101). For both fiscal and work incentive reasons payments have been allowed to 
decline relative to average net earnings. The Benchmarking Report (Ireland 2001b:46, Table 
6.6) shows social welfare increases fell considerably below net earnings increases over the 
1991 to 2001 period with the long-term UA payment increasing by 64 per cent compared to 
net average industrial earnings increasing by 109.1 per cent.
These low rates are a key contributory factor to worsening income distribution inequalities. 
The share of income o f the bottom 10 per cent declined from 2.28 per cent of total income in 
1987 to 1.74 percent in 2003 (Household Budget Surveys) While consistent deprivation 
based poverty fell, the inequality indicator or relative income poverty, increased to 21.3 per 
cent of households (CSO, 2005a,b), the highest relative income poverty in the EU where the 
average is 15 per cent (Eurostat, 2004). Responding to the analysis in Table 4.1 Whelan et al
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(2003 38) commented ‘The levels of persistent poverty suggest that social policy is not 
responding effectively or intervening early enough to prevent poverty becoming long-term5
F ig u re  4 1 T re n d s  in  C o n siste n t and  R e la tive  P o ve rty  an d  
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1994 1997 1998 2000 2001
Figure 4 1 Poverty Trends 1994-2001 Source W helan et al (2003), Monitoring 
Poverty Trends in Ireland Results from the 2001 Living in Ireland Survey, pp 37- 
3933
S h if t  in  w h o  e x p e rie n c e s  r is k  o f  p o v e rty
Competition state expectations are confirmed by shifts in the composition o f welfare 
claimants who experience risk of poverty There are new and multiple forms of inequality 
with the weakest with those further away from the labour market and with more obstacles to 
labour market participation, suffering most from adaptation Shifts in the risk o f poverty 
have moved across certain groups with the old, disabled and those on home duties, the vast 
majority o f whom are women, experiencing a higher risk o f poverty over this time These 
trends are consistent with the competition state hypothesis of greater income inequality The 
increased levels o f employment, the net inward migration o f labour-market-aged workers 
and the decreased unemployment rate have had little impact on Irish benefit dependency 
levels From 1986 to 2005 Irish benefit dependency ratios have held constant over the two
33 Consistent Poverty Percentage of households below 60 per cent mean income threshold and experiencing 
basic deprivation Relative Poverty Percentage of households below 60 of median earnings Deprivation Risk of 
scoring one or more on basic deprivation index
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decades at 20 per cent of the total population for claimants (37 per cent for all adult and child 
recipients), compared to 12 4 per cent of the total population in 198034
Ireland has however experienced a considerable shift in the types of benefits, with a drop in 
unemployment related claims and an increase in the numbers of people dependent on 
disability, lone-parent and caring contingencies (FAS 2004, Grubb 2004) Lone parents have 
shifted from less than 1 per cent of the working age population in 1980 to over 4 per cent in 
1999 FAS (2004) observed how the total decrease in numbers unemployed (down 37,000 or 
20 per cent) over 1998 to 2003 was absorbed by corresponding increases in the numbers on 
lone parent (up 13,000 or 21 per cent) or disability allowance (up 21,000 or 44 per cent) over 
the same period that the overall increase in working aged population rose by 260,000 or only 
11 per cent Some of this change can be explained by improvements in social welfare design 
and coverage, information and take up campaigns and rerouting people to more appropriate 
payments through Local Employment Services (LES) and the National Employment Action 
Plan (NEAP) Some of the shift is more structural and highlights new social risks
Increases in numbers on disability allowance and lone parents allowance is also an indicator 
of the payments capacity to meet new social understandings of disability and family 
breakdown The same can be said of the increase in numbers availing of Farm Assist as 
compared to farmers’ smallholders’ assistance and the numbers availing of improved carer’s 
allowance, both of which meet previously unrecognised social risks35 O’Connor A 
(2005 21) notes that stability in the proportion of the working aged population in receipt of 
social welfare and their composition is problematic NESC (2005a 85) notes how ‘a person 
may be become entitled to social welfare when in their teens and remain on it until they are 
reclassified as early retired’ Despite this, and unlike other liberal regimes in the UK and the 
US, until 2006, (as described in section 4 3 3), there was no meaningful attempt to place time 
limits on entitlement
34 Benefit dependency levels, the proportion of the working aged population claiming social security
payments, vary across OECD countries ranging from 11 per cent of the working age population (15- 
64) in Japan to 24 per cent in France and 38 per cent in the Slovak Republic However these figures 
are misleading as to some degree they do not capture the degree to which large sections f the 
population may be outside both the formal labour market and the benefit system
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T a b le  4 5  P e rc e n ta g e  o f  p e rso n s b e lo w  60 p e r  ce n t o f  m e d ia n  in c o m e  b y  la b o u r  
fo rc e  sta tu s
1994 1997 1998 2000
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2001
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% % % % ;
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%
i
%
Employee 32 4 7 26 65
i
8 1 9 2
Self Employed 16 0 144 164 179 14 3 -
Farmer 186 i 167 23 9 24 1 23 0 -
Unemployed 51 4 57 7 58 8i 1 57 1I
\
44 7
r
42 1
111 / Disabled 29 5 52 5 54 5
!
52 2 66 5 54 0
Retired 82
!
13 5
1
1 184
i —  —  ~
30 3 36 9 31 0
Home Duties 20 9
1
î 32 6
i
| 46 8 44 3 46 9 37 0
F
Source CSO (2005) European Survey on Income and Living Conditions, First results 2003, 
Dublin
Table 4 5 illustrates the shift in the composition of groups experiencing relative poverty 
Consistent with what would be expected under a competition state, those outside the labour 
market experience a higher risk of poverty Unemployment, while still significant, is no 
longer the major risk factor, those with disabilities are now most likely to experience poverty 
while the aged lone parent and caring claimants are increasingly likely to experience relative 
poverty Consistent with expectation of greater numbers of ‘working poor’ in competition 
states is the evidence that those in work experienced a 6 per cent increased risk of poverty, 
mainly experienced by part-time and casual women workers
The risk of poverty is clearly associated with reliance on social security Whelan et a l , 
(2003 22, Table 4) highlights how those relying primarily on social welfare, particularly 
those in receipt of social assistance means-tested payments, are most likely to fall below 
poverty lines linked to average incomes So while fewer people were unemployed the risk of 
poverty for those remaining unemployed doubled from 23 9 per cent in 1994 to 43 1 per cent 
in 2001, while for older people the risk increased in the same time frame from 5 3 per cent to 
49 per cent
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Section Conclusion
The expectation of greater inequality and residualisation in competition states is entirely 
consistent with the Irish experience. Ireland has had clear path dependence towards means 
tested payments. This pauperisation of segments of society is directly attributable to a 
conscious policy decision to keep social welfare payments means tested and to keep social 
welfare payments at low and ungenerous levels. The risk of poverty has shifted to the most 
vulnerable, those relying solely on those payments and unable to access paid participation in 
the labour market. However even those who do access paid employment find this is not 
always enough to avoid poverty.
4.6 Regulation
This section reviews evidence relating to three aspects of the remaining hypotheses: 
Regulation. The section first reviews whether the function of the state is changing from 
direct delivery to regulator. It then reviews whether social security has been privatised and 
finally reviews how new public management concepts have been applied to social security 
delivery. The section concludes by commenting on the internal delivery agenda that drove 
the modernisation of Irish social security.
State as regulator
A regulatory state ‘provides a framework of rules and performance indicators or targets for 
market actors to follow’ (Cemy et al., 2005:17). While Ireland had historically been a mixed 
economy welfare state, social security, unlike health and education, has been an exclusively 
statutory responsibility (Cousins 1995a, Fanning 1999). Over the past two decades the state 
has made some attempts to divest itself of secondary social security functions thus following 
a more regulatory path. It did so primarily in an indirect fashion, by promoting the social 
inclusion role of the non-profit private sector. The Programme for Economic and Social 
Progress (PESP, Ireland 1991) initiated the first local Area Based Partnerships to which the 
state delegates employment support functions including the Local Employment Service 
(LES). The White Paper Supporting Voluntary Activity (2000:69) sought to define and 
regulate the relationship between the state and the Community and Voluntary (DSFCA 
2000f) sector and signalled a shift to service contracts requiring a new model for third-sector 
organisations (Acheson et al 2004:123). NESC (2005a:206-7) proposes a further ‘shift in 
governance and reinvention of the role of the state away from provision of services to a
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regulator of rights and standards and enabler of local activist networks’ NESF (2006) 
recommends that a National Strategic Framework would support a Local Partnership 
Network based on interagency working of statutory and non statutory local service providers 
who work through annual Service Delivery Agreements This changing style of governance 
is however slow to evolve and there is considerable distance between the rhetoric of 
recommendations and policy implementation
P r iv a t is a t io n
Changing governance means more than simple delegation of tasks Renegotiation of the 
relationship between the private and public spheres involves a shift in power One area 
where government policy facilitated a shift in power was pensions policy where government 
invited the private pension industry to chair the National Pensions Board (NPB) This 
business-led governance promoted the commodification or privatisation of pensions 
Strongly advocated by the international financial services sector, the Pensions (Amendment) 
Act 2002 introduced second-tier private Pension Savings Retirement Accounts This policy 
was chosen m spite of opposition from civil service advisers who found themselves 
disempowered in this new form of governance A further but failed example of the states’ 
attempt to divest itself of its traditional social protection role was when attempts to transfer 
disability protection to employers were blocked by the veto power of employers in 1988 and 
1992 This contrasts with the UK experience where the state was successful in privatising 
disability payments US firms have been enabled through government fiscal policy to 
provide private welfare packages which include private health insurance and disability 
protection Government has also encouraged the Irish Farmers Association to adopt a private 
market solution to farmers’ social risk of disability Evidence suggests Irish governments 
want to divest themselves of social security functions but can only do so with the consent of 
business and employers Irish governments are vulnerable to veto players blocking policy 
and perhaps are less able to divest social protection functions than other liberal regimes
N e w  P u b lic  M a n a g e m e n t
A parallel government administrative reform agenda was also evident from the early 1990s 
and was launched as the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) in 1994 (Murray and 
Teahon, 1997) This required all Departments to focus on the quality of public service and 
the concept of customer care Consumerism, choice and new public management discourse 
were evident in the Public Services Management Act (1997) SMIs involved ‘customer
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service plans’, ‘customer service targets’ and ‘service delivery models’. The Irish experience 
mirrored international public service reform experiences where many countries incorporated 
a value-for-money approach with customer care, staff training and customer charters 
(DSCFA 2000a,c,d). Interviews with policy makers highlight that ‘expenditure reviews’ 
which emphasise value for money had some impact on policy development.
Changes in social security delivery during this period were consistent with the Irish SMI 
focus on the claimant as a customer. This change led to significant improvement in service 
delivery. Some of the change agenda was driven by internal staff processes and trade unions. 
However well-organised and ambitious claimant groups also forced the pace of change. In an 
interview with the author one senior DSFA official remarked how ‘key voluntary sector 
organisations dragged us into the 20th century’. However evaluations highlight considerable 
resistance to new public management practices and institutional change in the Irish public 
service (NESC, 2003). A strong centralised bureaucracy has a strong veto on change. This is 
reinforced by the strength of the public sector trade unions to veto change. Irish targets and 
performance indicators are applied in a more softly negotiated fashion than, for example, 
more punitive UK league tables. Reforms in a highly consensual political system such as 
those in Denmark or the Netherlands usually have to achieve a higher degree of cross-party 
acceptance and this usually moderates the more extreme ideological type of reform (Pollit,
2005).
Modernisation and Fraud Control
The residual safety-net emphasis of the Irish social welfare system had always meant the 
need for an effective administration of weekly payments. One of the greatest challenges for 
Irish social security policy and the related modernisation agenda is the delivery challenge 
which dominated the DSFA (formerly DSW and DSFCA) over the two decades. While some 
delivery focused changes can be traced to the ideological neo-liberal management values of 
competition states other localised drivers or triggers of initiatives to modernise Irish social 
security predated SMI type public sector reform agendas. Very high levels of unemployment 
of the 1980’s pressurised the Department to administer in excess of 300,000 weekly 
unemployment payments. This, combined with its usual workload, put huge strain on the 
Departments’ internal administrative infrastructure and preoccupied the Department over the 
1980’s and 1990’s. Near calamity occurred when systems failed in a transition from Pay 
Related Social Insurance (PRSI) to Personal Public Service Numbers (PPSN) in 1979 and 
again when a new IT system failed in the late 1980’s. In both instances hundreds of
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thousands of claimants faced non-payment and money was paid on demand to avert disaster 
In a clientalist and populist administration politicians must be able to assure voters of the 
effective delivery o f such a basic weekly payment The Department were under pressure to 
deliver
However the author’s interviews with key Departmental staff reveal an alternative 
motivation for increased investment in more efficient operational systems Exposure o f high 
levels of disability fraud in the mid 1980’s had caused shock waves within the Department 
and wider civil service and forced the unprecedented resignation of the Departmental 
Secretary General Politicians36 were subsequently reluctant to spend public monies on social 
security without being assured that the Department was operating the most effective fraud 
control mechanisms possible Minister Woods responded by pioneering investment in 
modem administrative systems that ensured the credibility of social security budgets The 
fact that the Department was one o f the first in the world to invest in a technically advanced 
administrative infrastructure was more an outcome o f local crisis in delivery systems than 
because o f a shift towards the type o f new public management expected in a competition 
state
The evidence supports the thesis hypothesis that Irish social security delivery demonstrates 
features of regulation, privatisation and new public management However these features are 
constrained by the slow movement towards more regulatory governance o f social security 
Reform has been limited by the capacity o f employers and trade unions to veto change and 
the way new public management has been negotiated in Irish political culture (NESC 2003, 
2005b) By far the biggest driver o f change in systems and management o f social security 
was a local concern about path dependant problems associated with the effective delivery of 
a large volume o f weekly payments This concern occasioned the 1985 restructuring of the 
Department of Social Welfare into a small Aireacht or policy making section and the 
services directorate which focused only on delivery This focus on delivery is perhaps more 
politically sensitive in a proportional representational electoral system (PR) where brokerage
36 Sensitivity to fraud is often attributed to the FF political culture which supports social security for 
the deserving poor and Fine Gael’s (FG) historically suspicious attitude towards social security 
However fraud appears to have been a concern of all parties including the social democrat and left 
wing parties in the 1990s
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politics makes government more sensitive to efficient delivery and more vulnerable to the 
electoral consequence o f any administrative systems failure The legacy however is a weak 
policy system and weak policy making capacity
Three legacies are apparent The openness of Irish industrial policy enhanced the 
Department’s early capacity to pioneer such technology The Department were able to utilise 
the presence of a US multi-national information technology firm, Digital, to pioneer 
sophisticated social security delivery systems The Department has since gone on to trade 
this technology on the global market and acted as expert adviser to many countries globally, 
a rather unexpected example o f the influence of globalisation on Irish social welfare 
development The nature o f the delivery challenge and its focus on fraud control and 
administrative efficiency led the Department towards technology systems that maximised 
internal efficiencies but which were underdeveloped in relation to enabling tracking of data 
for the purposes of policy development and information exchange across agencies The 
legacy of the delivery challenge is also important in that it had an impact on the policy­
making capacity of the DSFA With a clear priority given to delivery agendas the 
Department never developed a full policy capacity Policy functions continue to be delegated 
to social partnership institutions and private consultancy companies
4 7 Defaniiliansation
As argued earlier the trend towards commodification has to be assessed differently for 
women where a move to paid employment ha different implications in terms of social 
citizenship Here the question is not so much whether the focus is on moving women into 
employment (which can be considered an extension o f women’s social rights) but whether 
that move mto employment (which undoubtably occurred) was enhanced by, 
individualisation in social security structures that enable greater independence of the family, 
access to education and training to increase the likelihood o f access decently paid 
employment, childcare provision to enable women adequately accommodate care 
responsibilities If this has not been the case then the movement o f women into paid 
employment is a less significant extension of social rights than might otherwise have been 
the case
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Individualisation
Pressure from the Irish women’s movement and the legal requirements of the EU 19 ! 1 
Equality Directive resulted in a considerable restructuring of the social security system in the 
early 1980’s However, this restructuring was reluctantly undertaken The Fourth Report of 
the Joint Committee on Women’s Rights (Ireland 1996d) observed that both political and 
legal intervention was required to force full implementation Further anomalies arising from 
such reforms led to a legal challenge regarding the relative treatment of married and 
cohabitating couples Government responded to the need to equalise treatment of married 
and cohabiting couples by levelling down and limiting the amount of social protection that 
could be awarded to all new two-adult households This limitation rule37 was a considerable 
reinforcement of the male breadwinner system There was some symbolic reform of 
language in the male breadwinner model including renaming 'dependant adults' as 'Qualified 
Adults' (QA) and a collective renaming of prisoners wives, unmarried mothers and deserted 
wives allowances as ione parents allowances’ in 1993 and then 'one parent family' payments 
in 1997 While these changes reduced the labelling of women as related to men they did not 
fundamentally alter the male breadwinner social security model
Although the number is declining, there were still 119,000 Qualified Adults in 2004, 95 per 
cent of them women Despite extensive lobbying, there has been only slow progress towards 
voluntary or mandatory individualisation of payments (Murphy 2003) While the One Parent 
Family Payment enables access to employment, it still prohibits, by regulation, ‘meamngfùl’ 
relationships between men and women by restricting co-habitation (a social, sexual or 
financial relationship with a person of the opposite sex) (DSFA, 2006, NESF, 2001) Women 
are forced to live as 'independent' claimants or dependent cohabiters by regulations which 
impose lifestyle and behavioural limits and restrict women from forming family lives of their 
choice (NESF, 2001, DSFA, 2000e) However it is not clear in mid 2006 whether a recent 
proposal to abolish One Parent Family Payment, the limitation rule and the Qualified Adult 
will survive a number of possible vetoes to become policy
37 The limitation rule limited the total amount of social security an unemployed two-person household 
could claim to that of an adult and an adult dependant (or approximately 1 6% of an adult payment)
Women’s Access to Education and Training
Up to the mid 1990’s the issue of unemployment m Ireland was a predominantly male issue, 
much of women’s unemployment remained hidden, and women were considered m social 
security terms as the ‘qualified adults’ of unemployed men While Ireland had a significant 
investment in Active Labour Market measures, few were oriented at women and of those 
where women had high participation rates, such as Community Employment, there was low 
progression into paid employment (DSFA 2006) 1996 the INOU and the NWCI cooperated 
for the first time to establish a ‘Breaking the Barriers’ campaign to reform how the live 
register acted as a barrier to women’s access to state employment schemes, training and 
education opportunities The groups negotiated a policy process through P2000 to make 
recommendations concerning underlying access by women to labour market programmes 
and supports The P2000 Working Group on Women’s Access to Labour Market 
Opportunities (Access Group, Ireland 2000a) The group only reached consensus on a lowest 
common denominator consensus recommendation to extend eligibility for certain 
programmes to Qualified Adults of those on the live register Spouses of those in low income 
and women who have been primarily engaged in domestic or care duties in the home were 
not considered eligible Few of the large number of recommendations were implemented, 
even a basic Recommendation (No 18) to develop an ‘Information Manual’ guide for women 
seeking to return to work was not implemented (Ireland 2000a)
Despite a €40 million Equality for Women measure in the National Development Plan 2000- 
2007 the issue of women’s participation in the labour market has yet to capture public or 
political imagination An NESF (2006) project team Towards An Inclusive Labour Market, 
which aimed to increase the participation of atypical workers in the labour market, also 
failed to advance the policy interests of women as atypical workers In the process of 
compiling the report the male secretariat refused an offer from the Department of Justice 
Gender Equality Unit (GEU) to gender proof the report Such was the frustration of those 
advocating gender focused reforms that both the GEU and the NWCI took the unusual step 
of complaining in writing to the Chairperson of the NESF that the offer to gender proof the 
report had been rejected The NESC has been critiqued for what was considered a weak 
gender analysis in NESC DWS (2005a) The Equality Authority were concerned enough to 
fund a gender equality audit of the substantial NESC DWS (2005a) report
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There were however some social security policy changes to enable women access to 
employment In 1996, social insurance payments were extended to part-time workers (80 per 
cent of whom are women) The same year saw improvements in rules concerning means 
testing of work-related income for Qualified Adult payments (95 per cent of whom are 
women) In 1990 parenting alone payments were restructured into a pro-work incentive Lone 
Parent Allowance and then in 1997 further changes were made so that a new One Parent 
Family Payment incorporated a specific income disregard to compensate for the cost of 
childcare for lone parents (95 per cent of whom are women) This disregard was however 
not indexed and lost value (Loftus 2005) until its value was partially restored in Budget 
2006 While the disregard was useful and while over 60% of recipients accessed paid 
employment the structure of the payment trapped women in low paid and part time 
employment and limited it effectiveness in enabling women move into full time employment 
(McCashin 2004)
M o r e  m a r k e t  p r o v is io n  o f  c h ild c a r e
Women’s social risk is closely associated with children and the cost of childcare Care 
emerges as a central issue in women’s labour market decisions, mothers5 decisions are 
mediated primarily by childcare responsibilities and secondly by employment opportunities 
Childcare lobby groups do not accept that increases in child benefit are a contribution 
towards meeting childcare costs and it is generally accepted that the government failed to 
respond, m a meaningful way, to childcare challenges associated with greater female labour 
force participation (Oakely 2005) Over the two decades the Department introduced 
payments to support parenting (Adoptive payments, the extension of Maternity Benefit and 
the introduction of Maternity Assistance) and indicated its willingness to administer, but not 
fund, a Parental Leave payment However lobby groups continue to highlight the failure to 
further extend maternity leave / Benefit or to introduce paid parental leave (Murphy, 2003) 
The primary childcare strategy of the past decade has been the Equal Opportunities 
Childcare Programme under the equality framework of the Department of Justice Equality 
and Law Reform which, in the main has worked to mcentivise increased supply in the 
private childcare market This is consistent with what might be expected in a competition 
state
Coakley (2005) notes how the EU policy framework where paid work is seen as the key to
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participation and social inclusion and as a route out of poverty and where the adult worker 
model promotes increased labour force participation of mothers She highlights ambiguity 
concerning the new norm of working parenthood on the one hand and moral expectations of 
parental responsibility on the other NWCI (2000 8) argue that while encouraging 
participation in paid employment government policy also assumes ‘women will respond to 
all of societies caring needs on a unpaid basis’ Highlighting the need for a set of 
interrelated support frameworks for mothers in low-income families Coakley (2005) 
advocates reframing policy in a paradigm which includes choice, security and well-being in 
work and care for mothers, fathers and children
The DSFA (2006) represents an important step in Irish social security policy If 
implemented the report proposal will significantly advance both individualisation of social 
secueity and activation of low income mothers into paid employment However it is not clear 
whether there is policy commitment from other agencies for the training, education and 
childcare reforms that need to accompany the proposed social security reforms (OPEN
2006) The DSFA (2006) analysis accepts that Ireland is out of line with international best 
practice when it comes to supporting low income mothers into paid employment It could be 
said that women have returned to work in spite of the unavailability of labour market 
supports directly oriented towards women’s education and training needs The 
defamihansation of Irish women has yet to occur
7  8 O ffe n s iv e  o r  d e fe n s iv e  s o c ia l p o lic y 9
Having reviewed the five sets of indicators (developed by the author for the purpose of
evaluating Irish social security reform over the past two decades) it is now possible to 
conclude There is sufficient evidence to confirm a recommodification of Irish social 
security However there is also evidence to suggest this happened in a slow and incremental 
way Key limitations include less conditionality, less privatisation and fiscalisation of social 
security and lack of labour market, social security and childcare reforms enabling more 
movement of women to work Two factors might explain the lack of pace or reform Irish 
path dependency is an important factor in explaining the relatively slow reform process 
With payments already highly targeted and residualised there was little room for 
retrenchment and, with over 30 adult contingency payments, implementing change is 
complex High levels of economic growth and significant decreases in unemployment also
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meant less pressure for reform However these two factors alone can not account for the style 
of Irish reform
NESC (2005a) argues there are in fact significant pressures for reform of Irish social 
security These pressures include high levels of benefit dependency, inequality and in- work 
poverty and, the overarching pressure for reform, the need to compete in a competitive 
global market NESC (2005a lx-xm) identifies the problem that ‘social policy as a whole is 
not sufficiently aligned with the economic polices being pursued by the state’ and identifies 
the challenge of reconceptualising the welfare system to ‘connect more fully with the 
dynamic economy’ NESC (2005a 1) argued that ‘the social dividend of strong economic 
performance must however take forms that are supported of the country’s ongoing ability to 
trade advantageously in the world economy’ This is consistent with a move to a productivist 
and recommodified social policy The chapter ends by reflecting on the style of Irish 
commodification prescribed by NESC and asks whether it is most similar to ‘offensive’ neo- 
statist social policy’ found in Netherlands and Denmark or defensive neo-liberal welfare-to- 
work strategies found in the UK and the US (Torfing 1999)
T h e  D e v e lo p m e n ta l W e lf a r e  S tate
It is difficult to read between the lines of Irish rhetoric and assess a realistic policy position 
from the ambiguous and contradictory discourse that dominates much Irish and other 
countries national political discourse (Montague 2001, Roche 1984, Veit-Wilson 1998) It is 
clear that within the process of deliberating the Developmental Welfare State there is a 
strong policy coalition seeking to promote a positive social policy of a social investment type 
state An alternative coalition seeks to limit social protection to that consistent with a low 
taxation competition state This tension is resolved by use of ambiguous language typified 
by the phrases ‘supportive conditionality’ (NESF 1994, NESC 1999) and ‘sensitive 
activation’ (NESC 2003) Take for example the following NESC statements (2005a 221) 
describing how Irish activation policy
is not based on time limits or coercion but on the obligation and the need for 
welfare recipients and public authorities alike to periodically review the extent 
to which recipients best interests are being facilitated by the arrangements 
governing their access to an income
The taking of employment if coerced seldom leads to a lasting job match or
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provides employers with the quality of employees they seek What can be 
required of welfare recipients is participation in interviews where the range of 
public supports available to them are explored and they are offered every 
assistance to identify their personal goals and seek the means to realise them
Torfing (1999) argues that an offensive strategy disarticulates the concept of workfare from 
neo-liberal discourse and rearticulates it in a social democratic and universalistic discourse 
Nicaise (2002) also distinguishes different approaches along an axis with a workfare 
approach and a social inclusion approach as the two opposing poles The NESC description 
above, while ambiguous, seems more consistent with a social democratic or social inclusion 
than a neo-liberal or workfare discourse However closer examination shows that the content 
of the policies proposed do not necessarily match such rhetoric Defensive neo-liberal 
welfare to work strategies are characterised by ungenerous payments, such as in the UK and 
the US, that result in more inequality and in-work poor Key characteristics differentiating 
offensive strategies in the Netherlands and Denmark (Torfing, 1999 18) include activation 
based on education and training aimed at skill improvement rather than job search, broad 
programmes that upgrade the work of the skills of the workforce in general work, rather than 
focusing on only welfare recipients, a legal framework which guarantees that a person 
cannot be activated into ‘futile work for the sake of work’, empowerment rather than 
surveillance, control or punishment, relatively high rates of payment, more equitable 
outcomes and less in work poor Table 4 5 compares a workfare offensive model against the 
present Irish model and that proposed in the NESC developmental state model
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Table 4 6 Different workfare models, Offensive, Present Irish, DWS
O ffe n s iv e  M o d e l ! P r e s e n t  I r i s h  M o d e l j D e v e lo p m e n t a l W e lf a r e  S ta te  ( N E S C  2 0 0 5 a )
Activation based on education and training aimed 
at skill improvement rather than job search
33
Broad programmes that upgrade the skills of the 
workforce in general work (not just focusing on 
welfare recipients)
j
NEAP focused on job search j
ii
Community Employment focused on social needs |
rather than skills i
\]1
Back to Education Allowance restricted jj
]
Segregated and targeted
I ......  . . ..............  i
; Participation income focus ambiguous, 
individually tailored, will include education and 
! training but primarily aimed at self reliance and 
! employment
Universal services but individually targeted and 
locally tailored
ii
■ Some empowering discourse 
Legal framework guarantees no activation into !
‘futile work for the sake o f work5, empowerment ; Discourse highlights fraud control
rather than surveillance / punishment ; ]
| No legal guarantees !
i i i 3
j Low welfare payments for all Significant increase 
Relatively high rates o f payment (Torfing | o f  in-work poor 
1999 18) Few in-work poor 1
i
________________________________________________1________________________________________________ :
More empowering discourse
i Active control & review o f payment
; No legal guarantee but framework for rights and 
standards
1 Low ‘basic’ welfare payments for working aged, 
higher for children and elderly In-work poor likely 
and tackled with ‘services dividend’
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O’Connor (2005 183) advised there is a thin line between supportive and punitive policies 
While Irish policy is more conditional, or punitive, than might be generally accepted it is not 
as punitive as liberal models especially as the type of US and UK models described by 
Torfing as clearly defensive However the Irish preoccupation with fraud control and the 
tendency to link control and surveillance objectives with activation objectives 
(O’Rallagaigh, 2005)hmits the empowerment aspect of the policy Likewise job search 
rather than skills enhancement has been the clear focus of the NEAP activation strategy The 
social democratic and universal orientation of the Danish offensive model requires broad 
inclusive up-skilling programmes targeted at all workers rather than just welfare recipients 
NESC (2005a) on the other hand, proposes to retain a layer of local ‘activist’ services to 
target those most in need
Low rates of generosity differentiate Ireland, with replacement ratios of less than 30 percent 
gross average industrial earnings, from offensive polices which are characterized by 
relatively high rates of payment with replacement ratios of 89-96 per cent gross average 
industrial earnings for low-income groups (NESC 2005a 19) These low replacement ratios 
correlate with the highest level of income inequality in the EU 15 The defensive model 
outcome of increased numbers of working poor is also a feature of Irish policy where the 
percentage of employees below the 60 per cent median income line rose from 8 3 per cent in 
1994 to 18 8 per cent in 2001 (Whelan et a l , 2003 24) NESC envisages a hybrid social 
security regime with a large number of means-tested recipients in receipt of a relatively 
ungenerous ‘participation income’ NESC's (2005a 19,219) recommends that people of 
working age should receive a ‘basic payment’ to enable a ‘minimum threshold of income 
adequacy’ to ‘guarantee them access to the basic necessities of life’ and identifies the NAPS 
target of €150 m 2002 terms by 2007 as ‘the minimum justified by the present 
circumstances’ It is difficult to interpret this as a proposal for generous rates
To conclude the present discussion, present Irish policy is so far consistent with a defensive 
model and the NESC DWS recommendation of Danish flexicurity represents a shift towards 
a more offensive model However it ultimately fails to fully disarticulate the concept of 
workfare from a neoliberal discourse Ireland is more likely to maintain her place in the 
Anglo Saxon welfare world with a mix of efficient but inequitable welfare policies than to 
move into a Nordic world of flexicurity with efficient and equitable outcomes (Sapir, 2005)
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4 8 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter explored the development of Irish social security policy over two decades in a 
framework developed by the author as applications of the logic of the competition state to 
social security The five broad areas reviewed review It then over the next five sections 
addresses trends relating to aspects of activation / conditionality, retrenchment, 
residualisation, regulation and defamilansation confirmed a significant level of 
recommodification of Irish social security policy but not as much as one might have 
expected given Irelands level of economic openness to the highly globalised economy and 
the keenly felt pressures of international competitiveness, already expressed in a low taxation 
and social expenditure model This is especially so in relation to working aged women who 
appear to have experienced increased labour market participation without significant 
defamiliansation One might expected not only a greater level of recommodification of 
Irish social security but also given the mid 1990’s experience of welfare reform in both 
liberal regimes and countries like Netherlands and Demark that this would also have 
happened sooner (Sweeny and O Donnell 2003, NESF 2000, Loftus 2005, OPEN, 2006) 
The Chapter concluded however that NESC DWS is an important benchmark and a clear 
mdictor that Ireland began, in the early 2000s, to engage in a more robust recommodification 
agenda The ambiguity on NESC discourse suggests that while further reform is likely to be 
towards a more productivist and recommodified model this reform is likely to be modest in 
scale and pace and not of the degree anticipated in a Competition State
What is it that limits the pace and scale of development of Irish social security*? Pierson P 
(1998) expects ‘irresistible forces’ (endogenous or exogenous pressures for change) to 
collide against ‘immovable objects’ (path dependant national institutions, interests and 
ideas) Swank (2002) hypothesis, that the type of domestic political institutions and the 
number of veto points are crucial variables that determine domestic capacity to negotiate 
restructuring or recalibration Torfing (1999 5) identified the process of the political 
mediation of policy or the discursive construction of policy discourse as a key variable in 
determining type of change Competition state theorists emphasise the relationship between 
transforming governance and the changing nature of a more complex and fragmented 
multilevel state The thesis now moves in a new direction, a direction that explores how 
policy is mediated and what factors influence policy mediation The next chapter outlines 
and discusses how the key characteristics of changing social security governance might 
account for some of the policy choices of this era
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No government has so far been prepared to display to parliament or to the public the actual 
processes by which it reaches decisions in the field (Sir Samuel Goldman, British Treasury 
1971, in Heclo et al 1974a xxi)
CHAPTER FIVE 
IRISH SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY 
COMMUNITY
51 Introduction
The aim of this Chapter is to examine the effects of the consensual and clientahstic nature of 
Irish politics on policy capacities and policy styles Competition state theorists claim that 
globalisation is primarily a political construction used to legitimise shifts in governance and 
power These shifts lead to recommodifying policy outcomes which prioritise the market 
Domestic meditation, national political culture and institutions, interests and ideas determine 
the national style of policy recommodification This question is approached in two ways 
firstly the chapter examines the domestic Irish social security policy community and to 
explores shifts in governance within that community It uses the indicators framework 
introduced in Chapter 2 but uses indicators relating to how policy is mediated in the policy 
process This is to assess the types of shifts in governance including a growing complexity 
and fragmentation of the policy community, shifts in power towards capital within that 
community, multilevel governance and emergence of a new policy elite (Cemy, 2002a) It 
should be noted that descriptions and evaluations of the various aspects of the policy system 
is perhaps over reliant on implicit self evaluations of that community in the elite interviews 
by policy actors from within the community
How/Process j Transforming governance
\i
Iron Triangle to . Presence of international policy elite
Golden Pentagon |
I Multilevel governance
r
Fragmented and More actors 
Complex
, More institutional spaces
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Power shifts to j Shifts in power between institutions
capital ij
I Regulation
i
The Chapter is also guided by the framework developed to examine the rationale of social 
security change It will examine the veto culture of the Irish state, the social security policy 
capacity of the state and how the state manages social security policy discourse Any 
examination of policy discourse is made difficult by of the use of ambiguity by government, 
both as a method of producing consensus, for reducing conflict, and as a method of securing 
implementation It is beyond the scope of this thesis to exhaust an examination of policy 
discourse and the reader should be alerted to the rather cursory and brief treatment of 
discourse
WHY/Rationale | Conservative and consensus policy community
!
Conservative 
values seek to
i
; The PR electoral system
!
1
preserve status quo ! Catholic Church values 
Patriarchal power structures
Weak policy 
community
| Under resourced policy community
i
 ^ Role of social partnership
i
1
1 Civil society role underdeveloped
Lack of policy 
discourse
i
| Coordinative problem-solving discourse
!!
| Pragmatic rejection of ideological input
i
| Insular and dominated by EU discourse
E
The chapter uses veto theory to map key characteristics of the Irish state and outlines Irish 
vetoes including the proportional representational electoral system, the political culture of 
consensus, the Irish civil service, social partnership and the middle class The concept of the 
golden pentagon (Cemy, 2002a) is used to map and critically analyse five key features of the 
Irish social security policy community politicians, bureaucrats and non-elected office 
holders, multilevel governance and policy elites Having mapped the community, the chapter 
then examines how policy ideas are processed within that community It concludes that the 
interdependent dynamic of Irish institutions, interests and discourse about policy influences
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the breath and pace of social security reform options. In particular the closed co-ordinative 
discourse restricts social security change to small scale incremental reform.
Parsons (1995:14) understands policy as an intended course of action or the rationale or 
decision to adopt, or not to adopt, an option from competing courses of action. Policy 
community refers to institutional spaces and ideational processes where actors where actors 
with a common policy focus use a shared language work to discuss and bargain about policy 
ideas (Sabitier, 1989). Policy science literature warns against attempts to analyse too much 
order in chaotic policy processes (Burton, 2001). Each process is unique, complex and has 
too many variables to be packaged into a one-size fit all model (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). 
It is helpful nonetheless to disaggregate policy processes into three discrete independent 
variables: ‘interests’, ‘institutions’ and ‘ideas’ which Hay (2004a:204) argues actively 
determine the pace and direction of policy change in any policy community. While Hay 
often refers to ideas as significant paradigm shaping ideas in this context I refer to ideas as 
more small scale ‘policy ideas’. This thesis aims to ultimately account for the explanatory 
power of all three variables. The journey begins, however, by mapping relevant institutional 
spaces, the actors within those spaces and the interests of those actors in the social security 
policy community of the Irish state.
5.2 Irish Veto Players
There is a lively literature contesting different understandings of the Irish state, its capacity, 
level o f autonomy and model of development. O’Riain and O’Connell (2000) argue for a 
state-centred Irish ‘flexible developmental state’ where separate economic development and 
distributive roles are managed by a relatively autonomous ‘state-led’ social partnership 
process. Marxist informed approaches, which emphasise labour and capital power relations 
include Allen's (2000) class analysis, O'Heam's (1998) dependency approach and Cousins 
(1995,2005a) ‘power relations industrialisation’. These emphasise how constraints imposed 
by dependence on foreign investment and class conflict inform the policy decisions o f a less 
autonomous state. Kirby (2002) argues that Ireland’s changing relationship to the global 
economy brings with it changes in domestic policy as the state is transformed, to meet the 
needs of global capital, into a more complex and fragmentary competition state which 
subordinates social policy to the needs of the economy. Taylor (2005), drawing on Jessop’s
(2002) Schumpterian Workfare State, stresses the growing importance of negotiated
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governance of public policy. While the literature captures serious debate and difference of 
opinion abut the nature of the Irish state it is also possible to reflect on common observations 
about key characteristics of the peculiar post colonial institutions of the Irish state. These 
include the proportional representation electoral the system, populist culture and use of 
corporatist governance. There is also consensus in the literature that the early Irish state was 
conservative. It set much store on continuity of policy making and rejecting any policy 
innovation (Lee 1989; Acheson et al.; 2004, Ferriter 2004). The emphasis on economic 
liberalism under the Cumman na nGaelhead, and insular economic protection under Fianna 
Fáil was embedded in the national psyche. Kiam Caudle’s (1967:96) observation ‘the view 
that a welfare society and economic progress are incompatible is still widely held’ remains 
as valid today as when he wrote it in 1967. The next section examines these national 
institutions and argues that in addition to this conservative economic culture there is also a 
strong veto culture in Irish policy communities.
For the status quo to change, a certain number of individual or collective decision makers 
must agree to this change. A veto player can be understood as ‘an individual or collective 
actor whose agreement is required for a policy decision’ (Tseblis, 2000:209). Relative to 
comparable Anglo Saxon regimes, Ireland has a higher and an increasing number of veto 
players38. Lijphart’s map of shifts in democratic styles in 26 states from 1980 to 2000 
illustrates how Ireland moved from a majoritarian style democracy to a consensus-oriented 
democracy39. Ireland is the only English speaking country or liberal welfare regime on the 
left hand ‘consensus’ axis.
38
L ijphart (1999) h y po thesised  tha t coun tries w ith coalition  governm en ts, b icam eral leg isla tu res , 
flex ib le  constitu tions, p res iden tia l in stitu tions, co rpora te  in terest g roup  m ed iation , federal o r 
decen tra lised  governance  and P R -based  e lec to ra l system s w ill have m ore veto  p layers and  as a resu lt 
w ill experience  m ore  d ifficu lty  in ach iev ing  p o licy  change
39 Ireland  is charac te rised  by  L ijphart (1999: 67, 114-117, 189) as a un itary  and  cen tra lised , tw o  and  
h a lf  party , sem i-p residen tia l system  w ith parliam en t and an elec ted  p residen t, a m edium  influencing  
p rim e M in iste r and  as b e in g  ‘w eak ish ’ in  re la tio n  to  ju d ic ia l rev iew  and  constitu tional rig id ity .
Figure 5 1 Shifts in Democratic styles of 26 states L ijphart (1999 255)
Since 1981 the number of Irish veto players increased relative to other English speaking 
liberal regimes40 Key Irish vetoes, the proportional representational electoral system, 
coalition government, civil service, social partners and the middleclass are discussed below
A highly centralised executive cabinet dominates a bicameral parliament of the ‘Dail’ and 
‘Seanad’ (Connolly, 2004 249) Such highly centralised governance should make it 
relatively easy for a political party with a parliamentary majority to implement significant 
welfare change (Cousins, 2005a 123) However, over the last two decades, it has proven 
impossible for one political party to achieve a parliamentary majority Lijphart (1999) 
distinguished between parliamentary systems with multi member districts with Proportional 
Representation (PR) and single member first-past-the-post plurality or majority voting 
systems Like Malta, the Irish electoral system has national level multi-seat constituencies 
ranging from three to five seats decided by Proportional Representation Single Transferable 
Vote (PRSTV) (Smnott, 2004)41 Gillespie (IT  18 02 2006) describes this type of system as
40 U sing  a  d iffe ren t m e thodo logy  T sebelis (2002 ) ranks Ire land  as m ed ium  m  re la tion  to  v e to  p layers, 
w ith  m ore  veto  p layers than  A ustra lia  and doub le  the veto  p layers o f  U K , C an ad a  and N ew  Z ea land  
T sebe lis  does no t sco re  the  U S  bu t expects it to  ran  h igh  on veto  p layers  It m ay  be  im portan t that 
Ire land  is sign ifican tly  d iffe ren t to  o ther E ng lish  speak ing  countries
41 See L ijphard  (1 9 99 ,148 ) and  S inno tt (2004 ) f o r ^ g  exp lana tion  o f  P R S T V
having ‘seismographic qualities which enable minor tremors in public opinion transfer into 
significant changes in parliamentary representation’. This electoral system is more 
favourable to smaller parties and independents and reinforces the likelihood of coalition 
governments and a veto culture (Lijphart, 1999:150). Contending politicians, in order to 
attract as wide a range of transfers as possible, avoid controversy, ‘crowd the middle’ and 
cloud ideological differences42. Multi-seat constituencies lead to intra-party competition, 
when politicians are unable to differentiate themselves by way of party or policy they instead 
emphasise brokerage relations with the electorate. Thus the political culture is ‘localistic, 
clientalistic and intensely responsive’ Boyle (2005:22). Local political knowledge is an 
important input to policymaking and counteracts alternative sources of analysis from 
academics or experts. This type of electoral system is also open to sensitive to key groups 
who can swing votes including transfers towards or away from certain parties or candidates. 
Gillespie (I.T. 18.02.2006). It advantages large interest groups representing sectoral or local 
interests. These groups if they have sufficient organisational capacity to swing their 
membership or public opinion will get more disproportionately more attention from the 
political system. This leads to dysfunction in the policy system where policy decisions that 
are in the national interest may fall to lobbying from sectoral interests. Both de Buitlear et 
al., (1998) and Barry (2005:49) lament the quality of Irish governance and the clientalist 
nature of the political system.
Irish PRSTV led to permanent coalition government, electoral uncertainty and short-term 
political tenure. This changed the nature of government decision-making and reinforced 
short term political decision making where budget spending followed electoral cycles 
(Cousins, 2005b). Parties manage or minimise potential policy conflict among coalition 
partners by using programme managers to gain early consensus of all party leaders involved 
in the government (Murray and Teahon, 1997; 258, O’Halpin, 1996: 8). This more complex 
and fragmented policy-making process makes it difficult to move without consensus and 
leads to procrastination and paralysis.
42 T h is is espec ia lly  so because  governm en ts are decided , no t by  w ho w ins the  first seat, b u t in m u lti­
sea t constituencies, w ho  w ins the  last seat. L ast seats are alw ays decided  on transfers and are often  no t 
d e term ined  until th e  e igh t o r n in th  count. T he need  to  a ttrac t transfers from  opposing  parties leads 
parties tow ards p lay in g  safe  in o rder not to  a lienate  po ten tia l transfers. T h is re in fo rces consensus 
p o litics.
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The Irish civil service is characterised by its homogeneity. Catholic, middle class, male, with 
a rural, educated background, the typical civil servant works in a conservative culture that 
has been slow to transform under the Strategic Management Initiative (NESC, 2003; Pollit,
2005). Policy change is dominated by slow, incremental, path dependant administrative 
considerations (Crotty, 1998). Civil servants can and do veto policy agendas. The civil 
service is not a monolithic interest group. Departments compete with each other and the 
Department of Finance has effective veto power over other Departments. Policy capacity is 
generally weak and, because government Departments have devolved policy functions to 
numerous statutory agencies, is increasingly fragmented. Two key features limit civil service 
power. EMU has reinforced Department of Finance vetoes of public expenditure decisions. 
Access to Ministerial power is also more limited in the more crowded policy community. A 
senior civil servant observed to the author how:
Access to the Minister varies from Minister to Minister, but access to policy is 
diminishing because of the multitude of channels and more actors, there are 
almost a dozen channels to the Minister. It’s a more crowded policy space with 
a lot more different groups.
One reason the space is more crowded is the establishment in 1987 of Social Partnership 
(NESF 1997; McCarthy, 1998, 1999; Murray and Teahon, 1987). A different animal to 
continental state corporatism, the Irish social partnership process and individual Irish social 
partners have evolved as strong veto players (Hardiman 2001; NESC, 2005b) and act as a 
barometer of consensus (NESF, 1997). The composition of both the civil service and social 
partners is very much male, white and middle class. Cousins (1995, 2005a) and Hardiman 
(1998) highlight the power of the bourgeois or middle class in determining the development 
of a tiered welfare state. McLaughlin (2002) notes the power of professional elites. Case 
studies of the politics of redistribution highlight the veto power of the middle class, reflected 
the influence of the media, as an important variable in the Irish income related policy debate 
(Montague (2001), Lawless (2001) and O Flynn (1999). The state also remains patriarchal. 
Women (and other groups experiencing inequality) are underrepresented in decision-making 
(NWCI, 2004; Galligan, 1998; O’Connor,. 2006; Hardiman, 1998).
Ireland’s distinctive postcolonial political institutions and populist culture can be 
distinguished from other countries with liberal welfare regimes. The Irish constitution has 
directly vetoed social security policy in relation to gender related social security decisions
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The impact of the Catholic religion on national political culture, and through that, on the 
content and character of social welfare systems is discussed by McCashin (2004) and 
McLaughlin (2002). However it is not clear that Catholicism has had a very significant 
impact on Irish social security. In an overview sense Catholic values are reflected in the 
constitution and the special emphasis on the family and the mother in Irish social policy 
religion but the Church did not directly influence on social security policy as it did health or 
education policy. PRSTV dominates the Irish state; it can structurally account for multi- 
partyism and coalition governments and is culturally connected to consensus, corporatism 
and incremental unambitious policy making. The impact of a consensus culture on political 
philosophy and the degree to which policy systems are oriented towards normative decision 
making is important factor impacting directly on policy choices both in terms of how the 
policy process operates but also in terms of the assessments politicians and civil servants 
make of what is acceptable to the public. Who is considered to be part of the consensus 
culture (or the majority that matter) is important. For example within social partnership the 
issue of tax individualisation was considered acceptable to the social partners but was not 
acceptable within the broader political consensus.
The state is not autonomous, but a reflection of power relations (Cousins 2005a) and there 
have been shifts in power both within and between the institutions and actors in different 
policy communities. As with other national systems of social security governance (Carmel 
and Papadopoulous 2004) Irish social security governance has changed. With increasing use 
of agencies, regulation and delegation a key component of that state, the civil service, has 
become more fragmented. Over 20 national agencies with a social security function were 
established over the last twenty years. There has also been a growth of social partnership 
structures and working groups. Such fragmentation dilutes the states capacity to act in the 
national interest, key arms of the state are likely to compete against and veto each other.
5.3 The transforming social security policy community
The shape of pre-globalisation policy communities is captured by Heclo’s (1974b) image of 
an ‘iron triangle’ of relevant elected office holders, bureaucrats and non-office holding actors 
(business and voluntary associations with the capacity to influence policy). Globalisation 
causes a transformation of that community from an ‘iron triangle’. Two new points of power, 
a new policy elite and multilevel governance (Cemy 2002a) transform the iron triangle into a 
five pointed 'golden pentagon* are illustrated in Figure 5.2 and the following sections
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discuss features of each of the five points of Cemy’s golden pentagon
The model is used as a tool to aid descriptive commentary The choice of this model to 
represent the social security policy community is motivated by its capacity to highlight 
change in that community and the relationship between that change and the international 
policy community This makes the model appropriate for the task in hand but it is accepted 
that there are other ways to understand and analyse policy communities (Hudson and Lowe, 
2004) While the addition of a transnational policy community and a policy elite are borne 
out in the analysis the two features are still emerging and not enough analysis has been 
undertaken in this thesis to assess the degree of power that has been transferred to these new 
actors Despite the perhaps unfortunate use of colours, the model is not used by Cemy 
(2002a) or this author as a normative model suggesting one form of policy community is 
superior to the other
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Figure.5.2 Irish Social Security Golden Pentagon Cerny 2002a
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5.4 Political parties
The historical origin of Irish political parties lies in a post independence civil war intra- 
nationalist split, which dominated Irish politics and militated against a left-right ideological 
divide or strong social democratic tradition in Irish politics The low level of industrialisation 
and urban working class meant no significant labour movement and no development of class 
politics (Mair, 1992 389) This attitude is borne out by the ‘the striking electoral debility of 
class-based, left-wing parties’ in Ireland and the fact ‘there is no other single country in 
western Europe that even approaches the weak position of the Irish left’ (Mair, 1992 384-5)
Like southern Europe, postcolonial Irish politics is dominated by conservative, nationalist, 
clerical parties (Laver, 1992) and especially by a populist Fianna Fail Party The system is 
evolving from a two and a half party system of Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour to one 
where smaller parties (Greens, Sinn Fein, Socialists Party, Workers Party, Democratic Left 
and the neo-liberal PD’s (only the latter two parties have served in government) 
Independent TDs (members of the Irish Parliament) are also increasingly relevant to the 
composition of coalition government The focus on brokerage means a high premium on 
effective delivery of income maintenance This preoccupation with delivery systems coupled 
with an emphasis on pragmatic centrist or consensus policies means little incentive in the 
political system or civil service to invest in research The policy capacity of political parties 
is relatively limited and no parties develop extensive social security policies Open to 
pluralist lobbying, they tend to be policy ‘takers’ rather than policy ‘makers’ Nonetheless 
different approach to social security can be distinguished across political parties One 
academic interviewed by the author noted that while
there are no great differences between political parties on social security policy, 
you could say that FG are most right wing, PD’s are not interested, FF are most 
pragmatic and Labour the most philosophical
Fianna Fail is ‘wary of welfare’ (Ferriter, 2004b 16) Their limited approach to social 
security is to see it as a ‘safety net’ type of welfare system focused on poverty alleviation 
Their approach tends to be untheoretical, random, ad-hoc and unplanned with policy often
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developed in response to clinic work43. Cousins (2005a: 119) stressed how ‘FF cumman 
(local branches) acted as a forum for mediation of interests’. FF developed the social security 
system for political gain as part of ‘a strategic incorporation of the indigenous bourgeoisie, 
the workers and small farmers ... a clear political logic of winning and keeping the support 
of key classes’ (ibid: 121). The other dominant party, FG, is confessional or Christian 
Democratic and displayed a somewhat ambiguous attitude to social protection. Traditionally 
a pro-enterprise party seeking to reward effort and incentive and promoting the concept of 
the small state, it was identified with an anti-welfare approach. On the other hand its fair 
society agenda promoted public discourse about social justice and at one time key FG figures 
championed a basic income system.
Labour adopts a social democratic ideological position underpinned by a goal of full 
employment and a preference for social insurance or universal welfare coverage. This 
approach promoted state intervention alongside public sector reform. Most significant policy 
processes relating to Irish social security policy were initiated under Labour.. The PDs 
actively engage in Irish social security political discourse and echo the Reagan and Thatcher 
welfare agendas, which promoted a smaller welfare state, privatisation of public services and 
greater self-reliance. Of the smaller left wing parties the Democratic Left's (previously the 
Workers Party) understanding of welfare was markedly different to that of Labour in that 
they promoted a basic income approach. The Green Party also promoted a basic income 
approach and their discourse has strong undertones of self-reliance. Sinn Fein promotes anti­
poverty and equality initiatives but have developed little specific social security policy.
43 T his has resu lted  in th e  com plex  n um ber o f  con tingencies (over 35 d ifferen t ca tego ries  o f  paym ent).
Table 5 1 Ministerial Government 1982 - 2005
Year Minister
Part
y
Minister of 
State / Party
I
Adviser !
!
Ministerial style and capacity
i
1982-
1986
Desmond Lab Donnellan FG ! Long term planning
1986-
1987
Hussey FG Pattison LAB Reluctant Minister influenced by US
1987-
1989
Woods FF
! Capable, conservative, safe, 
| managerialist
1989-
1991
Woods FF
I
!i
i
f
1991-
1992 Daly FF
1
1
_  —........—
i
i
1
i
No legacy
1992-
1993
McCreevy FF i
i
i
1
 j
 I
i Neo-liberal ideology
\
I
1993- ! 
1994
!
Woods FF
i
i Burton LAB
1
!
i
I
!
1994-
1997
j De Rossa DL
t___
1
]
| Durkan FG
i
i
i
| Callender
i
1 Risk taker and ambitious
1997- Ahem j FF
ii
Cousins
Safe but unambitious social
2002 ! democratic
i
2002-
2004
Coughlan
!
1
! FF
!
3
Cousins (year j Weak, uninformed and 
1) 1 inexperienced
2004-
2005
i
i Brennan
I
\
1
1 FF
3
3
3 !
i
i
i Ambitious pragmatic neo-liberal
i
!
The Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and 14 cabinet Ministers have collective cabinet decision­
making responsibility for all policies, including social security policy Peillion (2001 174) 
believes state legitimacy to be quite dependant on welfare issues but the social welfare 
ministry is not high status within the Cabinet In interviews with the author one key policy 
actor observed that
Social welfare never rated that highly in government, there was no great kudos 
in having that ministry, it was the Cinderella of the services and if you wanted 
to be promoted you would avoid welfare, it was a cul-de-sac and a backwater44
44 Such low  status is re flec ted  m  G em m a H u ssey ’s u pse t reac tio n  w hen  appo in ted  M in ister to  D S W  in 
1986, low  status still p reva iled  w hen  S eam us B rennan  strong ly  res is ted  h is 2004  M in isteria l tran sfe r 
to D S F A  124
With centralised cabinet oriented policymaking the Dail and Dail Committees have an 
underdeveloped role in policy making. The Cabinet Social Inclusion Cabinet Sub 
Committee, to which NAPS reports, meets infrequently. There was no Dail discussion of the 
content of national wage agreements, the CSW (Ireland 1986) or NAPS (Ireland 1997c, 
2002a) in the Oireachtas. Shadow social security spokespersons focus debate on anomalies 
rather than major policy issues. In an interview with the author a previous social security 
spokesperson described a lose-lose role:
FF are like a hoover, they suck in everything. It is not much good coming up 
with good ideas because they will be taken by some one else or if they are bad 
they will be laughed at, government or other parties will have a field day.
Opposition and government backbench TDs sit on social security-related Oireachtas 
Committees dealing with social, employment, children's, women's and older peoples affairs. 
These committees have a limited role in policy development. One previous Minister 
observed in an interview with the author how the ‘Committee system is generally a joke; 
nobody tries too hard to make it work’. A review of the Social and Family Affairs Oireachtas 
Committee 1995 debates illustrated how time was taken up with anecdotal references to local 
individualised political clinic visits. These queries from local clinics feed into the social 
security policy community through committee work, the parliamentary question process or 
more informal contact between party colleagues. Delivery issues dominate in a clientalistic 
political culture. Because politicians have little interest in long-term policy planning social 
security policy is developed in an ad-hoc and fragmented fashion. A former Ministerial 
adviser reflected in an interview with the author:
The Department knows that what the Minister is going to be concerned about is 
the parish pump and somebody coming up to him at Mass and saying I didn’t 
get paid. He is not concerned that we didn’t come up with a radical plan policy 
proposal last week. If you are a politician dramatic changes aren’t necessarily a 
good thing unless they’re actually going to work.
The civil service and the political arena link and overlap through the political role of the 
Minister who has a powerful influence on their Departmental policy approach. FF Ministers 
dominated the last 20 years. Although Minister Woods served multiple terms and Minister
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Ahern served a full five-year term there was, there was otherwise as depicted by Table 5 1 a 
high degree of Ministerial turnover and great diversity m Ministerial style and competence 
However no matter who was Minister civil servants knew that Ministers were in power and 
that the prime goal was to deliver the commitments in the Programme for Government
On the other hand Ministers interviewed by the author, were wary of the complex social 
security system and acknowledged their dependence on the expertise of the civil service The 
close working relationship of senior civil servants and FF Ministers meant populist 
approaches to decision-making permeated the thinking and practices of civil servants In 
1992 Labour, eager to disempower the traditional civil servant link with FF, initiated the use 
of ‘political advisers’ and ‘programme managers’45 In practice the role of political adviser 
has varied widely, from a political role to a co-ordination role or from a technical policy 
adviser to a political or media adviser They are not as powerful as they are perceived to be 
O’Halpin (1996)46
FF held the social security ministry for 18 of the last 20 years and so dominated the last two 
decades Their pragmatic approach also permeated civil service thinking and led to an over 
focus on delivery at the expense of policy-making capacity The Labour Party appears to
45 Ministerial advisers liaise with senior civil servants and act as at link between the Cabinet, 
Oireachtas Sub Committees and the Civil Service
46 One political advisor commented m an interview with the author ‘One person can’t make all that 
difference You are a link between a Minister and the civil servant A lot of work is just delivering 
what has already been politically agreed in Programmes for Government, not delivering new ideas 
You are very unlikely to bring in any one particular thing One person isn’t going to do that, the best 
you can do is influence things or move things along faster than they would have otherwise’
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have initiated most key social security processes over the last 20 years47 A difference in 
policy emphasis is not the point of departure between political parties What seems to 
differentiate parties is the level of ambition for a planned approach to social security reform 
and levels of appreciation about how social security policy relates to national development 
However all parties (even those who pride themselves on ideological influences) are 
moderate Smith (2005 186) reports the conclusion of an interview with an Irish official it 
was ‘highly unlikely that an extremist policy platform would ever come to power here*
5.5. The Irish C ivil Service
Laffan and O Donnell (1998 161) cite arguments by Lee (1989) and Mjoset (1992) that 
Ireland’s lack of a national system of innovation was inimical to economic modernisation 
NESC (2005a, b) make the same case for social innovation A lack of policy capacity and a 
weak tradition of policy making is a second defining feature of the Irish civil service While 
the civil service is homogenous there are great cultural and ideological differences and a 
clear hierarchy between the key government Departments m the social security policy 
community The table below summarises social security relevant government Departments
47 The Labour Party initiated the 1949 White Paper on Social Welfare, introduced Unmarried 
Mothers’ Allowances in 1973, reformed Home Assistance into the 1977 Supplementary Welfare 
Allowance, launched the original Green Paper on the Voluntary Sector in 1976, launched the 1978 
Green Paper on Pensions Policy, established the 1986 National Pensions Board, initiated the 1986 
Commission on Social Welfare, the 1994 Expert Working Group on Integration of Taxation and 
Social Welfare Democratic Left initiated the NAPS and the 1997 National Pensions Policy Initiative
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Table 5.2 G overnm ent Departm ents- Social Security Policy C om m unity
Departm ent o f Social 
W elfare, DSFCA, DSFA
D epartm ent o f Enterprise, 
Trade and E m ploym ent
D epartm ent o f An Taoiseach D epartm ent o f Finance
Level of Integration Turf war with the DETE Turf war with the DSW Cross cutting Isolationist
Key Policy Section Aireacht LTU Unit Social and Economic Policy Unit
Public Expenditure Unit 
Division
Statutory Bodies CPA,NPB,Comhairle,FSA FAS, Forbairt, National 
Competitiveness Council
Enterprise Ireland
NESDO,NESC,NESF,NCPP
Local area based partnerships
Area Development 
Management
Ideology ar<L Values Delivery Focused 
Social Democratic 
Activation
Enterprise 
Anti Welfare
Consensus
Integration
Conservative 
Cautious 
Cost avoidance 
Neo-Liberal
Key Strategy Delivery
Supports
Activation
Conditionality 
Work Incentives
Employment Expenditure Control 
Work Incentives
Social Security Policy 
Capacity Poor Medium Strong Poor
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I
« Department of Social 
| Welfare, DSFCA, DSFA
Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment
i
i Department of An Taoiseach
i
i1
i Department of Finance
!
International Integration ' EU
' NAPsincl 
! ILO / ISSAi
; Network of Six English 
I Speaking Countries
OECD
NEAP
j  NAPsincl
1
Ii
I
i
iI
i\
1 OECD
I
!
I
1
ÌII
Partnership Approach j  Positive Difficult 1 Positive j Difficult
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Department of Social and Family Affairs (also DSFCA, DSW48)
The structure of the DSFA is heavily influenced by the priority it affords delivery 
Departmental staff interviewed by the author emphasised the degree to which administrative 
and delivery challenges preoccupied Departmental management and limited the 
Department’s capacity to engage in policy-making This did not related to simple resource 
capacity, the degree to which delivery of payments preoccupied the Department impacted on 
the identity of those in the Department Even senior managers identify themselves as 
delivery agents who follow policy agendas imposed from outside the Department and reject 
the role of initiating or leading policy debate Divided into operational and policy divisions 
(the brains and the brawn), the policy division (the Aireacht) is small and under-resourced 
The Aireacht is forward thinking, bright and competent staff have fostered good 
relationships within the policy community and engaged positively in Social Partnership 
Internal preoccupation with effective delivery of income supports was compounded by 
serious administrative failures in 1981 and 198949 One key policy adviser observed in an 
interview with the author how
The Department is not hugely policy focused, they are more concerned about 
what Ministers will live with, most senior managers are survivors of high 
unemployment, they were slower to adapt to Active Labour Market Measures 
than they should have been They are generally driven by the need to pay 
people, its much more delivery focused than policy or outcome focused
Over the last two decades DSFA established five statutoiy organisations and engaged in 
several new multi-level governance processes associated with the EU Open Method of Co­
ordination (Frazer, 2002) These include Comhairle (previously National Social Services 
Board) which focuses on citizens’ information and administrative and technical issues 
related to the delivery of welfare (Acheson et a l , 2004), the Combat Poverty Agency which 
has a statutoiy function to advise the Minister on poverty related policy50, the National 
Pensions Board and the Family Support Agency The Office for Social Inclusion supports
48 DSFA Department of Social and Family Affairs (2002 -  present), DSFCA Department of Social,
Family and Community Affairs (1997-2002), DSW Department of Social Welfare (1947 to 1997)
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engagement with various NAPS institutional processes and the NAPsincl The DSFA also 
engages in Pension and Employment EU Open Method of Coordination These agencies 
institutionally strengthen the Department’s policy capacity, however, it remains relatively 
weak, uncoordinated and fragmented and all of the agencies have underdeveloped policy 
fuunctions
The Government attitudes to the Combat Poverty Agency (CPA) has been problematic 
(Acheson et a l , 2004, Ireland 1996c) Opinions about CPA’s contribution to social security 
policy varied amongst those interviewed by the author One Minister, positive about CPA, 
blamed the FF attitude to the poverty industry on their ‘difficult and unhappy relationship 
between FF led administrations and CPA’ However a policy adviser in FF advised, that the 
tension into relationship with CPA was because CPA tended to confuse lobbying and 
expertise One senior policy explained in an interview with the author
Because of its lobbying activities, if you want into the tax strategy group and 
said look ESRI said XYZ they would listen, but if you said CPA said everybody 
would shrug their shoulders, because of that they don’t have any influence
Others observed that CPA had an inconsistent policy position on key areas like child income 
support where they were perceived to change their policy advice ‘on an almost annual basis’ 
A community and voluntary sector lobbyist noted that CPA were relatively ineffective m the 
social security debate and gave the example in an interview with the author of their 
submission to Benchmarking and Indexation Group
not only were they not invited onto the group but we had to fight to allow them 
give in a submission and even then they missed the boat, they misunderstood 
the brief of the group and no one even read the submission
A trade union worker identified in an interview with the author how CPA had
little discernible influence, not even in the context of NAPS May be it’s 
because of changes in staff but there is little research output There is lots from 
ESRI but you don’t need CPA to commission ESRI’
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Where perhaps they had most influence was through their community development function 
in supporting the national policy work of key national antipoverty networks who participated 
in national policy debate through corporatist and pluralist processes (Acheson et a l , 2004)
The Department’s weak status in the hierarchy of Departments combined with weak policy 
capacity means it had little power to resist policy set outside the Department by international 
processes, other government Departments, political parties or Social Partnership processes 
(for example the Department of Justice Equality and Law Reform imposition of the 2004 
Habitual Residence Rule)51 It also means those in the policy role are under a significant 
workload pressure In interviews with the author one senior civil servant observed how
the policy section is too small to be sustainable, there is a huge issue about 
building up expertise and policy capacity It means huge pressure on individuals 
and huge overload, no one will take the policy jobs
Within the Department there is tension between those who believe the Department should 
take a leading role in social security debate and those who believe the Department is an 
administrative Department, there to develop administrative systems to deliver policy 
developed elsewhere While the opinion of the Secretary General is seen as an important 
factor in determining the formal position the latter opinion appears more dominant among 
the more senior officials and particularly those whose work has been dominated by delivery
Department of Employment, Trade and Enterprise (DETE)
DETE (previously Department of Labour (DOL)), unlike DSFA, had no ‘hands on’ 
relationship with the unemployed The Department focused on the enterprise function and 
liaised most closely with industry, employers and competitiveness policy It left its social 
policy function to its statutory body, the training and employment agency FAS (previously 
AnCo) DETE statutory organisations including FAS, Enterprise Ireland and the National 
Competitiveness Council promote activation and welfare to work related social security 
policy Historically DETE (or DOL) had an obstructive working relationship with DSW
51 The capacity of the Minister to argue their case against more senior ministries appears to be crucial, 
Minister Woods for example was able to set and win policy agendas while Minister Coughlan 
appeared to have had little success defending the social security interests
One former DETE Minister described in an interview with the author 4 a turf war lasting 
seven years between the two Departments’ where
Any attempt by us to move into their territory was resisted and there were 
arguments The turf war was stupid, it wasn’t ideological it was just about 
organisations If you lost responsibility for something you lost clout, if you lose 
clout you lose budgets and bodies and promotional opportunities
While the turf war was more about institutional issues than policy, ideological differences 
are evident between the two Departments One previous DSFA Minister reflected in an 
interview with the author how ‘the underpinning attitude of the DETE was to see social 
security as a hindrance and as an obstacle to employment’ Various attempts were made to 
co-ordinate policy across the two Departments These ranged from Programme Managers 
(1992), the Tax Strategy Group (1995), and a Strategy Group on Long and Short-Term 
Unemployment (1997) that focused on welfare to work and activation issues Since 1998 the 
Departments are required to work together under the EU Lisbon Process to deliver the 
National Employment Action Plan (DETE) While, nationally and internationally, DSFA still 
play ‘second fiddle’ to the more senior DETE, the EU Open Method of Co-ordination 
(OMC) and NAPsincl process has mainstreamed many of DSFA interests (Murphy C 2002) 
The relationship is now more nuanced but still characterised by conflicting positions in 
opposing advocacy coalitions, institutional turf wars and little coordination in relation to 
overlaps in data sharing and activation strategies The institutional overlaps between the FAS 
employment support services and the DSFA jobs support unit remain unresolved Some 
senior civil servants in the DSFA argue that responsibility for long-term unemployment 
should transfer to DSFA However senior DSFA have shown little policy ambition in this 
regard52 In any case FAS have survived previous institutional reform attempts (Boyle 2005) 
and many interviewed are cynical about attempts to reform or relocate FAS
52 In 2003 the Minister for Employment Trade and Enterprise, Mary Harney, in an example of Irish 
pragmatism, offered FAS to the Minster for the DSFA The latter declined the offer because the 
Department believed that if institutional reform was to take place that it needed be a more considered 
and less pragmatic reform than that on offer
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The DOF more senior then other Departments, is both ideologically and pragmatically 
associated with low public expenditure (Lee, 1989). O’Connell and Rottman (1992:231) 
argued:
the most important part of the postcolonial legacy ... the DOF played a 
dominant role in state policy formation for much of Ireland’s post independence 
history, was opposed in principle to increases in state expenditure and taxes and 
in particular to increased commitments to social welfare.
This is consistent with descriptions of the ‘natural social conservatism of the Irish elites’ 
Adshead (2006forthcoming) which have ‘unrelievedly negative’ attitudes Jacobsen 
(1994:61). Fear of escalating public expenditure was reinforced by the experience of the high 
rise in spending of the 1990’s. DOF has an underdeveloped policy agenda. Compared, for 
example, to the employment policy focus of the UK Treasury the equivalent in Ireland is 
more interested in keeping spending down than in how public monies were spent.53. The 
Budgetary and Economic sections of the DOF have macro policy roles and the Public 
Expenditure Unit (PEU) serves as an institutional conduit for each Department to relate to 
the DOF54. This unit is conservative about public spending and has a reputation for ‘pouring 
cold water’ over policy innovation.55 One senior official described in an interview with the
Departm ent O f Finance (DOF)
53 This may explain why Ireland does not seem to be following the role o f  the UK Treasury and 
develop fiscalisation o f  social security. The PPF Refundable Tax Credit Working Group report 
conservatively kept the sharp distinction between role o f  income support and role o f  revenue 
gathering.
54 In the PEU a Principal Officer level official oversees the budgetary requirement o f  each spending 
Department. Each spending Department is required to transfer a senior Departmental official to the 
PEU unit in DOF. In this way the DOF access policy expertise needed to refute arguments for 
spending, (the spending Department could also benefit from having an inside voice within the DOF).
55 A key member o f  the Commission on Social Welfare (1986) observed to the author ‘I think one o f
the fortunate things about the CSW was that we had no civil servants. We didn’t have anybody from
finance; if  we had I don’t think we would have had a report.’
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author how the job of the DOF official on any social security working group was to ‘ensure 
whatever was agreed was as minimal as possible in order to avoid impact on fiscal flows ‘ In 
order words it was to veto spending It did this in various ways, controlling the drafting of 
papers, refusing to adopt consensus reports and pressurising DSFA Ministers to cut current 
expenditure56
A former Finance Minister advised, in an interview with the author, how that m the mid 
1990s only three questions drove policy ‘the focus on the EMU, generating economy 
growth and no borrowing5 He argued that expenditure implications rather than ideological 
positions drove decision-making A former social security Minister however argued in an 
interview with the author that the DOF had a clear ideological policy agenda
welfare was seen as an obstacle to the free operation of the labour market, 
everything was in competition with the market in that Department, they 
vigorously resisted the NAPS and ALMPS
Generally the DOF align themselves in policy advocacy coalitions with the DETE and IBEC 
and against the DSFA, the DOT, ICTU and the community and voluntary sector To break 
the cultural dominance of the DOF, various governments tried to develop a counterpoint 
institutional power in the Department of the Taoiseach (and Department of the Tanaiste) 
Other methodological tools include poverty roofing and gender mainstreaming however no 
innovation has so far managed to break the monopoly role of the DOF
Department of an Taoiseach (DOT)
The DOT has no specific policy responsibilities in the area of social security but co-ordinates 
government Departments mvolved in Social Partnership and NAPS institutions The General 
Secretary to the Government, the most powerful crvil servant in the country, heads this 
Department and attends all Cabinet meetings He chairs the NAPS Inter Departmental 
Committee, the NESC and the NESF and national wage agreements and plays a key role
56 The most politically controversial social security reforms of the two decades were two sets of cuts 
m 1992 and 2003 The case studies in Chapter Seven highlight those cuts as the product of a public 
expenditure conscious DOF pushing cuts on politifg^y weak first-time social welfare Ministers
linking political, civil service and social partnership actors57 Three other Departments 
institutionally relate to the social security policy community The Department of Health and 
Children administers the SWA scheme through the Health Service Executive regional and 
local structures (previously the Health Boards) The Department of Education and Science 
has an interest in the use of social security payments to fund adult participation in second 
chance and third-level education Farm Assist income maintenance payment overlaps with 
Department of Agriculture incomes policy agenda
The examination of different government Departments within the social security policy 
community highlighted weak policy capacity m an increasingly complex and fragmented 
community A weak but emerging DSFA struggles m an institutional battle with a stronger 
DETE DOT supports the DSFA but is itself often vetoed by an expenditure resistant DOF 
All Departments are however subservient to the political will of strong Ministers and obliged 
to implement programmes for Government Hence even the power of DOF is less influential 
at election times as is evident in electoral budget cycles (Cousins 2005b) The question is 
then who, other than civil servants, influences politicians?
5 6 N on-O ffice-H olding A ctors, Social Partners and Civil Society
In a pluralist and corporatist political system non-office-holding policy actors external to the 
political system and the civil service have strong policy influence While traditional forms of 
lobbying still dominate Irish policy making, Social Partnership has been a strong feature of 
the last two decades Pierson (1994) observed how governments manage the politics of 
welfare retrenchment by weakening opposition58 The Irish institutional strategy differed 
substantially from such strategies in that it focused, in keeping with the Irish political 
culture, on consensus building through social partnership However, where groups could not 
be co-opted, the Irish state actively sought to control opposition This section first addresses 
social partners5 participation and then reviews other forms of engagement by civic society 
actors
57 From 1992-1997 the Department of the T&iaiste played a co-ordinating role and developed the 
NESF which provides input into social security policy development
Thatcher tried to fragment and purposefully ignored welfare lobby groups and weakened the power
of the unions Reagan pursued a ‘defunding the left’ strategy and restricted labour union power
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This modem period of Irish Social Partnership needs to be put into the context of Irish 
political culture. Corporatism was evident in Irish political culture since the 1930’s. Social 
Partnership is not a new consensus driven political process but an expression of the Irish 
orientation to consensus, which underpins all aspects of Irish policy making. Corporatist 
structures were renewed in 1987, when government faced into a difficult period of 
retrenchment government, re-established Social Partnership. Trade unions, employers and 
farmers worked in several overlapping institutional spaces to develop consensus on policy 
strategies and to negotiate and monitor national wage agreements. This enabled governments 
to ‘adopt reforms with reduced electoral and social risks’ (Natali and Rhodes, 1998:7). In 
1994 Irish Social Partnership broadened to include the NESF and in 1996 part of the 
community and voluntary sector was incorporated into partnership structures (Acheson et al., 
2004).
The function of developing shared understanding and policy consensus dominates Social 
Partnership everyday work (NESF, 1997). Some credit social partnership as the cause of 
Ireland’s more humane welfare trajectory, relative to the UK or the US (Kiely et al., 1999; 
Nolan et al., 2001; Kennelly and O’Shea, 1998; Daly and Yeates, 2003). Others observe how 
social partnership can, through co-option, limit protest and smother the potential for more 
radical change (Allen, 2000; Broderick, 2002; O’Cinneide, 1999; Murphy, 2002). Chapter 
Seven evaluates whether social security- related claims of partnership are over stated. This 
section concludes by briefly reflecting on the individual ‘Pillars’, the employers, trade 
unions, farmers and the community and voluntary pillar.
Employers
Peillion (2001) argued that employers in partnership use their social and political capital to 
curtail the level of social expenditure and to influence the development of services useful to 
them, Cousins (2005a) agrees that employers’ major input has been to veto change. An 
employer representative, in an interview with the author, described their role in social 
security policy development:
It’s quite limited, its rare enough that we would have something direct to say to 
social security or that we would come out saying something about rates 
increases, we’re more likely to spell out the macro context and constraints.
Social Partnership
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IBEC participates in social security policy working groups but has limited expertise and 
input IBEC focuses on the link between economic competitiveness and social security, PRSI 
rates and work incentives ISME a competing business lobby group has, unusually in the 
Irish culture, engaged in active anti-welfare social security discourse Pellion (1995 378) 
notes how, because foreign companies tend to lobby through domestic networks, their 
lobbying activity is not visible however Murphy G (2000) notes the increasing organisation 
of private business interests There is significant evidence of foreign companies lobbying for 
social security changes outside Social Partnership structures
Trade Unions
Peilhon (2001) argued the ICTU features in the configuration of forces that have shaped the 
welfare system in Ireland The interests of employed union members primarily fuel ICTU’s 
interest in social security policy, these include interaction with low paid / casual workers, 
equality issues around parenting and maternity and child income support as it relates to 
childcare Cousins (2005a) explained the paucity of the trade union contribution as a result of 
public sector unions having no direct interest in a means tested social security system 
primarily serving the poor Hardiman (1998) concurs that trade unions’ first priority are their 
own members
Individual trade unions have developed specific social security policy interests because 
members are involved in the administration of social security (IMPACT, SIPTU, CPSU 
PSEU) or because members in low paid or precarious employment have specific social 
security needs (Mandate, SIPTU) ICTU however has a weak practical capacity to develop 
meaningful policy Participation in social security related processes is under-resourced and 
often delegated to relatively junior staff At the same time individual senior trade union 
officials are part of the policy elite, brokering ideas and transferring policy learning from 
abroad (Laffan and O’Donnell, 1998)59 A network of local unemployed centres also directly 
participates in the Community and Voluntary Pillar but have little impact on policy reform
Farmers
Members of the agricultural and rural based lobby groups focus primarily on rural specific 
issues (pensions for farmers, Farm Assist and the social security needs of farming women)
59 Roheen Callender, Peter Cassels and Patricia O ’B& iovan played this role in the policy community
A former representative described in an interview with the author how farmers prefer to 
negotiate directly with the relevant Department rather than through Social Partnership 
structures ‘When you are looking for a thing that’s not broadly based you are better off 
looking for the direct route to that Department than maybe using the Social Partnership 
route’ A senior representative acknowledged, in an interview with the author, that social 
security reform was not a big concern for the organisation
Our interest in the issue is mainly led by members needs but to be honest the 
phone isn’t hopping and there is no active demand for greater coverage’ The 
Trade Unions and Community Pillars keep social security high on the agenda so 
while we would never come out and oppose anything we would never be big 
activists
The Community and Voluntary Pillar (CVP)60
The Community and Voluntary Pillar (CVP) is a partnership particrpatron mechanism 
comprising a large number of diverse organisations representing specific interest groups 
(Acheson et al 2004 103) Only St Vincent de Paul (SVP) the Confederatron of Religious of 
Ireland (CORI), the Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed (INOU), the National 
Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI) and OPEN (One Parent Exchange Network) directly 
input into social security policy Others interact on specific social securrty issues affecting 
their immediate membership Effective participation has required collapsing individual
60 The C+V Pillar was organised by the government in 1996 as a mechanism to facilitate community 
and voluntary sector organisations to participate in SP It included seven groups (INOU, CORI, SVP, 
ICTU Centres, NWCI, NYCI, Protestant Aid and one network of 26 anti-poverty and equality groups 
the Community Platform In 2003 a section of the Community and Voluntary Pillar (comprising a 
network of 22 groups in the Community Platform and NWCI) rejected the content of Sustaining 
Progress and were subsequently excluded from key partnership forums including NESC Government 
then augmented the C+V Pillar with other groups from the sector including the Wheel Pillar social 
security agendas arc however still dominated by the more powerful groups (CORI, INOU, SVP) but 
gender and equality based policy is absent given NWCPs and Community Platform’s withdrawal
organisational interests into coherent pillar-level policy positions. This causes tactical 
tensions and internal power struggles and strained internal relations within the CVP61.
The sectors 1994 co-option into national corporate structures is unique to Ireland and can be 
reflected positively as strength of cause based interest groups in Ireland (Healy, 1998). It 
could also be interpreted as a state strategy to silence ideological debate or alternative 
political discourse expected from a third sector (Broderick, 2002: Murphy, 2002). High 
unemployment in the mid 1990s had necessitated the problem solving presence of strong 
unemployed / anti-poverty groups, however as high unemployment decreased such relevance 
diminished and the gaps between the community and voluntary sector agenda and business 
agenda widened (Hardiman 1998). McCashin (2004:276) notes the strategic importance 
Fianna Fail attaches to establishing links with trade unions, voluntary organisations and 
community groups and describes this ‘as a routine strategy of incorporation in a broad 
populist of agenda’. The state has subsequently manipulated the development of the 
community and voluntary sector by funding groups associated with voluntary sector service 
delivery models while retrenching funding for groups with redistributive policy agendas 
(CWC, 2005). This affects the relative capacity of the sector to engage in redistributional 
debate and has impacted on wider political discourse.
Social Partnership is, without doubt, a key institutional feature of the Irish social security 
policy community. While considered a relatively inclusive corporatist model it is limited in 
that it denies ‘outsiders’ access to policy processes initiated within Social Partnership, has no 
interaction with the political system and has only limited civil service interaction. In other 
corporate institutions, both trade unions and employers may be directly involved in 
administration of social security benefit, this is not the case in Ireland where social partners 
have little real expertise or interest in social security (Hardiman 1998). The role of Irish 
social partnership is more about maintaining a consensus around a shared macro 
understanding of an economic model than contributing in a detailed way to social security 
development. Cousins (2005a: 114) concludes CVP have not been able to play a decisive role 
in social partnership, his analysis has echoes of Lister’s (2004) analysis of ‘voice without 
influence’. With less power and capacity than other pillars it is more accurately described as 
a pluralist lobby group than a corporate power with resources to negotiate (Hardiman, 1998).
61 The degree to which COR1 have dominated income adequacy debates may have meant that other 
social security issues received less attention than mi^ht have otherwise been the case.
Wider civil society
The dominant role of the state in policy making is related to the long term weakness of 
representative societal organisations While organising outside of mainstream political parties 
(land reform, Irish language, women’s suffrage) was always part of the pre independence Irish 
political landscape, Acheson (2004) note how modem Irish civil society is relatively weak 
with no representative structure for civil society welfare groups and lower levels of 
volunteering and women’s civic participation than other European countries The latter is an 
important observation given the role women’s agency (women and mothers living in poverty, 
women’s movements and women administering welfare policies) play in shaping welfare 
states (Cousins, 2005a)
Anti-poverty sector (poverty industry)
All social security income supports are state delivered and tax or PRSI funded Social 
security is distinguishable from the rest of the mixed welfare economy in that (apart from 
direct civil service staff interests represented by CPSU, PSEU, IMPACT and SIPTU) there 
are no large institutional insiders within the social security policy community Nor is there 
any national welfare claimants’ organisation Civil society social security policy input is 
channelled through an infrastructure of welfare rights and citizens information organisations 
and free legal aid centres62 These focus on access to information and report back to the 
DSFA about policy anomalies and deliveiy standards They tend not to directly lobby about 
wider distributional issues or engage in broader structural policy debates However, these 
and other local groups representing people living in poverty, do organise into national 
networks and federations Funded by CPA in a national anti-poverty network, these anti 
poverty groups represent the unemployed, rural dwellers, older people, children, lesbians and 
gays, travellers, people with disabilities, lone parents and refugees / asylum seekers Each
62 The Congress Network (ICTU Centres for the Unemployed), overlaps with an INOU based welfare 
rights network both of which feed back a wide range of social security policy anomalies as does the 
network of Money Advice and Budgeting Services The Local Area Based Partnerships network 
which feed social security issues through the Area Development Management Income Maintenance 
Group to the DSW and the DETE focuses predominantly on welfare to work issues The largest 
network is the Citizens Information Centres which is coordinated (and subordinated) by the state 
agency Comhairle
group's social security agenda tends to be one-dimensional. There are distributional alliances 
including ‘Share the Wealth’ marches and anti-cuts campaigns. However anti-poverty groups 
do not always demonstrate solidarity with other groups (Allen, 1998) and there are episodes 
of mistrust and territorial dispute Acheson et al., (2004).
Some larger national organisations (like the INOU and the SVP) maintain a coherent 
institutional engagement with government departments. This can include regular contact and 
bilateral meetings with both Departmental officials and Ministers, direct lobbying of 
politicians, circulation of policy literature, lobby days and attending political clinics in local 
constituencies. The sector also participates in consultation processes under the auspices of 
the NAPS, customer service initiatives or one-off Departmental policy consultations. Most 
activity however is focused on the annual budget. The DSFA organises annual pre and post 
budget ‘listening’ forums for up to 40 groups who submit social security related budget 
submissions. As Acheson et al., (2004) argue this institutional space is however a state 
controlled space which, while popular with lobby groups, restricts more meaningful 
distributional debate Montague (2001). Quinn (2005) highlighted that successful pre-budget 
submissions lobbied for one specific change but many groups choose to present elaborate 
reports and use the pre-budget submission process as a broad media strategy (Montague, 
2001).
The National Campaign for Welfare Reform, formed as a national campaign to support the 
publication of the CSW in 1986, had lost momentum by the end of that decade and there has 
been no national campaign body since. Without this, as one political adviser reflected in an 
interview with the author
there is no one pushing anything to the extent that it is a political issue, no one
is worried about losing votes about welfare.
Forty groups came together to successfully lobby against the Dirty Dozen in 1992, but made 
a conscious decision not to develop a national social security lobby group. Again in 2004 a 
similar amount of groups campaigned against the Savage Sixteen cuts. Despite clear capacity 
to work together the preference is for ring-fenced activity in specific areas. This level of 
diversity means duplication of work and inefficient use of resources. WRC (2001) 
highlighted how the state and policy makers generally do not see the distinct and separate 
organisations within the sector, rather they hear only one message and are often confused
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about who in the sector might be giving that message Given the sensitivity of proportional 
representation to well organised sectoral interests, a national social security lobby group 
might be a more effective way of influencing change (Coleman, 2006) Instead there is a 
sector marked by lack of trust and territorial dispute (Acheson et al 2004) One key civil 
servant observed in an interview with the author 'the community and voluntary sector aren’t 
coming up with proposals’ Groups who develop an overview positions risk stepping into the 
’territory’ of another group Hence the only groups who developed overview positions are 
CORI and the SVP, neither of whom represents any one community of interest and both of 
whom have resources independent of the state This however leaves civil society over 
dependant ‘the most durable influence’ of Catholic Church organisations (Acheson et al 
2004 89)
The most significant power of the sector is veto power, Chapter Seven outlines the 
significant veto power of groups like Women in the Home and lone parents’ representative 
groups Nor does the sector use this veto power strategically McCashin (1992 5) notes how 
it is
inconsistent to chastise policy makers for beginning to implement CSW reforms 
while at the same time calling for the implementation of the CSW report What 
all this points to is that welfare pressure groups have not grasped and accepted 
the overall strategy of the CSW The report is not just a litany of universally 
popular reforms, there are nettles to be grasped
Church
While Fanning (2003 7) acknowledges the affinity between liberal morals and Catholic 
principles of subsidiarity he also concludes the Catholic Church had been less directly 
influential in relation to social security policy than health and education policy where they 
had much more material and social capital Fanning Pellion (2001 176) concluded ‘the 
church possesses no stake in social security, about which it has little to say’ Hardiman 
(1998) concurs The Catholic Church now tends to act as spokesperson for marginalised 
communities through social justice interest groups (CORI, SVP and Bishops Conferences as 
well as the justice desks of the Vincentians, the Jesuits and the Mercy orders) The major 
Church voice in the social security debate is CORI (formally CMRS) who throughout the 
last two decades focused their justice desk and social security energy on a basic income and
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adequacy lobby One Minister described to the author the immense lobbying power of 
CORI
People would come in with proposals We were far too polite, we should have 
told them to get stuffed with their crazy ideas, we strung them along for years 
basically It was the persuasive feel and the clerical collar and the perception 
that he (Fr Sean Healy) had a big lobby behind him
In interviews with the author CORI are credited by many civil servants as impacting on 
social security adequacy by creative long-term campaigning strategies Powell (1997 16) 
describes CORI as ‘undoubtedly most effective anti-poverty lobbyist in contemporary 
Ireland’, Acheson et al ,(2004 87) note how government seek CORI approval in the area of 
social inclusion Their significant access to FF enabled them play a public role arguing for 
equitable distribution outcomes over budgets 2004-6 CORI and lay members of the Catholic 
Church were also instrumental in initiating the Wheel to act as a co-ordinating point and 
counter point to the development of an alternative co-ordinating hub, the Community 
Platform There is however ideological debate within Church based groups During the 
consultation to produce ‘Work is the Key’ a major social policy input from various British 
Isles churches tension arose between the Irish Bishops Conference support for employment 
based anti-poverty solutions and CORI’s promotion of a basic income paradigm
Think-tanks, academics and the media
The Irish social security policy community is noticeably devoid of think tanks One policy 
maker in an interview with the author observed ‘the policy reading circle is small, you are 
really only talking about a handful of people’ There is also a perception that ESRI, the 
largest and most technically able think tank or academic research body, has a policy 
monopoly in social security research The ESRI was established to engage with the policy 
community and has proved highly influential influencing language, definitions and technical 
discourse Most commissioned work tends to be associated with measuring the impact of 
budgetary policy on income distribution and poverty As one policy maker commented in an 
interview with the author
technically they are very good but they are rarely asked to look at social 
security, you can’t critique them for not doing innovative thinking -  no body is 
paying them to do innovative thinking
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Under its own initiative, the ESRI does publish annual budget policy commentaries, which 
focus on broader social security policy and critical analysis of mainstream policy (Callan et 
al 2001b) A civil servant testified in an interview with the author how
If you are doing something the ESRI recommend, even if you’re not doing it for
the same reason, it makes it easier if you say the ESRI recommended it
Other consultancy firms tend to be contracted on projects with narrow technical terms of 
reference determined by civil servants or politicians A small number of independent 
consultants are hired by civil society actors to develop alternative policy positions to reform 
specific contingencies of social welfare None of these consultants contribute to public 
discourse in the media
There is limited engagement in social security within universities 63 The lack of incentive 
within academic promotion structures to publish or engage in social security policy related 
debate and the exclusive membership of many Irish social security institutional processes 
might be contributory factors The establishment of the Policy Institute in Trinity College 
Dublin (TCD) in 1995 where civil servants can be seconded for six-month study periods has 
been used to produce two social security policy reports (Quinn 1999, Healy 2003)
While the media is a clear force influencing the Irish social security policy community there 
is little institutional social security expertise in the Irish media Some national and local 
radios stations and local newspapers have initiated advice orientated social security slots but 
no national current affairs medium has a social security focused programme and there is no 
specialist social security magazine or journal Nonetheless the power of popular media is 
often cited as influencing decisions or acting as a veto Montague and Trench (2000 48) 
observe how ‘once a piece of research has been aired in the public it passes much more 
easily into the policy process One civil servant observed in an interview with the author
63 Faculties engaging in social security tend to be sociology or social policy, there is limited input 
from law faculties, economics faculties and multidisciplinary faculties like equality or policy studies
it's not like serious analysis like in the Observer, it’s the Joe Duffy show or the 
Marian Finucane (popular day time chat shows with telephone commentary 
from the pubhc)treatment that will get something moving
Aware of this, most groups try to influence decision-making by influencing public opinion 
Church-funded groups64 were among few organisations to use a theoretical informed policy 
approach or to play the role of think tanks by stimulating debate, some thing only one secular 
organisation, the ENOU, was able to produce65 Some lobby groups and social partner 
groups, aware ‘of significant shifts in the media landscape that create new avenues’ (ibid 48) 
have media strategies, employ press officers or use private media consultancy companies to 
manage specific campaigns aimed at stimulating public discourse and winning public 
opinion (WRC, 2001) Private Public Relations companies (Montague and Graphiconies) 
offer market special training and communication supports This indicates a significant shift 
from direct lobbying to communications strategies which are trying to influence public 
discourse and a growing awareness of the importance of influencing ideational thinking The 
final part of this chapter reviews the role of ideas and discourse in the Irish social security 
policy community
The non-office holding social security policy community is numerically strong but has little 
influence and can be described as Listers (2004) concept of ‘Voice Without Influence’ Only 
four organisations stand out as having any degree of voice with influence, they include the 
ESR1, INOU, CORI, and the SVP all of whom were cited m interviews with the author as 
having impact, and two of these are Catholic Church based This ongoing influence of the 
Church and its distinct social policy may be an explanatory variable in explaining some of 
the more benign policy decisions When civic society works together they have more
64 CORI produces theoretically informed policy research documents, holds a major related conference 
each year and produces a well-regarded annual post budget analysis Other organisations, including 
the Bishops Commission on Social Welfare, the Jesuits, the Vincentian Partnership and the SVP 
sponsored research and produced policy proposals
65 One NGO director explained m an interview with the author ‘the more important pomt is how ideas 
translate in the popular policy discourse, that is why wc sought funding for our journal the Margin and 
policy briefs from ADM funding’
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effective influence on social security policy But there are numerous obstacles stopping more 
effective collabration66
5.7 Policy elites
The ‘iron triangle’ has an inner policy network A combination of power and knowledge- 
resources determines membership, which is made up of primarily Ministers and Ministerial 
political and personal advisers and key civil servants The membership of the Tax Strategy 
Group (TSG)67 partially mirrors this inner network TSG is an inter-departmental committee 
chaired by the DOF, comprises senior officials and advisers from the DOF, the DOT, the 
DETE, Social Community and Family Affairs and the Revenue Commissioners It played a 
particularly important policy role in the 1992 to 1997 period, while of lesser strategic 
importance in more recent years still remains powerful No social partners or non-elected 
office holders are included in the inner policy network However TSG minutes record 
references to campaigning positions of ICTU, IBEC and the Community Pillar as well as the 
ESRI
Hall and Taylor (1996), Deacon B (2003) and Cemy et a l , (2005) define an emerging 
alternative network based not on power or knowledge resources but on expertise and skills 
Policy mediators or entrepreneurs are found in small informal networks of powerful 
individual actors These networks are found in the overlap of domestic / international
66 In interviews with the author various observations were made about CORTs (unhealthy) 
domination of the community and voluntary sector and their lack of capacity to work co-operatively 
with other groups It was also noted that Church organisations played a decisive role in establishing 
The Wheel and therefore a divisive role in shifting power away from social justice oriented civic 
society and towards voluntary sector service delivery organisations
67 The TSG examines and develops proposals for taxation, PRSI and levies for the Budget and
Finance Bill m the context of the framework of a medium term and longer term strategy set out m the
Programme for Government They are required to examine the strategic approach for a general social
welfare package and to assess the interaction of proposals on income tax, PRSI and levies with other
social welfare proposals, including child income support, and in particular the impact of this
interaction on the labour market and income distribution
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institutions. The emerging transnational policy elite comprise experts working in social 
partnership institutions, (but not necessarily the social partners) and the ESRI who are held 
in high regard and its technical experts play a briefing / information role for the whole policy 
community. It also includes technical experts associated with the European Open method of 
Coordination group of policy experts (ESRI researchers and key civil servants heading the 
OSI office, country experts based in Brussels and heads of relevant NGO’s). It also 
comprises non governmental lobbyists in international representative organisations and Irish 
people working in international organisations. Many Irish social security policy actors play 
lead roles in EU and other international organisations (either elected President or Secretary 
or as senior staff) (Laffan and O’Donnell 1998).
Whether based in Ireland or Brussels these key actors bring international experience and 
discourse back to the Irish social policy community. Apart from UN-based networking, 
which is more irregular and involves a smaller number of policy actors, most informal 
networking is EU-based. There is also a network of English speaking countries and 
connections with equivalents in UK organisations. These policy entrepreneurs68 can form a 
distinctive policy network without formal power but with extensive knowledge resources and 
they have the capacity to bring new thinking into the policy community. Their subjective 
preferences, professional backgrounds, institutional affiliation and cognitive make-up will 
influence how and which ideas pass through institutions and this will impact on options for 
change.
5.8 Multi-level governance
By far the most important international policy influence in Ireland is the EU. Laffan and O 
Donnell (1998:157) argue that membership of the EU is different to other international 
organisations ‘as it alters the external environment of the traditional nation state and its 
internal dynamic of policy making’. Ireland has adapted to the administrative and political 
demands of multileveled governance in the European Union however social security is not a 
strategic policy area for EU relations.
68 In interviews a number of people repeatedly referred to Peter Cassells, Brian Nolan, Hugh Frazer 
and Gerry/Ita Mangan and Fintan Farrell as being Irish ‘policy entrepreneurs’.
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The EU policy system is complex and characterised by multi-level governance where 
national and supra-national institutions and politicians, bureaucrats and civil society actors 
engage in a multitude of co-operative working arrangements. With a small budgetary base it 
uses regulatory policy and promotes policy through treaties, directives and 
recommendations. It also monitors policy through observatories and OMCs. Cram (1997) 
understands the EU as a bureaucracy where policy entrepreneurs seek to promote its 
potential role and independent agenda and expand its competencies by engaging in agenda 
setting and policy formulation, but not implementation. It invests in policy learning 
processes including networks, exchanges, conferences and research (Brine 2000). Aspects 
of the EU most relevant to social security policy include, Directorate General V, the Social 
Dialogue, the Social Policy Forum, the Structural Funds and social inclusion budgets, the 
Social Protection Committee, the Employment Committee and the Open Method of Co­
ordination of monetary policy, pensions, employment policy and social inclusion policy. 
Each Commission Directorate (DG) has its own policymaking style, strategy and 
institutional features that influence policy-making patterns. DGV 5, the social policy and 
employment directorate, is characterised by a heterogeneous collection of mainly politically 
weak organisations arranged around social and civil dialogue (O’Cinneide, 1995, 2005: 
Frazer, 2002).
There is no commitment to EU level social security convergence.69 The EU principle of 
subsidiarity means that social security policy is developed at domestic level and EU member 
states are protective of their domestic social security systems (O’Cinneide, 2005). EU social 
security policy is driven by a free labour market ethos, which promotes the free movement of 
socially insured workers and those seeking employment. There is also an anti ‘social 
dumping’ agenda, which, influenced by competitive driven global trends, seeks to avoid a 
‘race to the bottom’ by putting in place minimum income guarantees. There were only two 
legal directives in the last two decades, the 1992 EU Directive on Minimum Income 
Guarantee (which did not fundamentally change Irish social security practice) and the Part- 
Time Work Directive (which required only moderate changes in social security provision for 
part-time workers). The political and policy influence is harder to measure. One leading 
trade unionist described to the author how the EU was a very strong positive influence that 
moved Ireland from a traditional catholic ethos of social policy to a:
69 If convergence happens it is not necessarily a product or outcome of EU integration (Hay 2004).
whole notion of a social model and how there was a clear shift in language and 
thinking so that concept of social inclusion and full employment and a balanced 
social and economic policy were a familiar discourse
Open Method of Co-ordination
The political struggle to define a European social model is reflected in the compromise 
commonly known as the Lisbon Agenda which promotes competitiveness, job growth and 
social inclusion and which prompted a new policy process or governance process known as 
the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (O’Cinneide, 2005, Frazer, 2002, O’Donnell and 
Thomas, 1998) National states enter into a process of co-ordination with common 
objectives, agreed at Council level, of strategic action plans with short-term actions and 
long-term objectives, common indicators, joint EU evaluation, public accountability and the 
exchange of good practice (Frazer, 2002) OMC is an increasingly dominant policy style 
across five policy areas including social inclusion, pensions and employment-related social 
security issues and more a co-ordination of process than a co-ordination of policy De La 
Porte and Pochet (2004) view OMC as a politically significant governance mechanism that 
allows the EU to act as a semi- sovereign policy system Ferrara et al (2000) highlight the 
post-regulatory approach to governance that stressed the importance of hegemony (dominant 
discourses) for securing international co-operation In all OMC processes this hegemony 
privileges fiscal discipline over social needs or social cohesion and employment is the 
cornerstone of social inclusion policy A new language and technical discourse of 
policymaking includes concepts like targets, indicators and mobilisation of all actors The 
OMC potential to impact will depend on the capacity of the domestic policy community to 
use the OMC indicators as political tools to lobby for improved domestic performance 
Laffan and O Donnell (1998 170) remark on how the resource implication of multi level 
governance makes it harder to manage structural in central government However to some 
degree engagement with this EU ‘hegemony’ is selectively filtered There is still a sense that 
Irish policy makers are in control Smith (2005 183) reports how a policy maker described to 
her in an interview how
I think maybe we are inclined to invoke Europe when actually the lines of 
policy are what we would do anyway
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The Irish social security policy community is complex, fragmented and lacks integration 
Most institutions, whether state or societal, work at national level70 and are organisationally 
independent, they are stable and well resourced There is overlap, dialogue and interaction 
between the institutions and interests The Irish state is managing its engagement with 
international social security discourse at its own pace and to its own agenda There is only 
emerging evidence to confirm Cemy’s expectation of increased multi-level governance and 
an emerging transnational policy elite The transformation from an ‘iron triangle’ to a 
‘golden pentagon’ is ongoing No international policy elite has yet had much discemable 
influence on the domestic social security policy community However the OMC process may 
lead to ‘cognitive Europeanisation’ where member states adopt EU policy making tools for 
consultation and decision making (Sotiropoulos, 2004 282) and this may influence future 
policy formation as much as direct regulation (Guillen and Alvarez, 2004 297)
The community is relatively fluid Policy agendas move across institutional spaces71 and 
membership of institutions change over time72 Brewer and de Leon (1983) stressed the 
importance of decision makers’ subjective preferences Senior membership of these spaces is 
primarily male, middle-aged, third-level educated, home-owning, white Irish indigenous m 
origin and shares common Christian based social and political values This network of 
people is well integrated, stable, exclusive, and interdependent Such continuity and stability 
enables informal networking The Irish social security policy community is marked by two 
related weaknesses, underdeveloped policy capacity and weak policy learning capacity One 
trade unionist noted in an interview with the author that
70 Regional health board and social security structures and local office-level staff are not distinctly 
visible in the policy community Community-based or work-based local level actors participate in 
policy debate through their own national organisations Lack of direct local participation is seen as 
problematic and various institutions have initiated ways of opening up more sub national input into 
anti-poverty debate (NAPS Ireland 1997c, 2002a CWC 2000, NESF 1997)
71 The NAPS, for example, was initiated m the political system, driven by the civil service, supported 
by civil society, underpinned through SP and strengthened through interaction in the EU
72 Politicians are now members of the NESF, the CVP is now part of the NESC and more groups 
attend the DSFA pre-budget forums
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learning debate and thinking is in the wrong institutional spaces, we are 
building up capacity in the wrong places A lot of social learning is in Social 
Partnership but both civil servants and politicians are asked to deal with and 
decide very complex issues and yet are given little capacity to analyse to deal 
with the issues
NAPS institutional mechanisms attempted to integrate policy but ‘joined up7 thinking in 
terms of policy making is still a challenge and it is rare for the whole policy community to 
learn together The political sub-sector is particularly isolated Lack of learning reinforces 
the most fundamental weakness, the paucity of policy and research resources within the 
broad Irish civil service and political system In the words of a political adviser interviewed 
by the author
The real challenge is this policy community, we are really very bad at doing 
policy We are structured very badly, it’s a system-wide problem not just about 
social welfare It goes back to the nature of our political system and its short­
term pragmatic fix-it orientation, because the political system doesn’t demand 
policy, they don’t get policy
While the words of the political advisor highlight the frustration of policy actors forced to 
work within a policy system dominated by the culture of short term pragmatic politics it is 
important not to overstate that conclusion While the Irish higher education system did not 
invest in developing capacity in public social policy studies Within the civil service there is 
not the type of infrastructure that one might expect to support a high capacity policy 
community However there are also strengths in the policy community Certain actors in the 
policy community, particularly those in NESC and ESRI, are highly capable and well 
regarded by the international policy community and provide policy leadership in the Irish 
policy community However organisations are constrained by reliance on government 
fundmg and cannot be considered to be wholly independent One should also be mindful of 
the tendency of policy actors and domestic literature to self evaluate themselves as a weak 
policy community This should not be simply taken at face value, such a tendency may 
reflect a post colonial inferiority complex rather than reality
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5 9 Patterns of Discourse in the In sh  Social Security Community
This section reflects on how knowledge and meaning are produced through discursive 
practices Discourse reflects ‘a group of statements which provide a language for talking 
about, or representing knowledge about a particular topic It rules in certain ways of talking 
and rules out other alternatives’ (Hall 1997 44) This section examines how are ideas 
communicated, whether there is evidence of epistemic communities or policy monopoly, and 
what kind of discourse is evident in the Irish social security policy community?
Coakely (2004 53) and Girvan, (2004 358) argue that ideology appears absent in the Irish 
state At first sight a lack of left-right division between political parties and a consensus 
approach between classes in social partnership suggests a pragmatic flexible state enabling 
innovative policy change to adapt to the global economy However this absence of debate 
does not mean an absence of ideology The absence of debate may in fact be a result of 
consensus about ideology The Irish state has always had a dominant hegemony In the early 
days of the state this reflected the conservative, Catholic and patriarchal ideology (Femter, 
2004 337) and was maintained by a strong Church State relationship In the later days of the 
state this has softened somewhat and has also been augmented with a strong neo-liberal 
hegemony
Hegemony ideas are currently ‘cognitively locked’ into a neo-liberal agenda reinforced by 
political globalisation The dominant ideology is reinforced and maintained by strong 
epistemic communities including Social Partnership and industrial institutions like the 
Industrial Development Authority and the National Competitiveness Council established to 
support the competition state Irish political culture is a strong user of rhetoric, its model of 
development is legitimated by rhetoric about social inclusion The state explicitly and 
implicitly, by controlling funding and filtering social partnership participation, is able to 
mitigate dissent from the hegemonic ‘shared understanding’
Policy Episteme and Monopolies
Certain institutions, in the absence of well-resourced alternative policy advocacy coalitions, 
enjoy a monopoly role in Irish discourse The ESRI analysis, for example, underpins social 
partnership (NESF and NESC) and anti-poverty institutions (the CPA, Office for Social
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Inclusion and NAPS) Kirby (2002) argues that ESRI analysis is based on theoretical 
assumptions of rational choice hence poverty and social inclusion discourse is 
epistemologically rooted in classical economics theory Such technical literature focused on 
statistical measurement dominates policy discourse, limits public debate and acts as a barrier 
to entry into the policy community73 A second type of policy monopoly happens through 
social partnership This monopolises the process of debate favouring consensus over conflict 
and maintaining a strong narrative of shared understanding where ‘social partners leave 
ideological differences outside the door and problem solve in the context of a shared 
understanding5, (McCarthy 1998,1999, NESF 1997, NESC 2005b) Organisations which 
have tried to raise critical debate comment on the difficulty in raising the level of debate and 
discourse74 (WRC 2001) Individuals who have ventured into public debate quickly find 
themselves silenced (Murphy 2002)75
The dominant macro discourse revolves around competitiveness and employment growth, 
the dominant social security discourse revolves around technical debates about how to 
measure the perceived, socially constructed, policy problem of the day, work incentives and 
replacement ratios, definitions and measurement of unemployment, definitions and 
measurement of poverty / inequality and, most recently, labour market impacts of migration 
Alternative advocacy coalitions (sub-sets of groups defined by similar knowledge and 
interests working together within a policy community) promotes alternative discourses, a 
rights, equality and social spending approach and a less dominant discourse based on family 
values, parenting and responsibility76 These debates mirror Levitas (1998) typology of
73 In interviews community based activists were told they could not be on certain committees because 
they would not be able to understand the technical nature of the debate
74 The NESC (2003, 2005) work conceptualising a developmental welfare state failed to stimulate 
policy debate whereas the NESC (2004) study of housing provoked serious debate
75 Jim O Leary, for example, had to resign from the benchmarking process Michael O’Reilly was 
ostracized within the Trade Union movement Some policy entrepreneurs (Clinton 1994, Madden 
1994, Walsh 1992 and Hamey 2000) have made exceptional controversial welfare reform proposals
76 These coalitions tend to be tactical and short-term, built around specific campaigns and grouped to 
promote rights (disability coalition), redistribution policy (Share the Wealth) ending child poverty
Social Inclusion Discourse, Redistributive Discourse and Moral Underclass Discourse 
(Moran, 2005) Social inclusion discourse still dominates but a redistributive and rights 
discourse has lost some ground to a moral underclass discourse which links social security to 
conditions governing ‘behaviour’ (NESC 2005b)
Types of discourse
NESC (2005a) represents an attempt to modernise social inclusion discourse into one 
consistent with international competitiveness This was developed in a strong state-society 
co-ordinated discourse in a consensus based social partnership institution, the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC) Schmidt's (2000a) concept of ‘co-coordinative 
discourse’ refers to where change is managed through a closed elite level policy process 
confined to the type of problem solving or lesson drawing that leads to incremental reform 
The alternative is ‘communicative discourse’, capable of promoting social learning and 
leading to a change in values and a more fundamental restructuring of policy Processes that 
engage in broader communication and that seek wider social learning include commissions 
and public consultations
The coordinative shared understanding underpinning the consensus social partnership is 
consistent with the political culture of consensus coalition governments Social Partnership, 
in its early days represented a ‘weapon’ or a tool which government used to develop a 
societal consensus about retrenchment The first social partnership agreement was the 
blueprint which was institutionalised through social partnership, NESC and the other 
institutional developments that flowed from the agreements -  it was this relatively rapid 
institutionalisation of neo-liberal ideas that mean these ideas could act as a cognitive lock 
They still act as a cognitive lock because neither those ideas or institutions have been 
effectively challenged or undermined Over time more social security policies are developed 
within social partnership institutions77 When elite policy makers control policy development
(OYETCP), childcare (Childcare 2000), personal responsibility in employment (Irish Small and 
Medium Employers), in sexual behaviour and parenting (Myers) and m social behaviour (McDowell)
77 Activation, participation and employment, all key competition state features, are promoted but 
policy areas less consistent with the competition state, care, income inequality, social security, 
individualisation and social rights of migrants are ‘agenda managed’ and filtered out of mainstream 
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in a highly co-ordinated and technical discourse it is more difficult for political actors to 
engage in the social learning needed to legitimise a more structural type of change.
Sources of policy ideas may differ across political administrations. One Minister explained 
in an interview with the author how his internationalist political convictions led him to read 
widely and to search out policy examples in places as far apart as Sweden and Roosevelt’s 
US original New Deal, both of which he claimed influenced the original Social Employment 
Scheme set up in 1984 (Quinn 2005).78 If commitment to searching out international ideas is 
‘ideological’ then social democratic parties are more open to policy transfer and are most 
likely to look to social democratic inspired policy examples. FG, on the other hand, chose to 
visit the US in 1987 to examine workfare practices. Lack of subsequent engagement with 
more recent US welfare to work policy could be attributed to a more pragmatic FF which has 
less interest in seeking out other policy experiences or ideas anywhere. A FF Minister 
recalled in an interview with the author how he ‘didn’t need to read about what needed to be 
done or commission any research; I could see it all around me, in my constituency work, and 
in my clinics’.
Social security debate is limited by a hegemonic neo-liberal discourse and a political culture 
that tend towards short-term views and small incremental reforms. Cousins (2005a) notes the 
ideological dominance of the market and lack of realistic policy alternatives from right or 
left ideological sources. The weak civic society and lack of trade union role in administrating 
social security contributes to weak social security debate in Ireland (Hardiman 1998). A 
political adviser described, in an interview with the author, the lack of capacity and drive in 
the policy community:
There is nobody pushing change, no one has a proactive approach for any clear 
change. So there isn’t anybody really thinking, nobody is interested in trying to 
restructure social security, the poor aren’t pushing, the Department aren’t 
pushing, nobody is pushing it.
78 He also described how having read an article in the Economist magazine he was curious to examine
the Hungarian labour market experience. Using ILO contacts he arranged what was a first visit by an
Irish Minister to then communist Hungary where he researched their use o f  tracking and placing
underemployed people, which in turn influenced the development of Irish employment services.
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Kennelly and O'Shea (1998) note the paucity of recent social security debate in Ireland. 
O’Connor A. (2005) observed that ‘the suddenness of economic turnaround means social 
policy is only beginning to catch up with economic reality’. While Cousins (2005a), NESC 
(2005a) and O’Connor A. (2005) noted how the absence of crisis in the social security 
system dampens initiatives for reform there has also been strong resistance to and active 
vetoing of policy analysis that argues for solutions to relative income inequality, 
individualisation, childcare and the social needs of migrants.
5.9 Chapter Conclusion
The Irish social security policy community is a community in low level equilibrium 
experiencing a relatively ‘frozen landscape’ of social security reform (Esping-Andersen 
2003)79. Veto theorists anticipated that the more veto points the less capacity for radical 
change and the more muted the impact of globalisation. Middle class civil servants, social 
partners and pluralist interest groups work to reinforce the status quo. Wider civil society and 
organisations representing the poor are weak and unable to input effectively to policy 
learning, formation and implementation (Hardiman 1998). A powerful state-led policy 
network promotes a policy monopoly and episteme and significant state-society consensus 
exists alongside different short-term advocacy coalitions. A low level of political discourse 
and policy debate is dominated by coordinative lesson drawing rather than communicative 
social learning. Through multilevel governance it is possible to identify an emerging group 
of international policy entrepreneurs who act as conduits for ideas.
There are five ways institutional and cultural differences might be explanatory variables 
capable of accounting for the different Irish policy experiences than English speaking liberal 
regimes. Cousins (2005a: 124), Stephens, Huber and Ray (1999) and Swank (2002) concur 
with Hay (2004:205) that ‘centralised adversarial first-past-the-post and two-party systems 
are more prone to crisis induced policy making than others which are more prone to 
incremental reformisms’. Does this explain the slower pace of policy change? Multiple 
vetoes lead to policy cultures dominated by blame avoidance or policy avoidance (Hood
79 Like the Irish weather (not too hot not too cold and rain all the year round) the Irish social security 
policy community as a temperate personality (not too left7 not too right and incrementalism all the 
year round.
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2002 16-20, Green-Petersen and Haverland 2002 24, Pierson 1994, 1996)80 or by a 
consensus culture and a more ‘kind and gentle5 policy predisposition (Lijhpart, 1999 301) 
Does this explain a less radical policy or more benign policy trajectory9 Thirdly an insular 
coordinative policy community closed to ideas and debate is less likely to be open to radical 
structural change of either a positive or negative type Fourthly the combined impact of 
strong business veto, a relatively inactive trade union movement and a numerically strong 
but divided and weak civil society place little pressure for social security reform To echo 
Hardiman (1998 122)
we may find at least part of the explanation for the relative lack of progress in 
redressing these inequalities may be found in a closer analysis of the patterns of 
interest representation in the form of party policies and interest group 
formation
Finally once unemployment was resolved there is a lack of appreciation within the ‘shared 
understanding5 of how social inclusion and competitiveness are inter-related and therefore a 
lack crisis, focus and urgency on resolving remaining social inequities All of these 
rationales may explain why the type and pace of Irish social security change is contrary to 
what might be expected in the world’s most globalised country It is useful at this stage to 
explore more precisely the link between Irish social security and Ireland’s position in the 
international political economy This is the focus of the following chapter
80 Governments adopt blame avoidance strategies including presentational strategies, spin, timing, 
arguing, excusing, justifying, diverting, distorting, threats, agency strategies, shifting blame to 
agencies, regulators, and advisers They also engage m substantive policy strategies where policy is 
defensively chosen for electoral consideration
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Economic and political pressures generated by internationalisation have fundamentally 
important impacts on both the material and ideological interests of a broad array of policy 
actors (Swank 2002:177)
CHAPTER SIX 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL GLOBALISATION
6.1 Introduction
Chapter One reflected on the openness of the Irish economy and how a high level of 
international economic integration is a defining characteristic of the Irish economy (Land 
and Ruane 2006:1). One might expect therefore that Ireland is vulnerable to the impacts of 
globalisation. This chapter reviews how globalisation (as defined by Held in Ch 1) impacts 
on Irish social security. Laffan and O Donnell (1998:162) argue about the importance of 
‘appreciation of constraints and possibilities of international governance and its implications 
for developmental, technological, social, political and macroeconomic dimensions’. 
Competition state theory suggests globalisation influences the development of Irish social 
security in both economic and political ways. In the immediate and longer term economic 
globalisation and more intense global competitiveness directly impacts on the financial 
viability of the welfare state. The impact of political globalisation is more indirect but 
potentially stronger as it influences international ideas which permeate the domestic policy 
community through a transnational policy elite working in multilevel governance. It also 
causes internal shifts in power towards capital and business.
All governments react and adjust to the reality of globalisation in different ways (Weiss, 
2005; Mosely, 2005). The first part of this chapter examines changes in social security that 
can be directly attributed to economic globalisation. It reviews the impact of high economic 
growth, the impact of competition for foreign direct investment, competitive pressures on 
taxation and social insurance policy, migration, technology, competition in procurement and 
the privatisation of pensions. Since the distinction between economic and political 
globalisation is not always clear, this part of the chapter ends by discussing how the politics 
of managing foreign direct investment might impact on attitudes to social security policy. 
The study of policy processes or the mediation of domestic policy is incomplete without 
examination of international policy transfer as a source of policy. Part two begins by
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reflecting on the concept of policy transfer It then examines institutions in the international 
policy community which interface with the Irish social security policy community 
Competition state theorists stress the political mediation of policy ideas as an explanatory 
variable capable of explaining policy differences This part of the chapter ends by discussing 
whether the fact that the Irish policy community has been exposed to different or less policy 
ideas than other liberal welfare regimes might account for path departure from these liberal 
regimes The Chapter concludes that globalisation has so far presented both economic and 
political opportunities and threats and that the determining factor in how these impact on 
social security is how they are mediated by the domestic policy community
6 2 Economic Globalisation
It is difficult to isolate the immediate economic impact of globalisation on social security 
policy Welfare states developed at a time of embedded liberalism when trade barriers, 
capital exchange controls and fixed exchange rates meant less international constraints on 
domestic policy choices Scharpf & Schmidt (2000a) outlined how international constraints 
developed when the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system broke down in 1973 at a 
time when the world experienced the first OPEC oil crisis Government’s economic and 
political response was to remove both trade barriers and capital exchange controls National 
economies, no longer shielded against the international economy, had less control over their 
economic boundaries With rising interest rates governments struggling against stagflation 
(rising unemployment and inflation) could not afford to re-inflate their economies They 
depended less on Keynesian macroeconomic demand strategies and resorted more to micro 
management of the economy through wage restraint and spending controls As Scharpf and 
Schmidt (2000a 6) concluded
Governments are no longer dealing with captive capital owners and captive 
customers National systems of taxation, regulation and industrial relations have 
now become vulnerable to the extent that they reduce the attractiveness of the 
national economy to mobile capital and the competitiveness of nationally 
produced goods and services in international markets This has major impacts 
on employment in the internationally exposed sectors of the economy and on 
the financial viability of the welfare state
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Impact of high economic growth
Competition state theorists expect downward pressure on social security associated with 
regulatory and tax competition among national governments competing in internationalised 
product and capital markets This competition necessitates budgetary constraint and cost 
containment measures Though in the early 1980’s there were significant cuts in education, 
health and housing expenditure there is no evidence of major retrenchment of Irish social 
security Chapter Four reflected that a liberal welfare state with a high degree of reliance on 
means-tested payments had little room to decrease already ungenerous payments Chapter 
Nine examines the role politics played in ensuring less social security retrenchment This 
chapter focuses on whether experience of less retrenchment in this period can be explained 
by the exceptional levels of Irish economic growth associated with the high levels of 
international capital mobility and low taxation characteristic of the Irish economic 
development model (Smith, 2005) The combination of unusually high Irish economic 
growth rates and limited pressures from an ageing population meant Ireland did not suffer 
the same fiscal pressures experienced by other OECD countries One academic interviewed 
by the author commented
The fact that we were so plugged into the global economy was part of our 
economic growth and decrease in unemployment, this meant that our social 
expenditure shrunk in a rather painless way relative to some other countries 
who didn’t experience such job growth The impact of economic globalisation 
on social security might have been to protect it from the type of benefit 
reductions and social security reforms seen in other countries
In fact for much of the period since 1997 Ireland enjoyed budget surpluses and the capacity 
to expand social security rates and coverage Chapter Four, reflected however, that only 
limited expansion occurred and that Irish social security development was a story of 
‘arrested development’ where the government abstained from using the fruits of economic 
growth to expand and improve social protection to the degree that might have been 
anticipated as a correlate of economic growth (Alber and Standing, 2000 99)81 This is 
consistent with social expenditure and direct social security decreasing as a proportion of 
both GNP and GDP (Timeneon 2003) According to NESC (2005 61) expenditure on cash 
benefits as a % of GDP dropped from 13 6% m 1993 to 8 4% in 2001 Ireland’s comparative
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position for social spending decreased from 13th out of 14 to 14 out of 14 over that period 
(Hay 2006). This confirms that Ireland was always a comparatively low spender and is still 
comparatively low spender. Failure to use the opportunity afforded by economic growth to 
break a tradition of high rates of poverty suggests path dependant policy was a strong driving 
force determining Irish social security policy. Callan (2004) argued that Ireland always had 
high rates of relative poverty and that this increase in relative income poverty is a function, 
not so much of globalisation, but of the tax welfare model and an underlying social security 
policy orientated to ‘make work attractive’. The comments of Burke about the about the 
early Irish state seem appropriate to the 21st century:
Whilst it is true to state that the economic resources of the new state were 
simply not there to support any radical social policy, even if they were, the 
political desire seems equally lacking. The ideology of the new state was deeply 
conservative (Burke, 1999:26).
Irish social security policy did adjust downwards to globalisation: As Kiam Caudle observed 
in 1967, it was already ‘lean and mean’ and key policy makers were happy that it remained
so.
Low Tax Policy
The introductory chapter outlined how Irish policy discourse is dominated by the context of 
international competitiveness, the preferred Irish phrase for globalisation. What impact has 
this low tax-wage moderation Irish economic prescription on the amount available for social 
expenditure? NESC (2005) argued that globalisation pressures leave little choice but to 
remain with a relatively liberal welfare regime of means-tested basic rates; other options are 
considered politically unaffordable in the context of the pressures of international 
competition. However, the principle of low basic social security rates, or ‘less eligibility’, 
has always underpinned Ireland’s liberal approach to social security. The Minister for 
Finance in 1965, James Ryan, confirmed that the Second Programme for Economic 
Expansion strategy in relation to social security was to ‘keep assistance rates low on the 
grounds that to do so is to make work more attractive’ (Ferriter 2004b; 16). Even if there had 
been greater fiscal flexibility it is unlikely that any government would have sought to change 
this basic social security formula. In this sense it is unclear whether a restricted tax policy 
had that much impact on social security. This conclusion is reinforced by government’s 
argument that lower taxes lead to increased tax yield over this period. Sweeney (2005)
162
argued that government compensated for low income with a variety of stealth taxes and 
service changes to the extent that low taxation policy did not lead to any diminution of 
revenue over this period The policy of low taxation in practice since 1997 was not, it seems, 
a fiscal barrier to real increases in social expenditure
Pay Related Social Insurance
The most obvious impact of economic globalisation, voiced by many policy actors 
interviewed by the author, was on the PRSI system Although PRSI rates were low relative 
to other EU countries, the attention of policy makers focused on the implications of a PRSI 
rate increase on international competitiveness One civil servant from the Department of 
Finance reflected in an interview with the author
It wouldn’t be a major thing on the table but it would always be on the table and 
IBEC would lobby to keep it down
A civil servant interviewed explained in an interview with the author how pressure came not 
from globalisation but from traditional indigenous employers
The one thing where I saw us getting pressure from IBEC was on PRSI rates, 
we would be hit very strongly with competitiveness arguments so that, to be 
honest, we would track UK PRSI and have the graphs ready for direct 
comparison The competitiveness pressures with PRSI wasn’t the European 
Union rates but small companies exporting to the UK or companies near the 
border in Northern Ireland
The issue of PRSI rates and their impact on competitiveness pre-dated globalisation 
Globalisation has reduced reliance on the UK export open market and so reduced pressure to 
track UK PRSI rates But different forms of capital placed different policy demands on PRSI 
and international companies lobbied for different types of PRSI reductions Social security 
policy actively responded to the needs and desires of international capital by exempting 
certain non-EU migrant workers from social insurance coverage Foreign companies have 
directly lobbied the DETE to exempt their foreign workforces from inclusion in taxation and 
social insurance systems A civil servant explained in an interview with the author that
The reason employees PRSI thresholds were done away with was because they
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impacted on transnational companies
International companies structurally impact on social protection by providing private 
packages that reinforce second-tier market-led social security provisions, these impact by 
changing the context and choices around work-related social protection provision This 
undermines support for directly provided social security protection among workers (NESC 
2005a) The net effect of all of this is a significant undermining of the viability of pay-related 
social insurance A civil servant, in an interview with the author, set the 1995 White Paper 
on Social Insurance (DSFCA 1995) and PRSI policy development in context
Social insurance in Ireland is driven mainly by the amount coming at us, the 
competitive pressure to decrease the PRSI rate was leading us to a situation 
where there are a lot of people in the system who didn’t pay a contribution 
because of IBEC-driven exemptions, so there are consequences for capacity to 
deliver on social insurance in the future
Migration
Migration is a most visible form of globalisation The EU has always supported free- 
movement of workers as a basic requirement of a free market economy However in practice 
EU policy only requires free movement of already employed or recently employed workers 
or job seekers As discussed in some detail in Chapter Four, Irish state policy is to exclude 
migrants needs from Irish social security and leave migrants to the mercy of the market and 
to limit asylum seekers to ‘direct provision’ welfare entitlement In a fragmented and 
competing state such policy was led by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
(Direct Provision and Habitual Residence Rule) and the Department of Employment, Trade 
and Enterprise (PRSI exemptions) and opposed by Department of Social Family Affairs and 
the Department of Foreign Affairs on social and human rights grounds In each decision the 
primary consideration was not social policy but national economic or security interests and 
in each specific case the social rights of groups and individuals was subordinate to the 
perceived economic need or threat Legislation to remove social protection rights for migrant 
workers was brought into effect because only one foreign company, GAMA, lobbied for it 
GAMA used 67% of the PRSI exemptions issued under that legislation between 2002 and 
2005 This suggests that the pressure of globalisation (in this case labour market shortages in 
the construction industry) does not have to be very strong before the Irish government is 
willing to exempt migrant workers from social protection It seems political will rather than
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globalisation was the stronger driver
EU membership has push and pull influences on social security arrangements for migrant 
workers and asylum seekers The government responded to EU enlargement with legislation 
restricting welfare entitlement to ‘habitual residents’ but was then forced to amend this 
policy in the face of EU directives on family payments Legal obligations of the UN Geneva 
Convention (1951) oblige the Irish government to have a minimum standard of 
accommodation for asylum seekers Reilly (2005) outlines a significant number of 
international instruments influencing this policy area
Given the 2002 Census (CSO) is the most recent data it is impossible to give an accurate 
figure of the extent of migration to the year 2006 Foreign nationals represented 6% of the 
population in 2002 Over 60% come from within the EU 25 (and 70% of this 60% come 
from the UK) Leaving aside UK residents the 2002 census shows 1% of the population 
come from other EU 25 countries and 1% from the rest of the world The impact of the May 
1st 2004 Accession is illustrated in information from the QNHS September / October 2005 
which shows the numbers of new member state nationals increasing from 7,716 in 2002 to 
72,700 in 2005 an increase of 64,984 or over 842% In a different type of displacement the 
numbers of EU 15 and non EU migrants dropped over the same period These figures, 
however, are inconsistent with the numbers of PPSN numbers issued to new member states 
nationals which show up to 200,000 numbers issued since May 2004 (IT 06-04-2006), only 
1,318 ( 8%) of whom are on the live register However PPSN numbers are no indicator of the 
numbers of non nationals living or working in Ireland The administration of PPSN numbers 
has been a cause of concern to DSFA because a number of high profile illegal sales of PPSN 
numbers to foreign nationals There is also a significant and fluid movement of migrants to 
and from Ireland so that it is impossible to be precise about number of migrants in Ireland 
The availability of the 2006 Census in 13 languages reflected the reality of the extent and 
variety of inward migration and gives some insight into the impact migration has on service 
provision, translation services and information strategies of government departments 
including DSFA
Migration has other impacts on social security policy and outcomes Whether migration is 
permanent or temporary migration will have different social policy implications for the 
receiving country Temporary migrants tend to be aged 22-44 and require little in terms of 
social policy» permanent migrants reflect the general population’s age profile and need in
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terms of social protection and social services Ireland is receiving migrants at both ends of 
the skills distribution Previous emigration from Ireland damaged the skill distribution in the 
domestic labour force and, overall, present inward migration is restoring this imbalance 
with many migrants having above average rates of education The impact of migrants on 
wage rates and job displacement has been the subject of much controversy in recent years 
and it seems likely that there is some impact on wage levels in specific sectors including 
construction and hospitality (Labour 2006) Less attention has been focused on the labour 
market dynamic amongst low skilled migrants and indigenous unemployed or job seekers It 
is possible that some high benefit dependency amongst working aged Irish social security 
claimants may be in part be caused a different type of more hidden displacement The 
potential job seeker is discouraged in the face of indirect competition from what FAS (2004) 
have termed ‘cheep and cheerful’ low skilled migrant job seekers workers At the same time 
presence of an alternative workforce takes pressure of the state which has to some degree 
abandoned the challenge of upskilhng low skilled Irish workers into these low paid jobs 
This policy challenge may become more potent if and when the state chooses to proceed 
with a more aggressive form of activation as envisaged by NESC (2005a) and DSFA (INOU,
2006) Migration is likely to be one of the most visible forms of globalisation in the coming 
years and if managed correctly there is no reason to assume it will be anything but a positive 
impact on options for social security policy
Competition and procurement -  the EU Social Services Directive
Many definitions of globalisation reference technological expansion as a key feature of 
globalisation (Scholte 2000) Chapter Four already reflected on how the DSW’s capacity to 
partner Digital lead them towards exploring social security related technology systems and 
know-how to other countries, particularly Eastern European countries This commodification 
of Irish social security expertise meant such knowledge became, for a time, a profitable 
export industry in its own right In fact the DSFA only recently closed it’s internal 
‘international development desk’, which tendered for social security restructuring contracts 
m developing countries Advances in technology on the one hand make it easier to track 
fraud across borders and on the other hand make it easier to make transfer payments mobile 
The most obvious impact of technology however, as discussed in Chapter Four was to 
improve service delivery
Social security delivery is also impacted upon through the EU procurement process, which 
obliges tendering, to private and public bodies, of delivery services previously monopolised
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by statutory bodies, for example An Post’s social security delivery contracts. Future GATT, 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and EU Service Directives may open up delivery of 
public social services to competition to influence the structure, impact and delivery of social 
security policy (Yeates 2002).
The European Commission White Paper on Services of General Interest (2004) and ’Services 
Directive' (2004) aim to liberalise the market in services in Europe. This could have 
significant implications for a huge range of services provided for the general interest of EU 
societies and citizens, such as social, and health services.82 According to its own summary 
the legislative proposal is part of the process of economic reform launched by the Lisbon 
European Council with a view to making the EU the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. It proposes a genuine internal market in 
services to exploit the considerable potential for economic growth and job creation afforded 
by the services sector. The objective is a legal framework to eliminate the obstacles to the 
freedom of establishment for service providers and the free movement of services between 
the Member States. The proposal covers a wide variety of economic service activities -  with 
some exceptions, such as financial services. The Social Platform launched a Europe-wide 
campaign for 'Social Services of General Economic Interest' to be excluded from the scope 
of this Directive.
The first reading of the European Parliament (16-02-2006) significantly rewrote the directive 
and deleted the controversial ‘country of origin principle’ where service providers could 
operate in a country but comply with their home countries regulations. Crucially for the 
purposes of this discussion they also extended and clarified the exclusion of non economic 
pubic services including social welfare with the amendment ‘does not affect services 
pursuing a social welfare objective’. Commenting on the significant amendments, MEP de 
Rossa (2006:4) claimed a ‘victory for workers and consumers so far. We have shown that 
democracy can and does work in the citizens favour at European level, but that it requires 
active engagement by political parties and trade unions and NGO’s at national and European 
level to be successful’. A demonstration of Polanyi’s (2001) double movement?
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An EU and global level internal market for pensions (and other forms of social protection 
such as private health insurance) has already been developed The commodification or 
privatisation of pensions has been strongly advocated by the international financial services 
sector International and national private-sector pressures allied to sectors of the state drove 
the logic behind these moves The international context was the World Bank promotion of a 
privatisation agenda in pension policy
Competitiveness and foreign direct investment
It was argued earlier that globalisation and intensified competition for FDI has at least 
reinforced the original social security policy formula One trade union commentator 
observed in an interview with the author that Mow tax regime is conventional wisdom and 
the whole way we approach social policy is seeped in this wisdom’ The same official went 
on to observe that this influence was quite direct and that the swing back to market values 
and competitiveness in the mid 1990’s was a result of overall globalisation and strong US 
influence
Ireland was especially vulnerable to US Foreign Direct Investment and US 
macro ideas were very influential, I’m not saying it was that obvious, but policy 
makers would know that US investors would not like a huge investment in 
social policy
It is impossible to prove that sensitivity to US companies is factored into the social security 
policy but in several interviews with the author, policy elites referred to a prevailing attitude 
of trying to ‘bend over backwards to please investors’ Smith (2005 179) also found in 
interviews with elites that ‘globalisation appears to act as a cognitive filter through which 
Irish policy makers make sense of the complex world in which the live’ The competition 
state must reassure global capital and FDI stakeholders that Ireland is and will continue to be 
a low-tax economy One official commented in an interview with the author, on how the 
Irish swing against the EU social model was influenced by pressure from US companies
Normally Ireland gives a lame excuse for opposing things, we want to leave this 
to social partners to discuss back in Ireland or we have better legislation 
already, or this is too technical, rather than say it straight out that we have
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changed our outlook and US companies are telling us that if this ever happens 
they will have nothing to do with Ireland again.
It was discussed earlier how there has been no direct diminution of welfare spending caused 
by a low-taxation policy. Nonetheless rhetoric associated with low tax policy suggests 
international competitiveness requires a reining in of social expenditure (Smith, 2005). 
Chapter One discussed how discourse about international competitiveness is a common 
feature in Irish political discourse about social security (Smith, 2005). Murphy (2004) 
attributed the reluctance to set NEAP targets to the need to be flexible in an open economy. 
The Benchmark and Indexation Working Group (2001) terms of reference for example 
specifically included assessing the impact of social welfare adequacy on international 
competitiveness. Both the DOF and IBEC representatives argued that international 
competitiveness required fiscal and social policy to be adaptable and flexible and this 
rendered inflexible benchmarks and indexation formulas unrealistic. One participant 
observed in an interview with the author how:
I had a real sense of the big picture, we weren’t just talking about what the rate 
should be to keep people out of poverty, I became more aware that this was just 
a secondary objective to the primary objective of incentive to work and 
competitiveness.
From the DOF perspective, the influence of economic globalisation is direct, as one senior 
official observed in an interview with the author:
Countries were in competition to attract Foreign Direct Investment, we had to 
make sure our polices overall were conducive to bringing in companies, had to 
keep an eye on things like inflation, wages, social insurance, we were always 
conscious of what it would do to our attractiveness as a location.
From the DSFA perspective the impact of economic globalisation is less obvious. One key 
political adviser in the DSFA commented in an interview with the author:
I don’t think I ever heard the word globalisation mentioned in social welfare.
It’s certainly not something that people were thinking, Oh my God I can’t do 
that because of globalisation or we can’t do that because that company is going
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to leave, there is very little direct involvement.
What ever about the impact of globalisation on government departments the practical 
integration of European citizens may also have impacts. Quantitative differences in social 
security rates are more obvious to citizens or residents than qualitative differences in health 
care or other social services. Various NGO’s have tried to use the new transparency of euro 
based social security rates to highlight inequality in social security generosity across 
countries and to lobby for upward convergence.
As expected in the Competition State theory, the economic impact of globalisation played 
some role in determining social security reform. Cemy et al., (2005) highlight that 
globalisation presents opportunities as well as threats. In the Irish case such influence was, 
indeed, often positive. Key policy elite interviewed by the author for this thesis stressed that 
globalisation impacted most strongly on social security through the degree to which Ireland’s 
interaction with the world economy produced such phenomenal job growth. The shrinking of 
social security expenditure was largely a function of economic growth and falling 
unemployment rather than cutbacks and retrenchment. It is doubtful whether the Irish state 
would have sought to achieve as low a rate of social expenditure without the help of 
economic growth. High levels of economic growth associated with Irish globalisation may 
also have protected Ireland from harsher retrenchment83. There were, however, negatives 
associated with globalisation. These included a political correlation between FDI, low 
taxation and approaches to social security policies. It also included a more direct negative 
impact on PRSI policy; a privatisation of pensions and personal social protection packages. 
More neutral impacts which depending on they are managed could lead to positive or 
negative outcomes include migration related social security issues and increased competition 
in social security delivery.
While economic rationales might explain some benign aspects of Irish social security policy 
development, such rationale cannot explain other aspects of Irish social security policy (for 
example the failure to individualise payments or update income disregards). Explaining
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One academic interviewed by the author observed how ‘the scale o f  economic growth meant 
funding was available to do easy popular bits like restricting Child Income Support to Child Benefit, 
the movement o f  people into jobs meant they did not have to do the hard bits: those who might well 
have been politically motivated to slash and bum had no real reason or political justification to do it.
current Irish social security policy as an outcome of economic growth alone tends to 
interpret the Irish welfare state as relatively unproblematic and sympathetic Apart from 
unemployment (which economic growth ‘fixed’) Irish social security appears to have had no 
technical or cultural pathology to fix (unlike, for example, the Netherlands with a huge 
disability pathology) Why would one want to change a winning formula'?
NESC (2005a) exposed many reasons one might wish to reform the Irish social security 
system High and growing levels of relative poverty or income inequality, high levels of 
income work poor and high levels of benefit dependency are clearly problematic Whether 
the political and policy world chooses to grapple with such problems are of course political 
choices and not functional policy outcomes caused by economic growth There is evidence 
of political discourse arguing for example, that Irish inequality was pathological or that the 
male breadwinner model should be reformed While this never challenged the dominant 
episteme, these political alternatives prove that Irish style competition state social security 
policy was not an economic inevitability but a socially constructed political choice Later 
Chapters examine how domestic factors influence the construction of such policy choice 
The final part of this Chapter examines how political globalisation impacts on domestic 
social security change and contributes to the construction of political choices
6 3 Political Globalisation
Globalisation also has political aspects that complex theories understand as highly complex 
set of processes that lead to ‘a reconfiguration of power with implications for national 
governance’ (Smith 2005 19) Competition state theory views globalisation as a primarily 
political concept where changes m policy correlate with shifts in power and governance 
Explanations for particular policy choices can be found in the interaction between domestic 
institutions and practices, national and international interest groups and the evolving 
relationship between the public and private (Cemy et a l , 2005 15) The remainder of this 
chapter focuses on how political globalisation and international institutions impact on policy 
transfer and discusses how the Irish policy community receives and diffuses policy ideas 
from the international policy community The chapter concludes that although the DSW list 
‘international networking with social security organisations’ as a strength (DSW Strategy 
Statement, 1996 7) there is less evidence of international networking than one might expect
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Potential mechanisms for social welfare policy transfer
One civil servant interviewed by the author observed how ‘sometimes you would find 
yourself fighting off the politician who has heard of something brilliant that’s happening in 
the US’ Policy transfer and policy shopping are stages in the policy cycle most closely 
associated with international diffusion of policy (Skocpol, 1985) Dolowitz and Marsh 
(1996 344) defined policy transfer as ‘a process through which knowledge about policies is 
used to develop policies in another place’ A wide range of policy learning can be 
transferred The policy transfer process is often voluntaiy but can be directly or indirectly 
coercive (as in the case of IMF conditions) Policy transfer involves a wide range of actors 
including elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats, civil servants, pressure groups, 
policy entrepreneurs and supra-national institutions National states actively mediate the 
transnational diffusion of policy and adopt different policy transfer strategies including 
copying, emulation, synthesis, hybridisation and inspiration (Evans, 1985, Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996 344)
One of the more powerful ways to transfer policy is through policy regimes or institutional 
arrangements Regimes govern behaviour within policy processes and impose particular 
polices (Keohane and Nye, 1996) The Washington Consensus promotes neo-liberal 
concepts of the market economy and an ideology of competition, deregulation and 
privatisation (Gill 1995) The Geneva Consensus promotes free trade agreements in 
commercial and public sector trade including social security (Yeates, 2002) The impact of 
global regimes differs among nation states depending on how states choose to domestically 
invoke, interpret, implement and enforce these polices Some global organisations and policy 
mediators (UN, the EU and the IMF) have statutory and institutional power over policy but 
others (OECD) influence change through political dialogue
Hettne (1995) highlights the role of political discourse in promoting hegemonic regimes 
Cox R (1995) optimistically identifies ‘ontological shifts’ where the present commonsense of 
hyper capitalism, neo-liberalism and competitiveness, is challenged by a new ontology 
derived from international discourse about an alternative view of society Deacon (2003) is 
optimistic, like Cox, that an alternative political economy discourse might emerge based on 
social solidarity, equity and universality Deacon B (2003) argues different international 
actors have different ideological strategies and motivations The World Bank and the IMF 
have an aggressive ideological strategy compared to the more ideologically passive approach 
of the EU While the 1990s were heavily influenced by the neo-liberal discourse of the IMF
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and World Bank, the globalisation political debate moved to a more socially responsible 
globalisation discourse in the 2000s This debate links social expenditure and social cohesion 
and identifies certain active spending measures as social investment (OECD 2004, World 
Bank, 2003)
Standing (1999) concluded the future model of welfare is hostage to professional and 
ideological advice and pressure provided through international agencies Because 
representatives of mobile capital linked to neo-liberal political parties co-ordinate discourse 
with international financial agencies, domestic political conflicts correlate with conflicts 
among influential supra-national actors Who influences Ireland9 Irish policy actors are part 
of the international policy elite transferring policy to Eastern Europe and developing 
countries however it is also the case that intergovernmental organisations are relevant to and 
influence Ireland Ireland was a late starter in the international political community 
remaining relatively insular (Conroy 1999) and joining the OECD in 1954, the UN in 1955, 
the World Bank in 1957, GATT in 1967 and the EEC in 1973 The EU was reviewed in 
Chapter Five, the IMF, the OECD, the UN / ILO / ISSA are reviewed below
Governance Processes, International Policy Organisations
Yeates (2002) identified how international institutions use a variety of methods and 
processes to promote respective policy positions The EU uses regulation and Open Methods 
of Co-ordination, the UN uses standard setting and promotes human rights, the World Trade 
Organisation deregulates welfare provision, the International Labour Organisation uses 
charters and conventions, the International Monetary Fund uses conditional structural 
adjustment programmes, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
produces expert country reports and monitoring and Multinational Co-operations lobby 
governments and transnational bodies Likewise Irish organisations interact with the 
international policy community in a number of ways Formal interaction with international 
organisations comes through established protocols and processes in which the Irish state 
participates by virtue of its membership of these institutions and its international legal 
obligations (Reilly 2005) Different parts of the policy community are formal members of 
international organisations the UN, the OECD, and the IMF, and engage in formal 
governance processes which involve international policy organisations such as the EU and 
OMC, have international legal obligations or sign up voluntarily to international covenants 
as in the ILO Informally policy actors network with international organisations and 
colleagues, read journal articles and popular media and attend conferences / networking
173
opportunities
This section outlines the formal and informal overlap between the Irish social security policy 
community and the international policy community Smith (2005 179) and Laffan and O 
Donnell (1998) observed significant networking with these international organisations
United Nations
Some UN charters and declarations have direct social security implications For example, the 
UN Charter of Fundamental Human Rights sets out a right to minimum incomes The Irish 
government resists a justiciable rights approach to implementing these international 
obligations Social security lobbyists use these signatoiy and related monitoring and 
reporting processes as campaigning tools to promote a rights based discourse (Reilly 2005) 
Minister de Rossa used the occasion of the UN Summit on Social Development in 1995 as a 
political opportunity to initiate the NAPS He explained in an interview with the author ‘I 
knew if I announced at a UN conference no one could wriggle out of it’ Participants in the 
UN Gender Summit in Beijing 1995 used it as a political opportunity to protest directly 
about Irish unemployment to Irish Ministers Reilly (2005) concluded that the Beijing 
Platform for Action played a significant role influencing governmental discourse framing 
emerging activism and shaping new political spaces
ILO charters and conventions
ILO charters were significant for developing labour market standards and regulations in the 
1960’s and 1970s (Otting, 1994) The ILO now has little relevance to the post 1990’s Irish 
social security debate and has been overtaken by more powerful EU One former Minister 
described to the author how
Going to the ILO was like kind of going to the Tralee races, I don’t recall 
anything of any significance that wasn’t already on the table, happening at the 
ILO, it was just a great big junket
A civil servant remarked to the author
ISSA and ILO research is not good quality and hardly relevant The scope of 
coverage is very wide and they are trying to be all things to everybody and end 
up being nothing to anybody
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As with the UN conventions, ILO directives were used as, largely unsuccessful, campaigning 
tools No key member of the Irish policy community was a member of the ISSA (a specialist 
social security network working under the auspices of the ILO (McKinmon 2004)), although 
the DSFA seconded an academic to the ISSA to help prepare a pensions policy paper for the 
EU Irish Presidency in 2004
International Monetary Fund / World Trade Organisation
IMF country reports are read by the DOF, whose library regularly distributes IMF material, 
and IBEC staff and officials Others interviewed felt the political nature of the IMF limited 
its relevance While IMF structural adjustment programmes and poverty strategies are not 
directly relevant to Ireland they overlap with EU OMC and NAPS discourse Indeed in this 
case policy transfer was from Ireland to IMF-funded African countnes and Eastern European 
countries Since the closure of the DSFA’s ‘international bureau5 the state’s direct social 
security policy transfer role is less active but policy diffusion continues through private 
consultancy firms, with close links to previous Department personnel, tendering for work in 
developing countries Yeates (2002) commented that the WTO intention to liberalise 
services has potentially far reaching implications If the free trade principle is applied to 
welfare services, including social security, health and education this would have immediate 
implications for the pensions industry but could also see private firms competing with the 
state to administer unemployment and disability benefits There is no interaction between the 
Irish social security community and the WTO
OECD country reports and monitoring,
The OECD played a leadership role in creating and disseminating liberal welfare reform and 
labour market policy proposal between 1994 and 2001 (Dostal 2004) How pronounced the 
OECD influence was in Ireland is not clear According to one academic interviewed by the 
author the political nature of the OECD reduces its potential to influence policy
The OECD jobs study was selling a particular line at the time but it was quite 
ideologically driven and exceptionally politicised It wasjust used by those who 
were thinking that way anyway Nothing would be taken as gospel because the 
OECD or the World Bank was coming out with it
Others interviewed by the author agreed that the OECD had a definite political agenda to
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push ‘I’m not clear the EU have any dramatic agenda, unlike the OECD who have very 
clear lines on where they think you should be going5 Another civil servant argued that the 
OECD was more successful in driving its agenda ‘people are more aware of market-led 
polices because of the way the OECD push them5 While all government Departments 
respected the quality of the OECD5s work they did not necessarily use it to develop policy 
One civil servant described in an interview with the author how the Departmental planning 
unit
would draw from OECD reports and use them to selectively justify a position 
they already had developed, OECD work was used to defend rather than 
develop a position, we always try to throw a few quotes into the Ministers 
speech
OECD country visits were seen as important by the DOF which had most active 
Departmental engagement with them and participated in their Social Protection Committee 
The Public Expenditure Division actively sought out new OECD reports
During the year in the slack period you would be looking to see what is 
happening in Europe and in the OECD We are not in an ivory tower, we would 
get regular library reports alerting us to specific international reports and we 
would have contact with IMF and OECD personnel on their regular visits
The influence of the OECD is most evident in the policy areas of activation and employment 
incentives The 1994 Jobs Study was seen as influential because it created a climate of 
debate about incentives Most policy actors interviewed acknowledged that OECD material 
filtered through UK policy documents or the ESRI and that there was little direct reading of 
OECD material The domestic policy community does however selectively engage with the 
OECD by inviting them to promote domestic policy agendas In fact if Dostal (2004) is 
correct the OECD5s most powerful influence was how the Jobs Study impacted on 
subsequent EU policy and the European Employment Strategy (EES)
Direct Voluntary Membership of International Organisations
Laffan and O’Donnell (1998 168-169) note how from the outset economic interests that 
would be affected by EU policies were quick to mobilise and establish a presence in Brussels 
and now play nested games at the national level and connected games in the Brussels arena
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Most large national organisations are members of international representational 
organisations, ICTU, for example, is a member of the European Trade Union Congress 
(ETUC), IBEC is a member of the UNICE, the NWCI is a member of the European 
Women’s Lobby, and many anti poverty and social justice focused NGO’s are members of 
the EAPN (Laffan O’Donnell 1998) Some national organisations also have UN status and 
are part of networks that participate in UN summits Motivations for membership of these 
international institutions vary considerably but no one interviewed by the author used this 
pathway to directly influence Irish social security discourse Rather membership means 
access to information about funding and resources, networking opportunities, international 
solidarity and representation of the member’s interests at EU or global level Some, however, 
noted the importance of the international policy community as a source of ideas and 
inspiration Others saw it as an indirect place to network or break down barriers with 
domestic policy actors, one Secretary General of an unemployed organisation in an interview 
with the author observed
‘that it was only when the Irish civil servants saw how credible we were as
leaders of European policy debates that they took us seriously at home’
Such networking is sporadic with little expectation of policy learning Irish employers and 
unions are less interested in policy shopping than European employers and trade unions who 
jointly administer social security schemes An IBEC, representative explained to the author 
how UNICE had little relevance to Irish social security ‘we wouldn’t lay great stress on 
UNICE as a source of international thinking on social security’ A trade union leader on the 
other hand stressed that the ETUC was ‘a useful place to reflect’ A General Secretary of an 
NGO reflected on ‘how useful it was to get out of town for few days and see what other 
countries were doing’
E n g lis h -S p e a k in g  P o lic y  C o m m u n it y
Chapter Five discussed the evolving multi-level governance in the Open Method of Co­
ordination While the EU has been an influential source for Irish policy transfer the most 
obvious international influence on Irish social security is UK social security (Cousins 
2005a,b) There is ongoing institutional linkage and communication between Irish and UK 
ministries The Department of Social Development in Northern Ireland and the DSFA have 
regular contact, initiated a joint North-South summer school for staff, and undertake joint 
training and cross-border fraud controls
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Cross-national linguistic or cultural factors determine how well less obvious informal policy 
transfer can take place84 International policy communities influence social security systems 
Deacon A (2001) and Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby (2004) reviewed how UK New Labour 
drew from elements of US, Australian and European policy to develop their welfare-to-work 
policy Eardley (1996) identified how a group of English-speaking countries (including 
Ireland) network around social security reform Weiss (1999 129) highlighting the active 
ideological role of governments in English speaking countries, identified how ‘the ideology 
of free-market economics dominate English speaking, London, Canberra and Washington, 
but not Paris, Bonn or Tokyo, where pre-existing regime orientations promoted more 
symbiotic views of the state-market relationship’ Ireland as an English-speaking country is 
exposed to a more US-led policy discourse
Culturally in terms of policy influences, it is often argued that the UK and
Ireland are influenced in social policy terms at least as much by the US as they
are by mainland Europe’(Cousins 2005b,2)
Being exposed to such discourse however does not necessarily mean the policy community 
internalises the policy agenda of other countries or international institutions While the 
policy entrepreneur (outlined in Chapter Five) performs the role of bringing new thinking 
into the domestic policy arena that community selectively chooses which discourse is 
brought into domestic use
Many DSFA civil servants made reference to the importance of regular meetings the 
Department participates in with five other English-speaking countries, the UK, the US, NZ, 
Australia and Canada This ‘six countries’ network meets on a thematic basis to review 
social security Departmental challenges often associated with implementation or delivery 
issues such as fraud control or information technology Ditch and Oldfield (1999 75) 
conclude ‘circumstantial evidence of some shared diffusion of policy knowledge’ in this 
community and observe ‘shared concern to hold back the growth in social assistance, to 
introduce and implement more exacting conditionality rules for the receipt of benefit and a 
commitment to encourage labour market supply of lone parents’ Cultural familiarity and
84 Consider for example, the case of Finland where a ‘good fit’ candidate for policy transfer is 
underutilised because little Finnish policy is accessible in any language other than Finnish
ease of communication means these meetings are quite influential, although the influence 
seems to be more at an implementation than at a policy level They also expressed the 
importance of English-speaking countries to the Irish social security policy community One 
civil servant described in an interview with the author
The six countries would be one of the more active international policy networks 
and the fact that they are English speaking is part of it alongside commonality 
and origins of the systems as well as the culture and attitude are similar
International ideas come from informal reading of UK and US academic journals and UK 
quality newspapers Policy actors were more exposed to UK and US policy discourse and 
exposed to OECD and IMF discourse through reading such sources One academic noted 
paradoxically that people open to new ideas are mostly reading UK and US literature, while 
on the other hand, civil servants are going to Brussels and are exposed to a different frame of 
reference where social protection is seen as a productive force However civil servants 
interviewed played down the role of exposure to EU countries5 policy systems through 
Brussels meetings Senior civil servants may well be communicating with EU colleagues on 
a more regular basis but they tend to be much more influenced by the UK or other English- 
speaking countries Rose (1991 17) expected policymakers to remain ‘within the knowledge 
environment that they trust, whose overall political values are consistent with their own5 
This explains why policies in NZ and Australia are of active interest to Irish social security 
advisers With the expansion of the EU in 2004, English is becoming the most dominant 
language and this is likely to increase the likelihood of policy transfer through the EU
E x p o s u r e  to in t e r n a t io n a l p o lic y  d e b a te s a s a n  E x p la n a t o r y  V a r ia b le  fo r  I r i s h  C h a n g e
Smith (2005 179) argument that ‘the cognitive powers of ideas about globalisation and 
competitiveness are further reinforced by the fact that Irish policy makers are exposed to 
them so frequently5 is perhaps overstated To what degree does exposure to international 
policy debate transfer into policy decisions? Is international policy transfer or exposure to 
international debate an explanatory variable capable of explaining why Irish discourse and 
policy differ to other English-speaking liberal regimes? Daguerre and Taylor Gooby (2004) 
explain the more radical workfare-based UK activation social security policy as a result of 
the disproportionate presence of policy transfer from the US caused by a lack of European- 
UK policy networks and under exposure to Swedish active labour market discourse or 
French social inclusion discourse They identified three factors for effective policy transfer
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an opportunity to seek new policy (political crisis), goodness of fit (transferability of policy 
to a broadly similar policy regime with similar underlying values) and clear policy networks 
and lines of communication Ireland and the UK both had opportunity in the form of political 
crises, both have goodness of fit in the form of liberal welfare regimes based on less 
eligibility and work incentive principles Might the contrast between the UK policy 
network’s openness to the US and Irish policy network’s openness to the EU explain the 
different policy choices9 Might the 1986 Irish social democratic government have been 
oriented to seek social democratic policy examples compared to Thatcher’s orientation to 
Reagan’s monetarist regime9
A long history of policy contact influence and transfer between the UK and the US was 
strengthened under the Thatcher-Reagan years and again under the Chancellor Gordon 
Browns relationship with US President Clinton and his Labour Minister, Robert Reich The 
more active policy entrepreneurs in the smaller Irish policy community had 
disproportionately stronger networks with EU countries (in particular, the ICTU policy elite 
looked to the social democratic ETUC) However, at the same time, civil servants, policy 
makers and politicians (Hussey, 2000) were actively open to US discourse Irish policy 
makers looked in both directions, policy transfer alone cannot account for the decisions 
made Indigenous thinking seemed to most influence policy dialogue, one Minister described 
in an interview with the author how there was ‘a fair amount of ideas and international 
influence but there were a lot of ideas around anyway’ Some civil servant stressed how 
ideas were indigenously sourced (O’Rallagaigh, 2002) The 1986 CSW Chairman described 
in an interview with the author how ‘they looked at the British experience but didn’t buy it 
and how the EU had little influence on their thinking’ Policy ideas about proactive labour 
market policies from English-speaking networks were only relevant if they were being 
pushed in Ireland One adviser interviewed by the author stressed how ‘there is almost 
nobody nationally coming up with ideas’
Why is this9 It was observed in the previous chapter that other English speaking countries 
have similar majoritarian political institutions and electoral systems which enable a more 
radical passage of and use of ideas Ireland stands out with more veto points and a 
conservative political environment as less open to ideas about change One trade unionist 
concluded in an interview with the author
that the Irish political system is not terribly open to being driven by ideological
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currents Arguments are couched in non-ideological consensual language, we 
are much less open than a political system like Britain to swinging with an 
ideological tide
Ireland was exposed to the same mixture of international discourse, had a similar cultural 
and institutional ‘goodness of fit’ and capacity to transfer policy as the UK But its political 
and institutional framework left Ireland less open to ideological debate or radical policy 
choices While the Irish listened they never seriously contemplated radical reform As one 
senior civil servant said in an interview with the author ‘Ah sure we would never do that ’
S ta g e s o f  p o lic y  in f lu e n c e
This is not to suggest there has been no policy influence but to suggest there is less openness 
to significant change Three phases of policy influence appear evident over the period in 
question From 1987 -  1992 the crisis discourse was influenced by the The NESC strategy 
report of 1986 which argued that Ireland should take the small successful social democratic 
European states as its development model -  it was as a result of this that the Mjosets (1992) 
study was commissioned by NESC Within this framework social security policy outcomes 
appeared to be path dependent on the existing social welfare system provisions and the 
implementation of Commission on Social Welfare (1986) From 1992 - 1997 EU discourse 
became more dominant as the EU Social Policy and Delors White Paper was reflected in 
Irish social policy Ireland also transferred innovative domestic policy ideas to the EU and 
elsewhere At the same time EMU and the emerging Stability and Growth Pact framed 
discourse about social expenditure From 1997 onwards the new political coalition appeared 
more open to an international discourse more dominated by a more neo-liberal OECD and in 
Ireland the appeasement of US investors This change conincided with the election of a 
more right-of-centre coalition government in 1997, whose policies reflected the hegemony of 
global discourse, and also the fact that the ‘European social model’ lacked credibility among 
Irish policy makers This led to active lobbies against proposed EU social policy As a trade 
unionist described
In the ‘mid nineties it started to take a swing back the other way with more 
market competitiveness issues impinging on the social agenda - it was a result 
of overall globalisation but also of strong US influence in Ireland which caused, 
post 1997, Ireland to lobby against more social provision at EU level’
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It is not clear if the domestic political configuration is influencing or being influenced by the 
international policy dialogue The two seem intertwined and exposure to an international 
policy community is actively and selectively mediated and both the English speaking social 
security community and the EU appear to be equally strong influences Growth in the 
number of policy entrepreneurs, the focus on policy transfer in the EU OMC and the growth 
of an English speaking community in the EU will open up the policy community to new EU- 
sourced ideas
6 4 C h a p t e r  C o n c lu s io n
The review of the impact of economic globalisation highlights how the high levels of 
economic growth benignly influenced social security policy development and employment 
growth A low-tax development model subordinates social policy and rather more negatively 
influenced attitudes towards investing in expansion of social protection Economic 
globalisation further influenced PRSI policy and rate setting, pensions policy, migration and 
social security delivery One can tentatively conclude that policy makers are influenced by 
the macro conditions (real and perceived) necessaiy to appease foreign direct investment
Irish social security policy has been exposed to the process of political globalisation Ireland 
continues to be regarded as a key player internationally and is seen to punch above its 
weight Commentators from other countries remark on policy makers openness to invoking 
transnational developments and knowledge Ireland has also led the field in setting up the 
Anti-Poverty Strategy after the Copenhagen Summit There is as O Cinnieide (2005) argued 
a ‘curious parallelism’ between global and EU level discourse and Irish discourse While the 
thesis did not set out as an exercise in measuring the degree of policy transfer it is clear that 
Irish policy is increasingly influenced by international trends Most recently, since 19 9 7 , 
there has been increasing overlap between domestic and international policy coalitions 
particularly in the EU OMC and an emerging professional technical elite The shift from the 
redistributive adequacy agenda of the 19 8 6  CSW to a more productivist policy reflected 
shifts in the international policy community agenda This shift also correlated with domestic 
level political shifts, political regimes relate differently to international institutions 
However, given that the political culture may be less unreceptive to the more radical ideas it 
is possible that there are some policy debates which travel less far in the Irish context 
International policy ideas are carefully filtered and selectively amplified to suit the agenda of 
the domestic actor
182
It is my personal assessment that the social security system would look largely as it does 
today if social partnership never existed.(Cousins 2005a:205)
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE POLICY PROCESS
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine in depth particular policy decisions to enable a deeper 
understanding of the rationale informing certain policy decision and to explain why specific 
policy choices were selected or rejected. The Chapter reviews four social security policy 
processes: Child Income Support policy, policy relating to women, social security cutbacks 
(the Dirty Dozen and Savage Sixteen) and Social Partnership. These were chosen to draw out 
and illustrate the relationship between political culture and decision making. In particular 
they highlight the existence of veto points and consensus oriented political decision making. 
These case studies are analysed collectively using the format identified in the methodology 
section of Chapter One. This format identifies a range of factors that might inform decision 
making including; the source of the problem and the policy initiative; key documents and 
proposals; policy coalitions; decision points; political party input; international influence; 
Social Partnership; and types of discourse.85
7.2 Child Income Support Policy
A review of recent child income support policy by Corrigan (2004) highlights a wide variety 
of policy goals tied up with a narrow range of child income support instruments. The focus 
here is on two decisions concerning key child income support policy instruments, a 1994 
budget decision to freeze Child Dependant Allowances (CDAs)86 and a 2002 budget decision 
to introduce a three-year timetable of Child Benefit increases. The review highlights that 
while policy options are first mediated in the wider policy community, the most influential
85 A summary of the overall findings from the analysis of both Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight are 
included in Table 8.1 at the end of Chapter Eight.
80 Child Dependant Allowances are means-tested child income support for welfare dependant families 
paid on a per child basis as an addition to the parents’ weekly welfare payment.
factor at the point of decision is political or electoral concerns Decisions are dominated by 
blame avoidance strategies and the lens through which the policy community views a 
particular policy proposal is a very different lens than that used by the politician
D e c is iv e  m o m e n ts  -  F r e e z in g  C h i l d  D e p e n d a n t A llo w a n c e s
From the mid 1980s various social security policy reviews focused, in the context of high 
unemployment, on the need to promote work incentives and recommended reforming child 
income support The expert based CSW (1986), corporatist NESC (1990) strategy and a 
statutory advisory body CPA (Bond, 1992) all envisaged a decline in the role of the CDA 
and a simultaneous move to more unified (taxable) universal CB system (McCashin, 1992) 
Despite broad policy consensus about this reform option, the fear of negative electoral 
consequences of taxing Child Benefit meant it was never a serious political policy option 
This is confirmed in the 2002 budget when government declined the option of taxing Child 
Benefit even though a substantial increase in Child Benefit meant it was possible to 
introduce taxation of Child Benefit without any losers A senior trade union leader 
commented m an interview with the author that
the timetable of substantial Child Benefit increases presented an obvious 
opportunity to make Child Benefit taxable, it beggars belief that this was not 
done given such an obvious opportunity to reform in a no losers context
Back in 1992 Minister Woods, having rejected the option of taxing Child Benefit, but 
mindful too of any risks associated with social security reform, proceeded with a limited 
incremental downgrading of Child Dependant Allowances or ‘de-emphasising’ CDAs His 
blame avoidance strategy was to allow below inflation budget increases that reduced the real 
value of CDAs The Minister calculated that, given the nominal amounts of increases were 
small and insignificant in over all terms (a below inflation increase was eight pence while an 
inflation proofed increase was nine pence), the public would not realise that the real value of 
the payment was decreasing This policy was repeated in 1993
In 1994 a left Democratic Left Minister de Rossa, less prone to blame avoidance and more 
ambitious for change than the populist FF Minister, decided to go further Ideally he wanted 
to abolish CDAs However the fiscal constraint imposed by European Monetary Union entry 
criteria meant an unfavourable budgetary context This limited the Ministers capacity to 
undertake significant structural reform In an interview with the author Minister de Rossa
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explained:
We wanted to abolish CDAs overnight and give increases in Child Benefit to 
compensate but the cost was massive so we decided to leave CDAs unchanged, 
it would become insignificant over time so that at some point we could say, all 
right, now we can abolish it.
The Minister went on to say:
I was mindful of the political risk in not giving any increase to CDAs, but bear 
in mind how budgets are constructed, they’re done in secret so I didn’t tell 
anyone, I’d come under pressure in the next budget, but once its in its harder to 
shift it.
The Minister intended to justify his policy position by promising compensatory increases in 
the universal CB payment; publicity about increasing CB would also distract attention away 
from the lack of increase in CDAs. However the scale of CB increases required to ensure no 
nominal losers necessitated fiscal room to manoeuvre. In order to achieve a no loser’s 
scenario the Minister had to redistribute within his budget envelope from old age pensioners 
to children. This highlights the practical difficulty of funding even small scale reform on a 
no losers basis.
Child Benefit - Strategic Ambivalence
In Budget 2000 the government were forced into a major ‘damage limitation’ exercise when 
a decision to individualise tax bands was opposed by a lobby fronted by ‘Women in the 
Home’, a conservative women’s lobby group. The policy to individualise tax bands survived 
but Government had emerged badly from the whole debacle and were forced to compensate 
perceived losers of tax individualisation (married women who did not participate in paid 
employment) with a home carer’s tax credit. In the run up to the following Budget 2001 the 
government were under intense pressure from various interest groups to support parents with 
costs of childcare. Four distinct lobbies were evident: trade unions and employers (both 
social partners) lobbied for tax relief for childcare; a childcare users and providers coalition 
(Childcare, 2000) lobbied for a universal taxable Parental Childcare Payment; Women in the 
Home argued against tax relief which discriminated against the choice to work in the home; 
Child Poverty lobby groups argued that CB should be focused on child income support and
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poverty alleviation
In Budget 2001 the government responded to the different lobby groups with no new child 
care policy instrument but with a three-year timetable outlining plans for substantial 
increases in CB The then Minister Ahem argued that universal CB payments could cover 
separate policy objectives of child poverty, child income support and childcare The Minister 
explained in his budget speech how
People living in poverty didn’t need support to alleviate childcare costs, and for 
those who were working, poverty was not an issue so the increased payment 
could be used to defray their childcare costs
Such ‘strategic ambivalence’ is a blame avoidance strategy based on obfuscation The tone 
of the budget speech included an element of opportunistic credit claiming for such large CB 
increases However the primary motivation for the policy choice seems to have been to avoid 
the wrath of the very active ‘Women in the Home’ who had campaigned against the policy 
alternative of tax relief on child care costs Policy actors involved in the debate interviewed 
by Montague (2001 94-95) confirmed blame avoidance was a huge motivation for 
government The Bamados C E O  told Montague
government had been scorched as a result of the introduction of tax 
individualisation in the previous 2000 budget The politicians were not going to 
support the introduction of a measure which could be perceived as further 
disadvantaging mothers in the home
A trade union equality officer concluded to Montague that the
Government was determined not to revisit the situation it found itself in after 
Budget 2000, they were not going to get involved in a controversy once again 
with the ‘women in the home’ lobby
Instead of taking the blame government tried to divert blame by using ‘agency strategies’ 
(Hood 2004) A shift in governance from civil service or expert working groups to Social 
Partnership policy processes means it is harder to trace decision- making in a more
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fragmented and complex policy community87 In Budget 2001 government, having 
delegating childcare policy to a social partnership group government, hid behind the lack of 
consensus among those social partners and shielded their own responsibility for policy 
making In an interview with the author, a senior NESC employee blamed social partners not 
government on the failure to make progress on childcare policy
Groups in SP were deadlocked, and the childcare one almost seemed to feel 
they had the right to be deadlocked I’m amazed that they did not start 
something even if it is not the first option
The government also had to appease the child poverty lobby, which comprised eight well- 
organised community and voluntary sector groups working in an advocacy coalition Open 
Your Eyes To Child Poverty (WRC, 2001) The PPF Benchmarking and Indexation Working 
Group (2001) had examined issues involved with setting benchmark and indexation formulae 
for child income support payments Government had responded by adopting an income 
adequacy target for adults and children (NAPS Ireland, 2002a) Nolan (2002) noted that this 
target was deliberately ambiguous and open to different interpretations This ambiguity 
meant it was harder to hold the government to account and to ‘blame’ for failure to achieve a 
specific target
The history of a 1994 decision to freeze child dependant allowances shows how the larger 
and more populist FF ‘with more flanks to defend’, even though they had the same broad 
policy objective, could not have done the same as a small left-wing party This confirms that 
party politics matter Different political parties have different levels of ambition regarding 
the scope and pace of social security reform They also adopt different tactical approaches to 
achieve the same policy outcome It is also worth noting that Minister de Rossa did not 
escape unscathed, his personal political legacy was to be known as the Minister who was 
mean to old age pensioners It also highlights the necessity of a no losers strategy, the real 
fiscal cost of such a strategy and the consequent incremental nature of reform Irish policy
87 All recent policy initiatives related to child income support originated from outside the DSFA The 
P2000 commitment to a £100 benchmark for CB, to the three year timetable for CB increases and the 
strategically ambivalent shift to incorporate the function of childcare to the NESC proposal and the 
Sustaining Progress commitment to a second tier child income support payment were all developed 
and decided outside of the DSFA
187
makers are forced to adopt. This confirms Hood’s (2004) negativity bias theory where 
monetary losses register more significantly with the electorate than gains of an equivalent 
amount. The consistent veto on the taxation of Child Benefit highlights how fear of electoral 
loss is the key driver for the substantive policy choice. A presentational strategy based on 
strategic ambivalence, distortion and obfuscation suggests reliance on the ‘Dan Rather’ 
factor (Pierson, 1994:29), where the complex nature of the reform was difficult to explain or 
present in a 15-second TV sound bite.
The 2002 budget decision was largely about presentation strategy. The three-year timetable 
to substantially increase CB was not honoured but government had succeeded in giving the 
impression that it had a childcare strategy in the 2002 general election. Without consensus 
amongst social partners for alternative policy, governments, reluctant to take decisions, hide 
behind strategically ambivalent policy statements and targets. Social partnership consensus, 
would however, have been insufficient to overcome Fianna Fail’s vulnerability to electoral 
backlash from a key electoral group. Women in the Home, it seems, have more populist 
power than the combined corporatist power of ICTU and IBEC. Electoral concerns motivate 
‘substantive policy strategies’ (Hood, 2004), policy is carefully and defensively selected with 
electoral considerations in mind. This impacts on outcomes. Everyone appears to gain from 
increases in Child Benefit. However there are losers, the failure to target child poverty and 
the absence of childcare support for working parents are serious losses to children and 
parents as well as the society and economy.
Case Study Two Women and Social Security Reform
While the EEC 79/7 social security equality directive required gender equality in Irish social 
security it took considerable legal and political intervention to rectify direct discriminations 
in the system. Equality came grudgingly and slowly and without any fundamental alteration 
to the male breadwinner model. Significant debate about women's access to independent 
income and employment did not result in significant change over the last two decades. This 
was in spite of a key shift in the Irish economy in the 1990s, the increase in the number of 
women, especially mothers, in full time employment (see graph below). It could be said that 
Irish women participated in the labour market in spite of, rather than because of, Irish social 
security reforms. Irish policy makers seem reluctant to make the shift from women as carers, 
mothers and wives to women as workers and full citizens. As Chapter 4 concluded Irish 
policy is still distinguishable as a male breadwinner m odel with a weak childcare 
infrastructure and a non-individualised or family based social security system, which does
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not extend active labour market measures to women.
Figure 7.1 Trends in female labour force participation
(Total female working age population in 2005 1,585.900)
900 -,
J U U
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
♦  Not In Labour Force 809.1 820.1 800 802.2 800.3 8 11.1
—• —Labour Force 643.4 658.5 702.8 728.6 760.3 774.8
A In Employment 588.5 623.3 670.8 701.9 730.4 743.9
Despite the lack of momentum regarding social security policy changes to enable women 
access to employment some progressive change did occur in 1996 when social insurance 
payments were extended to part-time workers (80 per cent of whom are women). The same 
year saw improvements in rules concerning means testing of work-related income for 
Qualified Adult payments (95 per cent of whom are women). Parenting alone payments were 
restructured into a pro-work incentive One Parent Payment that incorporated a specific 
income disregard to compensate for the cost of childcare for lone parents (95 per cent of 
whom are women). These changes were initiated under Minister de Rossa, a socialist 
Minister, who had a female social security adviser seconded from the equality division of the 
country’s largest trade union (SIPTU). However these appear the exceptions that prove the 
rule. A strong decisive factor for the more general reluctance to develop a childcare subsidy 
or labour market strategy for women was a political culture based on strong patriarchal 
values (O’Connor, 2006, Yeates, 2003, McAmhn 1987). This culture is reflected in 
ambivalent attitudes towards women's economic independence and labour market
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participation This section reviews key policy moments which illuminate how patriarchal 
values influenced both the policy process and policy content by reviewing policy processes 
concerning individualisation, the P2000 Working Group on Administrative Individualisation 
(DSFA 2003b) and on the Social Insurance Working Group (2004a), and processes relating 
to reform of the One Parent Family Payment (DSFA 2006)
7 3 Women and Individualisation
The issue of individualisation of Irish social security policy, or restructuring access to social 
security, is a consistent feature of policy reviews The Second Commission on the Status of 
Women (Ireland 1982b 80), the Commission on Taxation (Ireland 1982a) and the 
Commission on Social Welfare (Ireland 1986a) all rejected the concept of dependency and 
supported an individualised social welfare system as did the Expert Working Group on the 
Integration of Tax and Social Welfare (Ireland 1996a)88 The Social Insurance in Ireland 
Report (DSW, 1996), NAPS (Ireland 1997c, 2000a) also supported individualisation as did 
Securing Retirement Income (NRB,1998) The Report of the Working Group Examining the 
Treatment of Married, Cohabiting and One-Parent Families under the Tax and Social 
Welfare Codes (DSFCA, 1999), examined specific proposals for achieving individualisation, 
including administrative individualisation and social insurance options and reinforced 
individualisation recommendations This long slow crawl through working groups and policy 
processes was accelerated by the NWCI who negotiated a PPF (Ireland 2000b) commitment 
to establish working groups to develop proposals for the expansion of the social insurance 
scheme and administrative individualisation of social assistance payments
The first of these groups to meet, the PPF Administrative Individualisation Working Group 
(DSFA 2003b), suffered much the same fate as the P2000 Working Group on Women’ 
Access to the Labour Market (Ireland 2000a) Heavily male dominated, it was badly chaired 
and marked by a stubborn resistance to progress the substantive issue It recommended only 
voluntary individualisation Fear of progressing with a more mandatory version of 
individualisation seemed prompted by the fear of electoral backlash from a male electorate 
(who it was assumed would perceive, in the event of individualisation, a personal loss of
88 The 1996 report made recommendations relating to taxation of cohabiting couples, research on 
equivalence scales, and the abolition of Benefit and privilege for over 25s
income) However deeper patriarchal values were strongly evident89 A participant in the 
group recounted, in an interview with the author, the inability of key male civil servants to 
grasp the basic concept of economic independence and its relationship to gender equality A 
second participant described how she ‘had never seen such blatantly sexist attitudes’ and 
recounted how one male participant had exclaimed that 4he couldn’t understand the problem 
because he had always been very fair to his wife and been very generous with his money’ 
The second group, the PPF Social Insurance Working Group (DSFA 2004a), was a more 
considered process but dominated by a male trade union agenda of limiting exposure of the 
social insurance system to gender related risk It avoided any substantial recommendations
A parallel series of policy processes reviewed the structure of the One-Parent Family 
Payment An expenditure review of the One-Parent Family Payment (DSFCA, 2000e) 
focused on overcoming barriers to work for lone-parents and questioned the length of time 
lone parents were in receipt of payment From a family formation perspective, it noted that
disincentives to form relationships can only be resolved where the status of 
individuals is not relevant to the support received and we believe we must in the
89 This same observations can be made about other policy processes concerning women From the 
very start, the P2000 Working Group on Women’s Access to the Labour market seemed doomed to 
failure The appointment of a DSFA Chair meant that the group was institutionally weak, the choice 
of a largely uninterested male chairperson reinforced the weak political priority and skills base of the 
group Participants m the group observed in interviews with the author how the process the group was 
‘poorly supported’ and ‘drafts badly composed’ The process was ‘mismanaged’, with the chairperson 
frequently absent and group membership constantly changing Tensions between Departmental 
institutional agendas surfaced in the group as did tensions between different objectives of the NWCI 
and the INOU
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future examine options in relation to universal child support and 
individualisation of payments90
This direction was reinforced in the NESF Lone Parents' Report (No 20, 2001) which 
discussed abolition of the concept of dependency in an individualised welfare system This 
report prompted the NWC1 to commission ‘A Women’s Model for Social Welfare Reform’ 
(Murphy, 2003) which focused on the development of a parental allowance, which could 
replace One-Parent Family Payment, qualified adult payments and the limitation rule This 
research served as a campaigning tool to lobby for gender related social security reform 
The recommendation of a parental allowance was further developed in a masters thesis by a 
DSFA civil servant (O’Connor A 2005) This work was then used to produce a key report 
outlining proposals to support lone parents (DSFA, 2006) This ‘radical1 report was 
considered by the Cabinet Committee on Social Inclusion and launched for consultation in 
March 2006 The report recommends partial abolition of limitation and total abolition of 
qualified adult in social assistance payments It also proposes abolition of the One-Parent 
Family Payment and replacing these with a parental allowance for parents with children 
under eight and a job seekers allowance for parents with children over seven Employment is 
defined as 19 5 hours thus protecting the concept of choice for parents to provide their own 
after school care for school going children The proposal is in the process of public 
consultation, if it is positively received it will begin a long process of implementation in the 
2007 Social Welfare Act Looking forward, an ambitious Fianna Fail Minister Brennan must 
convince anxious cabinet colleagues that there is no electoral risk in the DSFA 2006 
proposal Lone parent groups and women’s groups have clear veto power, any strong 
negative reaction from such groups will thwart the proposal to a ‘nearly was’ status
The failure to make progress implementing recommendations relating social security policy 
reforms to enable women’s right to participate in the labour market is consistent with other
90
The limitation rule means a family cannot financially benefit by claiming two Unemployment Assistance 
payments, the maximum they will receive is the value of one adult rate and one qualified adult rate This means 
that in a household where both adults (the man and woman) are unemployed there is no incentive for them both to 
register their unemployment Not only does this leave them poorer (by 45 euro per week in 2004) it also means 
that the qualified adult is not directly eligible for many labour market, FAS or education programmes At present 
one can only register as unemployed if looking for and willing to accept full time work this rales out many 
women who for care reasons are only looking for and available for part time work
unsuccessful initiatives by the women’s movement and the trade union movement to 
introduce a paid parental leave Benefit. In fact new Carers Allowances (introduced in 1992) 
contingencies and the home care tax allowance in 2001 consolidated the carer’s role for 
women.91 The failure to progress these reforms is puzzling in the light of significant labour 
market and skills shortages. As well as arguing for gender equality objectives the NWCI had 
argued that increased labour market productivity was a key requirement of a competitive 
economy and a key response to strategic labour market shortages threatening the efficiency 
of the economy. Male public servants who stubbornly resisted a gender agenda controlled 
the institutional processes concerning women’s right to participate in the labour market. This 
suggests ambivalence about the role of women, in particular mothers, in the Irish political 
economy.
Individualisation was largely agenda managed through male dominated working groups and 
policy processes. Political pressure from perceived male ‘losers’ and the group ‘Women In 
The Home’ reinforced by patriarchal attitudes of key civil servants (who as a legacy of the 
marriage bar are predominantly male) meant lack of institutional support and ambition for 
policy analysis. Costs of implementing a ‘no losers’ scenario were not just financial; there is 
also a political cost associated with increases in the numbers of women signing on the live 
register to access either labour market supports or individualised social security payments. It 
is interesting to observe what broke the procrastination and policy paralysis concerning this 
important policy agenda.
Lack of gender equality participation in all aspects of the Irish policy making community 
(political, bureaucratic, corporatist, Church and academic) is a significant obstacle to gender- 
related social security reform’s progression. Women require a critical mass to reinforce 
points made by individual women. The absence of adequate gender analysis in NESC 
(2005a) can be explained by the absence of gender balance in the NESC Council where only 
18.8% (6 out of 32) council members were women and all senior NESC secretariat were 
men. Likewise failure to use conventional gender equality governance strategies such as 
gender quotas for working groups or gender proofing of policy proposals weakens the
91
D esp ite  its stra teg ic  im portance  it is in te resting  to  no te  tha t in  large p art it cam e abou t as an 
in itia tive from  local c lin ic  feedback  and w as developed  as response  to  need  ra ther than  as an p art o f  an 
Integrated po licy  on caring . T he c a re r 's  paym ent has since been  enhanced  and in 2001 C arers B enefit 
w as in troduced .
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likelihood of positive gender equality outcomes Cousins (2005a, 1995a) noted how women 
play an important agency role in the development of the social security system but was 
critical of the Irish women’s movement, as an actor in the policy community, to bring 
forward any specific policy recommendations
The division among women’s groups and the lack of a clear counter hegemonic 
strategy are palpable No organisation has produced detailed costed coherent 
proposals as to how women’s independence can be recognised m the context of 
the Irish social welfare system (Cousins, 1995a 144)
The energy and initiative for social security gender related reforms in 1996 was initiated by 
Roisin Callender, a female political advisor in the 1994-1997 rainbow coalition This 
highlights how women’s participation in decision-making improves the likelihood of 
positive gender reform The Murphy (2003) NWCI commissioned research filled a 
significant research gap and influenced the DSFA (2006) policy proposal, as did a number of 
highly motivated female civil servants This informal advocacy coalition of non-government 
organisations and key (female) civil servants from DOT and DSFA was important At the 
same time, it is ironic that while women’s agency played a key role in advancing a reform 
agenda it is also women’s agency that, as was the case in relation to taxation of Child 
Benefit, will deny reform Any lack of consensus vetoes reform and lone parent groups and 
women’s groups have clear veto power over the DSFA reform proposals
7  4 C u t  B a c k s  -  a  C a s e  S t u d y  in  O b fu s c a t io n  a n d  D is t o r t io n
Swank (2002) hypothesed that multiple veto countries like Ireland are dominated by blame 
avoidance approaches to social security retrenchment Where cuts are considered 
unavoidable political decision makers try to minimise negative impacts and obfuscate and 
distort the impact of cuts to the electorate as a whole This section reviews two separate 
examples of government cuts to social security spending, the Dirty Dozen (1992) and the 
Savage Sixteen (2003) Further detail is in Appendix C The first case study shows how the 
government used a strategy of ‘obfuscation’ to hide a series of social security cutbacks In 
the second case study the government used a ‘justification’ strategy to try to legitimise a 
series of cuts In both cases the government blame avoidance strategies failed and they 
resorted to blame management strategies, which included denial of cabinet responsibility and 
the partial reversal of some cuts
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Dirty Dozen
In 1992, over a period of informal meetings, welfare rights workers in various NGOs 
observed a series of obfuscated social security cuts hidden in a variety of administrative 
circulars, secondary legislation and budget speeches
1 Treatment Benefit Necessary to have thirteen stamps paid in a recent contribution 
year making many long-term unemployed ineligible
2 Disability Benefit eligibility Necessity to have thirteen stamps paid in recent years 
was relaxed and many long-term unemployed are once again eligible92
3 Means testing of casual earnings for UA changed income disregards of only £10 per 
week
4 Part-time workers must lose a substantial amount of the working week (now clarified 
as one day) to be eligible for UB Result is many still excluded from UB
5 Emergency Needs Payments (emergency help with utilities) restricted to a capped
amount and only one payment per year (The Minister subsequently withdrew a 
specific administrative circular outlining protocols but left the policy in place)
6 The minimum payment for Maternity Benefit reduced to £50 and only women in
current employment remain eligible
7 Injury Benefit cut by £15 per week to the same level as DB
8 Maintenance orders for spouses / children made recoupable from lone parent
payments
9 Under 55’s with redundancy awards of £12,000+ are disqualified from UB for nine
weeks
10 Alleviation payments are abolished
11 The claimant must pay the first £5 of rent when on SWA Rent Supplement
12 Deserted Wife’s Benefit is means tested if earnings over £10,000 per annum
Welfare lobby groups publicly exposed these cuts, implemented by a single party 
government over a six-month period, in a campaign which became known as the Dirty 
Dozen (Allen, 1998) The trade union movement became active in the campaign and Labour 
adopted the cuts campaign as a key focus of the national election later that year (Quinn,
2005) Government had been caught and blamed What could they do to minimise the
92 Cousins (1992) points out the motivation for this cut may have been a ‘backdoor method’ to 
exclude married women from claiming Disability benefit and Unemployment Benefit
impact, how did they manage this blame7 One clear blame management strategy was to 
avoid cabinet responsibility and to focus blame on an individual Minister Groups and 
political parties opposing the cuts, as well as generally blaming the outgoing government, 
focused on the outgoing Minister for Social Welfare, Charlie McCreevy, who presented 
himself as a gung-ho right wing politician eager to implement neo-liberal reforms Such was 
the personal attack and blame attributed to Minister McCreevy that, in order to limit electoral 
damage, he chose to stay at home in the subsequent general election, he explained to a 
journalist
I didn’t canvass one house, I took the view that the best way of getting votes 
was not to canvas' (Irish Times 2002 / 06 / 05)
This campaign contributed to the government’s electoral losses but it returned to power in a 
coalition with Labour who had campaigned on the basis of promising to reverse these cuts 
The new Dublin based Taoiseach, Bertie Ahem (who had replaced the rural Albert 
Reynolds), replaced Minister McCreevy with a very experienced, ‘safe’ Minister Woods and 
instructed him to ‘clean up’ the mess that had been left behind by the previous Minister 
This, however, was largely for public consumption and the Programme for Government 
contained no commitment to reverse the cuts A ‘presentational’ strategy was used to ‘spin5 a 
line that the cuts were more comprehensively reversed than they actually were The INOU 
monthly bulletin (April 1993) challenged the Minister that the cuts were ‘dead’ An article 
4 Alive and kicking Operational in an exchange near you’ claimed
Both Dr Michael Woods, the Minister for Social Welfare and Joan Burton, the 
Minister for State for Social Welfare, seem to be under an illusion of some kind 
They think they have managed to reverse the twelve cuts imposed by their 
predecessor Mr ‘Mac the Knife’ McCreevy The truth is that since February 
they have changed, eased or rectified only three of last year’s twelve infamous 
cuts, another two seem eased but on closer inspection are still close to their 
original intention
The whole set of cuts were never fully reversed but the exercise in damage limitation worked 
to the extent that the cuts were politically neutralised Nine of the cuts held firm and had 
substantial impact on part-time workers and on the supplementary welfare system What 
political blame existed, immediate and long-term, was laid squarely at Minster McCreevy’s
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feet The dirty dozen legacy reinforced the tendency of blame avoidance, future Ministers 
were even more nervous to reform social welfare This did not however stop the government 
proceeding with more cuts on part-time workers in the reform of unemployment benefit for 
part time workers in 1993 However they were careful to gain the consensus of social 
partners before proceeding with abolition of Pay Related Benefit in 1994 (McCashin, 2004)
S a v a g e  S ix te e n
After the 2002 general election FF returned to continue a centre-right coalition with the PDs 
A young popular rural TD, Mary Coughlan, was appointed as a first time Minister for Social, 
Family and Community Affairs The post 9/11 economic slow down meant a negative fiscal 
environment Inexperienced, ‘she allowed herself be told what to do by officials and 
finance’93 (Sunday Times 13/03/2005) and accepted a package of social security cuts A 
more politically experienced Minister might have been able to stand up to the DOF or used a 
more obfuscated presentational strategy Possibly because she had no policy or political 
adviser, 'she was new to the office and the changes went past her’ (Sunday Times 
13/03/2005), she presented the full picture of the sixteen cuts as an appendix to her annual 
estimates speech (DSFA 13/10/2003) She also issued a press release, which fully laid bare 
and attempted to justify the sixteen social welfare cuts
Because of a variety of factors including increased demand on certain schemes, 
improved payments and most importantly the need to ensure prudent 
management of the social welfare budget a number of schemes have been 
reviewed and adjusted to ensure prudent management of public funds and 
ensure I am in a position to care for those less well off, disadvantaged, ill or 
unemployed by providing pensions, Unemployment Assistance and other social 
welfare payments94
1 The qualifying period for Back to Education Allowance (BTEA) Third Level Option 
increased from 6 to 15 months
2 Discontinuation of transitional half rate payment for lone parents who earn over €293 
per week
93
DOF officials had instructed the Minister to make 55m euro savings in direct social security 
expenditure rather than staffing or programme costs
94 www welfare ie/press/prQ3/pr)31103 html ^ 7
3. Rent/Mortgage Interest Supplement: recipient’s contribution increased by €1 per week 
to €13 per week.
4. Where one of a couple is in full time employment, both are excluded from claiming 
Rent/Mortgage Interest Supplement.
5. Claimants for Rent Supplement will be referred to the Local Authority for an 
assessment of housing needs in a more systematic manner.
6. Health Boards empowered to refuse Rent Supplement in cases where the applicant has 
not already been renting for a period of six months.
7. Rent Supplement will not be paid to people who refuse offers of or who leave local 
authority accommodation without reasonable cause.
8. MABS Supplement will be discontinued.
9. Crèche Supplement will be discontinued.
10. Diet Supplement, is being phased out over a number of years.
11. Entitlement to half-rate CDA in respect of UB and DB claims will be discontinued 
where the spouse / partner has gross weekly income in excess of €300.
12. Increase the current weekly earnings threshold for reduced rates of DB and UB from 
€88.88 to €150.
13. Entitlement for new claimants of Widow/Widowers Pensions or One Parent Family 
Payments to half-rate payment of DB and UB will be discontinued.
14. Increase from 39 to 52 in number of paid contributions required for DB and UB and 
Health and Safety Benefit.
15. An increase in the period where claims for UB and DB are linked with a previous 
claim from 13 weeks to 26 weeks.
16. The maximum duration of UB will be reduced from 390 days to 312 days where a 
person has less than 260 PRSI contributions paid since first entering employment.
Political reaction was immediate, Labour (Irish Times 21/11/2003) launched a campaign, but 
instead of focusing on the young naïve Minister (who by this time had collapsed with 
exhaustion and stress) both government and opposition focused blame on the Minister for 
Finance, McCreevy, reminding the electorate of his association with the 1992 Dirty Dozen. 
FF first used presentational tactics to try to justify and argue its position but also to associate 
the policy with Minster McCreevy. FF Senator Manseragh (Irish Times 22/11/03) argued:
Attempts to depict the resilient Mary Coughlan, Minister for Social Welfare, as 
a surrogate for Charlie McCreevy and to relocate Labours politically successful
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dirty dozen campaign of 1992 with a savage sixteen of 2004 is unlikely to catch 
on in the same way It has to be open to any Minister to adjust schemes and 
reorder priorities
An Irish Times editorial (23/11/2003) argued the cuts had ‘resonances of the exercise 
conducted by McCreevy when, as Minster for Social Welfare in 1992, he introduced a series 
of cuts known as the dirty dozen’ Minister McCreevy was taking the hit and his own cabinet 
was, it seemed, happy to let him take the hit
In March 2004 the first cut fell to political pressure from a politically sensitive and powerful 
widows campaign A cut restricting Rent Supplement was also the focus of vigorous 
campaigning by a coalition of 42 key organisations This pressure contributed to the 
government defeat in the June 2004 local elections Consequently a cabinet reshuffle was 
planned to create a ‘caring and sharing’ cabinet Despite speculation that the Minister for 
Social Welfare might be punished for mishandling the social security cuts she was promoted 
to be Minster of Agriculture Minister McCreevy, for his attributed role in the savage sixteen 
and other misdemeanours, was ‘side lined’ to the EC Minister, Mr Seamus Brennan, was 
appointed to the social security brief and was given political space to manoeuvre a blame 
management strategy His first act was to immediately distance himself from the cuts, deny 
cabinet responsibility and promise to rescind cuts where they caused hardship (Irish Times 
21/10/04) Carl O’Brien (Irish Times 29/11/04) described how ‘Brennan is likely to defuse 
the most incendiary of the remaining cuts and may tinker with the obscure cuts If all goes 
according to plan voters’ memories of savage welfare cuts will fade’ As predicted in the 
midst of pressure to ‘right the wrongs’ (Irish Times 9/11/04) Minister Brennan, in his 2004 
Budget speech,95 declared how
Following detailed examination I decided to ease nine of the measures at this 
time while instructing that those remaining should be subjected to a continuing 
active review
This fudge did not convince many political observers Opposition spokespersons argued 
‘many savage sixteen remained following the budget’ (Dan Boyle, Irish Times 21/12/04) 
The INOU wrote to Minister Brennan TD (6 January 2005) outlining how 'we wish to 
express our disappointment that although some modifications were made to the now dubbed
95 www irewland com /focus /budget/2005/estimati§^velfare
savage sixteen welfare cuts / changes not all were altered or rescinded in full9 The amended 
version of the cuts illustrated a careful strategy of rhetoric, press manipulation and distortion 
Appendix B outlines the amended cuts and illustrates the confusion, obfuscation and referral 
strategies used by Minister Brennan An anti-poverty lobbyist June Tinsley unravelled the 
distortion on national radio (The Sunday Show, 8/12/03) and argued
Two payments enabling and supporting progression are both only half reversed 
Of eight Supplementary Welfare Allowance cuts there have been no clear-cut 
reversals, two are subject to further consultation, the Creche and Diet 
Supplement are restored but are narrowed in focus, the Rent Supplement change 
is very unclear The six Unemployment and Disability Benefit payment cuts 
have the overall impact of weakening the value of the social insurance system 
and the Minister’s text justifies this intention
Minister Brennan may not have convinced everybody but he did enough to cause confusion 
once again relying on the Dan Rather factor (Pierson 1994 29) where the media will not 
report overly complicated issues In two by-elections m March 2005 the savage sixteen 
appeared on no election material The blame avoidance strategy worked Minster McCreevy 
took the most direct brunt of the blame management strategy but fifteen cuts remain
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this brief examination of cutbacks To some 
degree they typify Donnison’s (1982 209, cited in Lister 1988 2) description of the ‘wolves 
in the Treasury always ranging abroad in hopes of bringing down a benefit or two’ Why did 
a government leave themselves exposed to such retrenchment Both sets of cuts seemed 
motivated primarily by cost containment (preparation for EMU in 1992 and post 9/11 fiscal 
downturn in 2003), however both reflected substantive policy choices to retrench social 
insurance payments and the Supplementary Welfare Allowance scheme The 1992 cuts 
occurred in a political administration where both the Minister for Social Welfare and the 
Taoiseach were from rural constituencies Likewise in 2003 the rural Minister for Social and 
Family Affairs was dominated by a rural Minister for Finance It is possible that rural 
politicians were not sufficiently sensitive to the impact of social security retrenchment on an 
urban electorate
In the event of having to manage blame, similar blame management strategies were used to 
divert and minimise blame Both governments chose not to accept cabinet responsibility,
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cabinet reshuffles replaced offending Ministers and gave room for manoeuvre; governments 
reversed some of the more controversial and sensitive cuts and used ‘spin’ and media 
strategies to distort the reality of the remaining cuts. Government also used agency strategies 
deflecting some cuts by subjecting them to social partnership reviews. This review of the 
cuts confirms the sensitivity of the Irish electorate to social security cuts and the strength of 
lobby groups acting together. It also highlights the successful role of rhetoric and spin in 
Irish social security discourse where ambiguous presentation of information was used as a 
strategy to deflect lame for social security retrenchment.
7.5 Social Security and Social Partnership
There is no doubt that Social Partnership institutions are a dominant feature of the Irish 
social security policy community. Rhetoric plays a key role in Irish social security 
governance. It is used to avoid change by pretending more is happening than is happening, it 
is also used to manage the process of negative change. Social Partnership institutions are 
often the vehicle for such rhetoric. Because of the substantial use of rhetoric it is difficult to 
discern the role and function of Social Partnership in relation to social security policy but 
there is little doubt that NESC plays a leadership role in Irish social policy and that this role 
is consolidated in the context of the Developmental Welfare State (2005). Opinion differs as 
to the degree to which social partnership practically determines the content and scale of 
social security changes or the degree to which its dominant role is ideational and building 
consensus or legitimating the economic development model that sets the context for Irish 
social security reform. These roles are, of course, not exclusive. This section begins by 
examining the practical content of the pay agreements from 1987 to 2006 and the NESC 
strategy documents relevant to each of those agreements. The role and function of social 
security related partnership-working groups are then considered.
Analysing the social security content of social partnership documents
NESC strategy documents and national agreements are framed in a discourse stressing 
requirements for a consistent policy framework in a small open European democracy: ‘a 
macroeconomic policy approach which guaranteed low inflation and a steady growth of 
aggregate demand; an evolution of incomes which ensures continued improvement in 
competitiveness, policies that facilitate and promote structural adjustment in order to 
improve competitiveness* NESC (1996:13). NESC (1999:7) emphasised how ‘constantly
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evolving requirements of international competitiveness are understood as the necessary 
condition of continuing economic and social success’ The more detailed analysis is 
complicated by the presence of the type of strategically ambivalent rhetoric expected in 
‘Janus’ competition states, which address the needs of foreign investors and the domestic 
electorate (Cemy et a l , 2005) Ambivalent policy discourse may help social partners mediate 
tensions between specific interests but makes it difficult to identify substantial policy 
content Even a cursory analysis of the titles of national agreements tells a story of focusing 
on employment, job creation, competitiveness and economic growth It is striking that none 
reference equality as a national goal
An analysis of real and tangible social partnership social security commitments highlights 
that, apart from rhetoric, commitments to ongoing processes and qualified commitments 
dependant on future resource availability, few specific social security commitments were 
negotiated by social partners O’Cinneide (1999 47) notes with frustration how the content of 
agreements comprises ‘cutting and pasting lists supplied by government Departments’ Some 
commitments negotiated were already government policy commitments, many were resource 
dependant, others were never implemented (Community Platform 1997, CWC, 2001) 
Fitzpatricks (2006 30) note the frequent use of intangible commitments to ‘continued 
attention’ and ongoing monitoring’ A review of the content of the six programmes to date 
unearths few tangible social security policy changes If one applied very strict criteria (a 
clear monetary impact m terms of either expenditure or impact on peoples social security 
rates or conditions) then very few changes were negotiated save minor changes These 
included, for example, a commitment to extend the age limit for Child Dependant 
Allowances up to 21 year olds in full time education for all short term payments and an 
agreement that claimants eligible for two types of payment can self select the payment they 
prefer Certainly social partnership as part of the policy process which led indirectly to other 
policy decisions made outside social partnership structures but influenced by social 
partnership Child, working age adult and pension targets discussed or agreed in social 
partnership forums certainly helped form the political decisions that led to increases social 
welfare adequacy over this period Outcomes negotiated in social partnership (some of which 
were already government policy) are summarised in Table 6 1 below and detailed in 
Appendix D
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Table 7 1 Analysis of social partnership social security commitments
D a te  i N E S C  S t r a t e g y N a t io n a l A g r e e m e n t T a n g ib le  o u tco m e s a g re e d  t h r o u g h  s o c ia l p a r t n e r s h ip
19 8 6
1990
1993
A Strategy for 
Development
Growth, Employment and 
Fiscal Balance
A Strategy for 
Competitiveness, Growth 
and Employment
I Programme for National 
( Recovery (1987)
Maintained focus on the overall value of the lowest social welfare
Widening the social insurance base to mclude PRSI for both farmers and the self- 
employed
Acknowledging role of FIS 
Support Voluntary Activity
A strategy for the Nineties
Economic Stability and 
Structural Change
Programme for Economic 
and Social Progress (1990)
; Programme for 
] Competitiveness and Work 
! (1994)
Twelve area based partnership boards to stimulate local development led responses to 
high unemployment
CSW priority level rates by 1993 (conditional on available resources)
Implement CSW child income support recommendations over ten years
Commitment to a charter for partnership between the state and voluntary activity 
(delivered 2000)
Modernise service delivery and support voluntary activity 
Extend Social Insurance to part time workers
| Focus on ‘facilitate entry and re-entry’ and address disincentives to unemployment
!
! ’Urgent and careful consideration’ to integration of tax/social welfare systems (child 
, income support, FIS, employment incentives and dependency)
Maintain real social welfare income/priority CSW rates (fiscal constraints)
I PRSI reform agenda (imposed by Minister)
i One stop shops, fraud and control
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Date NESC Strategy National Agreement Tangible outcomes agreed through social partnership
1996 A Strategy into the 21 st 
Century
P2000, Inclusion, 
Competitiveness and 
Employment (1997
Social inclusion less ’residual’ and strategic objective in its own right 
Reducing Social Disparities £525m incl maintain real social welfare income 
Tackling long-term employment’ FIS unemployment traps reform 
CSW minimum rates commitment
Clause (3.3) ‘reciprocal obligation of the unemployed’, Fraud and Abuse
41 social inclusion oriented working groups processes (process not policy) incl Basic 
Income Working Group
1999 Strategy: Opportunities, 
Challenges and Choices
Programme for Prosperity 
and Fairness (2000)
Real increase in social welfare rates, progress towards £100. ‘higher increases 
priority if additional economic growth, (never subsequently honoured)
Adequacy benchmarks working group Individualisation working groups
CDAs extended to short term benefits, Child Benefit to be increased to £100
Carers Respite and examine social insurance anomalies
2003 Strategy: An Investment in 
Quality Services, Inclusion 
and Enterprise
Sustaining Progress (2003) Poverty and Social Inclusion chapter commits to ‘appropriate’ engagement.
Some existing government commitments were reiterated in Chapter five
Ten ‘Special Initiative’ policy processes one of which to examine effectiveness of 
merging CDA’s and FIS
No new expenditure commitments, Statements on fraud .
2005 Strategy: People, 
Productivity, Places
Towards 2016 No new social security commitments. Affirmation of existing income adequacy, 
recommitment to NESC study of options to reform child income support and 
commitment to prioritise lone parents labour market activation.
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This conclusion is reinforced in a review of the ten Sustaining Progress Special Initiatives 
(commissioned by the Department of the Taoiseach) The report by Fitzpatrick’s consultants 
(2006) highlighted the lack of emphasis on outcome oriented actions Of 67 actions under ten 
initiatives only 18% of activity related to new initiatives, 36% to progressing existing 
activity and 24% to policy formulation Fitzpatricks (2006 29-30) concluded this pattern 
‘does not fit fully with the spirit of the initiatives being action oriented problem solving 
tools’ and that many intended achievements appeared ‘fairly modest and process oriented’
TABLE 10 ACTIONS AND PR O G R ESS UNDER THE ENDING CHILD POVERTY SPECIAL 
INITIATIVE
A ction P ro g re s s
1 A review of child incom e support
arrangem ents to b e  undertaken, including 
examining the effectiveness of merging 
Child D ependen t Allowance iCDA) with 
the  Family Incom e Support (FIS)
The National Economic and  Social Council are 
undertaking an  irvdepth exam ination of CDA and FIS
2  Develop a  strategic poScy to streng then  
families, with particular focus on  the 
coordination o f suDDorts to families
Appropriate proposals v jN be brought forward early in 
2006
3  U ndertake further analysis of o b stac le s  to 
em ploym ent, with particular reference to 
lone paren ts, in th e  Irght of the  NESC 
research  on  th e  OECD report on family 
friendly policies
An Inter-Oepartm ental Working G roup w as se t up  to 
exam ine the  obstac les to  em ploym ent for lone paren ts 
A Working G roup w as a lso  estab lished  m the 
D epartm ent of Social and Family Affairs to review the 
incom e support arrangem ents for lone paren ts
The Minister brought th e  final reports on  lone paren ts 
to C abinet to G overnm ent an d  wi1! publish the 
docum ents a s  the basis of a  consultation with relevant 
stakeholders
4 Improve linkages betw een D epartm ents 
and  A gencies with responsibility for 
children
Work on  m apping the  linkages has been  completed 
and  will contribute to identification of the  gaps and 
overlaps in policy developm ent in relation to children 
and service delivery
5  U se the structures estab lished  under the 
NAPS to achieve the NAPS target on 
child poverty
(i) M eetings of the  Social inclusion Consultative Group 
focus on p rog ress tow ards the  achievem ent of NAPS 
targets, including the target specifically reiated to Child 
Poverty Reduction
(ii) T he seco n d  Social Inclusion Forum continues to 
en g ag e  v- ith line D epartm ents on the  a sse ssm e n t of 
progress m ade under the  NAP/in elusion
6  P rogress the  Children's Longitudinal 
Study
The Study h as  been  put out to  tender an d  a  preierred 
bidder h a s  b een  identified C ontract n e g o tia to rs  for 
the  first ph ase  of the study, which is schedu led  to last 
for seven  years, a re  no.v underw ay
SOURCE SUSTAINING PROGRESS 2003-2005 FINAL REPORT ON SPECIAL INITIATIVES, 2005
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At a more rhetorical level, over almost two decades, it is possible to identify the negotiation 
or framing of the relationship between competitiveness and social inclusion As outlined in 
Appendix C early documents promote redistribution, protect the income of the poorest (PNR 
Ireland 1987b) and establish innovate social institutions (PESP, Ireland 1991) The PCW 
(Ireland 1994b) in particular, reflecting the international context of the OECD Jobs Study
(1994) and the national context of the Expert Working Group on the Integration of Taxation 
and Social Welfare (Ireland 1996a) signalled a strong productivist agenda The focus on 
employment as a key driver of competitiveness means policy focuses on promotion of work 
incentives (reform of child income support, Family Income Supplement, individualisation, 
downward adjustment of PRSI benefits, income disregards and tapering, taxation of benefits, 
integration of tax and social welfare, (PCW Ireland 1994b, P2000, Ireland 1997b) and 
education, training and active labour market measures The latter also includes distinctive 
Irish discourse about supportive conditionality and reciprocal obligations and comment 
about controlling fraud The debate about income adequacy policy in subsequent documents 
is dominated by cost containment and work incentive agendas and income targets only 
commit to tackling consistent poverty (PPF Ireland 2000b) Privatisation, consumer models 
of service delivery and promotion of the regulatory role of the state feature in Sustaining 
Progress (Ireland 2003b) and DWS (NESCa 2005) These documents promote a fuller 
subordination of social policy to the economy where the function of social protection is to 
enable a life time attachment to the labour force One key trade union participant observed in 
an interview with the author how a key role of social partnership was agenda setting but that 
social partnership’s narrow focus on productivist issues meant social partnership was not 
adequately agenda setting on wider social policy
Social Partnership by failing to adequately agenda set had missed key issues 
like housing and childcare At this stage (in 2002) it is more a block on progress 
than a wheel of progress -  blocking rather than promoting change
The conclusion that social partnership is as likely to veto as to action change is confirmed m 
the analysis in the NESC Strategy People, Productivity, Places (NESC 2006) Within an 
overall critical assessment of the policy capacity of Irish public governance NESC reflects 
on how social partnership processes at times have caused strategic decisions to be delayed or 
reversed (NESC 2006 14) Perhaps because of this much strategic policy shaping took place 
outside social partnership Many major reforms (Dirty Dozen, Savage Sixteen, Budget 2003 
Child Benefit and Budget 2006 Childcare Packages, policy relating to migrants workers,
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habitual residents and direct provision for asylum seekers, pensions reform, and the most 
recent proposals to abolish limitation, qualified adults and the one parent family payment) 
were not negotiated through social partnership Government, fearing lack of consensus, may 
have actively kept these policy discussions away from social partnership vetoes Vetoing 
change may of course be a positive function McCashin (2002) attributes the absence of neo- 
liberal rhetoric in Irish social security discourse to social partnership One political adviser 
interviewed by the author stressed, how because the UK didn’t have Social Partnership, UK 
policy makers could make more radical changes
The UK government had more freedom in terms of what they engaged to do, I 
think Social Partnership here is one of the reasons politicians are very wary 
about making any radical changes
A civil servant interviewed by the author confirmed that the partnership process stops radical 
changes from happening but that this can also be a good thing
Sometimes that’s bad because it stops positive things happening but sometimes 
good because it stops something you don’t want to happen
NESC (2006 13) recognise that this tendency to rule out radical change can produce the 
‘lowest common denominator’ However the most striking conclusion from a content 
analysis of social partnership agreements is the scant amount of social security policy 
relative to the large volume of policy negotiated outside social partnership This is consistent 
with observations of Hardiman (1998, 2002) and Cousins (2005a) Many reforms that are 
negotiated through social partnership tend to reflect already existing Departmental policy 
priorities, others are constructed as weak commitments, duplicate other reports or are at a 
high level of generality (McCashin 2002) Over time an increasing number of commitments 
are in the form of ongoing institutional processes rather than policy outcomes Civil servants 
described in interviews with the author how they draft early chapters of the national wage 
agreement Cousins (2005a) observed from his time as policy adviser to two different social 
security Ministers that it was Department policy to hold back on policy changes already 
agreed at Departmental level so that they could be ‘won’ in Social Partnership The large 
number of commitments to back to work supports and active labour market measures m the 
mid 1990s and child or adult welfare adequacy in the early 2000s reflect to some degree the 
dominant voices in the Community and Voluntary Pillar but also well-established policy
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debates outside social partnership including the parallel National Anti-Poverty Strategy and 
Open Method(s) of Coordination. The focus on adequacy within social partnership and its 
consequent impact on budgetary policy was a significant exception. Community and 
voluntary sector’s participation in partnership strengthened their capacity to make income 
adequacy a political issue (albeit this was diluted by CORI’s over-preoccupation with basic 
income and less than effective tactical cooperation within the pillar).
The Role and Function of Social Partnership Working Groups
Hood (2004) identified how governments use agency strategies as part of their blame 
avoidance and blame management strategies. Pierson (2001) hypothesis that governments 
obfuscate policy decisions by distorting traceability about who and where decisions are 
made. Heidenheimer et al. (1990:265) reviewed how ‘committees of experts’ prepared public 
opinion. While in a general sense Social Partnership working groups distort traceability in 
the policy making process it is hard to generalise about their function. The different 
experiences of social partnership working groups make it difficult to identify any dominant 
rationale informing their establishment. This section reviews whether and how social 
partnership working groups contribute to social security policy formation. The range of 
function of social partnership working groups makes such a review difficult. Groups ranged 
from small and insignificant to major or substantial, the review that follows attempts to 
capture the general flavour rather than substantially review the full range of social 
partnership working groups.
Many Social Partnership negotiated social security outputs relate to commitments to 
establish a number of time limited working groups. P2000 (Ireland 1997b), for example, 
commits to over 63 institutional processes, 41 of which related to social inclusion and 
Sustaining Progress, for example, contained no new social security commitments but a 
commitment to establish the ‘10 special initiatives’ referred to above (Fitzpatrick 2006). 
Those interviewed by the author noted very different experiences of Working Groups. One 
social partner ventured in an interview with the author that:
Some groups were practical, straightforward and able to make 
recommendations (e.g. the rent allowance working group). But I've been to 
other committees where there is a sense of frustration and dissatisfaction with 
the process and quality of analysis. This may be deliberate, or it may be a skills 
issue.
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Another social partner acknowledged in an interview with the author the role of civil 
servants managing working groups
I’m not sure how well-informed the politicians or social partners are about 
social security -  relatively speaking the quality of the civil servant is very 
impressive, they are the people writing the brief
It depended on who was managing them, the DSW were very good at 
facilitating and brokering and analysis maybe because they have had a lot of 
exposure to the process
A community and voluntary sector representative described in an interview with the author 
how the process of the Administrative Individualisation Working Group reflected patriarchal 
power dynamics
They were all there at one end of the table, all men representing IBEC, the 
DOF, the DSFA Chairperson and the Irish Senior Citizen’s Parliament It was 
like they represented a different world
Some Social Partnership working groups play a role in forging consensus, one senior DOF 
official in an interview with the author noted how
Working groups allow ideas to settle and come to maturity, now we are 
prepared to do something, whereas five year ago it would have been seen as too 
radical In the meantime people have got used to the idea, the horns have been 
knocked off it
A trade union official interviewed by the author confirmed this view
By and large they progress ideas and explore them, there is a good cross section 
of views If a proposal emerges you can say that by and large it will travel
However other working groups are used to stall policy, a senior civil servant interviewed by 
the author commented how some groups were manipulated
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The political process can stop decision-making by kicking it into touch in 
partnership committees It would be naive not to say that there have been 
working groups set up to stop certain things
They can, according to one senior civil servant
Create a smokescreen of activity so government can be seen to be trying to 
develop social policy They don’t care what’s going on or whether something 
comes out the other end
A trade union official interviewed by the author stressed this ‘policy avoidance’ function 
speaking about the P2000 Basic Income Working Group
Some ideas are around for 40 years and come up every ten years or so Well 
never do them but we can talk about them in a committee all we like
Those who participated in such working groups were clear that it was the political system’s 
responsibility to make decisions Having made recommendations to government social 
partners revert back to lobbyists In the case of the minimum wage, tax credits and Child 
Benefit policy more radical changes evolved through the political system than through social 
partnership Politicians make policy changes recommended by the social partners in order to 
achieve different policy objectives to those promoted through Social Partnership96
96 The move to tax credits was claimed as a social partnership success by both ICTU and C+V social 
partners In reality there was little consensus and no recommendation from the P2000 Tax Credit 
Working Group to move to tax credits Had there been any such recommendation it would have been 
to help achieve the policy objective o f  focusing tax reform at low paid workers The political initiative 
to introduce Tax Credits was taken by the PD ’s because introducing a tax credit system made it 
fiscally viable to reach their Programme for Government policy objective o f  having only 20 per cent 
o f tax payers at the top rate, a completely different policy objective than that being explored by the 
social partners
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It was noted earlier how the political system does not always consult with social partners 
about substantial policy decisions (for example the Savage Sixteen social security cutbacks 
or immigration policy Habitual Residence Rule). Governments also have the comfort zone of 
falling back on Social Partnership as an excuse if the policy change they implemented 
proved too controversial. They use Social Partnership to deflect controversy (deferring some 
Savage Sixteen cutbacks for consideration by social partners or deflecting blame for their 
own policy paralysis by blaming social partners for failing to develop a policy consensus in 
childcare). As one civil servant interviewed by the author observed:
Government wheels Social Partnership in and out when social partners are 
needed to justify the presence or lack of a certain policy position.
The role of the working group in enabling policy learning should not be underestimated. An 
IBEC staff member observed in an interview with the author how:
Groups were important learning spaces, I sort of developed my knowledge by 
working in these groups; it works extremely well in terms of an exchange of 
knowledge and views.
Another senior trade union member reflected in an interview with the author how:
In a Social Partnership process the analysis and arguing and discussing are like 
tutorials, you had to read the stuff and get into discussions, hear all other points 
of view and expand your own knowledge.
Some working groups did not attempt to reach consensus but simply made the arguments for 
and against. They do not agree a recommendation but transfer the thinking and learning to 
the political or administrative process. One obvious problem is the absence of a wider range 
of policy actors involved in direct learning particularly politicians.
It is impossible to generalise about the role and function of working groups in Social 
Partnership except to conclude that increasingly Social Partnership is used as a convenient 
litmus test for consensus. The quality of each process varies considerably. Some processes 
contribute to social security policy in that they led to a more systematic and planned 
approach to policy. Some are frustrating talking shops and others veto change by stalling
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progress While these processes are civil service controlled processes, decision-making is a 
political prerogative The working group approach has considerable resource implications 
for all actors in the social security policy community in terms of time and capacity to 
participate This toil on resources is especially important given the general resource deficit in 
the Irish policy community relative to other countries While there was at times a 
considerable learning opportunity, the exclusive membership of the processes diminished the 
potential to utilise such learning It is difficult to assess how useful the lesson drawing 
function of social partnership is when those lessons are only internalised by a small body of 
individuals, when those individuals are not necessarily the most relevant actors in the policy 
community and when the organisations do not necessarily have internal structures to 
propagate such learning (NESF, 1997)
T h e  R o le  o f  S o c ia l P a r t n e r s h ip
If Social Partnership has only a limited policy formation role then what is its role9 This 
section discusses whether Social Partnership plays a social constructivist role in Irish 
political discourse The state-led and controlled institutions of Social Partnership (NESDO) 
and the social partnership process can be differentiated from the individual interests of the 
social partners This discussion argues that NESDO provides a shared framework about the 
desirability of moving from a distributional welfare state to a productivist workfare state9 
Given the absence of think tanks and the weak contribution of academics to political 
discourse it seems plausible that Social Partnership is the institutional vehicle through which 
a competition state, prompted by international political economy, promotes a 
competitiveness-led neo-liberal ideology
Blyth (2002) describes how ideas influence change by acting as a sequentially unfolding 
process whereby ideas reduce uncertainty at a time of crisis and enable collective action 
Blyth refers to ideas as weapons in a struggle about institutional change Cousins (2005a) 
and Allen (2000) describe how in 1987 the Irish government created Social Partnership It 
can be seen in 1987 as a weapon to develop consensus around co-responsibility for fiscal 
austerity Hardiman (2002 17) describes how it ‘evolved into a strategy for facilitating steady 
growth and the continuing inward investment that fuelled it’ Partnership provided a 
‘blueprint’ or a road map described as a shared understanding about the desirability of a low- 
tax low-spending development trajectory for a small open vulnerable economy Once the 
bluepmt was accepted social partnership then acted as a ‘cognitive’ lock ensuring 
institutional stability In this way Irish social partnership has been a cognitive lock into a neo
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liberal development model stressing key monetarist principles of low inflation and low 
taxation.
With in the Neo-liberal paradigm Breathnach (2005) identifies three phases of social 
partnership; the founding phase, dominated by economic management to break the vicious 
socioeconomic cycle; the expansion phase, with broader complex but fragmented agenda of 
equality and social policy; and the transition phase, which refocused on economics and 
sought to move ahead with a more narrow and controlled agenda. She further identified 
changes in governance where, in the third phase, there is a loss of organisational sovereignty 
as growth in professionalism ofthe staff or policy elite, meant that they became the 
repository of value rather that either institution of social partnership itself. This outcome is a 
similar concept to the expectation expressed by Cemy et al., (2005) that in the competion 
state there would be a shift in power to technical policy elites.
The emerging developmental welfare state model (NESC 2003; NESC,2005a,b) illustrates 
the leadership and social construction role of the NESC as it attempts to reform the 
relationship between social policy and competition policy within the confines of a neo 
liberal state, e. The report can be interpreted as an attempt to break the cognitive lock-in 
created by the neo-liberal idea of an efficiency- equity trade-off, in this context it can be 
described as an expression of a social investment state (Jensen and Dobnowolsky 2004). On 
the other hand it can be interpreted in the words of Cemy et al (2005) as ‘social- 
neoliberalism’, an attempt to promote more equitable outcomes within the confines of the 
cognitive lock of neoliberalism. Given the ambiguous nature of the NESC it is possible to 
read both interpretations from the same report. As a result of this ambiguity each government 
Department, government party and social partner can see his or her own version of policy 
reflected, the document itself reflects the ambiguity that is part of the Irish political culture
NESC discourse reflects existing political priorities of the broad state, including civil service 
controlled agendas, academic analysis (led by ESRI a state funded research agency) and 
transnational thinking (including OECD, Napsincl, European Employment Strategy). One 
policy actor interviewed by the author reflected how Social Partnership ‘hoovered up’ the 
policy around it and reflected it back to the bigger policy community. The ambiguity in 
NESC discourse reflected the political mediation of policy priorities and the leadership role 
the NESC plays as a central co-ordination point in the policy community. The NESC’s role 
appears to be socially constructing a mediated path, by bringing together competing
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discourses but discourses that all share the same macro economic analysis and exist within 
the same ‘cognitive lock’ (NESF 1997) Breathnach (2005) suggested that this insulated and 
exclusionary process of groupthink might inhibit critique by those marginalized by the 
mainstream This is especially so because of the degree of ambiguity needed to maintain the 
shared understanding Roche’s pre partnership conclusion holds firm,
deliberate ambiguity in policy may be an increasing obstacle to an effective anti­
poverty policy in Ireland since it satisfies no one’ (1984 196)
Certainly this has been the experience of the Community Platform who found it very 
difficult to articulate an alternative analysis within the confines of social partnership 
(Murphy 2002, Acheson et al 2004) and who, once they did articulate dissent, suffered in 
terms of access to policy makers and resources
Social Partnership has directly informed the development and content of only a limited 
number of social security policies but has vetoed others either at an agenda setting stage or in 
the process of managing working groups The impact of the veto appears to restrict change to 
moderate change thus protecting the system form more radical progressive and regressive 
change The experience of Social Partnership working groups’ processes has been largely 
civil service determined and the experience of such processes has been mixed in terms of 
both quality of participation and outcomes Decision making is firmly controlled by the 
political system The exclusive nature of the process limits the effective transfer of learning 
to the wider policy community Social Partnership has had a narrow economic agenda since 
its inception The opening up of its membership did not succeed in making social welfare 
policy more equitable or effective While there appeared to be an expansionary social stage, 
the inclusion of the Community and Voluntary Pillar did not lead to a more equitable or 
effective social welfare system and in fact sustained a narrow economic model By far the 
more strategic role of Social Partnership appears to be ideational to the degree that it 
functioned as a key institution in which the state developed a new policy regime and 
subsequently maintained a consensual Rhetoric appears to play a key role in maintaining the 
‘shared understanding’ and there is ample use of various strategic, constructive and 
deliberative ambiguities
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7 6 Chapter Conclusion
There is limited capacity in the Irish policy system to introduce change when it requires a no 
losers compensatory scenario This means most significant changes incur financial or 
political implications Cross-party consensus on policy direction facilitates decisions while 
absence of consensus amongst social partners and within the community and voluntary 
sector militates against decisions As expected veto pressure is strong and larger parties like 
Fianna Fail are perceived to be particularly vulnerable to electoral backlash Smaller political 
parties with more ideologically defined supporters are less impervious to electoral backlash 
for making more radical change
Through the child income support case study one can appreciate the degree to which blame 
avoidance strategies, electoral considerations and budgetary strategies dominate the direct 
political mediation of Irish social security policy choices It also highlighted the extent of 
strategic ambivalence in policy discourse The section on women and social security reform 
reflected on how a patriarchal state is ambiguous in relation to women’s labour market 
participation and how the deficit of women in decision-making is a direct reflection of the 
lack of gender proofing of policy decisions The third case study examined the ‘exceptions 
that prove the rule’ and how governments do manage the fallout that occurs when they 
expose themselves to blame It highlighted the crucial role that presentational strategies, 
obfuscation and rhetoric play in social security discourse Social partnership plays a limited, 
role in social security policy development Social partnership reinforces rather than alters 
the power structure and culture of Irish politics and continues a pragmatic political culture 
that shies away from ideological discourse while embedding policy deeper into a neo-liberal 
hegemony Recent attempts to reconceptualise social security and social policy are 
ambiguous and there is not enough evidence to conclude the cognitive lock of a neo liberal 
model of development has been opened
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Rummaging through recent struggles in the welfare state to appreciate better the political 
process and its relationship to collective social choices embedded in social policy (Heclo 
1974a 11)
CHAPTER EIGHT 
TRACING THE POLICY PROCESS
8 1  In t r o d u c t io n
As discussed in Chapter Six strong Irish economic and employment growth was a clear 
driver of change in policy priorities The early 1990s preoccupation with solving 
unemployment (NESC, 1993, NESF, 1994) had, only seven years later, shifted to a policy of 
maximising overall participation in employment
a full employment society is based on a high employment ratio with a high 
labour force participation of both men and women and the absence of long-term 
unemployment’ (NESC, 2000 7)
The focus shifted from unemployment to alleviating labour market shortages (NESF, 2000) 
While economic growth caused this shift of direction it cannot account for the type of policy 
choices subsequently chosen Policy choices determined whether activation policy was 
supportive or punitive and who benefited from increased economic growth and access to 
employment, income support or public services How those policy choices were constructed 
and decided is the focus of this Chapter The case studies in this chapter differ form the 
previous chapter in that they focus more on how the policy debate was socially constructed 
than what factors influenced the final decision making Hence they analyse more the nature 
of policy debate than the politics of decision making Using similar methodology as the 
previous chapter the chapter traces key moments in debate about the appropriate balnce 
between incentives to work and income adequacy and the appropriate level of participation 
or conditionality Particular attention is paid to isolating the initiative behind new policy 
processes, understanding how international and domestic ideation influenced the social 
construction of domestic policy discourse and whether changes in governance influenced 
changes in policy and outcomes
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Section Two reviews the process leading to the publication of the 1996 Expert Working 
Group Integration of Taxation and Social Welfare Report (Integration Group, Ireland 1996a) 
Section Three reviews the process of the 2001 PPF Benchmarking and Indexation Working 
Group (Benchmarking Group, Ireland 2001b) Examining these two processes enables a 
greater understanding of how the trade-off between income adequacy and work incentives 
was mediated Section Four reviews the process of mediatmg conditionality or compulsion 
and traces Irish policy from the 1987 Job Search to the 2005 NESC Developmental Welfare 
State and subsequent policy changes in 2006 that could move Ireland considerably closer to 
the type of conditionality or workfare considered more typical of a liberal welfare regime
8 2  In t e g r a t in g  T a x  a n d  S o c ia l W e lf a r e  ( In te g ra t io n  R e p o r t ,  Ir e la n d  19 9 6 a )
As discussed in Chapter Four Ireland has always had a tradition of fairly rigorous 
implementation of conditions concerning availability for and genuinely seeking work 
(INOU, 1997, Allen, 1998) Despite high unemployment in the early 1980s, ‘genuinely 
seeking work5 requirements for unemployment payments were strengthened in 1983, work 
incentives were emphasised by reductions in Pay Related Benefit (1984) and the introduction 
of incentives like Family Income Supplement (1984) Unemployment continued to rise and, 
while employment incentives remained a major consideration, concern about the scale of 
unemployment and income poverty led to a focus on income adequacy and anti-poverty 
measures Both the 1987 Programme for Government and the Programme for National 
Recovery (Ireland 1987a,b) committed to maintaining the real value of the lowest social 
welfare payments
In it ia t iv e  o f  p o lic y  p ro ce ss
Work incentive issues became a public policy concern in the early 1990s when, with 
economic recovery, policy actors voiced fears that higher levels of unemployment payments 
had dampened the incentive to work The Tax Strategy Group (TSG), initiated by 1992 was a 
new policy institution initiated by Labour which included Ministers, civil servants and 
programme managers This process dominated policy making over the 1992-1997 period 
Maintaining competitiveness was the key policy objective of budgetary policy and the 
primary focus of maintaining work incentives was seen as a key part of the competitiveness 
strategy The mood was influenced by the OECD Jobs Study (1994), which dominated 
international social security policy discourse and to a lesser extent the Delors White Paper on
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Competitiveness, Growth and Inclusion (1994) which, as Dostal (2004) argues was itself 
influenced by the OECD Jobs Study A key stage in the transition to a competition state 
came when the 1992-94 FF- Labour coalition government established in July 1993 the 
Expert Working Group on Integration of Social Welfare and Taxation (Integration Group) 
The group’s terms of reference were (Ireland 1996a 2)
To identify the problems associated with the interaction of the tax and social 
welfare systems and to identify the steps necessary to achieve greater co­
ordination / integration of the two systems, with particular attention to the 
impact on people’s incomes and to the tax code, social welfare system, 
budgetary and administrative implications
The initiative is largely credited to the then Junior Minister for Poverty, Labour T D Joan 
Burton In an interview with the author she attributed her motivation to concern about 
constituents’ experiences of poverty and unemployment traps A key civil servant 
interviewed by the author confirmed ‘without this political driver we would not have the 
resources and the full-time worker given to the group’
P o lic y  d is c o u rs e
This initiative of left leaning Minister for State Joan Burton was however taken over by the 
Department of Finance who set the dominant tone of the work by controlling the early drafts 
Through their influence, a neo-liberal economics epistemology, drawn from the OECD Jobs 
Study influenced the policy agenda and promoted a focus on Replacement Ratios97 (RRs) as 
the working methodology of the group Along with the Department of Employment and 
Enterprise they advocated low Replacement Ratios as the preferred policy solution to 
maintain work incentives Some Irish economists unsuccessfully challenged other 
economists’ uncritical acceptance of the economic orthodoxy behind replacement rate theory 
(Callan et al 1996, INOU 1995,) McCashin (2004 215) observed that
It is striking how official policy debates are conducted in the narrow economic 
logic of replacement ratios and the potential impact on work incentives with 
little qualitative analysis on how people perceive and experience social security
97 The Replacement Ratio (RR) is the ratio o f  the wage required to replace the welfare payment set 
against the welfare payment (Callan 1996) ^  ^^
Alternative policy coalitions (led by the DSFA and supported by the CPA) sought more 
supportive welfare to work policy and the elimination of poverty traps but found themselves 
in a defensive position and defending welfare rates against an agenda of reducing 
replacement ratios. One researcher in a statutory agency interviewed by the author reflected 
how:
looking back it was all about replacement ratios, pages and pages of them.
This focus on work incentives was artificially or socially constructed. Without doubt the 
OECD Jobs Study and, to a lesser extent, the Delors White Paper influenced this 
uncharacteristically intensive and ambitious overview of Irish social security policy. One 
senior civil servant explained in an interview with the author how:
The study was driven by a general perception in academic, political, 
administrative and partnership worlds, that a more integrated tax and welfare 
system would minimise work disincentives.
Challenges to this analysis suggested high replacement rates were not in fact a cause of 
unemployment. One academic reflected in an interview with the author how:
It was never really plausible that the disincentive effects were fundamental to 
the high level of unemployment, the jobs study (OECD) was selling a particular 
line but was quite ideologically driven and exceptionally politicised and used by 
those who were thinking that way anyway. ... At times of low economic growth 
and slow job growth there is often preoccupation with the somewhat theoretical 
question of whether people will be able to take up employment. This 
preoccupation vanishes in times of high economic growth when people take up 
employment.
Within the group it became clear that such disincentives were not strong. Members of the 
group observed in interviews with the author how the working group:
Started off very strongly, and as you got into the nitty-gritty 
of the arguments about incentives they all seemed to fall away.
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Another group member described in an interview with the author
Peeling back fears about disincentives till we realised that 
there weren’t any
P o lic y  D e v e lo p m e n t
The working group conclusions reflected OECD recommendations In their final analysis the 
recommended keeping replacement rates low and maximise the gap between work and 
welfare However the focus was on maximising income from work rather than reducing 
already low welfare payments This reinforced the Mess eligibility’ principle that ‘labour 
market aged’ payments be kept relatively low but did not suggest further reductions The 
report was influential, one Finance official in an interview with the author described it as
A fundamental mark on the ground about the need for a gap between take home 
pay and welfare and how we would have been consciously trying to widen that 
gap, you would need to ensure that in anything you would be doing the 
incentive to work would not be overlooked
Many recommendations were implemented, including reforms to FIS and CDAs, 
restructuring of various income disregards and tax reforms to benefit the lower paid 
Changes were on a no losers basis and led to significantly improved welfare outcomes 
Nonetheless they served the function of commodifying welfare in terms of enabling 
recipients to gain easier access to open market employment Overall the dogma of low 
replacement ratios was reinforced In the words of one DOF official, ‘we would always look 
at replacement ratios as a fundamental test of what a particular proposal would do’ One of 
the most enduring legacies was a greater focus on tax policy98 as an element of welfare-to-
98 Other than taxation o f  benefit payments the broad thrust tax reform focused on eliminating high 
marginal taxes and removing the lower paid from the tax net Over 1997-2002 the marginal tax 
exemption limits were phased out Over budgets 1999-2002 taxation reform mcluded reform to a tax 
credits system and removal o f  the minimum wage from the tax net (over 40 per cent o f  tax eligible 
units were in fact removed from the tax net) These policies widened the gap between welfare and 
work (INOU, 1997) It is important however not tg2Qver exaggerate these reforms, the vast amount o f
work policy however this did not lead to the type of Anglo -Saxon experimentation with 
taxation mechanisms to subsidise low income workers The political impact of the policy 
process can be measured in consensus about tackling disincentives There was according to 
Callan, Nolan and O’Donoghue (1996) a major preoccupation of Irish policy makers with 
replacement rates McCashin (2004) notes there was virtually no political dissent about the 
full abolition of Pay Related Benefit (PRB) in 1994 (the only dissent coming from the INOU 
who walked a symbolic coffin down Kildare Street with a sign ‘PRB Rest In Peace’ (Allen 
1998) Latye and Callan (2001) reflect on this very successful social construction that there 
is an incentive problem in Irish social security Noting that the disincentive effects for 
Unemployment Benefit are relatively small and that none exist for Unemployment 
Assistance they
question how media, government, and academic attention focused on those who have no 
disincentive (2001 125)
G o v e r n a n c e
Membership of the group was exclusive, members were invited on the basis of expertise and 
comprised civil servant and technical elites including the CPA While senior trade unionist 
Donal Nevin was Chairman there was no formal social partnership association nor was there 
any representation of users or people living in poverty In fact the technical nature of the 
work of the group was used to deny membership to anti-poverty groups (Allen, 1998)
Social partners and groups representing the poor took part in a parallel less influential NESF 
working group This overlapping welfare-to-work discourse, led by the INOU, sought to 
review social welfare reform since the CSW and focused on recommendations to eliminate 
various types of employment and poverty traps associated with work disincentives (NESF, 
1994a) Subsequent social partnership based processes that reviewed integration (for 
example NAPS Income Adequacy Working Group (1997), P2000 Basic Income Working 
Group (Ireland 2002d), P2000 Women’s Access to the Labour Market (Ireland 2001a) were 
all taken less seriously by key policy makers NESF (2000) highlighted the ongoing 
complexity of welfare-to-work policy and unemployment and poverty traps and 
recommended a comprehensive welfare-to-work strategy While the analysis was broadly
tax expenditure was focused on tax changes which benefited higher paid workers and did nothing to 
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endorsed and considered by the Strategy Group on Employment and Unemployment it was 
defensively received by the DSFA who claimed their DSW Employment Support Unit was a 
comprehensive welfare-to-work unit (NESF 2001b) In governance terms the Integration 
Report reflected a highly elitist governance approach which was effective in terms of making 
a serious policy impact This approach has since been replaced by a more inclusive 
representative governance system in a range of Social Partnership and related working 
groups This more fragmented and complex policy system has not had the same degree of 
policy impact
The Integration Group was a key moment in the journey from a social security system based 
on passive poverty alleviation to one that was beginning to focus on activation While Irish 
social security policy had always emphasised incentives to work, the Integration Group 
embedded a more technical replacement ratio discourse into Irish social security discourse 
This was done by discursively constructing, with the aid of international discourse, an elite 
expert based membership to work in a technical policy process dominated by the DOF The 
report established an epistemological framework for social security policy for some time to 
come and gave Replacement Ratios an over-dominant place in the policy hierarchy This is 
consistent with Stephens, Huber and Ray (1999) expectation of link between the rise in 
hegemony in neo-liberal economics and an environment of retrenchment This type of 
environment took expansion of entitlement of the agenda and shifted the politics of social 
policy to defending entitlements
8 3  B e n c h m a r k in g  a n d  In d e x a t io n  W o r k in g  G r o u p  ( B I W G )
A legacy of the analysis reinforced in the Integration Group is acceptance of low 
replacement rates at the heart of the Irish employment activation Even were generous rate 
increases considered affordable strategies (and given the budget surpluses it seems they 
were) they would not, for work incentive reasons, be considered desirable As discussed in 
Chapter Four, this policy stance lead to, in the context of increasing average and median 
incomes, growing income inequalities and increased relative income poverty (ESRI, 2003) 
The CSW (Ireland, 1986) adequacy benchmarks influenced social security discourse and 
were used as campaigning platforms throughout the 1990s Most national agreements 
contained basic commitments to gradual achievement of first the CSW priority rate (PCW, 
Ireland 1994a) and then the CSW minimum social welfare rates (P2000, Ireland 1997b) 
However there was growing awareness that the CSW rates had outlived their usefulness and 
needed upgrading Minister de Rossa had commissioned the ESRI to review approaches to
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rate setting and to produce a range of possible rates of payment The ESRI, while suggesting 
a range of payments, advised no method could give an unproblematic objective or scientific 
way of estimating what level of income would be adequate (Callan et al 1996)
S o u rc e  o f  In it ia t iv e
The Community and Voluntary Pillar entry into social partnership brought increased urgency 
to the debate about adequate rates The INOU and SVP had successfully negotiated for a 
commitment to CSW minimum rates in P2000 The Community and Voluntaiy Pillar 
proceeded to argue, in NESC, for a new analysis that linked rate setting to an established 
income target linked to average incomes which could be indexed each year NESC (1999 55) 
reflected this debate and recommended a new benchmark for the income adequacy of social 
welfare payments and a mechanism for indexing payments to improvements in the general 
living standard be established through the social partnership process However little progress 
was made in the subsequent wage negotiations, all IBEC would concede was the 
establishment of a Social Partnership Working Group on Benchmarking and Indexation of 
social welfare payments (Ireland 2001a) This illustrates the role of rhetoric in Irish policy 
discourse where apparent policy consensus is subsequently ignored (almost every NESC 
strategy, for example, recommends taxing Child Benefit and property)
The terms of reference of this working group stress the focus on economic concerns and the 
lack of a focus on poverty especially relative poverty which was only inserted into the terms 
of reference after strenuous argument by the Community and Voluntary pillar (Ireland 
2001a xx)
i) examine the issues involved in developing a benchmark for adult and child 
social welfare payments including the implications of adopting a specific 
approach to the ongoing uprating or indexation of payments having regard to 
their long-term economic, budgetary, PRSI contribution, distributive and 
incentive implications in light of economic, demographic and labour market 
patterns, and
11) examine the issue of relative income poverty
223
Policy discourse
The Benchmarking Group had arisen in the context of an income adequacy and anti-poverty 
campaign but, like the Integration Group, the terms of reference and the subsequent work of 
the group focused much more on work incentive issues and Replacement Ratios than on 
rates of poverty. In theoretical terms, neo-classical economics again dominated the group’s 
discourse and definitions. Requests from members, during the group’s work, to examine 
experiences of poverty, testimonials from people living in poverty or to request qualitative 
research were rejected. Nor was there consultation with people living in poverty or requests 
for submissions from the wider public.
The group can be divided into two fairly distinct advocacy coalitions, with DOF, IBEC and 
the DETE on one side arguing competitiveness. The DSFA, the DOT, the INOU and the 
three other social partner pillars accepted competitiveness arguments but emphasized the 
desirability of an income adequacy benchmark and indexation methodology. Within this 
adequacy coalition there were a range of opinions. Tactics and judgements about what was 
achievable through the group differed. These differences of opinion often created tension. 
While political actors were not directly involved it was evident that at least one group 
(CORI) had close contact with FF and tactically liaised with a senior civil servant close to
P o lic y  d e ve lo p m e n t
The group could not achieve consensus and a majority recommendation for a €150 
benchmark was forwarded to the Taoiseach. This recommendation found immediate 
relevance in the parallel institutional process set up to revise the NAPS but was reworded 
into a strategically ambivalent income adequacy target (NAPS, Ireland 2002a: 10):
The target will be to achieve a rate of €150 per week in 2002 terms for lowest 
social welfare payment, to be achieved in 2007, and the appropriate equivalence 
level of basic child income support to be set at 33-35 per cent of the minimum 
adult social welfare payment.
Nolan (2002) noted that given the drafting skills of those involved this ambivalence was 
hardly unintentional. Crucially what was left strategically ambivalent in this target was the 
issue of the indexation formula that would be used to up-rate the 2002 value to 2007 terms.
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Without making explicit the indexation formula the target was less meaningful than it might 
have been. The corresponding child income support target would be to maintain combined 
child income support at 33-35 per cent of the lowest adult social welfare payment, hence this 
also had less meaning. This strategically ambiguous target means that the income target, 
depending on whether it is indexed by inflation or Gross Average Industrial Earnings wages 
could range from €170 to €185 in 2007 terms with the child income support target varying 
between €59 and €65 at the 35 per cent end of the range. The issue of examination of relative 
poverty was largely sidelined and a major effort had to be made by the Community and 
Voluntary Pillar representatives to have the issue of relative poverty, as outlined in the terms 
of reference, even cursorily examined.
This process symbolised a debate between the social desirability of an income benchmark 
and indexation formula against the economic desirability of a flexible approach to fiscal 
policy and maintenance of work incentives through basic welfare, low PRSI contributions 
and low taxation. The report can be seen as a key moment where the competition state in an 
alliance with a centre-right government, the DOF, the DETE and employers consolidated a 
pro-competition social policy or subordinated social policy to economic policy.
G o v e r n a n c e
The expert-based membership base of the previous Integration Group report was replaced, in 
this instance, with a membership comprised of social partners. This reflected a changing 
form of governance and a shift in power bases. Expert groups like the CPA were denied 
access to this group and social partners (including representatives of the people living in 
poverty) who had not been in the previous group were the dominant membership of this 
group. Based on social partners’ previous experience of civil servants stalling working 
groups, the CVP sought an independent Chairperson, Prof Kieran Kennedy, a former 
Chairperson of the ESRI. While this was done for valid reasons, the choice of an economist 
as the Chairperson meant an economics episteme dominated the group. The target was 
embedded in the subsequent Programme for Government (Ireland 2002a) and Sustaining 
Progress (Ireland 2003b). CORI in particular used the ambiguity of the target to good tactical 
effect by maintaining a lobbying position which, to some degree, constructed a political 
alliance around a maximum target of 30% GAIE. CORI’s close relationship with Fianna Fail 
led to a 2004 invitation to address the parliamentary party meeting. They used this 
opportunity to campaign for the 30% GAIE target. A significant increase in Budget 2005 and 
2006 has increased the likelihood of reaching one interpretation of the original NAPS.
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Like the Integration Report, the Benchmarking Group subordinated social policy to the needs 
of the economy This policy process was channelled through a narrow technical economic- 
dominated discourse While governance shifted from experts to social partners, it still 
occurred m a tightly controlled elitist policy process The initiative belonged to the 
Community and Voluntary Pillar and reflects an advocacy coalition’s attempt to construct an 
alternative social discourse In the event however the discourse was dominated by work 
incentive and competitiveness concerns The link between a productivist outcome and a 
narrow coordinative governance process is not accidental It is interesting to note that it took 
electoral politics and old fashioned campaigning to force the implementation of adequacy 
politics The role played by CORI illustrates how, while the function of social partnership is 
agenda setting, the real politics of decision-making is carried out in pluralist power relations 
It also highlights a hidden but powerful advocacy coalition of CORI, elements of Fianna Fail 
and key civil servants
8 4 J o b  S e a r c h  to J o b  S e e k e rs  A llo w a n c e
Historically" there has always been a link between income support and job seeking (INOU, 
1997) and recent debate about adequacy was always nuanced with references to ‘supportive 
conditionality’ (NESC, 1996 201) and ‘proactive policies of engagement with people of 
working age’ (Ireland 2001a 61) DSW have been responsible for ensuring unemployed 
claimants are available for and actively seeking work Allen (1998) records how the 
Department was proactive about this surveillance and had no problem publicly humiliating 
unemployed people and using harsh and demeaning control tactics The CSW (Ireland 1986)
99 The D SW ’s employment traditional function o f  national placement service was transferrd to DOL 
m 1966 A placement service review, (IPA 1968) confirmed the separation o f  employment placement 
services from the Unemployment Benefit system DOL established a National Manpower Service 
(NM S) in 1971, but did not encourage the unemployed to use the new mainstream placement service 
and transferred employment exchanges back to the DSW  (NESC, 1985, 208-9) In 1982 the NM S was 
redirected to the unemployed but never successfully engaged this group (Cousins 2005 179) The 
placement focus o f  the NM S diluted further when the public training agency AnCo, the Youth 
Employment Service and the NM S joined to form FAS (1987) NESF’s (1994) recommendation for 
specialized local employment services in disadvantaged areas was implemented in 1995 These were 
brought under the jurisdiction o f  FAS in 2004
recommended, in the context of high unemployment, that available for work requirements 
should not be strictly enforced but relaxed to allow unemployed people engage in education 
courses It also reviewed the respective functions and links between the DSW and FAS and 
recommended continued institutional separation of functions but close co-operation between 
job placement and income support functions This path dependency influences options for 
Irish workfare or compulsory work for welfare benefit This section tracks the debate about 
conditionality from Job Search in 1987 to a period when the emphasis was on sensitive 
activation (1991-1996) to a period when the emphasis moved to ‘supportive conditionality’ 
or ‘systematic engagement’ (1997-2005) and a further period captured by the Developmental 
Welfare State (NESC 2005a) and DSFA 2006 proposals for a ‘Job Seekers Allowance’ The 
section concludes by reflecting on what drove the increased momentum for change in 2006
J o b  S e a rc h
While CSW (Ireland, 1986) deliberated about the institutional relationship between FAS and 
DSW a Department of Labour White Paper on Manpower Policy (1987) proposed a Direct 
Action Programme for the Long-Term Unemployed which would automatically target those 
over 12 months unemployed This was consistent with the then EEC policy on activation and 
the emerging workfare programmes in other Anglo-Saxon States Fine Gael Minister for 
Social Welfare, Gemma Hussey, visited the US in May 1986 to inspect workfare 
programmes and in September 1986 established a working party to develop a pilot ‘Job 
Search’ programme Following a general election and change of government her 
replacement FF Minister, Dr Michael Woods, announced a national Job Search Programme 
in March 1987 Job Search involved a strong element of compulsion, failure to engage lead 
to a review of welfare entitlement Bond (1988 199) described ‘a massive compulsory 
interviewing process that is hard to justify in terms of benefit to the unemployed and is better 
understood as a control measure’ Bond (1988) claimed Job Search functioned as ‘an 
instrument in the political management of unemployment’, he reasoned Ministers had to be 
seen to ‘be doing something about unemployment’ Job Search could be seen as a hardening 
of official attitude and the emergence of an increasingly punitive approach in the official 
treatment of the unemployed The Minster may have had an ulterior motivation a policy 
activist from that period recalled m an interview with the author that Minister Woods used 
Job Search m a politically strategic way By being seen to ‘control’ the unemployed the 
Minister was in a stronger position to negotiate budgets to maintain the real incomes of the 
unemployed This social construction shows an interesting use of rhetoric in Irish political 
discourse, talk hard and act soft, use the unemployed as a weapon to fight for the needs of
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the unemployed
S e n s it iv e  A c t iv a t io n
This ambiguous approach to the plight of the unemployed is evident in broader discourse 
through the early 1990s As the scale of Irish unemployment became evident policy makers 
wrestled with the plight of jobless economic growth Employers practically resisted job 
search placing ‘No Job Search’ signs to warn unemployed people against knocking on their 
factory or shop door (INOU 1998) A policy consensus emerged that policy discussion about 
conditionality was premature, it was unreasonable to force claimants to seek work that was 
not available, unemployed people wanted jobs and would take them if only they were 
available The DSW had no practical capacity to follow up on extensive control measures 
and informally relaxed conditions The focus was on job creation, a Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on Employment (1992) discussed large-scale public works programmes and 
CMRS (1993, now CORI) argued for voluntary socially useful work to be available through 
public sector bodies Some changes were introduced to enable people undertake voluntary 
work whilst in receipt of unemployment payments
The combination of a concerned DSW, a centre-left government and strong ICTU leadership 
resulted in positive innovative policy and institutional changes (PESP, Ireland, 1991b) The 
DSW believed the unemployed would take up jobs in the Irish economy once they were 
supported to do so Through all this a senior official described the DSW as ‘flying by the 
seat of their pants’ and credited the pragmatic Minster Michael Woods for negotiating, 
against conventional wisdom at the time, a series of ‘home grown’ pragmatic supportive 
policy changes Through internal administrative changes resourced by savings from a 
declining live register, DSW established a Jobs Facilitation Unit where Jobs Facilitators used 
Back to Work Allowances to broker employment for unemployed claimants Reforms to 
payment design focused on the simplification of means tests and tapering of income 
disregards, while service level changes focused on information strategies and welfare to 
work advice These changes had a positive impact on material welfare and were less coercive 
and restrictive than in other countries Around this time DOF established Revenue Assist, a 
tax measure to support the long-term unemployed, and the DETE introduced the 
Employment Incentive Scheme
The NESF in the process of preparing its Report No 4 cEnding Long-Term Unemployment’ 
deliberated on whether engagement in a Local Employment Service should be compulsory
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and recommended a voluntary service would be more effective. The INOU argued that 
people would take up ‘reasonable’ offers of employment (INOU, 1996; 1997). The NESF
(1995) welcomed the targeting of 18 and 19 year olds on the live register with a Youth 
Progression Programme but noted:
A serious concern is the compulsory element involved for young people who 
fail to register with FAS / LES or to compete the progression programme will 
not face the threat of their Unemployment Assistance being withdrawn....we 
presented cogent reasons why participation in programmes should be on a 
voluntary basis (versus the introduction of compulsion) as it eliminates the need 
to provide a quality product, reduces the value of participation in employer’s 
eyes, creates resistance from the unemployed and turns training into a form of 
punishment for being unemployed’ (NESF, 1995:22)
The DSW had initiated employment support services for unemployed people even though 
the statutory responsibility for employment services lay with the DETE and its statutory 
body FAS. This caused considerable institutional tensions between the DSW and the DETE: 
one Minister described ‘a seven year turf war’ between the two bodies. One former Minister 
for Social Welfare reflected how ‘the underlying attitude of the DETE to welfare was to see 
it as a hindrance; their agenda was to slash and bum, to reduce the level of welfare’. This 
negative relationship and institutional sensitivity may have deterred a common trend in other 
Anglo Saxon countries to merge Departments providing income supports and employment 
supports to make it more institutionally feasible to enforce harsher conditionality on 
claimants. Lack of institutional integration between these initiatives and between income 
support and employment placement services seems to be part of the story for the slow and 
inconsistent road to Irish activation. Indecon (2005) recommend greater institutional co­
operation and data sharing. However there is little appetite for institutional reform, one 
senior DSFA official observed to the author ‘organisations have a happy knack of preserving 
difference even after they are combined’.
S u p p o rt iv e  C o n d it io n a lit y
When, in the early 1990s, job creation policy began to produce results, the policy challenge 
took on a different shape. Would the unemployed, over half of whom were very long-term 
unemployed, be able to or want to return to work? Given that Ireland already had legislative 
conditionality requirements reactivation of conditionality required no major legal or
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structural change Existing policies which required claimants to have active engagement with 
the labour market were gradually reactivated through case management strategies in local 
employment exchanges (DSFCA 2000b) These policy moves happened without any 
publicly visible policy process and were largely driven from within the Department
c
Claimant organisations did not actively dissuade the Department from these policies on the 
grounds that the DSW responses were reasonable and offered support and structure to the 
unemployed in their search for employment but did urge DSW to proactively ensure people 
were informed of their rights and obligations
An alternative policy coalition (including PDs, elements of Fianna Fail, DETE and some 
employers’ organisations) had stronger views about the desirability of conditionality With 
the return of employment growth, employer’s organisations led debate about a perceived 
need to enforce conditionality regulations with greater rigour The debate was fuelled by a 
1996 Labour Force Survey, which highlighted a technical discrepancy between the numbers 
of unemployed claimants and the numbers available for work (CSO 1996)100 The 
controversy about this technical decision led into a hysterical and misleading debate about 
unemployment and fraud (Allen 1998) Public discourse, led by employer’s organisations, 
argued that the unemployed should be ‘activated’ Irish Small and Medium Employers 
Organisation (1996) looked for due emphasis on individual responsibility The Director of 
the Central Bank questioned the unemployed and their motivation to work (Allen 1998) A 
considerable discussion of conditionality was evident in NESC (1996 55) where IBEC 
negotiated the following statement in (P2000, Ireland 1997b 18)
In the context of the focus on unemployment and exclusion, enhancement of the 
real value of payments to the unemployed is based on the reciprocal obligations 
of society to provide them with decent incomes and worthwhile support in job 
seeking for the unemployed and of the unemployed to seek and accept 
reasonable employment development and training opportunities
This statement about reciprocal obligations was fiercely resisted by claimant organisations 
(INOU, 1997) who feared it would lead to more punitive and conditional measures The 
political battle being fought out between the unemployed and employers’ organisations
100 This debate was triggered by a decision from Eurostat (the EU Statistical D ivision) to move away 
from ‘live register’ unemployment measurement to Labour Force Survey measurement
reflected ideological attitudes to welfare The debate was taken up in Dail Eireann where the 
Select Committee on Finance and General Affairs (Ireland 1996f) noted their concern that a 
significant number falsely claiming unemployment payments meant an ‘unduly negative 
picture of economic well being’ and recommended that DSW antifraud measures should be 
independently monitored by the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General One policy 
maker in an interview with the author reflected on how the debate was a social construction
Policy did not need to focus on conditionality, with unemployment going down 
like the clappers why would you bother trying to really tighten the screws on 
the unemployed
S y s te m a tic  e n g a g e m e n t
Since 1998 relations between the DSW and the DETE have developed through the 
institutional linkage required of them by the EU Open Method of Co-ordination which 
requires the development of a National Employment Action Plan (NEAP, DETE various) 101 
It is a feature of the many EU national governments to blame Brussels for unpopular reforms 
(Pierson, 1996) The procedural shifts in governance and policy making required of the 
OMC offered the opportunity to introduce a more proactive conditionality in Ireland and a 
different discourse about unemployment in social security policy debate Unemployed 
organisations critiqued the NEAP’s dependence on ‘punitive policing approaches to 
unemployment, including a form of harder activation of the unemployed’ (O’Sullivan and 
Allen, 1999) An INOU (1998 4) document attacked an attitude of ‘threatening and abusing 
people for not rushing into the first job that appears’ One interviewee commented in an 
interview with the author that
Perhaps Irish policy makers feel braver using European policy makers to do 
what they wouldn’t achieve through the Irish policy process
101 The NEAP sets the employment and labour market framework for the period ahead The NEAP  
includes a preventive strategy under the requirements o f  EU Employment Guidelines, o f  engaging 
systematically with persons at an early stage o f  unemployment By 2006 all unemployed claimants o f  
all ages are required to voluntarily engage with FAS Failure to do so could lead to payment review  
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However, even under cover of the NEAP, Irish politicians and policy makers were still 
hesitant to venture into political debate about conditionality, only PD, Mary Harney, was 
prepared to publicly state that welfare should be cut (Irish Times 19/06/98) The combination 
of high economic growth, job creation and the type of rhetoric associated with ‘systematic 
engagement’ was sufficient to trigger substantial exit from the live register While the formal 
evaluation (Murphy 2002 116) concludes the preventative strategy had a profound effect, no 
evaluation has been able to isolate the specific impact of systematic engagement in a very 
fluid and buoyant labour market FAS, happy with the present harmonious relationship with 
the unemployed, refused to cooperate in information sharing with the DSFA Without 
resolving this institutional stalemate it is was in fact difficult to progress to more meaningful 
forms of ‘supportive’ conditionality (Indecon 2005) Nonetheless the desired activation 
outcome has been achieved in terms of numbers exiting the live register and maintenance of 
low levels of unemployment Murphy (2002 116) notes the NEAP disciplined the policy 
world and achieved a level of co-operation between the Irish social welfare and labour 
market systems but notes the limited use of targets in the Irish strategy She attributes this 
reluctance to ‘the open nature of the Irish economy, the likelihood of unexpected external 
shocks impacting on the economy and labour market which would render such targets 
meaningless’ (ibid 2002 111) Once again globalisation requires a flexible approach 
unhindered by targets
J o b  S e e k e rs  A llo w a n c e
Throughout the early 2000s a number of parallel policy processes debated policy relating to 
participation, activation and extension of conditionality O’Connor A (2005) argues that 
NESF (2000), Forum on the Future of the Workplace (2005), NAPS (Ireland 2002a) and 
NAPsincl (Ireland 2003a), NEAP Annual Reports (1998-2005) and the National 
Competitiveness Council (2003), all stressed the need for greater activation and mobilisation 
of the workforce FAS (2003, 2004, 2005), noting how the rise in lone parent and disability 
payments was outstripping decreased unemployment identified activation as a key response 
to labour market shortages DSFA strategy statements, annual reports and internal policy 
work (O’Connor A, 2005 and Bohan, 2005), lone parent and disability expenditure reviews 
(DSFCA 2000e, DSFA 2003b) all stressed participation and activation Non-government 
organisations, the NWCI (Murphy 2003), INOU (1999b) and EAPN (2006) also debated and 
discussed the need for active social policy EU employment guidelines promoted activation 
and OECD analysts Pearson (2003) and Grubb (2004) argued low Irish unemployment 
afforded a political opportunity to introduce more activation in the Irish labour market
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Grubb (2004) recommended restricting inflows into or introducing work requirements for 
lone parent and disability benefits This debate reflects both international discourse (EU 
2006) and discourse in other countries
The NESC DWS (2005) reflects these social security and social policy agendas NESC is not 
developing policy or new ideas, rather it is an ideational vehicle used to socially construct a 
narrative to justify a more productivist social security model The narrative begins ‘Ireland is 
being called by its economic success to accelerate the development of its social supports 
across their entire spectrum but in a manner that is aligned with the characteristics of the 
economy’ (NESC 2005a 6) While NESC still uses the rhetorical, inconsistent and 
ambiguous language ‘supportive conditionality5 (NESF 1994, NESC 1999) and ‘sensitive 
activation’ (NESC 2003, 2005a) there are clearer signposts as to what such language might 
mean NESC (2005a 173) calls for ‘greater attention to be given to the conditions, supports 
and assumptions surrounding income transfers to people of working age’ NESC 
(2005a 179) suggests ‘contact with the welfare system provokes the formulation of personal 
plans and forward movement’ Central to the concept is the development of a participation 
income for all working aged adults (NESC 2005a 204) where
Public authorities periodically review the extent to which recipients best 
interests are being facilitated by the arrangements governing access to their 
income’ (NESC 2005a 221)
Sweeney (2005) acknowledges that NESC (2005a) is an attempt to socially construct debate 
about reinventing Irish social policy The analysis in NESC describes residualisation and 
high levels of benefit dependency However these problems were not new and existed right 
through the 1990’s The fact that NESC now highlights them suggests a social construction 
of a problem Strong neoliberal epistemic assumptions are asserted They identify the 
problem ‘social policy as a whole is not sufficiently aligned with the economic policies 
being pursued by the state’ NESC (2005a lx-xm) signals the need to ‘recast the debate’ so 
social policy is ‘capable of supporting our aspiration to be an inclusive society based on a 
high participation, high skilled and high performance economy’ NESC (2005a 1) makes 
clear that ‘the social dividend of strong economic performance must however take forms that 
are supportive of the country’s ongoing ability to trade advantageously in the world
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economy’. This language not only reflects but is part of the process of making social policy 
subordinate to economic policy and valuing efficiency over equity.102
NESC (2005a) is very clear that the DWS report is not a blueprint or roadmap for change. 
How will its ideas be used to formulate policy and what type of institutional changes are 
likely? In 2006 two policy initiatives were launched by DSFA, the first renames 
unemployment payments as ‘job seekers’ payments. Legislation may also introduce tighter 
conditionality alongside the name change (INOU 2006). The second proposal DSFA 2006 is 
to abolish the One-Parent Family Payment and the concept of qualified adult and to replace 
these with a means tested parental allowance for those caring for children under the age of 
eight and means tested conditional job seekers allowance for those with children over the age 
of seven. If implemented, these proposals will bring Irish social security policy to a higher 
plateau of commodification. These policy changes were introduced outside social partnership 
structures but social partnership processes played an ideational role in creating a shared 
understanding about the desirability of such change.
This section concludes by discussing the momentum behind the Irish journey to a more 
commodified social security system. The journey began with a sensitive articulation of 
policy in the CSW (Ireland 1986) and moved to a more hostile rhetoric in the Job Search 
programme in 1987. The early 1990s was a story of more sensitive activation while over the 
last decade the tone has changed from supportive conditionality to systematic engagement 
and finally an emerging Anglo-Saxon model of Job Seekers Allowance.
In terms of outcomes or policy development, the real shift in policy has been subtle. Up to 
1996 Irish policy, compared to the UK’s New Deal policy or similar US, NZ or Australian 
policy, was less focused on conditionality or sanctions and more focused on financial and 
other supports back to employment. Post-1996 the NEAP brought more systematic 
engagement and the language changed to a more supportive conditionality. Up to 2006 Irish 
institutions treaded carefully regarding greater activation and invited international 
institutions to justify activation policy positions. There was very little momentum to Irish 
conditionality. One senior policy adviser interviewed by the author reflected:
102 The document does acknowledges that a society is more than its economy and that there are 
legitimate objectives for social policy independent of fostering productivity (NESC 2005a: xiv) but 
stresses how social policy should contribute to the^economy.
I think we didn’t go far enough, I think we didn’t try to, its not that we did it 
badly or anything but we didn’t move sufficiently in terms of trying to move 
people along. You need to be pushing a much more ambitious policy agenda.
Even though it was recognised that the social welfare system was dysfunctional in the way it 
worked to ‘entrench the detachment of people from the world of work and undermine the 
work ethic’ the concept of a punitive social welfare regime that would coerce the 
unemployed into the labour market or off the live register was never a serious political 
option (Boyle 2005:59). Even though there is a growing emphasis on ‘desert’ and a 
reconceptualisation of welfare in classical values (Powell, 1997:212) Irish policy makers 
shied away from harder measures and chose not to apply compulsion to those on lone parents 
or disability payments. Why was this?
In the early 1990s local social welfare service offices had a grounded relationship with local 
claimants. They empathised with their experience and understood that claimants did not need 
greater enforcement of conditionality to get back to work103. The combination of a local 
service delivery structure, a small population and the fact that unemployment touched many 
families in areas with relatively high levels of social cohesion pushed policy towards a 
distinctively Irish style of implementing ‘conditionality’. One civil servant quoted the old 
Irish proverb in an interview with the author:
It’s a small country, we live in each others shadow, many workers would have 
been uncomfortable imposing conditionality or payment sanctions on people 
they knew.
The lack of an ambitious policy agenda can also be attributed to aspects of the political 
environment and, in particular, the veto culture of blame avoidance. Local clientalistic 
politicians are vulnerable to hostile reaction to a full-scale implementation of obligation-to- 
work policy. Because activation policy requires a significant change in behaviour its impact 
is easily observable and impossible to hide, fudge or obfuscate. In a majoritarian political
103 Despite significant cross party antifraud rhetoric relatively high levels o f  informal economic 
activity was tolerated in the knowledge that low welfare payments required some form o f  financial 
top-up. Such informal work supported the structure o f  rural agricultural activity.
regime the government can decide to simply accept ‘blame’ and do without the votes of the 
claimant group experiencing conditionality. In the consensus regime with PRSTV the 
government has to anticipate the impact on vote transfers and so has a wider, more complex 
political risk to consider. Lijphard (1999:300) associated consensus governments with ‘kind 
and gentle’ policy. As one policy actor reflected in an interview with the author:
It would have been hard for the Irish political system to impose conditionality -  
I don’t think our political system makes it easy for our government to do hard 
things; it’s hard to radically restructure or create significant numbers of losers.
From 1997 the combination of labour market shortages and the window of opportunity 
offered by the NEAP have brought about a subtle change in rhetoric. However such change 
has not brought about a significant policy shift. Availability of labour through inward 
migration softened employers’ attitudes, politicians feared the veto power of a strong and 
well organized unemployed organisation, the Irish National Organisation of the 
Unemployed. Civil service remained institutionally divided and less effective because of an 
‘institutional turf war’ between the DSFA and DETE.
Why then in 2006 did a radical shift occur in the shape of DSFA (2006) proposals? What 
caused this radical departure from a more incremental and secretive style of policy making? 
At least two things had changed. A populist Fianna Fail, in particular, treated social security 
policy as an income transfer policy and had little analysis of the relationship between 
economic and social policy. In a blame avoidance political culture it allocated the DSFA as a 
junior ministry to new inexperienced Ministers who were encouraged to play safe and focus 
on efficient delivery. However in a cabinet reshuffle Taoiseach Bertie Ahem was 
compromised into allocating the social security ministry to an ambitious and experienced 
politician, Seamus Brennan, who quickly made Cabinet colleagues anxious by resolving to 
implement ambitions reforms. A second consideration in moving forward proposals for a job 
seeker allowance was that Minister Brennan faced a considerably weakened community and 
voluntaiy sector and could move forward without strong vetoes. Previously the INOU was 
seen as an effective veto on such change. As one public servant observed in an interview 
with the author:
They had a good effective representative organisation in the INOU, the most 
well organised and vocal unemployed movement in Europe. The very presence
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of the INOU meant that the trade union movement also had to be seen to be 
protecting the interests of unemployed workers.
In 2006 the INOU was no longer considered a formidable veto player. They engaged in a 
consultation process with Minister Brennan and informally and formally signalled consensus 
with both the NESC DWS and DSFA proposals for a Job Seekers Allowance. Indeed, 
instead of fighting such reforms, the INOU actually suggested the name change to DSFA. 
Brennan’s carefully constructed engagement with lone parent groups is evidence that they 
still have veto power over his proposals and that he will not succeed without their approval.
8.5 Rationale for decision making and constraints on decision making
What changed about Irish governance that enabled Irish social security policy to shift to a 
more productivist discourse? What impact does a more complex, fragmented and multilevel 
governance have on policy development? This section identifies whether sources of pressure 
and initiatives for policy change originate from individual policy actors or policy coalitions. 
It reflects on the nature of discourse and how change is socially constructed and where 
international discourse influences the nature or type of Irish discourse. It reviews how 
governance and decision making shifted over this time and concludes change is carefully 
managed through political rhetoric.
Policy Coalitions as sources of initiative?
It is possible to see trends in policy coalitions. However these should not be overstated. The 
individual orientation of the civil servant or social partner can be an important factor in 
determining the organisations tactical position. But above all it can be seen that politics 
matter. The period began with a Fine Gael centre-right political agenda influenced by the US 
workfare approach and shifted to a more populist agenda under Fianna Fail. From 1992 to 
1996 a time of little job growth, social democratic and EU social policy agenda marked a 
period of ‘sensitive activation’. From 1992 to 1997 a combination of the DSFA and a 
sympathetic left-of-centre government and strong community and voluntary sector 
leadership supported a pragmatic and offensive approach to conditionality. Post 1996 and in 
a time of job growth a more active EU social policy coincided with a right-of-centre 
government and a shift to more ‘supportive conditionality’ and under EU guidance to 
‘systematic engagement’ under the NEAP. In 1999 CORI lobbied for a long-term strategic 
review and won a PPF (Ireland 2000b) commitment to develop a ten year strategic review of
2 3 7
the social welfare and tax systems The end result, the Developmental Welfare State, was an 
ideational vehicle for a more commodified social security policy or welfare state A FF 
neoliberal Minister, Seamus Brennan, oversaw the relatively radical proposals concerning 
extending conditionality to women with childcare responsibilities in 2006 The DSFA, DOT, 
CVP, ICTU, IFA and ESRI can all be loosely identified as a part of a ‘social democratic 
coalition’ more likely to support increases in social welfare rates and offensive activation 
policy IB EC, the DETE and the DOF are often grouped together in minority reports seem 
more likely to promote competitiveness at the expense of social inclusion related objectives 
The size of any policy coalition does not reflect power Some policy coalitions are 
characterised by ‘voice without influence’ (Lister, 2005) while others, especially the DOF 
and IB EC have influence without necessarily having to use voice (Hardiman 1998)
S o u rc e s  o f  p re s s u re  f o r  c h a n g e
Cousins (2005a) argued there was in fact little pressure on social security over the last two 
decades Economic growth alleviated some of the pressures felt in other countries 
experiencing slower growth The combination of Irish political culture and weak policy 
community meant little drive for change However various actors did act as pressures or 
drivers for change CORI, for example, stood out in the drive for a focus on relative income 
poverty and income adequacy The CPA was behind the drives to develop a Child Poverty 
Advocacy Coalition to make child poverty a political priority (WRC, 2001) The INOU stood 
out for influencing delivery issues and defensively protecting the interests of the unemployed 
in an increasingly hostile environment The NWCI stood out in (largely unsuccessfully) 
efforts to promote gender equality issues Ability to influence agenda setting should not 
however be confused with ability to influence the end policy IBEC who did little to agenda 
set perhaps exerted most pressure by vetoing change
D is c u r s iv e  C o n s t r u c t io n  o f  P o lic y  D is c o u r s e
Torfing (1999 5) identified the process of the political mediation of policy as the key 
variable in determining whether the style and content of a country’s welfare / workfare 
policy is offensive or defensive and stressed the need to examine the construction of policy 
discourse The three largest policy initiatives reviewed in this chapter (Integration Report 
Ireland 1996a, Benchmarking Report Ireland 2001b) and NESC (2005a) were all left-of- 
centre initiatives which were subsequently controlled by either civil servants or policy elites 
and pushed in a neoliberal epistemic policy direction There is significant evidence of the
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social construction o f problems. The discourse is distinctly Irish and rhetoric appears to play 
a very important role. Minister Woods used rhetoric associated with Job Search to argue for 
maintenance o f the real value o f social welfare payments. The OECD jobs study was used in 
Ireland to politically construct a problem o f  work incentives that in reality only impacted on 
a small number in the labour force. The NESF discourse on compulsion did not reflect the 
rights and responsibilities discourse o f the US and the UK but a practical pragmatic 
engagement with the issue o f compulsion and an attempt to forge a consensus path towards 
‘sensitive activation’. Controversy about measuring unemployment and labour shortages 
occasioned reconstruction o f discourse towards a more hostile but still ambiguous rhetoric 
towards the unemployed. This lead to a shift in policy and language symbolised by the 
phrase ‘supportive conditionality’ (NESC: 1996). Rhetoric associated with ‘systematic 
engagement’ in the NEAP played some part in live register exit and the related increase in 
the number o f working poor. The NESC Developmental Welfare State was a clear attempt to 
‘reinvent’ Irish social policy and create urgency around a problem that is still not necessarily 
seen as a political problem. In the latest shift the move to ensure greater labour market 
attachment o f lone parents and women in the home has been carefully packaged as 
‘enlightened’ social policy (DSFA 2006).
International Influence
International influences have direct and indirect impact. Different domestic policy coalitions 
look in different international directions for policy influence. International influence seems 
selectively determined by key policy actors. In interviews both politicians and civil servants 
tended to claim in the earlier part o f the period examined that they were not influenced by 
Europe but that the influence was the other way around, with Irish changes promoted as best 
practice in international policy forums. The international political economy context for social 
security policy is referred to throughout all major policy reports. Sources o f  initiatives for 
activation and conditionality policy ebb and flow with economic conditions. A strong 
neoliberal policy monopoly supported by EU and OECD policy discourse rests alongside a 
weaker policy discourse (aided by OMC NAPsincl and UN international rights discourse). 
The OECD Jobs Study had a clear influence on the Integration Group and some initiatives 
and drive for change probably came from EU discourse (the Green Paper on Social Policy 
and the Delors White Paper). EMU and the Stability Pact are important indirect influences 
on policy debate. A more direct influence was the impact o f the Essen Employment Strategy 
and OMC through NEAPs. This clearly influenced the pace and type o f development o f  
policies relating to activation and conditionality in Ireland. The future development o f
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poverty indicators through the NAPsincl OMC makes it likely that Ireland will have to 
accept targets in relation to persistent and relative income inequalities
It is also clear that this productivist development model is framed in the context o f  the 
LISBON agenda and its preoccupation with, or at least a steady focus on, maintaining high 
employment growth NESDO’s struggling at a conceptual and analytical level to understand 
the interconnectedness o f  economic growth and social protection in the light o f the 
transformation o f the economy into knowledge-based innovative flexible and adaptable 
society mirrors EU shifts in language and the 2005 Hampton Court meetings (McCarthy
2006) Such thinking also reflects the EU Minimum Income Recommendation (EU 2006) 
The NAPS analysis reflected Danish and Dutch policy transfer and Nordic models and 
Minister Brennan cited Swedish models as an influence on his 2006 reform proposals The 
most obvious influence however was clearly the UK as is evidenced by adoption o f  the ‘job 
seekers’ language in 2006 some ten years after it was first used in the UK Mainly English 
speaking liberal regimes (Australia, US and UK) as well as Netherlands are referenced in the 
DSFA 2006 proposals However citation o f  international policy examples is more a case o f  
selective amplification, international examples are cited not to learn from but because they 
support a particular policy agenda This is consistent with the mantra that responses to 
globalisation have to be found in domestic institutions (McCarthy 2006)
Governance
Governance has changed substantially since the starting point o f  this overview o f  social 
security policy The 1986 CSW process was a once-off group o f  government-appointed 
experts with no civil servants, no social partners or politicians A significant amount o f  
social security policy is now developed in the Social Partnership arena, this reflected the 
evolving ideational role o f  Social Partnership institutions which have evolved a consensus 
role developing a social security reform consensus This meant a shift in power away from 
certain government agencies and towards others The CPA, for example, was represented on 
the Integration Report but not on the Benchmarking Group or other social partnership 
processes
The emphasis has always been on elitist forms o f coordmative governance However these 
have shifted, from civil service led processes to Social Partnership led processes Institutions 
and processes like NESF and NAPs were used to develop this policy in a slightly more 
communicative form o f policy making than usual However these decreased in importance as
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NESC’s coordinative style o f  policy making assumed a more strategic role and as NESCs 
own internal governance has also changed Within social partnership, the shift has been, 
with establishment o f  NESDO, to a more elite secretariat or professional staff influenced 
processes Breathnach (2005) described professionalisation o f  social partnership where 
power and functions evolve to the technical policy elite
The 2005a NESC DWS report was produced by a policy elite (the secretariat staff o f the 
NESC) and considered and debated only by the membership o f the NESC comprising social 
partners, civil servants and experts The NESC secretariat (male civil servants) were the key 
authors Most social partners with little direct expertise ensured their specific narrow 
interests were protected or developed The lack o f  analysis about gender or race related 
social security reflects the totally inadequate representation o f women and ethnic minority 
groups in NESC and in the social partnership Pillars It also suggests that governance tools to 
increase equality outcomes such as gender proofing and equality processes were not used 
(Callan 2004, McGauran 2005) Direct participation from political actors was limited to 
communication through the secretary generals o f  key Departments There was little evidence 
o f  any form o f  communicative discourse
Decision Makers
Within the policy community the DOF influence can be seen in many ways including the 
overall political culture o f  cautious approaches to public expenditure, to its direct drafting o f  
papers in the Integration Report, its vetoing o f benchmarks for working aged and pension 
payments and its strong pressure on Ministers to produce direct current expenditure cuts The 
analysis o f  the role o f the DOT in the income adequacy debate in the Benchmarking Report 
(Ireland, 2001b), the process o f  reviewing NAPS and the DSFA proposals provides evidence 
that the DOT is an important policy actor in any policy coalition and is perhaps the only 
policy actor with sufficient influence to counteract the DOF Civil servants, even though they 
drive key policy processes, must revert back to political masters No key decisions were 
taken by the Integration Group but their analysis clearly influenced discussion at TSG 
meetings which, in turn, reflected the political priority afforded to issues and eventual 
political decisions made about child income support and tax reform In the Benchmarking 
process the DOT with the full authority o f  the Taoiseach could override the DOF and press 
for an income adequacy target, albeit one couched in considerable ambiguity
Table 8 1 illustrates that when it comes to making policy decisions, as seen in the previous
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Chapter, the more powerful social partner secretariat and the social partners were not in the 
governance loop The radical DSFA 2006 proposals were for example channelled though a 
senior officials committee o f the Department o f Finance, an Taoiseach and Social and 
Family Affairs, and a Cabinet Social Inclusion Sub-Committee Consultation about these 
proposals is being processed in wider communicative fora than social partnership This 
suggests in governance terms that, no matter hat consensus exists in the policy community 
about the desirability o f a particular policy proposal, politicians are more wary o f the veto 
that comes from pluralist lobbying groups and their influence on the electorate than about 
appeasing Social Partners This confirms that the political system is making decisions The 
NESC DWS recommendation that social assistance payments be transformed into a more 
conditional participation income will require a strong and ambitious Minister to take on 
controversial reform in the Irish electoral system
8 6 Conclusion
As Cemy et a l , (2005) expected there have been significant changes in governance as the 
welfare state changed to the competition state, the role o f  Social Partnership hasevolved and 
the policy community is more fragmented and complex The political system retains a prime 
decision-making role and short-term political considerations rather than policy analysis 
dominate decision-making While space between domestic and international institutions has 
fused the domestic policy agenda remains dominant and civil servants and politicians tend to 
selectively amplify the international policy advice they wish to promote at domestic level 
(Smith 2005) The EU OMC required more systematic linkage between FAS and the DSFA  
than had been possible to otherwise create Ideological debate has not played a large role in 
the ‘pragmatic’ evolution o f  Irish social security discourse but rhetoric is used in political 
debate and within shared understandings to reinforce the inevitability o f a competition driven 
state which is strongly associated with neo-liberal ideological values and policy The 
approach can be summed up in the comment o f  a senior official who explained m an 
interview with the author that
The system is too soft and that it needed hardening up, but that the hardening
needed to be done in a soft way
As hypothesised in Chapter Five the consensus-driven, blame-avoidance, no-losers 
political culture appears to the dominant force behind the slow pace and muted type o f  
change to the Irish social security regime (Swank 2002)
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Table 8 1 Influences on key policy decisions
Indicators EWGITSW NEAP
i
BIWG INESC DSWi
Policy problem
Perceptions about disincentives 
undermine competitiveness 
Work incentives
Perceived lack o f  activation o f  
the unemployed
Needs o f  competitiveness versus 
high relative poverty
i
High benefit dependency, 
, inequality
Source of the 
problem Socially constructed argument
Socially constructed argument 
Labour shortages and analysis 
o f  statistical data
Policy coalitions win political 
argument Rates lagging behind 
growth
! Politically constructed debate 
Need to further subordinate 
social policy to competition 
state
Source initiative ! Joan Burton Minister o f State, [ Labour Party
EU and DETE but resisted by 
1 FAS CVP but taken over by the DOF
CORI but taken over by the 
NESC
Membership
i
i
; Expert, trade union chaired Civil service
1
1 Social partners
Social partners and key civil 
servants
i
Policy coalitions
__ i
; 1 
FF / Labour
!
1 DETE / Employers / DSFA, 
| INOU / unions
[
DOF / DETE / IB EC, CVP, 
Farmers, ICTU DSFA / DOT
Within NESC, CVP and 
academic vs IBEC and civil 
service
1
Key documents j; OECD Jobs Study, DOF and DETE briefing papers
! Essen Employment Strategy, 
Labour Force Survey ESRI
i
Academic sourced Dutch and 
Danish influence
I
Key proposals j
3
I
1
FIS, Tax reform towards lower 
paid, child income support 
reform |
More decisive definition o f  
; systematic engagement
Keep welfare payments low to 
ensure work incentives and 
competitiveness
Flexicurity Participation Income 
Greater conditionality
243
Indicators I EWGITSW NEAP , BIWG
i
1NESC DSW
ii
International
influences
j OECD Jobs Study, Delors EU 
| White Paper OMC, OECD
None, some UK and academic
! work ignored
!
i
EU social models Danish policy 
i Academic sourced
SP
E
{
1 No direct link but personnel 
i overlap
i
EU requirement social partners 
participation DETE resisted
ii
1
| Full participation but no say in 
s final conclusioniii
j
Full participation but nature o f  
process difficult, 
implementation unclear
Discourse j Technical economic driveni! ep i stemei
E
i
! Technical coordinative -  some 
! emotive fraud discoursei
!
î
1 Technical RRs and refusal to 
1 consult and widen discoursei
| Mixed discourse Conceptual 
1 mixed with factual -  clear
i
S epistemological position
Outcomes
I
! FIS reform, tax policy, CDA
! reform
1
\
E
1 Systematic engagement and 
; shift in resources to short term 
' unemployed
1
ï
j  NAPS income adequacy target 
1 No relative poverty target
i
i
, i .......
i
'  Clear consensus N o  
1 implementation process but 
likely to open door to
1 conditionality
s
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It should be widely realised that there are people in high positions in the state who are 
convinced that an expansive social policy is a danger to economic development Kiam- 
Caudle (1967 104)
CHAPTER NINE 
DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON CHOICE IN 
COMPETITION STATES
91 Introduction
As outlined in Chapter One, this research aimed to analyse what happened Irish social 
security policy over the two decades 1986-2006, to understand how such policy was 
mediated and the rationale for particular policy changes In particular the research aimed to 
elucidate two key variables, how reform has been domestically managed and how the 
international political economy influences Irish social security reform The objectives were 
to understand
•  what changed in relation to Irish social security policy,
• the domestic and international process through which change was mediated
•  the domestic and international rationale for the specific Irish change trajectory
The thesis had a central puzzle Why, given the national stress on competitiveness, the 
economic potential o f the Irish social security system remains underdeveloped and why Irish 
social security has been slower to adapt to global competitive demands than both other 
liberal regimes and other small open economies The thesis argued that, given Ireland’s 
status as one o f  the world’s most globalised nations and the emphasis on competitiveness in 
national policy discourse, a competition state theoretical framework (Cemy et a l , 2005) was 
most suited to examine the experience o f  Irish social security policy reform The 
examination, however, found that recent Irish social security reform, while consistent with 
many characteristics identified by Competition State theory, did not fully conform to what 
might be expected in a Competition state Our central research question sought to understand 
why this might be the case and to understand, m the Irish context, how domestic constraints 
limit policy choices even in highly globalised competition states The research objectives 
were operationalised by examining the key themes summarised in Table 9 1
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Table 9.1 Summary of key questions examined in the thesis
Hypotheses Indicators
W hay happened Recommodification
Regulation State as regulator; Privatisation; New Public Management -  customer focus
Retrenchment Cost cutting; Cost containment; Cost avoidance (failure to expand or to meet new risks)
Residualisation Targeted payments; Increased relative poverty; Non labour-market participants are poorer
Activation / 
Conditionality
Active Spending; Conditionality; Activation of lone-parents and/or disability claimants
Defamiliarisation Individualisation; Women’s Access to Education and Training; Market provision of childcare.
How policy is mediated Transforming governance
Iron Triangle to Golden 
Pentagon
Presence of international policy elite; Multilevel governance
Fragmented and Complex More actors: More institutional spaces
Power shifts to capital Shifts in power between institutions; Regulation
Rationale for why 
changes happened
Conservative consensus policy community
Conservative values The PR electoral system; Catholic Church values; Patriarchal power structures
Weak policy community Under resourced policy community; Role of social partnership,; Civil society role 
underdeveloped
Lack of policy discourse Coordinative problem-solving discourse; Pragmatic rejection of ideological input; Insular and 
dominated by EU discourse
The next section o f this Chapter reflects on this analysis and reminds the reader o f  key 
conclusions from Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. Remaining sections conclude the analysis o f  the 
case studies in Chapters 7 and 8 in order to achieve the final thesis objective o f  
understanding the causal factors driving Irish social security policy. Sections three, four and 
five sketch separately and examine the causal influence o f Irish institutions, political parties 
and ideas. Section Six takes the analysis a step further by examining how these institutions, 
actors and ideas related and interacted within the policy community over the last two 
decades. Section Seven offers some final reflections on how the thesis has contributed to 
societal knowledge and learning.
9.2 Overview of thesis
The literature review in Chapter Two offered theoretical concepts from which were derived
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the thesis theoretical framework, methodology and methods The thesis is founded on a 
theoretical assumption that globalisation is a transformative agent The relationship between 
globalisation and transforming governance is a key concern o f  Competition State theory The 
thesis hypothesised that Irish inconsistencies in a competition state-style social security 
system can be explained by the national factors that influence how such policy is politically 
mediated
Chapter Four investigated what happened to Irish social security and confirmed the original 
suspicion that, while Irish social security reform was broadly consistent with competition 
state hypotheses, key important characteristics were less consistent The chapter forwarded 
substantial evidence o f  movement from a redistributive welfare state to a productivist 
reordering o f social policy to meet economic needs The development o f  Irish social security 
is characterised by new regulations including privatisation o f pensions and new public 
management-inspired changes in social security delivery There is scant evidence o f  
significant retrenchment but substantial evidence (consistent with other countries) o f  
avoiding indexation policy to contain ongoing cost and avoiding new costs by ignoring 
emerging social needs including care needs and migrants With no change in high reliance on 
means testing or residualisation, there is evidence o f  significant and growing inequality and a 
shift in the risk o f poverty towards the non labour market poor There is recommodification 
in the form o f  increased use o f  activation and conditionality o f  unemployed claimants 
However given significant demand for Irish labour there is less focus on welfare-to-work 
strategies than might have been expected Specifically there has been little progress relating 
to women’s access to employment, less upgrading o f  income disregards and tackling o f  
unemployment traps, less conditionality and less extension o f  conditionality to groups 
outside the formal live register, than one might expect Sweeney and O ’Donnell (2003 33) 
conclude that ‘despite the emphasis on employment the Irish welfare system does not reflect 
this (employment) perspective’ In seeking to understand why elements o f  Irish change 
contain features somewhat uncharacteristic o f  a Competition State, the thesis observed that 
path dependence has some explanatoiy power The high number o f  contingency payments 
inherited from the past makes restructuring quite complex, limits the scope and pace o f  
social security reform options and enables those resisting reform to hide behind the 
complexity o f  the reform Change is rendered less urgent because the Irish social security 
system is ‘lean and mean’ and its employment orientation already broadly consistent with a 
liberal market economy
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Chapters Five and Six traced a transforming system o f  governance and identified how  
domestic institutions become more complex and fragmented, power shifting to business, 
more multilevel governance and the emergence o f  a new transnational policy elite While 
there is some evidence o f Cem y’s (2002a) expectation o f multi-level governance and an 
emerging policy elite, the analysis o f  the domestic policy community in Chapter Five 
concluded that the Irish domestic social security policy community remains relatively 
insular It is dominated by a domestic political culture o f  multiple veto points, consensus 
politics, problem solving and pragmatic co-coordinative policy discourse This leads to a 
limited and conservative menu o f policy options Tselblis (2002) and Lijphart (1999) 
highlight the difference between these Irish consensus institutional features and those found 
in majoritarian liberal welfare regimes (UK US, NZ, Canada and Australia) None o f the 
other liberal regimes have this combination o f  PR electoral system, coalition government or 
corporatist governance This institutional combination is a strong casual factor accounting 
for Irish path departure from the stronger activation models found in Anglo- Saxon or liberal 
welfare regimes At the same time the type o f  low tax constraints associated with neo liberal 
economic models and the lack o f  commitment to the core value o f equality differentiates 
Ireland from other consensus oriented regimes that place a higher premium on equality 
outcomes and achieve a greater equilibrium between social and economic objectives (NL 
and Nordic countries) We return to these domestic features in later sections o f  this Chapter
Chapter Six concluded that economic and political aspects o f the international political 
economy do impact on Irish social security The economic impact o f  globalisation played a 
key role in shaping the development o f  Irish social security policy and had both positive and 
negative impacts Positive impacts include how Irish interaction with the world economy 
produced such high levels o f  job growth enabling social security expenditure reduce as a 
percentage o f  GDP / GNP without significant recourse to cutbacks and retrenchment and 
reducing pressure on social security expenditure It is unlikely the ratio o f social security 
expenditure to GNP or GDP would have declined to the degree it did without such strong 
economic growth Negatively, the relationship between Irish social security change and 
macro-economic structural outcomes is filtered through the Irish policy o f low taxation The 
potential revenue capacity o f  high economic growth was never fully realized resulting in 
what Alder and Standing (2000) describe as ‘arrested development’ The level o f  Irish social 
security expenditure is inconsistent with countries with comparable levels o f  economic 
growth or per capita income (NESC 200a, 113) and competitive pressure to reduce PRSI 
rates meant loss o f capacity to expand or improve PRSI benefits The policy focus on
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economic and industrial policy, foreign direct investment and job creation meant over focus 
on economic growth as a solution to social problems Shared understanding only applied to 
social policy problems that that could be solved by job creation or access to employment 
The national discourse about globalisation was socially constructed so that policy choices 
like low taxation were understood as economic inevitabilities and alternative policy choices 
were unavailable to Irish policy makers Incompatible policy alternatives including national 
targets to reduce income inequality were rejected An ‘if  it’s not broke, don't fix it5 approach 
towards social security policy meant substantial reforms o f  a male bread winner social 
security system were not entertained Economic growth fixed unemployment, other 
pathologies including high levels o f  inequality, child poverty and low levels o f  employment 
participation were not on the policy agenda
How did international political institutions influence this domestic political debate9 Did they 
reinforce the dominant policy episteme or offer policy alternatives? Political globalisation 
refers to the direct and indirect impact o f  international political institutions on domestic 
social security change Chapter Five concluded that international political institutions, while 
a potentially strong influence on the social construction o f  change, are still only an emerging 
influence The domestic policy community remains heavily focused on delivery and 
implementation issues and somewhat ‘oblivious’ to international discourse Attempts to 
strengthen the domestic policy community capacity to interact with the international policy 
community (opening o f  a Brussels desk by the Department o f  Social Welfare, engagement 
with the EU Open Method o f  Coordination processes and establishing the Office for Social 
Inclusion) have however enabled a new trans-national policy elite to emerge in Ireland 
These policy entrepreneurs transfer and diffuse international policy discourse to a more 
complex and fragmented domestic policy community However the degree to which EU and 
other international institutions’ policy agendas are brought into domestic political discourse 
depends to a large degree on the strategies and tactics o f  domestic political actors and 
whether they chose to selectively amplify particular policy arguments made by international 
institutions Different domestic policy actors choose different international sources o f  
influence They make conscious choices about whether to develop policy coalitions with 
international actors or whether to selectively amplify the policy agenda o f particular 
international institutions This is especially the case in relation to rights approaches and 
gender related policy where traditional patriarchical cultures seem to screen out gender 
related learning
251
Where key power holders look to for international ideas plays a role in the social 
construction o f  Irish social security policy The cultural familiarity with other English- 
speaking countries (especially the UK) remains a key factor in determining where people 
look towards for policy inspiration Non-ideological populist parties remain more insular and 
less likely to look towards international policy debates Neo-liberal parties turn towards more 
market-led practices, the OECD, IMF and US policy Irish social democratic political parties 
and trade unions are more likely to focus on social democratic practice elsewhere and / or 
EU dialogue This differentiates Irish social democrats from their counterparts in the UK  
who looked more readily to the US (albeit US influence is mediated through the UK and a 
social security network o f  six English speaking countries) The chapter concludes that Irish 
policy makers are becoming more exposed to international discourse and that given the 
increased use o f  Open Method o f Co-ordination they are more increasingly likely to be 
exposed to a social market EU than neo-liberal discourse However who is in power 
domestically is a key factor determining which international ideas will be relevant
9 3 Rationales for policy changes9
In Chapters Seven and Eight the thesis analysed case studies o f political mediation and the 
social construction o f  social security policies104 By further reflecting and analysing these 
experiences the thesis now seeks to elaborate how institutions, political interests and policy 
discourse matter in the domestic mediation o f  policy The question is not which o f  the three 
variables (institutions, political interests and discourse) offer the most powerful explanation 
but how the interaction o f  the three variables might account for ‘Irish style 
commodification’ First each o f  the three variables are examined in turn
104 Chapter Seven examined Child Income Support, Gender, Cutbacks and Irish Social Partnership, 
Chapter Eight reviewed the Expert Working Groups on Integration of Tax and Social Welfare, the 
P2000 Working Group on Benchmarking and Indexation and various stages of policy mediation 
concerning activation and conditionality including Job Search, the NESF Report No 4 Ending Long 
Term Unemployment, the National Employment Action Plan and the NESC Developmental Welfare 
State
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9 4 Institutions matter
Irish institutions matter most in the way they limit potential policy choices rather than 
determining which one is actually chosen This is not unusual (Burton, 2001 213), but Irish 
institutional vetoes, in particular the proportional representational electoral system, have a 
particularly strong limiting impact There are four key ways that institutions limit policy 
choices, the key values o f institutions, the stress o f  consensus, insularity and key personality 
traits o f government departments
How core values influence key actors within the state is an important starting point in 
understanding how Irish culture relates to social security policy In particular the 
conservative approach to policy explains the slow and cautious pace o f  social security 
change Cousins (2005a) highlights how polls show significantly more Irish support for a 
welfare state than support found in other liberal regimes and other small open economies 
However high levels o f  inequality are tolerated in a state dominated by a form o f Catholic 
social teaching which focused, in the early years o f the state, on more absolutist forms o f  
poverty reduction and charity (Acheson et al 2004, McMahon 1987, McLaughlin 2002) As 
discussed in Chapter Two addressing equality has never been a core objective o f  Irish social 
security policy This leads to political acceptance o f a ‘solidarity without equality5 (O ’Riain 
and O Connell 2000 39) The impact o f a shift to more individual values associated with 
neo-liberalism is likely to have further eroded societal support for equality The patriarchal 
nature o f the state explains its marked ambivalence to women's employment and this is 
reinforced by unequal gender participation in decision-making matters
Shifts in governance have tended to reinforce the high number o f  vetoes and consensus 
politics The electoral system and non-ideological political party division produced a 
conservative and consensus driven policy culture, which operates within a ‘no losers’ policy 
blame-avoidance framework The significant number o f  Irish veto points steadily increased 
when coalition government and social partnership became a permanent feature o f  Irish 
political life These vetoes cause Irish policy ‘paralysis’ and limit policy choices to a
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restricted policy menu105 The institutional role o f social partnership has developed beyond 
co-ordination o f  national wage policy towards a more ideational role promoting a particular 
model o f  development Social partners are used by the state as an institutional iitm us test’
i '  106tor consensus
Interaction with the international political economy is mediated through Irish political 
culture While international institutions have become more relevant the domestic policy 
agenda remains dominant Both civil servants and politicians selectively amplify 
international policy advice they wish to promote at domestic level The EU Open Method o f  
Co-ordination promoted more systematic linkage between FAS and DSFA and a more 
pronounced form o f  activation and employment-focused regime than had been previously 
possible to create There is evidence o f  an emerging professional and technical social 
security policy elite or entrepreneur who transfers policy to and from this international policy 
community
Different Departmental values influence policy outcomes as does the dnve and influence o f  
particular civil servants Relations with the Department o f  Finance dominate all 
Departments’ policy agendas The Department o f  Finance aversion to expenditure is both 
practical and ideological and was reinforced by the 1980s fiscal crisis and international 
discourse relating to EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact This financial conservatism is 
a major obstacle not only to new policy requiring additional expenditure but also to more 
general policy innovation involving no additional expenditure (Lee, 1989, Kiam-Caudle, 
1967) The lack o f  policy resources and weak policy capacity o f DSFA is a key explanatory 
variable for the time lag and slow pace o f  Irish social security policy development In DSFA  
the brokerage political culture reinforces an emphasis on payment delivery and controls, and 
a lack o f  capacity regarding activation policy This was reinforced by significant
105 This is borne out in the words of a policy actor interviewed by the author who contended that 
‘consensus is really a fudge, the political system has a fair gravitation to fudge, there is a significant 
bloc against change, I’m not convinced that bad times would have brought more changes, the system 
wouldn’t allow it We never seemed to take on those sharper edges like the US and UK ’
106 The contrast between the elitist ‘expert’ process leading to the 1986 CSW report and the ‘elitist’ 
social partnership led process leading to the 2005 NESC DWS illuminates how governance changed 
over that time and shifted towards social partnershgg^nd away from certain government agencies
administrative challenges and failures during the 1980s. Where DSFA is exposed to 
international policy discourse it focuses on policy implementation at the expense o f policy 
analysis. The institutional relationship between the key government Departments (DSFA, 
DETE and DES) impedes innovative policy development. In particular the historical 
institutional separation o f job placement in FAS from income supports in DSFA impedes 
more ambitious implementation o f activation and conditionality.
This section concludes that institutions matter. The figuration o f the domestic community 
has a significant impact on the range o f possible policies open to Irish social security policy 
in that it limits ‘radical’ policy choices and confines policy choices to apparent ‘no loser’ 
options. Any significant change is therefore costly and takes a considerable amount o f time 
to incrementally achieve. The institutional complexity o f  the Irish social security policy 
community is evolving over time. There are more complex and fragmented institutional 
relationships and interaction with international institutions is becoming more influential. 
This transforming governance also involves shifts in institutional power and policy 
functions. Within the civil service power is shifting from Departmental based civil servants 
towards a newly emerging policy elite. The next section examines power and whether 
politics matters.
9.5 Politics matters
Even though Irish social security does not have the power to infuse the Irish electorate to the 
degree that pensions issues, for example, infuse the French electorate107, Irish politicians are 
careful to avoid blame associated with social security changes that incur losers. Fianna Fail, 
being the most populist, is more cautious than other parties about negative changes, more 
likely to engage in short term electoral budget cycles and less likely to have a planned 
approach to policy. Political parties are not the only form o f  political or interest group 
representation. Murphy (2002) identifies three coexisting principal patterns o f organised 
interests, pluralism, corporatism and elitism. This section reflects on such interests and 
examines whether political parties or corporatist, pluralist or elitist forms o f power have 
explanatory potential to account for the style o f Irish social security reform.
107 One policy maker observed in an interview with the author: ‘You would never have people out on 
the street for Child Benefit like you had on the tax marches, you could fiddle and tweak with pensions 
as much as you would want and no one would notip^.
The period can be divided into three political periods 1987-1992, 1992-1997 and 1997-2002 
It matters that Fianna Fail held the social security ministry for 18 o f  the 20 years under 
consideration The stop-start nature o f Irish activation strategies (programmes are often 
based on pilots and experience periodic retrenchment) can be explained by inconsistent 
policy across these stages This suggests variations in political commitment to a fully 
developed welfare-to-work strategy and different degrees o f emphasis on the degree to 
which policy should be offensive and supportive and defensive and punitive From 1987- 
1992 centre or centre-right governments held power In this period o f fiscal rectitude Fianna 
Fail government had little social security ambition but understood the political expediency o f  
protecting the incomes o f the poorest They readily accepted the consensus and expert 
analysis o f  the Labour Party initiated CSW (Ireland 1986) and gained consensus o f social 
partners in the Programme for National Recoveiy (Ireland 1997a) to maintain the real value 
o f  social security
In the second period, 1992-1997, a centre-left coalition108 government engaged with social 
democratic EU and UN dialogue in a reforming period marked by more ambitious policy 
processes including the Tax Strategy Group, the Expert Working Group on Integration o f  
Tax and Social Welfare and a National Anti Poverty Strategy (NAPS) Labour’s influence in 
government increased the pace and volume o f  policy debate about reform, but resources for 
reform were limited From 1994 to 1997 a non Fianna Fail Minister from a small left wing 
Democratic Left Party, Minister de Rossa, held the social security welfare ministry He 
appeared more willing to expose his party to electoral risk and was more ideologically 
orientated towards gender reform and a more rigorous but offensive activation model 
Actively engaging with the international policy community the socialist Minister looked to 
the EU social model and launched NAPS under the auspices o f the UN Summit on Social 
Development in 1995
From 1997 -  2005 a centre-right government engaged with a more neo-liberal OECD- 
inspired rhetoric The availability o f resources and institutional capacity was not matched 
with political ambition for social security reform The period was a missed opportunity 
characterised by active resistance by the DOF to developing anti-poverty and income
Party Politics
108 A Rainbow Coalition of Labour» Fine Gael and Democratic Left followed a Labour-Fianna F£il 
coalition
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adequacy strategies under NAPS (Johnston 2002, Hanan 20002) The second half o f this 
period was marked by fewer resources and a period o f  robust retrenchment under a more 
pronounced neo-liberal PD-FF coalition There is evidence o f again a smaller party 
(Progressive Democrats) leading social security policy discourse in relation to non-nationals, 
conditionality and lone parents This is again consistent with smaller parties advocating more 
radical policy agendas However towards the end o f  this period there was a distinctive 
softening o f rhetoric by Fianna Fail This change o f attitude to social security, reflected in 
higher rate increases m subsequent budgets was attributed to electoral losses in the 2004 
local elections Politics is needed to force implementation o f income adequacy targets
Corporatism
Corporatism has been influential (Hardiman, 2002) Breathnach (2005) identified that social 
partnership evolved, over this period, from a crisis model to an expansionary social model 
and back to a narrower economic model These stages roughly overlap with the political 
stages outlined above Over time social partnership institutions developed into the National 
Economic and Social Development Office, an influential government controlled think-tank 
which overviews a wide range o f  policy debate This was state-led but social partnership- 
populated institution plays a powerful ideational role in developing and maintaining a 
consensual framework around a specific socio-economic model that subordinates social 
policy goals to the needs o f the economy and employers Individual social partners directly 
inform some social security policy but with limited expertise, analysis and ambition such 
influence is significantly limited in scale and scope (Hardiman, 1998, Cousins 2005a) Trade 
union input in the first two national programmes was significant but by 1996 trade unions 
had begun to limit their input to issues directly impacting on members Business 
representatives work at a more macro level vetoing increased social expenditure and 
promoting work incentives Farmers combine traditional lobbying tactics and social 
partnership negotiation to promote agricultural or rural policy issues As Hardiman 
(1998 141) concludes in evaluating the Community and Voluntary Pillar’s impact ‘the input 
o f organisations representing the most disadvantaged is likely to be treated as ‘residual 
category’ confined to securing whatever is left after over after established interests have their 
say’
Pluralism
Trade unions primarily seek to influence through social partnership but farmers are more 
pragmatic about influencing tactics and tend to use various pluralist methods to influence
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government. Broader civil society or the Community and Voluntary sector’s engagement 
with social security policy predates social partnership and most organisations continue to 
influence through pluralist relations. The Community and Voluntary sector includes a wide 
array o f organisations operating from different power bases. It includes Catholic Church- 
based organisations operating from quite powerful but declining power bases Schmitt 
(1998:217). The sector inputs through the National Anti-Poverty Strategy, local development 
structures, pre-budget forums and traditional forms o f direct lobbying and campaigning. 
Much o f its discourse has been ‘voice without influence’ (Lister 2004) but CORI,109 SVP, 
INOU and NWCI have influences agenda-setting, delivery issues and income adequacy. The 
growing consultative voice o f the sector within and outside formal social partnership ‘has not 
proved enough to change policy priorities’ (Hardiman, 1998:142) and the sector does not 
have the policy-influencing power o f a well organised vested interest. The community and 
voluntary sector’s most powerful role is as a veto player, the potential electoral power o f for 
example Women in the Home, pensioners and lone parent’s groups can act as breaks on 
more regressive and progressive ambitious change agendas.
Whitley and Winyard (1987) and Lister (1988) observed the ease with which governments 
consciously play groups o ff against each other and the importance o f members o f the British 
anti-poverty sector acting as a single unified lobby. Irish advocacy coalitions (1996 National 
Campaign for Welfare Reform, the Community Platform, the Community and Voluntary 
pillar or ad hoc campaigns against the Dirty Dozen and Savage Sixteen or the late 1990’s 
Open Your Eyes to Child Poverty Initiative) were effective in the short term goals they set 
themselves. The challenge is increasing the capacity to organise into a more proactive strong 
vested interest on a longer time scale (Coleman, 2006). Acheson et al (2004:197) argue the 
state plays a key role ‘in structuring the civic space in which voluntary action occurs’ and 
that ‘interaction o f state drivers with cultural and ideological forces’ shape voluntary action 
and development. This sector’s capacity to be an effective driver o f change has been 
curtailed both by state (or Fianna Fail) strategies to control or limit the development o f the 
sector (McCashin 2004) and by the sector’s own failure to act cohesively (Acheson et al 
2004).
109 One policy actor interviewed by the author reflected that CORI strategy works because over a long 
time scale they have been influencing and changing ideas. Others argue that CORI wasted their power 
to influence on Irrelevant policy agendas including basic income and the Part-Time Job Opportunities 
Programme.
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Elitism
Competition state theorists expect the business elite to be increasingly influential Hardiman 
(1998) reflects how business elites enjoy the advantage o f  seeking to influence governments 
fully committed to a national model o f  development that promotes competitiveness over 
social policy and that accord business interests more priority than redistribution Raj and 
McMahon (2003) found elites influenced the Irish privatisation policy process In the case o f  
social security policy pensions industry participation on the Pensions Board signified a 
governance shift which resulted in a partial privatisation o f  pensions Domestic private 
industry has traditionally impacted on PRSI rate setting, interests representing foreign direct 
investors have more recently influenced PRSI policy, while the Turkish construction 
company GAMA successfully lobbied for PRSI legislative changes Employer lobbies have 
also influenced Irish labour market-led immigration policy The most powerful influence o f  
the business elite is unlikely to be visible in policy institutions but to happen through 
personal and social networking (Schmitt, 1998) Byrne (2005) and Hardiman (1998 140) 
argue that as long as governments rely heavily on corporate donations for their funding there 
will always be a systematic bias in political decisions
This section concludes that politics and who is m government matters Fianna Fail has 
clearly dominated the last two decades and their populist approach to policy development is 
a strong causal factor for the underdevelopment o f  various aspects o f Irish social security 
policy It is also clear that the personal characteristics o f  the individual power holders matter 
Within Fianna Fail, for example, urban Ministers and urban Taoisigh are more sensitive to 
the electoral impact o f social security reform Key individual trade union and community 
and voluntary sector leaders have had ideational influence and individual civil servants have 
been immensely powerful in either progressing or blocking the passage o f  policy or in 
furthering the agendas o f  certain lobby groups In a small policy community relations 
between those in power also matter Corporatist, pluralist and elitist power models also have 
explanatory potential The Irish political system advantages groups able to organise and 
promote their interests (Coleman, 2006, Hardiman, 1998) Groups with material and other 
resources to both organise members and to articulate their interests have been more 
influential Conversely the least organised and disadvantaged are residual and are least likely 
to voice their concerns in a way that influences the policy process and policy outcomes
259
9 6 Discourse and debate m atter
Frazer (1992 3) argues ‘that public support for the social welfare system is cultivated by 
open debate and political leadership’ Cemy et al (2005) and Torping (1999) stress the 
political construction o f  ideas as important causal factors with explanatory power to explain 
social security change The dominance o f pragmatism and consensus in modem Irish 
political culture suggests an absence of, or at least a non-articulation of, ideology or ideas 
Media discourse is often trivialised or individualised There is no discourse about social 
security at the level in which it takes place in the quality British broadsheet media 
Nonetheless, ideas do play a powerful role in the social construction o f Irish social security 
discourse Rhetoric and construction o f  sensitive and ambiguous language play an important 
role particularly in relation to conditionality, activation and gender110 One civil servant 
described in an interview with the author how policy makers are sensitive to the use o f  
language
These things were sold softly by people who might have had harder agendas, 
we have ‘get the scrounger’ mentality wrapped up in the ‘helping hand’ culture 
o f the Department
The ideational influence o f international policy actors (OECD and EU in employment policy, 
EU in social inclusion policy and World Bank in pensions policy) is evident in Irish 
discourse There is for example consistency and overlap between the NESC (2005a) and the 
European Commission’s communication ‘Concerning a consultation on action at EU level to 
promote the active inclusion o f  the people furthest from the labour market’ (European 
Commission 2006) Irish policy entrepreneurs111 have opened up new reform agendas, 
transferred policy and influenced the pace and type o f development o f  policies relating to 
activation and conditionality in Ireland However this thesis argues that domestic political 
institutions and populist political culture make Ireland more immune to ‘radical’ policy
1,0 Minister Woods for example ‘talked hard’ about punitive Job Search while arguing simultaneously 
in Cabinet that the real value of unemployment payments needed to be maintained The ambiguous 
rhetoric of ‘systematic engagement’ in the National Employment Action Plan convinced many to 
leave the live register The NESC DWS can be read as an opportunity for empowerment or as a threat 
of more punitive sanctions for unemployed people
111 Cassells, Frazer, Farrell, Mangan, Nolan and Sweeney
prescriptions than other liberal regimes and that this can account for example to the more 
limited approach to activation and conditionality in Irish social security policy.. Evidence 
from the elite interviews supports one observer interviewed by the author who linked the 
lack o f  ambition to the Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system:
There is a much clearer policy direction in the UK; you have the Prime Minister 
and the Chancellor o f the Exchequer and the Minister saying work, work, work, 
work, work, work. It’s bound to percolate down a lot more than where you have 
a less clear message. The main reason for the unclear Irish message is fear o f  
electoral loss o f  votes: in Ireland this fear is far more intense because o f  
Proportional Representation.
Scarphf (2000) identified that more substantive change occurs when ideas are processed in 
wide communicative political discourse that enable social learning and attitudinal change. A 
key feature o f  the Irish social security policy community is the degree to which debate 
happens among a narrow sub group o f policy actors in a tightly controlled coordinative 
technical discourse (often within social partnership but also in expert groups and inter- 
Departmental committees). Tightly controlled coordinative technical discourse discourages 
ideological discussion by limiting policy change to ‘problem solving’ with existing policy, 
existing macro analysis and existing resources. Groups find it difficult to progress issues that 
cannot be mediated through consensus based change and controversy is often agenda 
managed into ‘working groups’. Irish discourse can be communicative but such public 
discourse (as in the case o f conditionality, gender and equality) is often ‘defensive’ in nature. 
Gillespie (IT 24.09.05) notes ‘glimmerings o f debate are visible’ from some trade union and 
voluntary sector organisations.
It is possible to identify how three stages o f changes in government impact on Irish policy 
debate. The first stage 1987-1992 was when a paradigmatic national political consensus was 
developed around a monetarist and increasingly neo liberal focus on fiscal rectitude and 
competitiveness. This concept was used in communicative discourse to the nation at a time o f  
social and economic crisis with political leadership identifying a clear vision o f  social 
partnership based onthe NESC(1986) policy blueprint which became cognitively locked into 
neoliberal policy agenda based on the primacy o f  competitiveness and a low tax model o f  
development. The availability, in 1987, o f  a social democratic-leaning consensus based 
Commission on Social Welfare report was an important starting point in developing a
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consensus framework among social partners about the social security policy prescription for 
national recovery. This decisive ideational influence led Irish social security regime change 
in a qualitatively different direction than the neo-liberal-leaning Fowler Report o f the same 
period in the UK (Lister, 1988).
The second stage was when strong centre-left political leadershippromoted equality and 
poverty policy to try, within the constrains o f the cognitive lock, to shape a policy agenda 
for a more equal society. The agenda identified the need for new institutional structures that 
sought to overcome the limitations o f Irish political culture by enabling new actors to engage 
in wider communicative discourse in bodies such as NESF and NAPS and campaign for 
innovative offensive activation policies. The third stage, dominated by centre-right 
government refers to the reversal back to a more neo-liberal coordinative discourse where a 
statistical and technical discourse reinforces the cognitive lock by prioritising global 
competitiveness. Alternatives are actively discouraged. Not only is there little engagement 
with new institutional structures like NAPS but also attempts to dissolve alternative policy 
coalitions and prevent more communicative discourse are evident. Whether one views the 
DWS as a social investment state or a social neo-liberalism it is clear that the cognitive lock 
o f a low tax and ungenerous social security system has not been altered significantly.
This section concludes that the particular Irish style coordinative discourse is a key variable 
that maintains a narrow problem-solving approach to policy making at the expense o f more 
value-led popular discourse that might create social attitudinal change. Controversy is 
avoiding by careful and ambiguous use o f rhetorical language.
9.7 The interaction of Institutions, Politics and Discourse
Brewer and Deleon (1983) advise not to seek too much parsimony in the policy system. 
However, to understand why decisions were made, it is necessary to move from mono causal 
explanations and to probe the relationship between institutions, actors and discourse. This is 
doe by using an advocacy coalition framework. Within any one institution individual actors 
or discrete Departments will belong to different advocacy coalitions identified with different 
policy discourses (Sabatier, 1999; Boyle 2005:19). Policy brokers mediate between 
competing coalitions o f policy actors, policy decisions are the outcomes o f power struggles 
between the competing coalitions. In Ireland it is possible to identify a strong neo liberal 
competitiveness policy monopoly (supported by EU and OECD policy discourse) and a 
weak social inclusion and redistributive policy discourse (supported by the EU social
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These coalitions co-exist in the same Irish political culture, which stresses consensus and 
pragmatism; hence no advocacy coalition is likely to be extreme. Members of each coalition 
interact informally to reinforce particular policy arguments and to argue for particular policy 
changes. They draw on sympathetic analysis in international organisations and may 
sometimes work together formally on joint campaigns. Chapter Seven referred to two 
coalitions competing in the process o f negotiating the Benchmarking and Indexation 
Working Group. These coalitions are diagrammatically outlined below.
inclusion OMC (NAPsincl) and international rights discourse of the UN).
Figure 9.2 Advocacy Coalitions in the Irish Social Security Policy Community
Competitiveness / Efficiency Coalition Equity or Equality Coalition
OECD/IMF 
World Bank 
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Circular interdependent relations
The advocacy coalition approach usefully offers a cross sectional view of a policy 
community and helps analyse relations between different actors and coalitions, ‘new 
interactions alter both the way policy is made and outcomes of the policy process’ (Cemy, 
2002a:3). However it tells us little about which coalition has power and why or how power 
shifts between coalitions. An alternative mechanism to achieve more in-depth understanding 
of the inter-relationship between discourse, institutions and interests is to chart the circular
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relationship between the three variables (John, 1998:168) and analyse how this has evolved  
over domestic and international economic and political cycles. In the three stages or cycles 
(1987-1992, 1992-1997 and 1997-2005) different advocacy coalitions are more powerful at 
any one time. While political and institutional vetoes will limit change regardless o f which 
advocacy coalition is in power it should still be possible to identify what combination of 
international and domestic discourse, institutions ands actors influence policychange.Figure
9.3 represents the interaction of different elements including political power, policy 
processes, policy ideas, types of discourse, international policy influence, stage of evolution 
of the social partnership process and the economic environment.
Figure 9.3 
Interaction of international and domestic ideas, interests and institutions
1 Policy ideas influence (type o f policy ideas and source o f policy ideas)
2 Institutional influence (partnership and civil service)
3 Political influence (political power and political discourse)
4 International policy influence
5 International economic influence (Crisis, Growth, Competition)
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Figures 9 3 a,b,c above illustrates how policy discourse, interests and institutions all played a 
formative factor in determining social security choices The relationship between the 
variables is circular and reinforcing The relationship between political parties, openness to 
ideas, where in the international political economy they were willing to source ideas and how  
much they were willing to institutionally promote communicative debate seem key factors in 
determining the climate and appetite for change Who had political power was a key factor 
differentiating the periods in question, the relative strength o f advocacy coalitions, the 
degree o f and type o f  exposure to international political ideas and the amount o f  
communicative discourse
Membership o f advocacy coalitions remain more or less constant over the relevant years 
Their potential impact is conditioned and limited because the institutions they exist in are 
oriented towards technical problem solving and promote discourse that is consensus based, 
co-coordmative, limited and hidden from the public The limited number o f players and the 
limited type o f discourse mean policy is only discussed and explored from a limited number t 
o f perspectives and there is less concern with problems outside the institutions or life 
experience or experienced by the policy actors inside the advocacy coalitions Various 
equality-proofing tools have been developed to overcome this limitation but are rarely used 
to good effect (McGauran, 2005) Over the time period o f  this thesis, policy institutions and 
social partnership structures evolved into more elitist technocratic institutions using more co- 
coordinative discourse between small groups o f elites This reinforces existing policy 
monopolies, promotes the status quo and limits both policy change and effectiveness
9 8 Chapter Conclusion
O ’Riain (2004 18) held that competition state theory obscures ‘the existence o f  a political 
space for struggles within and through existing institutions over how development could and 
should be structured’ However this thesis illustrates that a competition state theoretical 
framework exposes how institutional and political struggle about policy matters hugely An 
important and ongoing site o f  struggle between communicative and coordinative debate is 
the emerging tension over the role o f  civil society and the community and voluntary sector 
This space is vital as it is from here that Polanyi’s (2001) ‘double movement5 or societal
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reaction to commodification is likely to emerge 112 It is o f  no surprise then to find that the 
Irish state has proactively by way o f  funding, regulation and institutional reform attempted to 
orientate the Community and Voluntary sector (and hence civil society) towards a particular 
development model where an umbrella group ‘The W heel5 advocates for service delivery 
and charity models o f civic engagement (Acheson et a l , 2004 189) This shift in power has 
been at the expense o f  the Community Platform and a social justice alternative policy 
agenda The shift illustrates how the Irish competition state has attempted to manage 
domestic political tensions and mitigate societal reaction as it subordinates social policy to 
the needs o f  the economy
All o f this means societal power and political energy is more constrained Without more 
communicative discourse it is difficult to release the transformational power associated with 
Polanyfs (2001) powerful concept o f  the double movement where society responds to the 
increased pressures and vulnerabilities o f  globalisation Where such political movement 
does occur the state's response is to limit such discourse and find a pragmatic short-term 
consensus-based ‘solution5 which often involves a partial reversal o f policy Irish political 
culture promotes a non-ideological approach to political debate where political decisions 
about redistribution are reduced into technical statistical debates (Veit-Wilson, 1998) A 
value-led debate in a more communicative discourse is needed to change priorities at a 
political level and identify alternative policy agendas
The most successful countries have coherent co-ordmative and communicative discourse 
The original establishment o f  the NESF and the NAPS was an attempt to create more 
communicative discourse Minister Brennan's method o f  consulting widely about DSFA  
2006 proposal indicates an awareness o f  the need for communicative discourse capable o f  
generating a change in values that can lead to a public support for a more radical form o f  
change The key to unlocking a positive reform agenda, however, is a more communicative 
and inclusive discourse and a discourse that is lead, not by a compromised state, but by civil 
society The key conclusion arising from this thesis is that strengthening the capacity o f  the 
social security policy community and broader civil society will enable more communicative
112 Polanyi (2001) anticipated that following a ‘movement’ towards commodification, society, sensing 
a diminution of human welfare, will respond in a ‘double movement5 by pressing the state to protect 
commodified labour from the excesses of market greed Society would press the state to decommodify 
labour Polanyi clearly differentiates civil society from the state
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discourse. The fragmentation and territorial division o f the community and voluntary sector 
currently limits the transformative capacity o f  that sector (Acheson et al.,2004)113. This 
thesis argued that applying competition state theory to the study o f  Irish social security 
would be theoretically useful. This has been the case; the thesis made a contribution to 
societal knowledge about why Irish social security developed in its distinctive fashion and 
how domestic factors constrain the impact o f  globalisation. The fact that Ireland is one o f the 
world’s most globalised states adds to the potency o f the above research findings. This 
thesis, as a successful practical application o f competition state theory to an area o f  social 
policy, overcomes Phillips’ (2005) argument that competition state theory had little 
empirical application or testing nor little relevance outside functionalist economic areas. 
The thesis made a further theoretical contribution by developing a set o f  five indicators to 
enable theoretical examination o f  how competition states impact on social policy114. This 
framework can be applied to other policy areas such as housing, health, or education and be 
developed as a framework to enable cross policy and cross-country comparison. The thesis 
explored methodological issues related to defining and measuring commodification, 
concluded Esping Andersen’s (1990) concept o f  decommodification fails to account for 
conditionality or work obligations and developed a commodification indicator to account for 
changes in work obligations. More can be done to further theoretically and methodologically 
develop this line o f  enquiry. This thesis also contributed a gender dimension to the 
theoretical framework and highlighted the need, within political economy literature, to 
examine the links between the globalisation, commodification o f  women and care and the 
gender composition o f  governance institutions.
The thesis findings also offers an interesting interpretation o f Swanks (2002) work. The 
thesis provides a case study o f  a country with liberal programmatic structuring but without a 
majoritarian electoral system found other liberal systems. It is consistent with Swanks 
framework to find that Irish impulses towards more liberalism are held in check by more 
inclusive Irish electoral and corporate institutions. The conventionally hypothesised 
globalsiation dynamics (Swank 2002:279) are not absent in Ireland but they are certainly 
muted. To quote Swank:
113 Appendix E outlines recommendations to strengthen the policy community
114 This framework was based on five indicators of recommodification; activation / conditionality;
retrenchment; residualisation, regulation and defamilarisation.
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Central features o f domestic institutions shape —  promote or impede configurations 
o f  norms, values and behaviours embodied in national policy making routines that 
favour or disfavour slow adaptation to the pressures o f globalisation and the inclusion 
o f all interests in that process (2002 285)
Schmidt (2000 306) concluded that countries manage adjustment to the external economy
‘not only because o f their greater or lesser economic viability, their greater or lesser 
institutional capacities and better or worse policy responses but also because o f their 
more or less convincing legitimating discourse’
The thesis concludes that Irish institutional capacities and style o f policy discourse mitigate 
both negative and positive reform and produce a frozen landscape o f  policy reform
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Appendix A Interview Schedule
Interview
Number
1 i! Interview Type j1 |Time period1 1 Senior Trade Unionist |Spring 2003
2 Principal Officer Department of Social Welfare 1_ - -jSpring 20033 Principal Officer Department of Finance jSpring 2003
4 Senior consultant (Academic) |Spring 2003
5 ! CEO - Statutory Agency Spring 2003
6 Former Department of Social Welfare Junior Minister Spring 2003
7 Senior Academic ~ UCD Spring 2003
8 | Former Department of Social Welfare Minister Spring 2003
9 I Former Chairperson, Commission on Social Welfare Spring 2003
10 1 CEO - Social Partnership Think Tank Spring 2003
1 ' Former Employer/Social Partnership Spring 2003
12 Journalist Spring 2003
13 ' Political Adviser in Department of Social Welfare Spring 2003
14 1 Former Department of Social Welfare Minister Spring 2003
15 Former Department of Finance and Department of Labour Minister
ii. Spring 2003
16 ’ Social security legal expert / academic Spring 2003
17 j Employer Representative/Social Partner Spring 2003
18 Farmer Representative/Social Partner | Spring 2003
19 , Former CEO Non Government Organisation/social ! partner | Autumn 2005
20 Policy worker - Non government organisation/former | social partner Autumn 2005
21 j Assistant Secretary - DSFA Autumn 2005
22 | Assistant Principal DSFA Autumn 2005
23 1 Former Department of an Taoiseach Junior Minister 1 Autumn 2005i24 1 Former Secretary General Department of Social Welfare il Autumn 2005
25 Social Policy Academic -TCD Autumn 2005
i
Appendix B Review of Competition State Theorists 
Cerny
Cemy believes globalisation is with us for good or evil (1999:149) and is a primarily political construct which places international competitiveness as the main criterion for policy success. He theorises about a move from the industrial welfare state to the competition state which prioritises the role of the market. Cemy's competition state focuses on competitiveness and the creation of a favourable investment environment for international investment. It seeks a low-inflation stable economic environment anchored by wage moderation and low-taxation. Because it has less macroeconomic capacity it focuses on micro-level supply-side interventions. These include switching expenditure from public welfare to enterprise innovation and learning and to de-regulation and re-regulation of private industry. Low tax policy means cuts in welfare budgets and limited capacity to fund social security. The state moves away from redistribution and the provision of public goods. Public services previously thought to be outside the market are increasingly commodified. This ‘privatisation of the public sphere’ means privatisation of public services or organising them around profit criteria so they are more consumer-driven and less based on citizenship rights (Cemy 1999:155). Public goods are more circumscribed and those that enhance capital or create flexible labour markets are favoured.
He is clear that none of these outcomes are predetermined, ‘the future will be shaped by historical accidents, conjunctural events and a wide range of social economic and political agents’ (Cerny 1999:159). Competition state theory stresses politicking and the role played by different agency including domestic institutions and practices, national and international interest groups and the evolving relationship between the public and private in determining policy choices. Common to all states is an over-determination of neoliberalism:
There is a process of the internalisation of neo-liberal globalisation, of complex adaptation, of policy experimentation, of the break up and rebuilding of political coalitions, of the increasing salience of transnational linkages and networks in a more open world, and of changing public attitudes toward the new disciplines of competitiveness and change (Cemy, Menz and Soederberg et al 2005:21).
Standing and A lber
Standing and Alber (2000) also argue that the welfare state becomes a competition state when, in order to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), governments adapt their social and labour policies to conform to an international norm. Political agendas become more cautious in order to curtail capital flight, more powerful capital markets exert direct and indirect pressure on governments obliging them to roll back social spending and social legislation. National tax levels are constrained and there is pressure to cut public sector deficits. Governments are goaded into making social protection systems more selective and targeted and to adapt and modify labour systems to be more competitive. There is a shift from universal to selective public spending and from social protection / services to training measures for the workforce. The end result is new and multiple forms of inequality with the weakest suffering most from this adaptation. This is a result of the logic of commodification which throws people back to the market for social protection: those furthest from those labour market are least able to secure that social protection.
Standing and Alber's quantitative analysis defines commodification as a trend in lower social spending relative to a given level of wealth (2000:107) and proves that this trend exists in countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This trend also exists in Ireland (Timenon, 2003), Standing and Alber (2000) also focus on qualitative assessment of change and their in-depth qualitative analysis shows remarkable
country-specific heterogeneity This leads them to conclude that if functional imperatives with regard to globalisation exist, nation-specific structures and politics mediate them However they highlight how the ideas and interests of national actors and institutions are influenced by the interests and ideas of supranational actors
Jessop
Jessop (2002) theorises about a Schumpetarian Welfare State (SWS), a version of the competition state focused on recommodifymg land, money, labour, power and knowledge He identifies a shift from a full employment focused Keynesian Welfare State to an innovation- focused SWS geared towards competitiveness Social policy is subordinated to the discursively constructed needs of the economy He accepts there are many national variations of his ideal type state but identifies common characteristics the promotion of permanent innovation and flexibility through the supply of side policy measures and a knowledge-based economy, the rearticulation of earlier social policy objectives to meet economic objectives and a focus on the present and future working populations He uses the concept of ‘workfare’ to describe the economic reorientation and downward pressure of welfare policy This process, ‘where redistributive welfare rights take second place to a productivist reordering of social policy to meet the needs of the economy’ (2002 23), is similar to what Cerny terms as recommodifi cation
Torfing
Torfing (1999) locates his work in Jessop’s SWS and introduces a key additional conceptual tool to differentiate between national approaches to what Jessop describes as ‘workfare’ Torfing identifies a more contingent productivist welfare policy with more active provisions based on either supportive ‘welfare to work’ polices which act as springboards to enable claimants return to work or more conditional obligations to seek and accept employment The shift from redistributive welfare policies to workfare policies is connected to a shift from macroeconomic policies to a focus on structural supply-side economics He classifies some supportive labour market activation policy as ’offensive’ neo-statist social policy (the Dutch and Danish), which he distinguishes from more punitive ‘negative’ defensive neo-libera! welfare to work strategies (the UK and the US) The former offensive type will not produce a new underclass of working poor that he anticipates is a clear outcome of the more defensive strategy Torfing identifies the process of the political mediation of policy as the key variable in determining whether a country’s welfare / workfare policy is offensive or defensive and stresses the need to examine the discursive construction of policy discourse (1999 5)
Appendix C Details of amendments to Savage sixteen
Details of both Dirty Dozen and Savage Sixteen are included in the main body of the thesis The following is a more detailed account of how government obscured what happened the Savage Sixteen Each savage sixteen cut is first outlined, the text in bold refers to the language used in DSr A’s briefing document announcing the easing of nine cuts on 4-12-2004 and the italicised text relates to comments by the opposition party and lobby groups and used on national radio on 5-12-2004
1 2004 The qualifying period for Back to Education Allowance (BTEA) will beincreased from 6 to 15 months in respect of the Third Level Option
2005 Amended Qualifying period reduced from 15 to 12 months In addition, 
cost of Education Allowance increased 58 per cent from €146 to €400
The latter is insufficient compensation as it is meaningless to the person excluded from 
participation
2 2004 The transitional half-rate payment for lone parents is to be discontinued where arecipient of One Parent Family Payment takes up employment where earnings are in excess of the upper threshold of €293 per week
2005 Amended One Parent Family Payment recipients to receive transitional 
half-rate payment for 6 months, where income exceeds €293 per week
The cut is only 50 per cent reversed
3 2004 The minimum contribution all recipients of Supplementary Welfare AllowanceRent / Mortgage Supplement are required to make towards their accommodation will be increased by €1 per week to €13 per week
2005 No change and no further increase Measure to be kept under ongoing 
review
4 2004 SWA is not payable to people in full-time employment In future, if one of acouple is in full time employment, both are excluded from claiming rent / mortgage supplement
2005 No change Referred for review to the Social Partners  A diversionary tactic
5 2004 To receive Rent Supplement the tenant must be m need of accommodation andunable to provide for it from his own resources For the most part, Health Boards decide whether an applicant for Rent Supplement is in need of accommodation without reference to the local authority In future claimants for Rent Supplement will be referred to the Local Authority for an assessment of housing needs in a more systematic manner
2005 Amended subject to consultations with the Department of Environment and 
Local Government This measure was needed mainly to ensure that Rent 
Supplements are paid in appropriate  circumstances, in accordance with 
established policy and taking account of the objectives of the SWA scheme, which 
focuses on meeting immediate, short-term need, ra ther than long-term housing 
needs Particu lar  care is taken to ensure that the interests of vulnerable groups, 
such as the homeless, the elderly, people with disabilities and those on UB were 
fully protected in the course of implementing these measures 
Divasion and Obfuscationf
1
6. 6. 2004: Health Boards will be given the power to refuse Rent Supplement incases where the applicant has not already been renting for a period of six months, with provisions for exceptions in relation to people who are homeless or where there are other compelling reasons.
2005: Amended. The six-month and other criteria to ensure that people who have 
a short-term income need, such as people who become ill or unemployed, or are 
assessed by a local authority as having a housing need are not disadvantaged.
Partial change in policy but original principle to restrict Rent Supplement to new 
renters is intact.
7. 2004: Rent Supplement will no longer be paid to people who refuse offers of local authority accommodation or to people who leave local authority accommodation without reasonable cause.
2005: Amended. Rent Supplement to continue in payment unless third offer of 
local authority accommodation refused.
No change just clarification of original intention and how it will be implemented.
8. 2004: A supplement given to recipients of SWA who have been supported by the MABS in brokering a deal with creditors will be discontinued.
2005: Replaced. Allocation of special funding of €700,000 to M A B S to develop 
additional and innovative services to directly tackle over- indebtedness and the 
financial and emotional stress it causes families.
This remains a cutback and has not been reversed, the €700,000 is about an entirely 
different scheme and is intended to distract.
9. 2004: As a result of state expenditure on crèche care and increased CB payments, the Crèche Supplement will be discontinued.
2005: Amended. Continuation of funding for existing Crèche Supplement 
recipients and their community crèches, and funding of new cases referred by 
Health Sector Personal Social Services Professionals.
This change does not restore the previous status quo but maintains a narrower focus 
and more restrictive eligibility than old payment.
10. 2004: The Diet Supplement, which has become outdated in the context of increases in welfare payments in the past number of years, is being phased out over a number of years.
2005: Amended. Restore payments on basis of new revised diet costs. Report on 
adequacy and application of Diet Supplement by the Irish Nutrition and 
Dieteticlnstitute has been commissioned by the Department.
This is playing for time. The commissioned report is likely to lead to reduced diet 
supplements. (P. S. In 2006 this turned out to be the case)
11. 2004: The entitlement to half-rate CDA in respect of UB and DB claims will be discontinued where the claimant’s spouse / partner has gross weekly income in excess of 6300. This measure directs the current resources towards families at the lower income level.
2005: Amended. Increase the income threshold for entitlement to half-rate C D A  
with UB, DB, In ju ry  Benefit and Health & Safety Benefit by €50 to €350 per week.
2
Not reversed slight improvement by increasing cut off point by €50 but the original 
intention to means test a social insurance payment remains intact
12 2004 The current weekly earnings threshold for the purposes of payment of reduced rates of DB and UB are being increased from €88 88 to €150 The present thresholds have not been updated since 1993 and consequently now represent a serious disincentive to employment
2005 No change at present Will remain under review
Cuts remain
13 2004 Entitlement for new claimants to half-rate payment of DB and UB where recipient is already in receipt of Widow / Widowers Pensions or One Parent Family Payments will be discontinued
2005 Already amended
Restored due to campaign by widows and lone parents
14 2004 Increase the underlying number of paid contributions required from 39 since First entering insurance to 52 for entitlement to DB and UB and Health and Safety Benefit This measure is designed to more closely relate the contribution conditions for those benefits to the level and duration of the benefits being provided
2005 No change This was designed to ensure that entitlement to DB and UB 
requires a reasonable degree of attachment to the workforce Will continue to be 
reviewed
Cuts remain and Minister tries a justification strategy to convince her audience of the 
merits oj such cuts
15 2004 An increase in the period where claims for UB and DB are linked with a previous claim from 13 weeks to 26 weeks
2005 No change Will continue to remain under review A key component of the 
administration of the benefit system is the concept of continuity in a claim and the 
notion of linked claims is a key component of how this operates in practice 
Currently , where a person makes a UB or DB claim within 26 weeks of the end of 
a previous claim, both claims may be linked 
Cuts remain and text tries to justify them
16 2004 The maximum duration of UB will be reduced from 390 days to 312 days where a person has less than 260 PRSI contributions paid since first entering employment This measure recognises a longer, sustained employment record by more favourable treatment in terms of subsequent entitlements
2005 No change at present Will remain under review The effect of this measure 
was to restrict payment of UB to 312 days (one year) where the person has less 
than 260 (five years) paid PRSI contributions In terms of short-term Social 
Insurance cover, this provision recognises a longer, sustained employment record 
by more favourable treatm ent in terms of subsequent entitlements In qualified 
cases, UA may be available 
Cuts remain and text tries to justify them
3
Appendix D
The following more detailed synopsis of national agreement social security is included to illustrate that partnership agreements have only a weak influence on Irish social security policy. Note the number of vague commitments, commitments to further review and consultation, the number of commitments not implemented and so repeated in subsequent agreements and the number of commitments which are already agreed government commitments in other policy documents or in Programmes for Government.
Social Security Content o f  Six National W age A greem ents
Content has been edited for the purposes of brevity.
Programme for National Recovery (1987)
iv.2 Maintain overall value of social welfare and consider special provision for greater increases for those receiving lowest payments
iv.3 Introduce PRSI for farmers and self employed in 1988
iv.4 Consider changes in Social Welfare Appeals system
iv.5 Undertake a detailed study on Family Income Supplement
iv.6 Measures will be taken to ensure close liaison with voluntary service providers
Programme for Economic and Social Progress (1991)
4.11a Continue to protect social welfare payments against inflation
4.11b Move by 1993 to CSW priority rates SC
4.11c Further increases as resources allow
4.12 Social insurance coverage to be extended on an appropriate basis to part time worker as a matter of priority
4.13 Carry out a fundamental review of pension coverage and conditions of entitlement
4.14 Removal of anomalies (concerning full rate and modified rate) for entitlement to social insurance payments
4.15 £69m in 1990 terms over ten years to implement Child Income Support measures in CSW
4.16 FIS increases in income limit for eligibility and maximum payment
4.17 Discuss review of Household Review Group with appropriate interests
4, IS Greater integration of SWA into mainstream social welfare
4 19 Improve range of opportunities and incentives for unemployed, lone parents and other social welfare recipient
4 20/22 Improve occupational and sick pay schemes
4 23/24Commit to draw up Charter for Voluntary Organisations
4 25 Develop self sufficient information service
4 26 Regulation to control fraud/abuse and move RSI number assignation from Revenue to DSW
4 27 Modernise and improve accommodation
Programme for Competitiveness and Work (1994)
6 6a Continue to maintain real income position
66b Further progress towards CSW main recommended rates
6 6c Maintenance of social insurance system including contributory principle
67 Identifying and minimising factors which create obstacle to gainful employment
6 8 Special attention will be devoted to the reform and development of child Income Support
69 Further consideration to developing FIS and particular regard to interaction with tax system
6 10 Care to ensure while in employment is sufficiently above income when unemployed
6 1 Concept of dependency will be examined in the context of overall welfare reform
6 12 Detailed consultations on Expert Working Group Report on Integrating Tax and Social Welfare
6 13 Urgent consideration to streamlining and standardising means tests
6 14 Examine recommendations in the National Pension Board Report
6 15 Examine further income disregards for lone parents
6 16 White Paper on Voluntary Sector by 1994
6 17 Establishment of Customer Advisory Groups
6 18 Promote and Develop Back to Work and Education Allowances
6 19 Action on fraud and abuse and monitor employers compliance with social welfare code
2
Partnership 2000 (1996)
3 12 Efforts to combat abuse in all areas of public expenditure
4 18 The Expert Group on the Integration of Tax and Social Welfare identified significant unemployment and poverty traps associated with child income support In the 1995 and 1996 Budgets, Child Benefit was significantly increased in the context of a strategy to move towards a more integrated child income support system
4 19 Priority will be given to the Family Income Supplement (FIS) system reform so as to be calculated on a net income basis, rather than on gross wages, as at present
421 Specific consideration will be given to alleviating the SWA Rent Supplement unemployment trap, through the introduction of an appropriate tapering arrangement The Government will consider this issue within the first year of this Partnership, in consultation with the Social Partners
431 It is agreed that the minimum rates recommended by the Commission on Social Welfare will be implemented before the end of this Partnership
4 32 The impact of the £60 earnings ceiling on the payment of adult dependant allowances and child dependant allowances creates poverty traps, particularly for low-paid workers Measures to alleviate those poverty traps will be considered, in consultation with the Social Partners
4 34 The reform and development of the Social Insurance System will be continued over the course of this Partnership
4 35 A further independent appraisal of the concept of, and the full implications of introducing a basic income payment for all citizens will be undertaken
4 36 The application of the Revenue Commissioners regulations on pensions will be reviewed in the light of the National Pensions Initiative
4 37 The Minister for Social Welfare will also request the Pensions Board to examine abolition of front-end loading commissions, indexation of pensions in payment, offering a choice of a fixed pension or a lower indexed pension to all annuity recipients and defined contribution scheme recipients, and provision of a Certificate of Reasonable Expectation by the providers of defined contribution schemes
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness 1999
3 22 
3 2 3
Target of lOOpw for the lowest social welfare rate 
Benchmarking and indexation Working Group
3
3 2 4 Child Benefit to be substantially increased with a priority focus towards£100 per month for the third and subsequent child
3 2 5 Child Dependant Allowances for all social welfare payment when childunder 22 is in full time education
i3 2 6 Rate increases a high priority in event of economic growth
3 2 7 Working Group on Administrative Individualisation
Working Group on Fully Inclusive Social Insurance model 
3 2 8 Examine social insurance fund board
3 2 9 Implementation of the Carers Benefit previously announced in budget
3 2 10 SWA Guidelines to be published
3 2 1 Issue of SWA clawbacks to be examined in ongoing SWA review
3 2 12 Legislative amendment so that all eligible claimants can chose most
Sustaining Progress 2003
2 7 1 Combating Long-Term Unemployment Special Initiative
The preventative strategy outlined in the National Employment Action Plan will be extended to all persons on the Live Register for longer than 6 months on a phased basis starting in the Dublin region Government will continue to seek to address any barriers or disincentives to taking up employment
2 12 3 Child Poverty Special Initiative
Importance of Child Income Support arrangements including examining the effectiveness of, for example, merging the Child Dependant Allowance and Family Income Supplement
5 1 3 Income Adequacy
It remains Government policy to meet the target for the lowest social welfare rates and appropriate child equivalence levels as set out in the revised NAPS by 2007, on the basis set out in the Strategy During the period of the Agreement, increases in the rates will be made in order to achieve this target
The final phase of the planned multi-annual increases in Child Benefit rates will be completed in 2004 and 2005
4
5 1 4 Pensions
The Government has decided, having regard to the recommendations in the National Pensions Policy Initiative (NPPI) Report to increase social welfare pensions over a 5-10 year period to 34% of average industrial earnings, that the level of social welfare pension will be improved to reach a target level of 200 euro by 2007 in line with the commitment in the Programme for Government
Progress will also be made towards implementing the commitments to implementation of improvements in Widow(er)’s Pensions and to increase the level of qualified adult allowance for pensioner spouses to the level of the old age (non- contributory) pension
A review of the qualifying conditions for Old Age (Contributory) and Retirement Pensions, incorporating proposals for the development of the existing Homemaker’s Scheme, will be published in 2003
Appendix E Recommendations
The key recommendation arising from this thesis focus on the need to strengthen the social security policy community capacity to engage in stronger social analysis (NESC 2005a,b) and to promote and enable more ideational communicative discourse (Little 2002). Before detailing these recommendations one observation can be made. It is striking throughout the thesis how reference is made to the degree to which one Irish institution, the Proportional Representation electoral system, dominates and influences the political culture and policy system.
While recommendations about the Irish electoral system are not in the scope of this thesis it does seem worthwhile to at least examine the potential for reform of this electoral system to a Proportional Representation and combined lists systems as recommended by Laver (1998) and Barry (2005). The recommendations that follow are more specific to the Irish social security policy community.
Government Departments and Agencies
\
D S F A : The DSFA policy role is unclear and underdeveloped. The ‘Aireacht’ with responsibility for policy making is presently very under-resourced and pressurised. There is a clear need for more social security focused policy resources. Within the Department opinion is mixed as to whether the DSFA should lead social security policy debate and have a clear resourced policy role. The delivery focused Department appears to have limited aspiration for a more ambitious role in policy development. In the context of such ambivalence additional policy resources may not be used to optimum advantage.
Rather, it may be more useful to revisit the CSW (1986) recommendations for a National Social Security Agency, which would take a strategic overview about how medium term social security policy should evolve. Forfas, which provides good quality proactive analysis to the enterprise policy community, might be a useful model. Any such agency could make proactive use of various statutory agencies that have an unclear and under utilised policy role including the Pensions Board, Comhairle and the Family Support Agency as well as the potential social security function of the Equality Authority and National Disability Authority.
C P A : A review of CPA (1996:91) concluded ‘areas where insufficient resources were seen to be deployed were long term strategic issues in relation to social welfare developments’.The direct social security policy advisory potential of Combat Poverty Agency remains underdeveloped and under-utilised and is over focused on annual budgetary policy rather than long-term structural policy. In order to have a more consistent approach to policy analysis and to be more strategic in its role CPA should employ a specific social security policy analyst to develop capacity to input into strategic and long-term policy debate.
Community development approaches are a clear strength of CPA. While Comhairle have social policy feedback system among Citizen Information Centres this focuses on delivery type anomalies. There is potential for CPA and Comhairle to initiate more developmental type social policy work in CIC’s and with other local and national welfare advice organisations. This could have a dual role of developing policy but also developing advocacy and strengthening and widening the social security policy community.
D E T E /F A S : The pro-enterprise culture of DETE dominates the social policy function ofthe department. DETE still need to develop a more strategic understanding of their role in social policy. Indecon (2005) conclude that the Employment Action Plan can not cope with logistical and administrative arrangements. Lone parents groups and women’s groups have identified serious doubts that the lack of capacity of FAS to gender proof delivery of training and active labour market programmes is a serious obstacle to the implementation of DSFA
2006 proposals (OPEN 2006). While (Torping 1999) advises that it is in the best interests of emancipatory activation policy that FAS and DSFA remain institutionally separate an information and systems protocol and data sharing strategy is required to ensure that more effective co-operation and outcomes is achieved between the two agencies (Indecon 2005).
Political system and political parties
The lack of ambition for social security reform from within the political system is evident in the absence of detailed social security proposals in political manifestos. Political discourse is dominated by anecdotes from constituency clinics and the electoral system renders policy development overly sensitive. Ministers with the social security brief appear to benefit from a programme manager or policy adviser. The political system needs to be supported by well- resourced civil servants with the appropriate policy expertise.
Social security policy, given its impacts are individually experienced, immediate and transparent is particularly sensitive to PR and the emphasis on consensus in Irish political culture. Greater and more effective use could be made of cross-party work in Oireachtas Committees to develop policy in contentious area such as lone parents and activation. However these committees need significant policy resources to support the work of Oireachtas members.
Social partnership
Larragy (1997) argues that redistributive political decisions are better kept for the publicly accountable representative political system. Social partnership is often inappropriately used to develop social security policy and to replace the role of civil servants, politics and civil society in political dialogue about social security reform. This has the consequence of in some instances in the words of a civil servant interviewed by the author ‘half baked stuff coming down for us to implement’. It also means less societal level learning. It is not clear, for example, why such a technical exercise as an examination of policy to merge CDA and FIS payments into a second tier child income support payment, should come under the remit of a body whose function is long term strategic policy.
Politics can be assisted but not resolved through policy consultation (Davis, 1997). Where social partnership is considered to have a consultative role in policy making, the appropriate forum should include as wide a set of relevant people directly impacted by the policy, including those directly involved in service delivery and service users as well as people living in poverty, women and migrants. Other wider forms of civic debate such as those originally envisaged in NAPS should be promoted.
Academic community
The Irish social security academic community is small and has already begun to network more coherently through the Irish Social Policy Association. A social security sub-committee would be a useful development for this association. The DSFA could develop expertise by diverting some consultancy budget away from the major consultancy firms (including ESRI) and by diverting work from social partnership institutions and moving towards using smaller university-based consultancies. One outcome of this might be more diverse voices and greater capacity to tackle policy monopolies.
Trade Union Com m unity
The evidence shows that the trade union movement can play a key leadership role in social security discourse. To do so they need, like CPA, to invest in consistent expertise, Globalisation has impacted strongly on PRSI rate setting and some PRSI restructuring has
been negotiated directly by business interests Trade Union interest in protecting the PRSI system would be most usefully advanced through the establishment of a National Pay Related Social Insurance Board The stronger governance implied in such a board would make business interests more transparent and social insurance easier to defend
Business community
In this thesis it was observed that the shared understanding underpinning Ireland’s national development strategy is limited in its capacity to theorise the relationship between competitiveness and forms of social policy unrelated to the labour market This leads to, even given the constraints of the international political economy, greater subordination of social policy to economic policy than is necessary The business community in particular must move from vetoing social expenditure to playing a role in developing a more sustainable national development strategy which maximizes both efficiency and equity (Sapir 2005)
Com m unity and Voluntary Sector
It is clear that, despite its size, the role of the community and voluntary sector is not as influential as it might be (Acheson et al 2004, Hardiman, 1998) The diversity of voices within the sector appears to confuse policy makers (WRC, 2001) The evidence also shows that when the C+V present or lobby for conflicting approaches governments manipulate the ‘palpable’ differences between organisations as an excuse for doing nothing (Cousins,1995a 114) The sectors work is most influential when they work through larger advocacy coalitions It seems that it would be more useful, where possible, to engage in joint policy development work across organisations in the sector so that the sector maximises its power as a vested interest capable of influencing electoral outcomes (Coleman, 2006) There is a case to be made for a national campaign for welfare reform which would be a more permanent coalition of the up to 40 groups who have a recognized interest in social security reform
The C+ V is dominated by ineffective short-term pre-budget submissions at the expense of individual, personal engagement between lobbyists and civil servants (Acheson et al 2004 101) Interviews with policy makers suggests that where it has produced more analytical policy based material (INOU, 1996, Murphy 2003, Loftus, 2005) this has had some impact on policy Given the over all weakness of the Irish social security policy community this kind of more detailed policy analysis is likely to have more significant impact More long-term proactive policy proposals and deeper relations with policy makers would be a more strategic use of what are often significant resources
Proofing Tools
There is also a clear democratic deficit to the degree that the life experience and priorities of end users is not captured in any constituent part of the policy-making system A wide range of policy tools and processes have been developed (including poverty proofing, equality proofing, budget impact assessment, gender mainstreaming) but are not being used to good effect (Callan, 2004, McGauran, 2004) Legislation is needed to statutorily require that these tools be used as appropriate during key stages of the policy cycle Danish policy makers also have a statutory obligation to ensure that the process of policy development and implementation includes consultation with end-users of policy (Van Aerschot 2003) A similar statutory obligation could be considered in the context to a move to a more active social policy envisaged in the Developmental Welfare State
There are clear dem ocratic deficits in relation to representation o f  women and other groups 
experiencing inequality in the social security policy com m unity Existing governm ent policy 
regarding 40 60 gender quotas is simply ignored (NW CI 2004) Such a requirem ent needs to 
be made a statutory obligation
O’Cinneide (2005) distinguishes between the prescriptive obligations and the indirect persuasive influence of the EU It is likely that, over the coming years, the Open Method of Coordination will bed down more into the domestic policy community and process of governance This presents potential opportunities for those wishing to promote a more balanced model of development A key strategy for those seeking greater equity should be the continued development of transnational and multilevel advocacy coalitions to promote global and EU visions of more equitable developmental paradigms, models and policies
Open Method of Coordination
